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Abstract 
Bakhtin, carnival and comic theory 
In Rabelais and His World, Mikhail Bakhtin presents us both 
with a theory of carnival, andwith an account of the historical 
decline of the carnivalesque since the Renaissance. This thesis 
uses Bakhtin's work as a point of departure for an analysis of 
particular moments in the history of post-Renaissance comic 
theory. It is argued both Bakhtin's account of carnivalesque 
decline provides us with a potent framework within which to 
perform such an analysis, and that this in turn facilitates a 
thorough interrogation of, and engagement with, Bakhtin's theory 
of carnival. 
Chapter One outlines Bakhtin's theory. identifying its historical 
and utopian dimensions, and exploring some of the problems 
which it generates. Chapter Two addresses some of the 
methodological issues relating to a historical analysis of comic 
theory, and situates Bakhtin's theory of carnival in relation to 
recent work in the area of comic theory. The remaining chapters 
focus on particular comic theory texts in the light of Bakhtin's 
thesis. Chapter Three contrasts Kant's analysis of humour with 
Schopenhauer's theory, relating the former to its Enlightenment 
context and the latter to its Romantic context. Chapter Four 
explores Bergson's discussion of laughter, situating it in relation 
to modernism, while Chapter Five reviews Freud's theory of jokes, 
examining the proximity between the structures of carnival and 
the structures of the Freudian joke. Chapter Six focuses on a 
Brechtian theory of comedy, assessing its relationship with the 
carnivalesque tradition, while Chapter Seven attempts to update 
Bakhtin's thesis in relation to contemporary configurations by 
exploring recent arguments concerning the comic credentials of 
postmodern culture. It is argued in conclusion that, if post- 
Renaissance culture has witnessed a decline in the significance of 
the carnivalesque, then the trajectory of that decline has 
undergone' a complex series of historical shifts and reversals. 
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Introduction 
It would be extremely interesting to write the histoTy of 
laughter. 
(A. 1. Herzen; quoted in Bakhtin, 1984: 59) 
In Rabelais and His World, Mikhail Bakhtir. attempts to account 
for the ways in which the meaning of laughter, and the culture 
with which it is associated, have been transformed since the 
Renaissance (Bakhtin, 1984). He argues that in the work of 
Rabelais, and in the popular carnival forms which informed it, 
laughter enjoyed a positive corporeal and collective significance. 
Since that time, however, carnivalesque forms have been 
increasingly marginalised within the social formation. As 
feudalism was replaced by new social structures, so there was a 
reorganisation of cultural practices. The new bourgeois order 
placed a greater emphasis on the private sphere, and as a result 
the practices associated with carnival, enacted as they were within 
the public sphere, were either eliminated, downgraded or 
assimilated by the private sphere. In the process, laughter lost its 
carnivalesque connotations, and acquired instead a more negative 
and restricted significance. If Bakhtin is correct, then the sort of 
transformations that he identifies should be reflected in some form 
or other in philosophical and theoretical explorations of comic 
phenomena. This thesis will seek to elaborate on Bakhtin's 
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argument through a detailed analysis of certain moments in the 
trajectory of post-Renaissance comic theory. It will be argued both 
that Bakhtin's thesis provides us with a potent framework within 
which to perform an analysis of comic theory, and that such an 
analysis simultaneously facilitates a thorough interrogation of 
Bakhtin's theory of carnival' 
. 
Chapter One will undertake a detailed examination of Bakhtin's 
analysis of carnival. Bakhtin argues that the culture of the Middle 
Ages consisted of an official, serious side, related to the power and 
the imagery of the church, and an unofficial under-belly, linked to 
the practices of carnival and its popular festive imagery. Laughter 
was of central importance to this popular festive imagery, linking 
together the marketplace, the banquet, the lower stratum of the 
body and the grotesque. This topography of carnival has been 
criticised for projecting an idealised conception of folk culture. I 
will argue, however, that while Bakhtin's theory is certainly 
problematic, it can nevertheless be defended both on the grounds 
that it provides us with a historicised account of carnival, and on 
the grounds that its utopian dimension enjoys a critical potential. 
Chapter Two addresses some of the methodological problems 
and issues surrounding a historical analysis of theoretical texts. It 
will be argued that a Bakhtinian emphasis on the dialogic nature 
of signification complements recent perspectives developed in the 
field of intellectual history. Further, it will be argued that recent 
work within the field of comic theory allows us to elaborate on 
Bakhtin's account of the cultural processes underpinning the 
development of post-Renaissance comic theory. 
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In Rabelais and His World, Rabelais'work is identified as 'the 
summit in the history of laughter' (1984: 10 1). Bakhtin's mapping 
of the historical descent from this summit will be used to structure 
the remaining chapters of the thesis. According to Bakhtin, while 
the Enlightenment valorisation of reason underscored a negative 
evaluation of laughter, the Romantics' reaction against the 
Enlightenment allowed for a reappraisal of the sort of grotesque 
imagery derived from carnival practices (1984: 116-28). This 
disparity between Enlightenment and Romantic views of laughter 
will be used as a starting point for Chapter Three, which will focus 
on the analyses of humour advanced by Kant and Schopenhauer. 
Chapter Four will focus on Henri Bergson's essay on laughter, 
singled out by Bakhtin as representative of the negative streak 
within the philosophy of laughter (1984: 7 1). It will be argued that, 
while Bakhtin's assessment is undoubtedly correct, Bergson's 
theory needs to be situated in relation to the current of modemism 
in order to develop a comprehensive critique of it. 
Bergson's contemporary, Freud, is disregarded in Bakhtin's 
survey. This omission is curious, for Bakhtin2 had earlier 
published a critique of Freud in which he recast Freud's distinction 
between the conscious and unconscious realms of mental life in 
terms of a distinction between two ideologically different forms of 
consciousness, an 'official conscious' and an 'unofficial conscious, 
(Voloshinov, 1976: 85). This classification would seem to 
anticipate Bakhtin's analysis of medieval carnival, and Chapter 
Five will address the relationship between the carnivalesque and 
Freud's theory ofjokes in the light of this distinction. 
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Chapter Six will focus on the possibility of deriving a theory of 
comedy from the work of Bertolt Brecht, identified by Bakhtin as a 
representative of one of the routes down which the grotesque has 
developed in the twentieth century (Bakhtin, 1984: 46). It will be 
argued that although there are some crucial differences between 
the dynamics of theatrical performance and the dynamics of 
carnivalesque participation, there are nevertheless some important 
affinities between Brecht's appraisal of comic practices and 
Bakhtin's analysis of the critical function of carnival. 
Chapter Seven will reflect on the extent to which Bakhtin's 
thesis needs to be updated in relation to contemporary cultural 
formations. One of the key areas of debate here concerns the 
extent to which the development of postmodern culture has either 
debilitated or revitalised comic practices. It will be argued that, in 
charting the post-Renaissance marginalisation of comic practices, 
while at the same time identifying points at which such practices 
flourished, Bakhtin's thesis allows us to negotiate such issues. 
Since my thesis is concerned with an analysis of comic theory, 
before embarking on this analysis it is worth considering in more 
detail the relationship between comedy and theory, between comic 
phenomena and theoretical discourse. At the 1987 Annual 
Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 
Jonathan Miller opened a session devoted to the study of humour. 
In it he complained that humour typicallylails to gain admission 
for serious consideration by scientists', and that 'it is also regarded 
by those laymen who take great pleasure in the experience of 
laughter as being too frivolous and enjoyable to be treated by 
science at all' (Miller, 1988: 6). If Miller is correct, then the 
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relationship between comedy and theory would appear to be 
particularly precarious. 
This problem can be brought into sharper focus by recounting a 
personal anecdote. In February 1990,1 was about to begin 
teaching an adult education class looking at humour and comedy. 
A reporter from the local newspaper, the NottinghanL EvenirW Post, 
had seen my entry for the course in an adult education prospectus 
and, sensing material for an article, had contacted me to discuss 
it. Naively thinking that I might be able to help popularise a small 
corner of academia, I agreed to meet him and, when I told him 
about my research project, which was funded by the British 
Academy for two years, the story apparently became even more 
newsworthy. 
Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge have tried to list the criteria that 
a particular event needs to fulfil in order for it to be deemed 
newsworthy (Galtung and Ruge, 1973). The criteria are that the 
event falls within the temporal or geographical scope of a particular 
news production: that it can be given a clear meaning: that it is 
either consonant with or, alternatively, at odds with our 
expectqtion; that it has already been treated as news in one form 
or other, that it differs significantly from other coverage: that it is 
connected with 61ite nations or people: and that it is negative or 
can be personified. The more of these criteria a particular event 
can fulfil, the more likely it is that it will be selected as 
newsworthy. 
On February 6,1990, the story appeared on the front page of 
the Evening Post with the following headline: 'Ben gets 96,000... as 
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a chuckle checker'. This was accompanied by a large photograph 
of me, clipboard in hand. 'checking the chuckles' of two laughing 
police constables. Using Galtung and Ruge's criteria, we can 
analyse the apparent newsworthiness of the story. Since I was 
based in Nottingham, the story obviously fell within the 
geographical scope of the local paper and, since the other lead 
story announced the setting of the city's poll tax at 9390, the 
apparent frivolity of my activities differed significantly enough from 
the severity of an iniquitous tax for it to attract a relatively high 
news value on that particular day. However, perhaps the key 
criterion in clinching the newsworthiness of the story was its 
unexpectedness: here was someone receiving funds from the state 
for research into humour. As a more detailed analysis of the 
coverage will reveal, this apparent unexpectedness derived from a 
contradiction between the assumed earnestness of academic 
research and the perceived frivolity in studying humour, between a 
utilitarian view of government funding and the consequent 
worthlessness of a project like mine. The story's newsworthiness 
was guaranteed, in other words, because it infringed an 
expectation that serious discourse and comic discourse should 
occupy. mutually exclusive territory. 
The Evening Post locates a contradiction in the amusing 
incongruity between the object of research and 'the less than side 
- 
splitting title' of the thesis, for example. Indeed, this basic 
contradiction not only structures the entire article, but is portrayed 
throughout as humorous in form. Punctuated with numerous 
puns, the article starts in the form of a joke 
-'Did you hear the one 
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about... ' 
- 
and ends with a request for readers to send in their own 
favourite jokes 
-Iclean ones, of course)' - to the newspaper. 
Meanwhile, the national press were picking up on the story, 
some of whom dealt with it slightly differently, as the Sunday 
Mirror's reaction, printed under the caption 'Laugh... I nearly 
criedl', makes clear: 
A Nottingham University academic is being given a 96,000 
government grant to find out exactly what makes people 
laugh. I can tell him for nothing one thing that DOESNT 
make me laugh 
- 
the thought of taxpayers' money being 
squandered on such arTant nonsense. (Sunday MiTTor, 11 February 1990) 
In spite of such contrary interpretations, the overriding 
newsworthiness of the story is still ensured by the apparent 
contradiction between earnestness and worthless frivolity. For the 
Evening Post this is a source of amusement, for the Sunday Mirror 
a source of outrage. 
Perhaps the most interesting, and certainly the longest, 
coverage appeared in a page-long article by lain Murray in 
Marketing Week, a trade magazine for the advertising and 
marketing industry. For Murray, the inherent contradiction in my 
situation is that to 'find out what makes people laugh' is actually 
an 'impossible' task. This makes the fact that my attempt is being 
funded by a British Academy grant all the more amusing: 
With 96,0000 jingling in his pocket, a postgraduate 
student of even the meanest imagination and the slightest 
curiosity ought to be able to observe a laugh or two and 
perhaps speculate upon their cause. (Murray, 1990) 
At this point Murray reintroduces the opposition between 
earnestness and frivolity, placing himself on the side of frivolity 
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and me on the side of the earnest. Had he receiverl such a grant 
he would have devoted it'to the pursuit of fast women and slow 
hangovers, leaving the laughter to take care of itself. L on the 
other hand, am 
a serious young man on whom an abundance of loose 
women and matching change would be wasted... because 
any one who believes that the nature of laughter may be 
analysed has probably been dealt a poor hand in the 
sense of humour department. (1990) 
Murray spends the rest of his article (ironically? ) analysing the 
nature of laughter, ranking wit, particularly that of 
P. G. Wodehouse, above various forms of vulgar humour. and finally 
urges me either to abandon the project, or to split the money with 
him. 
We can identify a number of reasons for the form that these 
reactions took. They certainly share a mistrust of academic 
discourse and a commitment to crass, utilitarian values. They 
perhaps also represent a desire to safeguard the pleasure of 
humour from theoretical scrutiny, a point raised earlier by Miller. 
The key opposition on which the articles rely, however, is the 
distinction between serious and humorous discourse. What I will 
suggest in the course of my thesis is that, far from being 'natural'. 
this distinction is historically constructed, and its evolution is 
closely related to a more general process of cultural stratification. 
Where Bakhtin's theory of carnival is of assistance is in beginning 
to explain this process. By conducting an analysis of particular 
comic theories in relation to this Bakhtinian perspective, I hope to 
cast further light on such developments. 
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in the light of the media coverage that my initial research 
received, Miller's reference to the precarious relationship between 
comedy and theory would appear to be borne out. What my thesis 
attempts to do is to explore the historical development of this 
relationship. What I will not try to do is to efface the boundary 
between comedy and theory by attempting a comic style of writing. 
The deployment of theoretical discourse 
- 
the writing of a PhD 
thesis, for example, 
- 
is, after all, bound by certain institutional 
factors, just as the deployment of comic discourse 
-a stand-up 
performance, for instance, 
- 
is equally bound by such factors. As 
Ken Dodd eloquently summed it up, 'the differcnce between Freud 
and me is that he never had to play the first house to the highly 
critical audience at the Glasgow Empire on a wet Monday night' 
(quoted in Cook, 1982: 2). As with Freud, Bakhtin explores comic 
phenomena within the constraints of theoretical discourse, and it 
is to his theory of carnival that we turn first. 
Since Bakhtin's theory of car-nival arises out of a study of 
Rabelais, he tends to concentrate on European culture. My 
thesis shares this European focus. It should be pointed out, 
however, that there is a literature on the pattems and ftinctions 
of humour in cultures beyond Europe (e. g. Christensen, 1963: 
Hammond, 1964: Kennedy, 1970: Marc, 1989; Miller, 1967; 
Sharman, 1969; Ziv, 1987) 
2 The precise authorship of the work in question, Freudianism: A 
Marxist Critique, is problematic: the book was actually 
published under the name of V. N. Voloshinov. At the 
beginning of Chapter One, I will explain the manner in which I 
will negotiate such problems. 
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Chapter One 
Bakhtin and carnival 
One of the first problems to confront when reading Bakhtin is 
the controversy surrounding the authorship of certain texts. There 
has been an intense debate amongst commentators about the 
extent to which the authorship of texts published under the names 
of V. N. Voloshinov, P. N. Medvedev and I. Kanadv might actually 
be attributable to Bakhtin himself (see Clark and Holquist, 1984: 
146-67; Todorov, 1984: 3-13). and the most recent interventions 
suggest that the dispute is far from settled (see Rzhevsky, 1994: 
Morson, 1991: 1072). As a result we are left with the problem of 
how to refer to the disputed texts, and throughout the rest of this 
thesis I have adopted the strategy of using the name under which a 
text was published when referring to it speciflcalW. When talking 
more generalhj about Bakhtin and his possible collaborators, 
however, I will adopt Robert Stam's strategy and use the name 
'Bakhtin' 'stenographically... to refer to Bakhtin himself together 
with his close collaborators' (Stam, 1989: 3). As Stam argues, 
such an approach would seem to be in keeping with Bakhtin's 
insistence on the dialogic nature of signification. 
In this chapter I will explore Bakhtin's theory of carnival. The 
most important text here is Rabelais and His World (Bakhtin, 
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1984), but in the course of the exegesis I will also refer to other 
works by Bakhtin. I will then investigate some of the problems 
relating to his theory of carnival, where I will argue that Bakhtin 
presents carnival not only as a historically variable phenomenon, 
but also as a utopian category. In the final section, I will explore 
the extent to which this utopian dimension might yield a certain 
critical potential. 
Rabelais and His World 
Bakhtin describes his approach to Rabelais'work as a form of 
'historic poetics' (1984: 120), whereby Rabelais' texts are analysed 
both in terms of their historical context, and in terms of the - 
historical influences which are manifest in them. The influences 
which interest Bakhtin are not simply literary ones, but any aspect 
of cultural and social practice which somehow finds its way into 
Rabelais'work. In doing this, Bakhtin echoes his earlier 
recommendation in 'Discourse in the Novel'. that literary study 
should not ignore 'the social life of discourse outside the artist's 
study, ' but should explore the relationship between a literary text 
and 'discourse in the open spaces of public squares, streets, cities 
and villages, of social groups, generations and epochs' (Bakhtin, 
1981: 259). According to Bakhtin, the key to understanding 
Rabelais'work is to analyse the practices of carnival on which they 
draw. I want to begin this section by describing the cultural 
periodisation within which Bakhtin situates Rabelais'work. I will 
then turn to Bakhtin's account of carnival, before looking at his 
analysis of its import within the work of Rabelais. 
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a) Bakhtin's cultural periodisation 
The cultural periodisation that Bakhtin employs in Rabelais and 
His World is based around his account both of historical 
transitions in the significance of laughter, and of the relationship 
between official and unofficial culture. Bakhtin argues that, since 
the Renaissance, the significance of laughter has been 
systematically downgraded, and the cultural forms which it 
accompanies have been increasingly marginalised. We can divide 
his analysis into four historical stages. 
The first stage is that of preclass and prepolitical society where, 
according to Bakhtin, 'the serious and the comic aspects of the 
world and of the deity were equally sacred, equally "official"* 
(Bakhtin, 1984: 6). There was at this time, then, a synergy 
between the comic and the serious, and this relationship could be 
perceived in certain rituals even through to early Roman society. 
As class-structured societies developed, however, this equivalence 
could no longer be tolerated. In order to consolidate their position, 
the Church and the feudal class sought to surround themselves 
with a sense of awe and fear, and comic phenomena were not the 
most appropriate forms with which to achieve this aim. In the 
second stage of Bakhtin's schema, then, we find a separation 
between serious and comic discourse, between the official culture 
of the ruling class and an unofficial folk culture. As a result, the 
official culture of the Middle Ages exorcised the trappings of comic 
imagery from their discourse: 
The very contents of medieval ideology 
- 
asceticism, 
sombre providentialism, sin, atonement, suffering, as well 
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as the character of the feudal regime, with its oppression 
and intimidation 
- 
all these elements determined this tone 
of icy petrified seriousness. It was supposedly the only 
tone to express the true, the good, and all that was 
essential and meaningful. (1984: 73) 
As the comic aspects of preclass society were relegated to the realm 
of the unofficial, they took on a new significance, acquiring a 
critical and celebratory potential that they had perhaps lacked in 
an earlier period. Above all, they offered an alternative to the 
seriousness of official culture, 'a completely different, nonofficial, 
extraecclesiastical and extrapolitical aspect of the world, of man, 
and of human relations' (1984: 6). It is within this realm that 
Bakhtin locates the practices of carnival. 
The third stage in Bakhtin's account is the Renaissance, the 
period in which he situates Rabelais. The Renaissance is marked 
by the collapse of feudal and Church authority, and the emergence 
of a new ruling class, the bourgeoisie. In order that this new class 
might supersede the old regime, a new form of discourse was 
required in which the orthodoxies of medieval ideology could be 
challenged. Bakhtin argues that the discursive fon-ns of 
carnivalesque practices offered just such an opportunity: in 
contrast to the realm of official culture, unofficial culture 
celebrated 'the gay relativity of prevailing truths and authorities' 
(1984: 11). This relativity was constructed through the 
ambivalence of carnivalesque imagery. The grotesque body which 
dominated such imagery simultaneously represented birth and 
death, feasting and defecation. In addition, the 'world inside out' 
(1984: 11) that e., dsted during the period of carnival offered an 
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alternative construction of social relations, suggesting that the 
feudal and theocratic order was not necessarily a given. 
The relativising potential of carnival practices thus offered an 
occasion for the skids to be put under the prevalent truths of the 
medieval order, and it is because of this, argues Bakhtin, that they 
were able to penetrate the realm of serious culture so effectively 
during the social upheaval of the Renaissance. This process was 
aided by the decline of Latin in relation to the vernacular language 
within which carnivalesque discourse was conducted (1984: 99- 
100; 465). Consequently, a new conception of comic discourse 
arose during the Renaissance in which 
[laughter] has a deep philosophical meaning, it is one of 
the essential forms of the truth concerning the world as a 
whole, concerning history and man; it is a peculiar point 
of view relative to the world; the world is seen anew, no 
less (and perhaps more) profoundly than when seen from 
the serious standpoint. Therefore, laughter is just as 
admissible in great literature, posing universal problems, 
as seriousness. (1984: 66) 
During the Renaissance, then, comic discourse acquired a new 
epistemological status alongside serious discourse, and this parity 
can be seen in the work of Rabelais, Boccaccio, Shakespeare and 
Cervantes (1984: 72). Grotesque imagery, for example, with its 
emphasis on corporeality, complemented the new humanist 
perspective on the world, and with their shared privileging of the 
human rather than the divine, they helped to call into question 
medieval ideology (1984: 362-63). 
The fourth stage in Bakhtin's schema takes us from the 
Renaissance through to the twentieth century. Just as feudal and 
theocratic power had consolidated itself through the creation of a 
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serious, official cultural reahn, so the bourgeoisie has sought to 
consolidate its position through the reorganisation of cultural 
forms. After the relativising tendencies of Renaissance culture, 
there was a need for the bourgeoisie to present their new set of 
values as 'eternal truths'. to construct a stable code of propriety 
(1984: 10 1). If this was to be achieved, then 'the ambivalence of 
the grotesque [could] no longer be admitted' (1984: 10 1), and this 
brought about a new breach in the relationship between serious 
and comic discourse. Henceforth, carnivalesque forms were 
relegated to a position low down on the cultural hierarchy. Comic 
forms were no longer considered appropriate for articulating 
serious ideas, and Bakhtin traces the effect that this process has 
had on Rabelaisian scholarship. 'At the end-of the sixteenth 
century, ' he argues, 'Rabelais descended lower and lower, to the 
very confines of great literature and was finally driven out of 
bounds' (1984: 65). And although there have been some 
fluctuations in the relationship between serious and comic 
discourse since this time, and some reappraisals of the value of 
humour, there has, according to Bakhtin, been no significant 
reversal of the hierarchy that was constructed between the comic 
and the serious. Consequently, he concludes, '[the] grotesque 
tradition peculiar to the marketplace and the academic literary 
tradition have parted ways and can no longer be brought back 
together' (1984: 109). Bakhtin's periodisation thus provides us 
with an account of the way in which the relationship between 
comic and theoretical discourse, addressed in the introduction, has 
developed historically. 
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It is worth raising two points in relation to Bakhtin's 
periodisation here. Firstly, it is a schema which also pervades 
much of his work on the novel, although here the progression is 
usually described in relation to the development of language. In 
'From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse', for example, Bakhtin 
identifies a cultural progression from monoglottic culture, to 
polyglottic cultures, and, finally, to heteroglottic cultures (Bakhtin, 
1981: 41-83). In historical terms, there is a rough equivalence 
between Bakhtin's key example of monoglottic culture 
- 
ancient 
Greece 
- 
and the first stage of Bakhtin's Rabelaisiari periodisation. 
According to Bakhtin, the monoglottic conditions of ancient Greece 
gave rise to what he calls 'the major straightforward genres' of the 
epic, tragic and lyric (1981: 64). For Bakhtin, these genres are 
predicated on the idea that language is both univalent and fully 
capable of representing reality. As such, they embody a 
'centralizing (unifying) tendency', signifying social and ideological 
cohesion (1981: 67). 
The second stage of Bakhtin's periodisation is equivalent to the 
polyglottic epoch. Polyglottic cultures include two or more difirerent 
languages side by side, and Bakhtin's key examples are of 
Hellenistic, Roman and medieval culturel. The Hellenistic world. 
for example, consisted of a melting pot of different languages and 
cultures, and this heterogeneity facilitated the development of 
satirical and parodic genres: under such conditions, one language 
could be used to parody another. As Bakhtin points out, this form 
of parodic quotation raises a problem: 'is the author quoting with 
reverence or on the contrary with irony, with a smirk? ' (1981: 69). 
In Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, he cites Menippean satire as 
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an example of this irreverent form. Developed between the third 
and first centuries BC., Menippean satire consisted of a mixture of 
fantastical narrative, topical discourse and strong comic elements 
(Bakhtin, 1973: 92-7). Rather than displaying the centralising 
tendency of monoglottic genres, genres like Menippean satire were 
able to relativise the supposed authority of particular discourses by 
sending them up. As such, polyglottic genres reflected a 
'decentralizing tendency (that is, one that stratifies languages)' 
(Bakhtin, 1981: 67). This combination of styles and voices created 
a situation where the ideological cohesion of monoglottic culture 
was called into question. 
Renaissance culture, the third stage of Bakhtin's periodisation, 
represents the decline of polyglossia and its replacement with 
heteroglottic conditions; the development, that is, of a unified 
language embodying a 'social diversity of speech types' (1981: 263). 
Here, the 'parodic-travestying word' of polyglottic genres begins to 
penetrate all genres, and the novel develops as the ultimate 
representation of heteroglossia (1981: 79). 
The fourth and final stage of Bakhtin's periodisation consists of 
a process of ongoing struggle between centralising and 
decentralising tendencies (1981: 270-5). Certain genres assist 
centripetal forces, perpetuating the myth of a unitaiy language, 
and thus contributing to the process of social and ideological 
cohesion. However, such genres struggle against the reality of 
heteroglossia, against the ability of other genres 
- 
particularly 
those fertilised by popular discourses 
- 
to perform a centrifugal 
function by laying bare the full range and diversity of speech types. 
We can see, then, how Bakhtin's periodisation of Rabelais overlaps 
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with his historical analysis of the novel. In both cases he is 
concerned with the way in which the cultural practices of the past 
prepared the way for the development of the novel, and in both 
cases he takes the cultural configuration of the Renaissance as 
crucial to this development. 
The second point that I want to raise in relation to Bakhtin's 
cultural periodisation concerns its accuracy. To what extent do his 
periodising categories provide a legitimate guide to the 
development of cultural practices? Ken Hirschkop has noted of 
Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia, for example, that'[elven today, 
it doesn't square with many societies: and the notion that the 
major social forms of discourse have not changed since the 
Renaissance seems, to say the least, a little suspect' (Hirschkop, 
1989: 18). While Hirschkop's point is certainly valid insofar as it 
applies to Bakhtin's cultural periodisation, Bakhtin's discussion of 
post-Renaissance comic theory actually veers away from a 
portrayal of post-Renaissance culture as a monolithic entity, 
identifying discontinuities between the Enlightenment, the 
Romantic period and modem cultural forms. While such labels 
similarly beg the question of accuracy, chapters three to six will 
explore'each of these moments in more detail, providing a more 
thorough assessment of Bakhtin's periodisation in relation to 
particular comic theories. 
Hirschkop makes one point in defence of Bakhtin's 
periodisation: namely, that concepts such as heteroglossia are, like 
most of his concepts, 'balanced somewhere between evaluation and 
empirical description' (1989: 18). Bakhtin forsakes a certain 
accuracy, in other words, in order to develop a critical analysis of 
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the development of the novel in relation to social and linguistic 
transformations. I will argue that a similar sort of ambivalence 
- 
'between evaluation and empirical description' 
- 
surrounds 
Bakhtin's concept of carnival, but that it is precisely this 
ambivalence that provides it with, its force. It is to the category of 
carnival that we now turn. 
b) Carnival 
Bakhtin's thesis is grounded on the premise that Rabelais' texts 
are indebted to the 'culture of folk carnival humor' (Bakhtin, 1984: 
4), and he uses the term 'carnivalesque' to refer not only to carnival 
in its narrow sense, 
- 
the specific festivals and feast days 
celebrated over the course of the year - but also to the whole range 
of popular, festive practices that developed during the Middle Ages 
(1984: 217-8). In this wider sense, the term includes the following 
forms: 
1. Ritual spectacles: carnival pageants, comic shows of 
the marketplace. 
2. Comic verbal compositions: parodies both oral and 
written, in Latin and the vernacular. 
3. Various genres of billingsgate: curses, oaths, popular 
blazons. 
(1984: 5) 
Although Bakhtin identifies carnival in the narrow sense as the 
'maternal womb' of these various forms (1984: 17), it is clearly the 
case that comic verbal compositions and billingsgate genres had 
the potential to extend beyond the bounds of the carnival feast. As 
we have seen, Bakhtin locates these practices within the 
-binary 
culture of the Middle Ages, organised as it was around a serious, 
official stratum, and a laughing, unofficial stratum. Although 
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carnivalesque practices had been banished from the official 
stratum, they were nevertheless licensed beyond the realm of 
officialdom. Here they acquired a particular significance. Not only 
did carnivalesque imagery offer an alternative to official imagery, 
but by suspending and/or inverting social hierarchies carnival 
provided an alternative construction of social relations. In what 
follows, I will look at three aspects of carnivalesque practices: 
grotesque imagery, laughter, and the marketplace. 
i. grotesque imagery 
Carnivalesque practices were imbued with images of the 
grotesque body, images of'[elxaggeration, hyperbolism... [and] 
excessiveness' (1984: 303). In contrast with the classic conception 
of the body as a complete, individual entity, the grotesque 
conception of the body was of an incomplete, amorphous entity. 
As a result, grotesque imagery is preoccupied with the body's 
orifices, those points at which an individual body begins to merge 
with the world around it. Not only do mouths. noses, buttocks and 
genitals frequent the imagery of carnival, but so too do the physical 
functions that mediate the relationship between the body and the 
world: eating, drinking, digestion, defecation, copulation, childbirth 
and death. On one level, the reliance upon such imagery is 
obvious. Mardi Gras, for example, was a feast day, where food and 
drink would be in abundance, and this contrasted starkly with the 
Lenten diet that would follow. At the same time, as E. P. 
Thompson has argued, 'for the young, the sexual cycle of the year 
turned on these festivals' (Thompson, 1974: 392). In this sense, 
grotesque imagery can be seen as nothing more than a celebration 
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of the freedoms permitted during the period of festivities. At 
another level, however, grotesque imagery contributed to the 
alternative construction of reality provided by carnival as a whole. 
Firstly, the material imagery of the grotesque provided an 
alternative to the spiritual imagery of the Church (1984: 401). 
Secondly, the dynamism of the grotesque body represented an 
alternative to the stasis of the official order. This is because it'is a 
body in the act of becoming. It is never finished, never completed; 
it is continually built, created, and builds and creates another 
body' (1984: 317). The physical functions with which grotesque 
imagery is preoccupied are all dynamic processes of interaction 
between the body and the world, between the old and the new. 
While official culture strove to portray social relations as natural 
and unchanging, grotesque imagery contrastingly represented the 
extent to which human existence was bound up with processes of 
transition. Finally, grotesque imagery signified an alternative to 
the fear inspired by official imagery. Life in the Middle Ages was 
lived within the shadow of potential catastrophe, of famine, 
drought, fioods, disease. According to Bakhtin, official imagery 
traded on these cosmic threats in order to inculcate a sublime 
sense of fear (1984: 335). Grotesque imagery overcame tl-As sense 
of fear by assimilating humans with the cosmic elements. For 
example, rather than submitting to the threat of disaster, 
grotesque images of eating and drinking were able to represent the 
way in which a person'triumphs over the world, devours it without 
being devoured' themselves (1984: 281). In a number of ways, 
therefore, grotesque imagery represents an alternative to the 
symbolism and ideology of officialdom. 
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ii. laughter 
Grotesque imagery also had an important connection with 
laughter, the second aspect of carnival to which I will turn. 
Bakhtin ascribes to carnivalesque laughter a number of qualities. 
Firstly, laughter contributed to the overcoming of fear mentioned 
above. Carnivalesque imagery displaced the potential disasters_ 
which threatened the community into the persona of comic 
monsters. In this way, participants could assert their superiority 
over, and their imperviousness to, various threats, in the form of 
laughter (1984: 9 1). Secondly, such forms of laughter had a 
universal quality. They did not represent the triumph of the 
individual but the victory'of the great generic body of the people' 
(1984: 88). Laughter was a loud, collective, communal 
phenomenon: Bakhtin does not have in mind a concealed titter but 
an unrestrained belly-laugh. Thirdly, carnivalesque laughter 
embodied the freedom facilitated by the licence of feast days. 
Laughter, in this sense, was a celebration of permissiveness, whose 
significance, as Bakhtin points out, was necessarily relative to the 
strictures that governed the norms of everyday life (1984: 89). 
Finally, laughter enjoyed an epistemological status. Carnival 
imagery held up emblems of power and authority as objects of 
derision. The chorus of laughter that responded to such images 
4permitted the expression of an antifeudal, popular truth, ' exposing 
the supposed naturalness of the social order as artificial (1984: 
94). In his essay'Epic and Novel', Bakhtin identifies a similar 
epistemological propensity in laughter, where he accredits it with 
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the capacity to undertake a thorough scrutinisation of objects that 
fall within its scope: 
Laughter has the remarkable power of making an object 
come up close, of drawing it into a zone of crude contact 
where one can finger it familiarly on all sides, turn it 
upside down, inside out, peer at it from above and below, 
break open its external shell, look into its center, doubt it, 
take it apart, dismember it, lay it bare and expose it, 
examine it freely and experiment with it. (Bakhtin. 1981: 23) 
in spite of the demysti4ring potential that Bakhtin affords laughter 
here, however, he nevertheless argues that such potential was 
constrained by the sense of fear instilled in people by the power of 
official culture. We need to remember, in other words, that the 
'[flreedom granted by laughter often enough was mere festive 
luxury (1984: 95). For all that it operated within certain 
constraints, however, laughter played a central role in the 
carnivalesque cultural practices of the Middle Ages. 
W. the marketplace 
The third aspect of carnival to which I will turn is its typical 
location: the marketplace. Carnival took place in the street, and its 
grotesquery and laughter were shared in the market square. 
Bakhtin envisages the marketplace as an unofficial site controlled 
by the people (1984: 154), a place where people could experience 
their own collectivity: 
The carnivalesque crowd in the marketplace or in the 
streets is not merely a crowd. It is the people as a whole, 
but organized in t1wir own way, the way of the people. It 
is outside of and contrary to all e., dsting forms of the 
coercive socioeconomic and political organization, which 
is suspended for the time of the festivity. (1984: 255) 
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Under such conditions, the marketplace was a site of free and 
frank communication. Indeed, the street hawkers' cries, 
- 
the 
speech genres typically employed in the discourse of the 
marketplace 
- 
combined 'falbuses, curses, profanities, and 
improprieties' (1984: 187). In addition to this, the marketplace 
provided a situation where the sense of dynamism and change 
embodied in the forms of grotesque imagery could be experienced 
by the people as a whole. vIbe body of the people on carnival 
square is first of all aware of its unity in time, ' argues Bakhtin, 'it 
is conscious of its uninterrupted continuity within_ time, of its 
relative historic immortality' (1984: 255). We might argue, 
therefore, that while the laughter and grotesque imagery of carnival 
had the potential to cultivate a rebellious critique of the ruling 
ideology, it was only on the street that this potential could be 
fulfilled. for it was here that the people gained a sense of their own 
collectivity. 
Grotesque imagery, laughter and the marketplace location were 
thus three of the key elements of carnival. We are now in a 
position to see the way in which these elements penetrated 
Rabelais'work. 
c) Gargantua and PantagrveP 
In his comprehensive study of Rabelais, published in 1979, 
M. A. Screech could only offer Bakhtin a single footnote, explaining 
that Rabelais and His World was 'useful if treated with caution' 
(Screech, 1979: 479). Today, however, Bakhtin's study occupies 
an important place within Rabelaisian scholarship. Carol Clark 
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has argued, for example, that while Screech's studies of Rabelais 
tended to situate him in relation to learned culture, Bakhtin's work 
has provided the impetus for a younger generation of scholars to 
try and recuperate something of the 'vulgar' Rabelais (Clark, 1983: 
1). What I want to do in this section is to explain Bakhtin's 
reading of Rabelais, and the importance that he ascribes to this 
vulgarity. 
We can begin by looking at-the way in which Bakhtin situates 
Gargantua and Pantagruel in relation to his cultural periodisation. 
As we have seen, the Renaissance is of crucial importance to 
Bakhtin's schema, both in terms of the particular configuration 
that developed between serious and comic discourse, and in terms 
of the overall development of the novel. For Bakhtin, the 
Renaissance is marked both by social transformation, and by the 
increasing inability of the official ideology of the Middle Ages to 
secure a hegemonic position in making sense of the world: 'a 
world, ' as Bakhtin explains in his essay'Forms of T'ime and 
Chronotope in the Novel'. 'in which simultaneously America was 
being discovered, a sea route to India was being opened up, [and] 
new fields in natural science and mathematics were being 
established' (1981: 166) 3. Given these conditions, the Renaissance 
witnessed attempts to construct a new world view: 
Thought and word were searching for a new reality 
beyond the visible horizon of official philosophy. Often 
words and thoughts were turned around in order to 
discover what they were actually hiding, what was that 
other side. The aim was to find a position permitting a 
look at the other side of established values, so that new bearings could be taken. 
(1984: 272) 
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This process of taking new bearings was assisted by the fact that 
polyglottic cultures gave way to heteroglottic culture during the 
Renaissance. On one level, the triumph of vernacular languages 
over Latin represented a victory against the entrenched position of 
medieval officialdom. However, this victory had only been achieved 
after a lengthy process of interanimation between Latin and the 
vernacular languages during the polyglottic epoch. As a result of 
this process, the heteroglottic conditions of the vernacular allowed 
for a diversity of voices and inflections to be represented within the 
one language (1984: 465-73). By allowing for the juxtapositioning 
and relativising of different 'dialects, idioms, and jargons' (1984: 
470- 1), these conditions facilitated the exploratory process of 
taking new bearings. However, according to Bakhtin, they were 
not alone sufficient. It was only by drawing on the popular forms 
of carnival that the process could be completed. During the 
Renaissance, then, the divide between official and unofficial 
culture gradually disappeared as carnival forms penetrated high 
culture. It was this process, together with the attendant social and 
linguistic transformations, that enabled a new world view to 
emerge. Bakhtin takes Rabelais'work as the key example of the 
way in which the carnivalesque fertilised literary culture. What I 
want to do is to look at this process in relation to the three aspects 
of carnival explored in the previous section: the grotesque, laughter 
and the marketplace. 
Rabelais'work is brimming with grotesque imagery. The tales 
of Gargantua and Pantagruel, both of them giants, are a chronicle 
of fantastical exploits littered with moments of drinking, feasting, 
urination, defecation, copulation and giving birth. Gargantua 
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begins, for example, with a description of Gargantua's birth. This 
takes place on Shrove Tuesday, as his mother and father, 
Garganielle and Grandgousier, are celebrating at a Mardi Gras 
feast. Gargamelle had just eaten 'sixteen quarters, two bushels, 
and six pecks' of tripe (Rabelais, 1955: 48), when she went into 
labour. Initially her 'bum-gut' exploded as a result of her over- 
indulgence, so one of the midwives had to operate to restrict 
Gargamelle's sphincter muscles (1955: 52). The result of this 
operation was to force the foetal Gargantua up through 
Gargamelle's body, so that he was eventually delivered via her left 
ear. His first words, 'Drinkl Drinkl Drinkl' prove to be an accurate 
indication of his future behaviour, while his father's first words on 
seeing him, '"Que grand tu as. " 
- 
What a big one you've gotl 
- 
(the 
gullet being understood), ' provided him with a very apt name. As 
Bakhtin says of this passage, '[wle thus obtain a truly grotesque 
image of one single, superindividual bodily life, of the great bowels 
that devour and are devoured, generate and are generated' 
(Bakhtin, 1984: 226). 
Similarly, laughter is central to Rabelais'work. As Bakhtin 
notes in 'Forms oMme and Chronotope in the Novel', Rabelaisian 
laughter typically acquires a grotesque inflection, insofar as it is 
frequently conjoined with images of birth and death. This can be 
seen in the example of Pantagruel's birth, cited by Bakhtin (198 1: 
198), A baby who 'was so amazingly large and so heavy that he 
could not come into the world without suffocating his mother' 
(Rabelais, 1955: 174). The birth was further complicated by the 
fact that Pantagruel's emergence from his mother's womb was 
preceded by the emergence of 
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sixty-eight muleteers, each pulling by the collar a mule 
heavily laden with salt; after which came out nine 
dromedaries loaded with hams and smoked ox-tongues, 
seven camels loaded with salted eels; and then twenty- 
four cartloads of leeks, garlics, and onions: all of which 
greatly alarmed the... midwives. (1955: 176) 
The initial response of Gargantua, Pantagruel's father, is to weep at 
the death of his wife, but as soon as he thinks of his newly-bom 
son, he 'began laughing like a calf (1955: 177). Bakhtin is clearly 
correct in identifying the grotesque significance of this laughter: it 
is a positive form of laughter, registering the grotesque conception 
of the human condition as a state of regenerative transition 
(Bakhtin, 1981: 198). 
However, there are two further points that Bakhtin raises in 
relation to Rabelaisian laughter. Firstly, Rabelais'work is so 
imbued with the comic imagery of carnival that even the ostensibly 
'serious' passages 'acquire in their context an overtone of laughter' 
(Bakhtin, 1984: 135). The narrative, for example, is shot through 
both with a series of curses to the reader Cyou dunderheads 
- 
God 
rot youl' (Rabelais, 1955: 39)), and with the assurances of the 
narrator that the narrated events are to be believed ('and if you 
don't believe it, may your fundament fall outl' (1955: 47)). TIlis 
framing device calls into question the very ability of the narrator to 
communicate in serious discourse. 
The second point raised by Bakhtin in relation to Rabelaisian 
laughter concerns the epistemological status of carnivalesque 
laughter. As we have seen, carnivalesque laughter had the 
potential to demystify reality insofar as it provided the means for 
probing the objects around it. Crucially, in Rabelais this potential 
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was fused with the progressive humanism that was emerging 
during the Renaissance. Renaissance humanism supplanted the 
dominant religious world view of the Middle Ages with a new world 
view centred on the human being, and laughter contributed 
significantly to this process. In his essay'Epic and Novel', for 
example, Bakhtin assesses the historical development of character 
within literature, and he argues that the comic forms of carnival 
played a key role in this development insofar as they provided a 
#comic familiarization of the image of man': '[11aughter destroyed 
epic distance: it began to investigate man freely and familiarly, to 
turn him inside out' (Bakhtin, 1981: 35). We can see this sort of 
process at work in the two childbirth passages referred to so far. 
However fantastical each birth might be, the physiological detail of 
each passage literally lays bare the body4. In this way, Bakhtin 
argues, the 'thousand-year-old laughter [of folk humourl not only 
fertilized'Ilterature but was itself fertilized by humanist knowledge 
and advanced literary techniques' (Bakhtin, 1984: 72). In this way, 
then, carnivalesque laughter and the grotesque contributed to the 
construction of a new world view. 
In order to understand this process in greater detail, however, I 
want to turn to the third aspect of carnival that we have looked at, 
the marketplace. Bakhtin identifies two important relationships 
between Rabelaiswork and the carnivalesque marketplace. 
Firstly, he notes the way in which Rabelais' language echoes the 
language of the street, deploying as it does the range of '[albuses, 
curses, profanities, and improprieties' found in the marketplace 
(1984: 187; quoted above). We have already seen some examples 
of these idioms in the passages referred to earlier. 
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The second relationship identified by Bakhtin concerns the need 
to establish a new set of bearings to replace the world view of the 
Middle Ages. For Bakhtin, this is 'the problem that all Renaissance 
literature was trying to solve, ' and it could only solve it by finding 
'forms* that would make possible and would Justify the most 
extreme freedom and frankness of thought and speech' (1984: 
271). What Bakhtin has in mind here is'a completely loud, 
marketplace frankness that concerned everyone' (1984: 27 1), for as 
we have already seen, the marketplace facilitated this open and 
free form of communication. We can draw on Bakhtin's concept of 
the chronotope. 
-at this point in order to determine further the 
relationship between Rabelais and the marketplace. In his essay 
'Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel', Bakhtin 
explains the concept of the chronotope in terms of 'the intrinsic 
connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships' that obtain 
within each genre (1981: 84). Each genre can be characterised, in 
other words, in terms of the co-ordinates of space and time 
typically embodied within it. The precise nature of these co- 
ordinates is going to impose certain requirements and constraints 
on the narrative of a text belonging to that genre. Bakhtin devotes 
a significant part of his discussion of chronotopes to the 
Rabelaisian chronotope (1981: 167-206), and he also provides an 
analysis of its folkloric precedents. He identifies these precedents 
in the 'pre-class, agricultural stage in the development of human 
society' (1981: 206). Here, life was organised around the 
requirements of productive agricultural labour. Spatially, this 
culture was oriented collectively towards the earth, because it was 
the earth that provided people very directly with sustenance. 
Temporally, the culture was oriented towards the future, because 
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people's labour was geared to producing food for the future: 'men 
sow for the future, gather in the harvest for the future, mate and 
copulate for the sake of future' (1981: 207). Bakhtin argues that a 
similar sort of chronotope organtses Rabelais' narrative. The 
Rabelaisian chronotope is, as we have seen in the two childbirth 
examples, geared to a temporal dynamic of regenerative transition. 
At the same time, its spatial perspective is organised around the 
various points of interaction between humans and the world 
around them: the passage where Gargantua is born, for example, 
constructs a relationship between eating, drinking, reproducing, 
defecating and raising oxen for tripe. Although Bakhtin's 
discussion of the folkloric chronotope does not specifically refer to 
carnival, I would argue that carnival in fact shares a similar 
chronotope5. Spatially, carnival is located in the marketplace, a 
site which constructs for the people a sense of their own 
collectivity. At the same time, the grotesque imagery that inhabits 
the marketplace is preoccupied with the relationship between 
humans and the world around them. Temporally, the marketplace 
is governed by the 'gay time' of carnival (1984: 219), representing 
the historic progression of humans in the form of images of birth 
and death, decay and renewal. There would thus seem to be a 
strong affinity between the Rabelaisian and carnivalesque 
chronotopes. 
According to Bakhtin, we can only understand the significance 
of these chronotopes if we compare them to the dominant 
chronotope within the official culture of the Middle Ages. Spatially, 
the medieval chronotope6 was organised around an opposition 
between high and low, from the celestial bodies at the top, to the 
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earthly elements down below (1984: 363). On this vertical wds, the 
high is valorised over the low. Temporally, this chronotope was 
organised around the idea of stasis, the 'belief.. in a static 
unchanging world order and in the eternal nature of all e2dstence' 
(1984: 275), and as such it denied the possibility of transition 
along a horizontal a2ds. 'Me contrasts between this chronotope 
and the Rabelaisian/carnivalesque version are striking. The latter 
supplants the hierarchy of high and low with a typology of 
interactions between humans and the world around them, while it 
supplants the stasis of the medieval picture with a radical sense of 
historical progression. In the work of Rabelais, this chronotope 
lent itself to the development of a humanist world view: 
This transfer of the world from the vertical to the 
horizontal was realized in the human body, which became 
the relative center of the cosmos. And this cosmos was 
, 
no longer moving from the bottom to the top but along the 
horizontal line of time, from the past to the future. In 
bodily man the hierarchy of the cosmos was reversed and 
canceled; he asserted himself outside it. (1984: 363-4) 
The inadequate world view of the Middle Ages was thus replaced in 
the Renaissance by a new, progressive world view predicated on 
notions of historical transition and humanism, and centred on the 
human body. For Bakhtin, this world view was articulated most 
forcefully in the Rabelaisian chronotope, which was itself indebted 
to the popular festive fon-ns of carnival. 
We have seen in this section, then, how Bakhtin's reading of 
Rabelais situates him both in relation to the carnivalesque 
tradition, and in relation to the transformation that took place in 
the Renaissance. What is important to Bakhtin's argument is not 
simply that Rabelais draws on carnivalesque imagery, but that 
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camivalesque imagery is renewed and rearticulated in his work in 
relation to the particular problems faced during the Renaissance 
period. 
In my discussion of Rabelais and His World I have looked at 
Bakhtin's periodising schema, at his analysis of carnival, and at 
his reading of Rabelais. We are now in a position to explore in 
more detail some of the problems and issues confronting his theory 
of carnival. 
Problems with the theory of carnival 
Bakhtin. provides a very positive account both of the 
carnivalesque practices of the Middle Ages, and of the impact that 
they had on the work of Rabelais. In both^ cases he attributes to 
carnival a progressive and/or rebellious political significance. In 
the former case, this derives from the way in which the imagery of 
carnival offered an alternative to the official organisation of social 
relations. In the latter, it derives from the cross 
-fertilisation 
between the carnivalesque and Renaissance humanism, enabling 
the construction of a new world view. In this section I will examine 
some of the problems connected with Bakhtin's account. These 
problems can be divided into three groups: a) the popular; b) 
gender; and c) politics. 
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a) The popular 
As Graeme Tumer has noted, Bakhtin's theory of camival has 
provided an analytical framework that has frequently been put to 
use in recent studies of popular culture, even if the theory has, at 
times, been 'carelessly adapted' (Tumer, 1990: 219)7. The category 
of the camivalesque would seem to offer a model with which to 
explore the interface between pleasure, ideology and the 
oppositional potential of popular culture. In this section, however, 
I want to examine some of the problems involved with Bakhtin's 
conception of the popular. 
We can identify three aspects to Bakhtin's conception of the 
popular in Rabelais and His World. Firstly, the 'people' are 
envisaged as a unified, subordinate entity, whose homogeneity is in 
fact reinforced through the imagery of carnival. For all that the 
grotesque imagery of carnival represents the people in a'universal' 
sense, society itself was divided into two opposing blocs: the people 
and the ruling class. Bakhtin's binary model of the culture of the 
Middle Ages erects a distinction between the official and the 
unofficial as separate realms, and he locates the people and the 
popular (or'popular-festive forms') within this unofficial realm. As 
a result, carnival is represented as an autonomous set of practices: 
the people organise it'in their own way' (1984: 255). Secondly, 
popular-festive forms are attributed with an ability to convey a 
historical awareness that is absent from the official world view. 
While the dominant chronotope of the Middle Ages projected a 
sense of stasis, popular forms challenged this impression through 
their preoccupation with images of transition, inversion and 
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incompleteness. Indeed, it was this aspect of popular culture 
which, as we have seen, facilitated the development in the 
Renaissance of 'a new free and critical historical consciousness' 
(1984: 73). The third feature of Bakhtin's portrayal of the popular 
is very much related to the previous two features: it is oppositional. 
Laughter, grotesque imagery, images of inversion, images of 
transition: each of these phenomena contributes to the 
construction of an alternative to official imagery. In this way, 
popular culture is envisaged as an arsenal of oppositional 
practices. 
We can raise a number of problems in relation to this 
conception of popular culture, the first of which would be that 
Bakhtin's account of carnival is overly positive, that he tends to 
overlook its negative aspects. Peter Burke's analysis of carnival in 
Popular Culture in Early Modem Europe, for example, identifies 
'three major themes': 'food, sex and violence' (Burke, 1978: 186). 
Bakhtin's analysis has much to say about food (he devotes a whole 
chapter to the imagery of the banquet), and sex (which is 
subsumed within the category of the grotesque body), but he has 
very little to say about violence. He certainly registers the extent to 
which carnival practices often resorted to activities of debasement 
and abuse: the 'slinging of excrement' (1984: 148), for example, 
and the insults traded in the atmosphere of the marketplace (1984: 
187). However, he interprets these gestures within the context of 
the grotesque; that is, the act of debasement or abuse is seen to 
confer on the object a connection with the lower stratum of the 
grotesque body, with the genitals or anus. As such, Bakhtin 
argues, these gestures enjoy a positive pole deriving from the 
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regenerative connotations of the grotesque. I do not want to argue 
that gestures of this sort necessarily lack the ambivalence 
identified by Bakhtin. However, I would argue that debasement 
and abuse might equally enjoy a more negative, and more literal, 
signification. Further, I would argue that Bakhtin concentrates on 
symbolic violence at the expense of physical violence. As Burke 
points out, for example, while carnival violence 'was often 
rituallsed' 
- 
in the niýnner suggested by Bakhtin, 
- 
it was also often 
'displaced on to objects which could not easily defend themselves, 
such as cocks, dogs, cats, and Jews, who were pelted with mud 
and stones on their annual race through Rome' (Burke, 1978: 187). 
Bakhtin tends to ignore the possibility of such incidents, and as a 
result his conception of the popular runs the risk of being overly 
optimistic. 
The second problem would be that Bakhtin's theory is based on 
an idealisation of the 'people', a point raised by Katerina Clark and 
Michael Holquist, who argue that Bakhtin sees the 'people' as 
necessarily 'anti-absolutist, pro-universalist and anti-war' (Clark 
and Holquist, 1984: 3 10-11). We might respond to this criticism 
by arguing that it is not so much the people themselves to whom 
Bakhtin attributes this oppositional potential, but rather the 
imagery and practices deployed by the people during the carnival. 
However, this revision also faces problems. As Hirschkop has 
noted, in contrasting the 'naturalizing tactics of the ruling class' 
with the 'historicizing tactics' of the people, Bakhtin reifies the 
concept of carnival as a social force in itself (Hirschkop, 1986: 
104). What Bakhtin's theory of carnival lacks, argues Hirschkop, 
is a model of socio-economic power, and it is only with the use of 
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such a model that we could properly understand the propensity 
either of the ruling class to maintain the social order, or of the 
subordinate class to resist it. As Michael Gardiner has argued, 
Bakhtin's analysis of carnival 'neglects to take into account the 
institutional context of feudalism and the hegemonic role played by 
the Catholic Church, at least in any great depth' (Gardiner, 1992: 
177). 
I want to explore this problem a little further by turning to 
Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's analysis of the carnival that took place 
at Romans in 1580 (Le Roy Ladurie, 1979). The carnival festivities 
lasted over a period of weeks, and took place within an atmosphere 
of brewing unrest. Not only was France experiencing a period of 
religious wars between Protestants and Catholics. but the 
Dauphin6 region, where Romans is to be found, was in the throes 
of a series of tax revolts. In addition to this, 1579 had seen a 
number of 'antiseignorial struggles' developing in the region, with 
peasants destroying country manors (1979: xix). As the carnival 
festivities approached, two clear social groupings were apparent 
within the community: the craftsmen and peasants, led by 
Paurnier, who generally supported the recent regional revolts: and 
the nobles and patricians, represented by Gu6rin, who favoured 
the maintenance of the status quo. The carnival festivities 
themselves were organised around these two groupings, and the 
various rituals and parades acted out by each of the groupings 
were designed to antagonise the opposing faction. Eventually, this 
antagonism could no longer be contained within the symbolism of 
carnival, and fighting broke out. The patricians' faction undertook 
a slaughter of the peasant forces, and the ensuing struggle 
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engulfed the Dauphin6 region for a number of months. Le Roy 
Ladurie's study presents a very detailed analysis of the relationship 
between carnivalesque practices and the various forms of political 
struggle enacted in and around them. 
We can use Le Roy Ladurie's analysis to highlight some of the 
weaknesses in Bakhtin's conception of the popular8. As we have 
seen, Bakhtin insists on the autonomy of the people within the 
carnival square. Le Roy Ladurie's analysis suggests that the 
situation is more complex than this. The Romans carnival 
consisted of a symbolic struggle between two opposing factions. In 
fact, Le Roy Ladurie argues, 'there were in effect two Carnivals, 
that of the plebeians and that of the notables' (Le Roy Ladurie, 
1979: 207). While each of the rival factions maintained a degree of 
control over the precise form that their particular festivities took, 
the duality of the Romans carnival suggests that it would not fall 
that neatly within the bounds of Bakhtin's conception of popular 
autonomy. While this duality is not necessarily the dominant 
pattern that carnivals followed, Le Roy Ladurie suggests that it was 
nevertheless often the case that carnival would be structured 
around some sort of ritualised battle between two parties (1979: 
207,313-14). Further, although Bakhtin credits carnival with a 
political significance, he nevertheless argues that it is 
'extrapolitical' (1984: 5) insofar as it lies beyond the political, social 
and economic structures of everyday life (1984: 255). Again, Le 
Roy Ladurie's analysis calls into question this conclusion. Rather 
than representing a world divorced from everyday political, social 
and economic processes, Le Roy Ladurie shows how such 
processes were manifested in the very fabric of carnival. For 
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example, the animal imagery favoured by each of the factions very 
much reinforced their social position. The patricians' faction 
employed images of the rooster, the eagle and the partridge, whose 
airborne abilities represented their superiority (1979: 216). The 
popular faction, on the other hand, employed images of the bear, 
the sheep, the hare, the capon and the donkey, each representing 
a'wild and earthy orientation' (1979: 215). We might argue that 
such imagery simply reinforces Bakhtin's emphasis on the 
grotesque nature of carnivalesque imagery, that in asserting their 
connections with the low and the downward, the commoners were 
opposing the official imagery that always placed value on the high 
and the upward (Bakhtin, 1984: 401). However, the animal 
imagery was also overlaid with connotations directly related to the 
political struggle that was developing in Romans. The hare had 
come to represent the Hugenots, and the capon to represent, the 
group supporting the tax revolt, while the partridge represented the 
Catholics (Le Roy Ladurie, 1979: 203). In addition, the eagle and 
the partridge represented those who had changed sides, and had 
come over from supporting the popular group to supporting the 
patricians'case (1979: 215-16). While the commoners' imagery 
certainly drew on the tradition of the grotesque, then, like the 
patrician's imagery it was simultaneously imbued with elements of 
the ensuing political struggle. In this sense, carnival can be seen 
as a continuation or intensification of political struggle, rather than 
a phenomenon where such processes are suspended. 
The marketplace, where Bakhtin locates the autonomy of the 
people, emerged during the carnival at Romans as one of the key 
sites of political struggle. In the weeks leading up to Mardi Gras, 
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traders flocked to the town to buy and sell. 'Even during the 
holidays, ' Le Roy Ladurie says, 'it was business as usual' (1979: 
216). However, in the heated political context of the day, the 
marketplace became a source of antagonism. The plebeians 
resented the sight of 'Romans's supply of wheat leaving town', 
while the patricians were anxious about the influx of people 
ostensibly sympathetic to the plebeians' cause: 'might they not be 
attacked by all these peasants coming to town to buy grainT (1979: 
217). At the same time, one of the patricians' carnival activities 
was to decree a new price list for the market, inverting all of the 
regular prices of foodstuffs: 'the highest prices would be for hay, 
straw, oats, all animal feed, as well as for bad or wormy wine, 
slated eel, rotten herring, and fatback' (1979: 190), while the 
lowest prices were to be paid for 
turkey studded with cinnamon and cloves, pheasant or 
ruffled grouse, partridge, hen, hare, roast snipe, ringdove 
d l'orange, fatted veal, mutton, trout, carp, pike, wine 
from Cornas or Tournon, hypocras, strawberries with 
rosewater and sugar... (1979: 190) 
Executed as it was by the patricians, the purpose of this inverted 
price list was not to make luxuries available to the poor, but to 
mock their poverty, to use 'absurdity to illustrate "an order in 
which Nature and society are soundly unchangeable... "' (1979: 
192). In Romans at least, the marketplace was not the 
carnivalesque preserve of the people, but one of the key sites in the 
political struggle surrounding the carnival. Le Roy Ladurie's 
analysis thus raises a number of questions in relation to Bakhtin's 
conception of the popular. 
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While Rabelats and His World provides us with a ground- 
breaking analysis of the relationship between popular culture and 
literary forms, Bakhtin's conception of the popular faces a number 
of problems. 
b) Gender 
Just as the concept of carnival has been put to use in recent 
discussions of popular culture, there have also been some recent 
attempts to draw on the notion of carnival in developing feminist 
readings of certain textual practices (e. g. Russo, 1988; Stam, 1989: 
157-86: Wills, 1989). However, as several commentators have 
argued, the construction of gender in Bakhtin's theory of carnival 
is itself problematic (e. g. Booth, 1986; Ginsburg, 1993; Russo, 
1988). Before considering some of these problems, I want to look 
at some of Bakhtin's remarks concerning the relationship between 
carnival and gender. 
The most appropriate point at which to start is Bakhtin's 
analysis of Rabelais' representation of women. Bakhtin situates 
Rabelais' portrayal of women in relation to the 'querelle des 
fenunes', a dispute concerning'the nature of women and wedlock' 
which preoccupied the literate sections of the French public in the 
middle of the sixteenth century. The dispute was fought out 
between two main positions, 'the Gallic tradition', which envisaged 
women in a negative light, and the'idealizing tradition', which 
envisaged them in a positive, chivalric light. Rabelais belonged to 
the Gallic tradition, and as such, argues Bakhtin, we would not 
expect him to'take the women's side'(1984: 239). However, what 
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tends to be overlooked is the fact that the Gallic tradition actually 
consisted of two lines of thought: 'the ascetic tendency... which 
saw in woman the incarnation of sin'; and 'the popular comic 
tradition' (1984: 240). Bakhtin explains this tradition's conception 
of women in the following manner: 
The popular tradition is in no way hostile to woman and 
does not approach her negatively. In this tradition 
woman is essentially related to the material bodily lower 
stratum; she is the incarnation of this stratum that 
degrades and regenerates simultaneously. She is 
ambivalent. She debases, brings down to earth, lends a 
bodily substance to things, and destroys: but, first of all, 
she is the principle that gives birth. She is the womb. (Bakhtin, 1984: 240) 
This is the tradition within which Bakhtin situates Rabelais' 
representation of women. As such, Bakhtin concludes, Rabelais' 
attitude towards women is one of ambivalence rather than 
hostility. 
There are two points worth raising in relation to Bakhtin's 
argument here. The first concerns Bakhtin's keenness to distance 
Rabelais from the negative conceptions of women current at the 
time. This enables him to situate Rabelais' representation of 
women within the popular traditions which, in Bakhtin's view, also 
informed all the other aspects of his work. Indeed, Bakhtin argues 
that, in appealing to a conception of women derived from the 
popular comic tradition, Rabelais carved out a unique position for 
himself in the querelles desfemmes (1984: 242). In this way, as 
elsewhere, Bakhtin credits Rabelais' portrayal of women with the 
ability to shatter prevailing codes of representation. The second 
point is that Bakhtin posits an essential connection between 
women, the lower bodily stratum and the grotesque: women both 
destroy and give birth. Although his theory of the grotesque is 
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liberally peppered with references to the genitals, the phallus, 
buttocks, the anus, the mouth and the nose, the womb is in many 
ways accorded a privileged status within this anatomy. 
It is this privileging of the womb that concerns Ruth Ginsburg, 
who has provided the most detailed analysis of the role of female 
imagery in Bakhtin's account of the grotesque. As she shows, 
female imagery invades Bakhtin's account at several points. His 
concept of the grotesque is highly reliant upon images both of the 
womb and of the pregnant body: the grotesque, Bakhtin claims, 'is 
always conceiving' (Bakhtin, 1984: 170; quoted in Ginsburg, 1993: 
170). At the same time, his analysis of the regenerative aspect of 
the Rabelaisian chronotope similarly draws on the image of the 
womb: it is 'a pregnant time, a fruit-bearing time, a birthing time 
and a time that conceives again' (Bakhtin, 1981: 207; quoted in 
Ginsburg, 1993: 168). What disturbs Ginsburg about Bakhtin's 
use of such imagery is that, 'in the process of being elevated into 
the central site of carnival', this imagery is 'de-femalised' (1993: 
168). One of Ginsburg's examples of this process concerns the 
scene looked at earlier, where Gargamelle gives birth to Gargantua. 
As we have already seen, Bakhtin interprets the scene in terms of 
Ga truly grotesque image of one single, superindividual bodily life, of 
the great bowels that devour and are devoured, generate and are 
generated' (Bakhtin, 1984: 226; quoted in Ginsburg, 1993: 174). 
However, he continues, 
this, of course, is not an 'animal' or 'biological' bodily life. 
We see looming beyond Gargamelle's womb the devoured 
and devouring womb of the earth and the ever- 
regenerated body of the people. The child that is born is 
the people's mighty hero, the French Heracles. (Bakhtin, 1984: 226: quoted in Ginsburg, 1993: 174) 
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As Ginsburg points out in response to this passage, although 
female (or, more precisely, maternal) imagery is of central 
importance to Bakhtin's concept of the grotesque, in the final 
analysis the woman's body is marginalised in favour of the body of 
the people as a whole, 'which comes forth in the image of a super- 
male young Heracles' (1993: 174). This marginalisation is similarly 
in evidence in some of Bakhtin's accounts of carnival. Ginsburg 
notes, for example, how the following passage constructs carnival 
as a male domain: 
The influence of the carnival spirit was irresistible: it 
made a man renounce his official state as monk, cleric, 
scholar, and perceive the world in its laughing aspect. 
Not only schoolmen and minor clerics but hierarchs and 
learned theologians indulged in gay recreation as 
relaxation from pious seriousness. (Bakhtin, 1984: 13; quoted in Ginsburg, 1993: 169) 
The problem with Bakhtin's theory of carnival, Ginsburg 
concludes, is that, even while the theory remains preoccupied with 
images of the pregnant womb, women are actually expelled both 
from the theory, and from the carnival itself 
Mary Russo touches on similar ground in her discussion of the 
female grotesque, where she focuses on Bakhtin's comparison 
between the grotesque and the 'Kerch terracotta figurines of senile 
pregnant hags' (Russo, 1988: 219). Bakhtin offers the following 
analysis of the latter: 
This is a typical and very strongly expressed grotesque. It 
is ambivalent. It is pregnant death, a death that gives 
birth. There is nothing completed, nothing calm and 
stable in the bodies of these old hags. They combine 
senile, decaying, and deformed flesh with the flesh of new 
life, conceived but as yet unformed. (Bakhtin, 1984: 25-6: quoted in Russo, 1988: 219) 
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As Russo comments, for feminist readers such an assessment is 
problematic, reliant as it is upon 'all of the connotations of fear and 
loathing associated with the biological processes of reproduction 
and ageing' (Russo, 1988: 219). For all that there is an exuberance 
to Bakhtin's analysis of the figurines, Russo argues, it nevertheless 
reproduces patriarchal assumptions about women (1988: 219). 
Given these problems, how ought we to respond? I would argue 
that, in spite of its problematic treatment of gender, it is 
nevertheless possible to see how Bakhtin's theory of carnival might 
contribute to feminist criticism along other lines. As Maroussia 
Hajdukowski-Ahmed has noted, for example, the theory has proved 
fruitful to feminist analyses of hysteria. Here, the notion of the 
grotesque has provided a model for exploring the hysteric's body, 
while the concept of carnivalesque discourse has provided a 
framework within which to account for the rupture of the hysteric's 
discourse (Hajdukowski-Ahmed, 1993: 192-3). Robert Stam, on 
the other hand, has argued that, just as the carnivalesque blurring 
of social categories works to relativise the established social 
hierarchy, so 'the blurring and shifting of gender distinctions', 
which Bakhtin identifies as belonging to carnivalesque practices, 
might work to emphasise the extent to which gender is a social 
construct rather than a given (Stam, 1989: 163). Finally, as Russo 
has argued, there is scope to reconsider the imagery of carnival in 
the light of feminist research. Returning to the Kerch terracotta 
figures discussed by Bakhtin, she records his remark that the 
6senfle pregnant hags... are laughing' (Bakhtin, 1984: 25; quoted in 
Russo, 1986: 219). She proceeds to ask'the question that never 
occurred to Bakhtin... Why are these old hags laughing? ' (1986: 
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227). The implication is that the image is more complex than 
Bakhtin would have us believe. While the women's age and their 
pregnant condition might well signify both birth and death, their 
laughter might signify a knowingness and celebratory potential 
that Bakhtin overlooks. A feminist analysis of carnival might 
pursue such an analysis of such images, both in order to challenge 
received interpretations, and in order to tease out new ones. 
In this section, then, we ha've seen that Bakhtin's theory of 
carnival faces certain problems in terms of the way in which the 
symbolism of female imagery is interpreted. While the conclusions 
of such arguments were generally accepted, it was argued that 
Bakhtin's theory might still be of use within feminist criticism. 
C) Politics 
One of the aspects of Bakhtin's theory of carnival which has 
generated the most discussion concerns the overall political 
significance of carnival. Clearly, the problems surrounding 
Bakhtin's conception of the popular and his deployment of female 
imagery already have a political edge to them, since between them 
they raise issues of cultural politics, class politics and gender 
politics. I would argue, therefore, that such issues cannot be 
wholly divorced from a discussion of carnival's overall political 
significance. What I want to focus on in this section, however, is a 
number of issues concerning the sort of function thaý carnival 
might perform, the extent to which it provides either a site for 
political contestation, or a site where such conflict might be 
contained. 
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In our consideration of the theory so far we have already 
identified two levels at which carnival is assigned some sort of 
political significance. The first level is that of the carnival proper, 
which Bakhtin credits with the ability to provide the people of the 
Middle Ages with a collective, festive experience built around a 
range of rebellious grotesque imagery. The second level is that of 
carnivalised literature, a textual carnival of the sort provided by 
Rabelais. As we have seen, Bakhtin credits Rabelais' texts with the 
ability to challenge the medieval world view, and to construct a 
new historical and humanist world view. According to Bakhtin, 
this tradition of carnivalised literature stretches from Menippean 
satire through to Dostoevsky and beyond. Like Menippean satire, 
carnivalised literature relativises contending voices, challenging the 
centripetal forces that seek to shut them out. There is a clear 
connection between carnival proper and carnivalised literature 
insofar as the latter is either directly parasitic on the forms of 
carnival practices (as in the case of Rabelais), or, after the decline 
of carnival proper, is parasitic on the traditions of carnivalised 
literature which had been directly infiuenced by carnival proper 
(Bakhtin, 1973: 108). However, we also need to register the stark 
differences between the two phenomena, between, as Mikita Hoy 
has put it, 'the text which promotes the carnivalesque in linguistic 
terms, and the actual carnival of being and doing itself (Hoy, 1992: 
780). Since Bakhtin's theorisation of carnivallsed literature needs 
to be contextuallsed within his overall theory of the novel, in this 
study I want to concentrate on the issue of function as it relates to 
the processes and political significance of carnival proper. indeed, 
it is this aspect which has been discussed Most fully in recent 
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work on comedy and comic theory (e. g. Eco, 1984a; Horton, 1991; 
Nelson, 1990; Palmer, 1994). 
As we have seen, Bakhtin assigns to carnival a number of 
functions. Carnival not only performed a celebratory function, it 
also served a critical function. It was an occasion where the people 
inhabited an autonomous sphere, enjoying a sense of freedom and 
collective identity. Carnival's grotesque imagery provided a 
challenge to the official images; of spirituality, stasis and fear, while 
carnival laughter had the potential to demystify the entire edifice of 
officialdom. Bakhtin would thus appear, to identify an 
oppositional, rebellious potential in carnival, and it is the idea that 
carnival enjoyed such potential that has most frequently been 
challenged in discussions of the carnivalesque. I want to look at 
two problems on which such challenges have focused: the fact that 
carnival was a licensed affair, and the issue of carnivalesque 
transgression. 
It is Terry Eagleton who puts the issue conceming camival 
licence most succinctly. Forget the lords of misrule, the inversion 
of hierarchy and the comic dethroning of theocracy, the argument 
goes, if the carnival is licensed by the authorities, then it can 
aniount to nothing more than a safety-valve, whereby the 
discontent of the people might be siphoned-off peacefully. 
'Carnival, ' Eagleton thus claims. is merely 'permissible rupture of 
hegemony, a contained popular blow-off as disturbing and 
relatively ineffectual as a revolutionary work of art' (Eagleton, 
1981: 148). Carnival might allow for a hot-bed of satire, in other 
words, but this can be no more than comic relief. 
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We can, however, raise a number of arguments in opposition to 
this conception of carnival as a safety-valve. I want to begin to do 
this by returning to Peter Burke's discussion of the history of 
carnival. Burke accepts that there are certainly some aspects of 
carnival which would seem to lend themselves to the safety-valve 
interpretation. 'Comedies built round situations of reversal, ' for 
example, 'and played during Carnival, frequently end... with a 
reminder to the audience that. it is time to set the world the right 
way up again' (Burke, 1978: 202: see also Sheppard, 1990: 279). 
However, Burke argues that this only tells part of the story, and 
that we can identify several examples of carnivals where rituallsed 
expressions of rebellion boiled over into actual unrest. As a result, 
edicts were frequently delivered against the carrying of arms at 
times of carnival, as a means of staving off the possibility of riots 
breaking out. At other times, carnivals were actually prevented 
from taking place (1978: 203-4). As we have already seen, Le Roy 
Ladurie's analysis of the Romans carnival illustrates the extent to 
which carnival might serve as a focus for unrest, unrest which led 
to the massacre of the peasants in 1580. In such cases. carnival 
needs to be seen as more than a mere festive safety-valve. 
Burke goes on to detail the decline of carnival and the reform of 
popular culture that took place between 1500 and 1800. Again, he 
interprets this process not in terms of social control, where the 
ruling class were in a position to licence and authorise the various 
practices of popular culture with a carte-blanche, but as a series of 
struggles and conflicts between ruling and subordinate groups, a 
process that responded to diverse social, economic and political 
developments. Burke argues that one of the reasons why the 
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ty-valve view of carnival has perhaps acquired such force is 
because social anthropology has tended to be preoccupied by 
dconsensus at the expense of conflict' R 978: 203). This line of 
argument is also advanced by Eileen and Stephen Yeo in their 
critique of models of social control. Such models, they argue, posit 
the structural ability of the dominant social group to control the 
cultural practices of subordinate groups (Yeo and Yeo, 1981). The 
problem with such models is that they are profoundly unhistorical, 
assuming that static structures of control will always enable the 
containment of popular practices. These models thus overlook the 
historical specificity of the forms that particular practices take in 
particular contexts: 'ItIhe forms which emerge and dominate in any 
one place or time produce different social relations rather than just 
being one among many possible ways of producing the same 
(capital ist) relations' (1981: 14 1). Historians of popular culture 
thus need to attend to the different social relations that obtain 
within any particular context. As a result, the Yeos argue, we need 
to replace the social control model with a framework that views 
popular culture as an 'arena of contestation' between different 
social forces. The arguments of Burke and the Yeos thus suggest 
that the safety-valve approach to popular culture provides an 
inadequate analysis of carnival. 
It Is worth returning to Bakhtin himself at this stage in order to 
assess the extent to which this alternative conception of popular 
culture might be integrated with his theory of carnival. The first 
point to raise concerns Bakhtin's model of medieval culture, which 
in many ways would seem to support the social control model of 
popular culture. Bakhtin's model posits a binary divide between 
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official and unofficial culture, the latter being limited to the 'small 
islands of feasts and recreations' (Bakhtin. 1984: 96). Given this 
isolation, it is easy to see how the potential of carnival could be 
defused: for all that Bakhtin identifies in the people the autonomy 
to organise the carnival themselves, the fact that carnival was 
isolated from official culture would have meant that officialdom 
was itself able to avoid any symbolic challenges to its hegemony 
generated in the course of the. proceedings. Such a model would 
appear to be consistent with a safety-valve interpretation of 
carnival. 
However, elsewhere Bakhtin posits a more complex relationship 
between carnival and social power. Firstly, he argues that carnival 
practices acquired their rebellious frisson only in the light of the 
stringencies of the everyday. Carnival in this sense was not 
completely isolated from the official order, as the above model 
suggests, but rather provided a dialogic response to the official 
structures of fear, intimidation and prohibition. Secondly, Bakhtin 
views* the legalisation of carnival not as a static state of affairs, but 
as an ongoing process of negotiation. This process 'was forced 
[and] incomplete, 'he argues, it'led to struggles and new 
prohibitions. During the entire medieval period the Church and 
state were obliged to make concessions, large and small, to satisfy 
the marketplace' (1984: 90). This dynamic model of the 
development of carnival is echoed in Bakhtin's analysis of its 
gradual decline after the Renaissance, which charts the way in 
which the realm of the grotesque has continued to 'struggle for its 
existence' (1984: 10 1). Finally, we could argue that this dynamic 
model of cultural change is actually underpinned by Bakhtin's 
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valorisation of the historicising potential of carnivalesque practices. 
As we have seen, Bakhtin identifies a value in the ability both of 
carnival proper, and of Rabelais' textual carnival, to challenge the 
stasis of official ideology. Similarly, his concept of heteroglossia 
envisages an ongoing struggle at the level of language between 
centripetal and centrifugal forces (1981: 272). It might be argued, 
then, that the corollary of this position is not a static model of 
social control, but a dynamic model of cultural contestation. As 
the Yeos argue, this historical understanding of cultural change 
itself has a political significance: 
What was defeated or abandoned, and how that change 
occurred, itself composed part of what won or came to 
dominate. 'Ibis mixture of the past in the present is our 
guarantee not that a different, better future is inevitable 
but that it is at least available through present struggle. (Yeo and Yeo, 1981: 130) 
Although we can perhaps identify some problems in Bakhtin's 
model of medieval culture, then, the general direction of his theory 
of carnival, along with much his overall theoretical project, would 
seem to support a dynamic model of popular culture, suggesting 
that carnival cannot always be interpreted as a licensed safety- 
valve. 
We are now in a position to move on to the second of the two 
problems concerning carnival's political significance, the issue of 
camivalesque transgression. As we have seen, the codes of 
carnival permit a transgression of the codes of the everyday: social 
hierarchies are inverted, official imagery is replaced with grotesque 
imagery, and forms of pleasure that are usually restricted or 
denied are indulged in. One interpretation of such transgressions 
is that they are inevitably subversive, and Bakhtin's theory of 
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carnival at times certainly directs us towards such a view. This 
interpretation of carnival has been challenged by Umberto Eco, 
and it is to Eco's argument that I now turn. 
In his essay, The Frames of Comic "Freedom"' (Eco, 1984a), Eco 
focuses on the transgressions undertaken both during carnival and 
within comic texts. Arguing against Bakhtin's view of the 
subversive potential of carnival, Eco concludes that comedy and 
carnival are necessarily restricted to reinforcing the status quo. 
Positing carnival and comedy as related terms, he turns to an 
Aristotelian definition of comedy in order to produce 'a 
complementary definition of carnival' (1984a: 1)9. Aristotle defined 
comedy in terms of its representation of low life and lawlessness. 
His definition contends that tragedy similarly concerns itself with 
the violation of a law (Oedipus kills his father and marries his 
mother), but tragedy requires that the laws that are violated are 
spelt out in the text (it is wrong to kill your father; it is wrong to 
marry your mother). In comedy, however, the broken rules, rather 
than being spelt out, are merely presupposed by the text. Indeed, 
if we take the example of a pun, then as soon as the broken rule is 
spelt out, as soon as the semantic clash is explained, then the 
comic effect of the pun all but disappears. 
In order to challenge the notion of carnivalesque subversion, 
Eco goes on to apply this analysis of comedy to carnival. If the 
rules that are flouted during carnival are, like the broken rules of 
comedy, presupposed in the very text of carnival itself, then, as Eco 
argues, 'the law must be so pervasively and profoundly introjected 
as to be overwhelmingly present at the moment of its violation' 
(1984a: 6). Eco concludes, therefore, that 
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comedy and carnival are not instances of real transgressions: 
on the contrary, they represent paramount examples of law 
reinforcement. They remind us of the existence of the rule... 
the comic is only an instrument of social control and can 
never be a form of social criticism. (1984a: 6-7) 
For Eco, then, carnivalesque transgressions perform a conservative 
function because they necessarily emphasise to us the very codes 
that they violate. 
'Mere are a number of problems with Eco's argument however. 
Insofar as he uses an Aristotelian theory of comedy as a basis for 
his argument, he can be compared to the neo-Aristotelian Chicago 
critics of the 1950s 10. They took a formalist approach, using the 
conventions and patterns of various genres as a framework within 
which to interpret individual texts. Indeed, Eco is similarly trying 
to establish the conventions and patterns of comedy and carnival 
as genres. Once he has achieved this structural task, he draws 
certain'semantic conclusions about the limits of comedy and 
carnival. The problem with both the Chicago critics and Eco 
himself is that the concept of genre is used ahistorically. Eco is 
thus able to construct a generic model of comedy and carnival and 
use it in an a priori argument about their political status. My first 
point about this would be that, as an a priori argument, it does not 
necessarily work. A carnivalesque inversion might serve to remind 
us of the actual rules of social hierarchy, but, equally, it might 
prompt us to question their artificiality. My second point would be 
that, by assuming that questions about the politics of comedy and 
carnival can be answered purely in terms of their generic form, so 
the specific historical and cultural context of a particular comic or 
carnivalesque performance is removed from the equation. 
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A further problem with Eco's argument is that it focuses on 
camivalesque images of inversion at the expense of other strategies 
deployed within the carnival. Eco takes images of animalisation, 
the use of masks, and the creation of an 'upside-down world' as 
the paradigms of carnivalesque transgression, and then tries to 
show, as we have seen, how such transgressions actually work to 
reinforce the norms of everyday life (1984a: 2). Le Roy Ladurie's 
analysis of carnival in many ways supports Eco's contention. In 
the case of Romans. he argues, images of inversion tended to be 
deployed most by the patricians; the inverted price list, discussed 
earlier, being one such example. In such cases, Le Roy Ladurie 
proposes, 'turning society temporarily upside down implied a 
knowledge of its normal vertical position, its hierarchyý (Le Roy 
Ladurie, 1979: 301). However, Le Roy Ladurie also identifies other 
strategies present within carnival, arguing that, rather than 
operating in a 'counterrevolutionary' manner (1979: 302). these 
strategies provided a potential focus for real political struggle. One 
of the symbolic purposes of carnival, for example, was to eliminatd 
'harmful elements... as a preliminary to Lenten purification' (1979: 
311). At one level, there would have been a high degree of 
consensus around the sort of elements that needed to be 
eliminated: '[njo one can argue with the fact that insect pests and 
fieldmice destroy crops, or that poisonous snakes and storms are 
threats to human welfare, ' for example (1979: 313). However, 
when it came to the question of social ills, this consensus broke 
down. As Le Roy Ladurie argues, '[flor the craftsmen a social ill 
might mean an indirect tax on meat or bread, while the municipal 
elite would consider the same tax beneficial' (1979: 313). 
Consequently, there were certain features of carnivalesque practice 
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which actually lent themselves to the fuelling of unrest. Such 
unrest was not necessarily contained by the rituallsed behaviour of 
carnival, as the d6nouement of the Romans carnival illustrates. In 
ignoring the range of strategies available within carnivalesque 
practices, then, Eco's argument would appear to be flawed. As a 
result, carnival is not necessarily consigned to performing the 
conservative function that Eco supposes. 
We have thus explored two'problems concerning the politics of 
carnival, the fact that it is a licensed affair, and the nature of its 
transgressive imagery. In both cases we have reviewed arguments 
to the effect that the apparent subversive symbolism of the 
carnivalesque can always be contained; in the former, because, 
since carnival is always licensed by the authorities, it must 
necessarily amount to a form of safety-valve, in the latter, because, 
in transgressing the norms of the everyday, carnival necessarily 
reminds us of those norms. In our discussion of these arguments, 
we have sought to develop more of a historical approach to 
carnival. We have argued that, while carnival might at times 
operate as a safety-valve, and while its Imagery might at times 
reinforce dominant norms, it nevertheless maintaias the potential 
to serve as the site of both symbolic and real forms of struggle. 
Given this, I would agree with Peter Stallybrass and Allon White's 
conclusion concerning such issues: 'the politics of carnival cannot 
be resolved outside of a close historical examination of particular 
conjuntures: there is no a priori revolutionary vector to carnival 
and transgression' (Stallybrass and White, 1986: 16). LeRoy 
Ladurie's analysis of the carnival at Romans is of value precisely 
because it undertakes this sort of historical examination, As I 
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have tried to show, Bakhtin's theory of carnival is consistent with 
this approach, because in exploring the dynamics of medieval 
carnival, and the manner in which the carnivalesque subsequently 
declined, he develops a concept of carnival as a historically variable 
category. 
Carnival and utopia 
For all that we can identify in the work of Bakhtin a theory of 
carnival as a historically variable category, however, Bakhtin's 
theory also seems to combine a utopian dimension. Not only does 
he frequently use the term'utopiaý to describe the sense of 
collectivity and freedom that existed during carnival (e. g. Bakhtin, 
1984: 185,264-5,454), but the world of carnival is frequently 
referred to in utopian fashion as an alternative universe: '[o]ne 
might say that it builds its own world versus the official world, its 
own church versus the official church, its own state versus the 
official state' (1984: 88). Some commentators have found this 
utopian dimension to Bakhtin's theory of carnival rather 
unfortunate. Dana Polan has argued, for example, that it 
essentialises the phenomenon of carnival, and that this 
essentialism detracts from Bakhtin's historicised analysis of the 
decline of carnivalesque (Polan, 1991: 141). What I want to argue 
in this section, in contrast, is that while the demarcation between 
Bakhtin's conceptualisation of carnival as a historical phenomenon 
and his conceptualisation of it as a utopian construct is never very 
clear, the latter nevertheless enjoys a critical potential. 
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We should perhaps begin by briefly describing the utopian 
dimension to Bakhtin's theory of camival. Camival is 
characterised as a world where freedom is absolute, where all of 
the various hierarchies and strictures of everyday eýdstence are 
suspended. For Bakhtin, this situation has a number of 
implications. Firstly, it constructs a new sense of collectivity. 
Secondly, it makes possible new forms of communication. Thirdly, 
it goes hand in hand with a series of unrestrained physical and 
sensual pleasures in the form of food, sex, and laughter. Fourthly, 
it incarnates a sense of celebration and festivity. And fifthly, it 
incorporates a fife-affirming range of imagery. Each of these 
aspects of the carnivalesque utopia are absent from everyday 
eidstence. indeed, the everyday eidstence of the Middle Ages is 
presented as a dystopian alternative, based on structures of 
alienation, prohibition, denial, and fear. 
Bakhtin puts this utopian vision to use in three ways. Firstly, 
he uses it to ground his critique of the historical development of 
laughter. Secondly, he uses it as a model for the valorised realm of 
dialogic discourse. Thirdly, he arguably uses it in a critique of the 
Stalinist system under which he suffered I will look at each of 
these areas in turn. 
a) Utopian laughter 
As we have seen in our discussion of Rabelais and His World, 
Bakhtin assigns to carnivalesque laughter a utopian quality, 
characterising it as a phenomenon embodying fearlessness, 
collectivity, freedom and demystification. This utopian conception 
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of laughter pervades much of Bakhtin's corpus. In 'From Notes 
Made in 1970-71', for example, one of his fmal pieces of published 
work, he offers the following analysis: 
Only dogmatic and authoritarian cultures are one-sidedly 
serious. Violence does not know laughter... Seriousness 
burdens us with hopeless situations, but laughter lifts us 
above them and delivers us from them. Laughter does 
not encumber man, it liberates him. 
The social, choral nature of laughter, its striving to 
pervade all peoples and the entire world. The doors of 
laughter are open to one and all. Indignation, anger, and 
dissatisfaction are always unilateral: they exclude the one 
toward whom they are directed, and so forth; they evoke 
reciprocal anger. They divide, while laughter only unites; 
it cannot divide... Everything that is truly great must 
include an element of laughter. Otherwise it becomes 
threatening, terrible, or pompous, in any case, it is 
limited. Laughter lifts the barriers and clears the path. 
'Me joyful, open, festive laugh. The closed, purely 
negative, satirical laugh. This is not a laughing laugh... (Bakhtin, 1986: 134-5) 
It is worth raising two points about this passage. Firstly, the 
utopian qualities of laughter are clearly set out: it is liberatory, 
universal and conciliatory. Secondly, the final line suggests that 
the true nature of laughter is precisely this utopian version. While 
other forms of laughter certainly mist, they somehow represent an 
aberration of this true nature. 
This opposition between true, utopian laughter on the one 
hand, and degraded forms of laughter on the other, structures 
Bakhtin's historical analysis of laughter. For Bakhtin, the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance constitute the zenith in the development 
of laughter, because it was during these periods that the 
characteristics of utopian, carnivalesque laughter were fully 
realised. Since that time, however, the power of laughter has 
gradually declined, and it has lost the positive characteristics 
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associated with it during these earlier periods. According to 
Bakhtin, this process has produced an image of laughter where it 
is viewed 'not [as] a universal, philosophical form. It can refer only 
to individual and individually typical phenomena of social life. 
That which is essential cannot be comical' (Bakhtin, 1984: 67). 
Laughter has emigrated from the public world of the marketplace, 
then, to the privatised world of the home, and in the course of this 
transition the collective aspect of carnivalesque laughter has 
disappeared. In the eighteenth century, for example, Voltaire 
viewed Rabelais"gay, century-old laughter' as 'something 
despicable, ' regarding Rabelais as 'chief among buffoons' (1984: 
117). In the nineteenth century, laughter continued to be stripped 
of its 'gay and joyful tone' (1984: 38), becoming instead a negative, 
sardonic form. This has given rise, Bakhtin argues, to 'genres of 
reduced laughter - humour, irony, sarcasm, ' (1984: 120) and these 
now constitute the dominant forms of laughter in the twentieth 
century. We have witnessed, in other words, a 'disintegration of 
popular laughter'. a gradual erosion of laughter's utopian qualitics 
(1984: 120)12. 
It might be argued that there is a contradiction in Bakhtin's 
analysis here between the historical project and the essentialist 
conception of utopian laughter. The premise behind the historical 
project would seem to be that laughter, like other cultural 
phenomena, always has a historically-specific significance. Given 
that this is the case. itjust doesn't make sense to Identify the 
essence or true nature of laughter, - or any other cultural 
phenomenon 
- 
because such a move tries to identify not a 
historically-specift meaning, but a meaning that transcends 
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history. I would argue, however, that we can defend Bakhtin 
against this criticism on two grounds, Firstly, I would argue that, 
while his utopian conception of laughter certainly does attempt to 
reveal the true nature of laughter, it nevertheless avoids the 
essentialist pitfall of trying to transcend history. The reason for 
this is that Bakhtin locates the source of utopian laughter in a 
precise spatio-temporal context: in the carnivalesque practices of 
the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Utopian laughter, in other 
words, was realised in the particular historical configurations of 
those periods. Secondly, I would argue that it is precisely the 
appeal to a utopian conception of laughter that provides Bakhtin's 
analysis with its critical force. Not only does he chart the 
transitory significance of laughter, he also attempts to explain how 
the social, cultural and political conditions that allowed utopian 
laughter to be realised in the Middle Ages and Renaissance have 
subsequently limited the possibility of it resurfacing. Post- 
Renaissance forms of laughter are thus read critically in terms of 
the extent to which they depart from this utopian benchmark. In 
this way, Bakhtin's conception of utopian laughter grounds his 
critique of the historical development of laughter. 
b) Utopia and language 
The second area in which Bakhtin's utopian conception of 
carnival is put to use is in his theory of language, where it serves 
to illustrate the conditions under which discourse becomes 
dialogic. Bakhtin's account of the dialogic nature of language has 
both a descriptive and a prescriptive dimension, and it is the 
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prescriptive sense for which carnival provides an archetype. At the 
descriptive level, the account is set out most thoroughly in 
Voloshinov's Marxism and the Philosophy ofLanguage (Voloshinov, 
1973). Here, Voloshinov expounds his theory of the dialogic nature 
of language against the background of two alternative trends of 
thought in the philosophy of language, 'individualistic subjectivism' 
and 'abstract objectivism' (1973: 48). The former trend, 
represented by the speech-act theories of von Humboldt, Vossler 
and Croce is correct, he argues, in focusing on the unit of the 
utterance. It is mistaken, however, in treating this unit in 
isolation, and in accrediting signification either to the speaker him 
or herself, or to a system of normative rules which govern all 
utterances. The latter trend, represented by the structuralism of 
Ferdinand de Saussure, is mistaken in privileging an abstract, 
linguistic system ('Ia langue') at the expense of the actual speech 
utterances themselves ('parole'): 
The actual reality of language-speech is not the abstract 
system of lirtguisticfo, ii 
, 
not the isolated monologic 
utterance, and not the psychophysiological act of its 
implementation, but the social event of verbal interaction 
implemented in an utterance or utterances. (Voloshinov: 1973: 94) 
The dialogic nature of language, then, derives from the fact that 
the linguistic sign is an essentially social phenomenon, a locus of 
interaction between speaking subjects and the context within 
which they find themselves. The word, in other words, 
is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose 
word it is and for whom it is meant. As word, it is 
precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between 
speaker and listener, addresser and addressee. (1973: 86) 
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The word stands in a dialogic relationship to addresser and 
addressee, then, but it also enjoys a dialogic relationship with the 
utterances surrounding it and to all of the sedimented meanings 
generated through its past performances. VoloshinoVs theory thus 
identifies signification as a dynamic process, a process inextricably 
bound to the dialogic context of communication. 
The prescriptive dimension to Bakhtin's concept of dialogism is 
closely related to this descriptive sense. Given the dialogic context 
of signification, each sign is necessarily going to be saturated with 
a range of different 'accents' (Voloshinov, 1973: 23). Language, in 
other words, is permeated through and through by contending 
accents, registers and dialects, each pertaining to different social 
groups. It is this heteroglottic quality of language that'maintains 
its vitality and dynamism and the capacity for further development' 
(1973: 23). Voloshinov argues, however, that it is in the interests 
of the dominant class 'to impart a supraclass, eternal character' to 
linguistic signs (1973: 23). This not only projects a sense of the 
unambiguity and univalence of serious discourse, 
- 
the medium 
. 
preferred by those in authority - it also projects, as we have already 
seen, a sense of social and ideological cohesion (Bakhtin, 198 1: 
67). This centripetal tendency is threatened on two counts, 
however. Firstly it is threatened by the heteroglottic nature of 
language, which means that, in spite of the operations of the 
unifying tendency, there is always the potential within language for 
the social diversity of speech types' to be revealed. Secondly it is 
threatened by the dialogic dynamism of language, which entails 
that there is always the potential within language to challenge the 
alleged stability of signification. Apart from being the natural state 
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of language, then, 
- 
language as a locus of dynamic interaction 
between speaking subjects 
- 
the concept of the dialogic also has a 
prescriptive, valorised sense where it refers to forms of discourse 
capable of undermining the monologic illusion of a unitary 
language. In so doing, dialogic discourse is supposed to reveal the 
power relations reflected in the diversity of speech types, relations 
which monologic discourse works to conceal. 
Bakhtin's favoured example of dialogic discourse in the field of 
literature is the novel, which he defines 'as a diversity of speech 
types (sometimes even diversity of languages) and a diversity of 
individual voices, artistically organized' (Bakhtin, 1981: 262). By 
orchestrating a plethora of voices and styles in this way, '[tlhe 
signifying process of the novel, ' as Hirschkop has put it, 'lays bare 
the social materiality of discourse... in the form of (quoting 
Bakhtin): 
the actual and always self-interested use to which this 
meaning is put and the way it is expressed by the 
speaker, a use determined by the speaker's position (profession, class, and so forth) and the concrete 
situation. (Bakhtin, 1981: 401; quoted in Hirschkop, 1986: 101-2) 
The dialogic nature of the novel thus lays bare the dialogic nature 
of language, and, crucially, Bakhtin traces this novelistic dialogism 
back to the folk practices of carnival. This is partly because it was 
in the language of the marketplace 'that devices were first worked 
out for constructing images of a language, ' for laying bare the 
social materiality of discourse (Bakhtin, 1981: 400). For example, 
4on the stages of local fairs and at buffoon spectacles, the 
heteroglossia of the clown sounded forth, ridiculing all "languages" 
and dialects' (1981: 273). Carnival thus provided the novelist, as 
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we have seen in Bakhtin's study of Rabelais, with a reservoir of 
dialogic practices, with a range of speech genres, accents and 
voices culled from the marketplace: it allowed for'the 
carnivalization of speech' (1981: 426). However, Bakhtin's 
argument does not revolve simply around the historical connection 
between Rabelais and carnivalesque practices-, there is also a 
utopian dimension to the argument. The utopian conception of 
carnival incorporates a communicative utopia: carnival is 
envisaged as a period of unbridled communicative freedom, giving 
rise to: 
special forms of marketplace speech and gesture, frank 
and free, permitting no distance between those who came 
in contact with each other and liberating from norms of 
etiquette decency imposed at other times. (1984: 10) 
As Peter Flaherty has noted, such a conception has strong 
affinities with JfArgen Habermas' notion of an 'ideal speech 
community', 'where all forms of communication might mingle freely 
in a utopian realm of full discursive equality' (Flaherty, 1986: 423). 
Carnival provides a site where such possibilities are first realised, 
and the novel in turn drew on this discursive utopia. Thus, as 
Gardiner rightly points out, 'for Bakhtin, the novel is a repository 
of critical social knowledge which most approidmates his cherished 
ideal of dialogism and which positively accentuates this ideal' 
(Gardiner, 1992: 176). The utopian communicative conditions of 
carnival therefore provide Bakhtin with an archetype for dialogic 
discourse, and it is on the basis of such a model that Bakhtin 
undertakes his analysis of the novel. 
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c) Utopian critique of Stalinism 
We have seen two areas within which Bakhtin's utopian 
conception of carnival provides a grounding for his critical project. 
The third area concerns the Stalinist system under which Bakhtin 
lived. As Clark and Holquist have argued, at the level of 'political 
allegorY, the utopian conception of carnival constructs a liberatory 
alternative to the repression of the totalitarian regime (Clark and 
Holquist, 1984: 309). This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, 
as they point out, '[alttempts were made by Stalinists to coopt... 
carnival techniques of inversion for their own purposes' (1984: 
309). Richard Stites' study of Russian popular culture is quite 
instructive in describing the way in which the Soviet system put its 
faith in the circus, for example (Stites, 1992). Secondly, in 1935 
Anatoly Lunacharsky, Stalin's ex-Commissar of Education, had 
published an article extolling the safety-valve theory of carnival. 
As Clark and Holquist speculate, Bakhtin would probably have 
read this article, and his own theory of carnival's utopian potential 
can be interpreted as some sort of response to what can be seen as 
the official Soviet position (Clark and Holquist, 1984: 313). In 
identifying carnival as a site of liberation, popular protest, and fully 
egalitarian social relations, then, Bakhtin's vision of a 
camivalesque utopia represents an allegorical alternative to the 
Stalinist system. 
Dominick LaCapraýs discussion of Bakhtin extends somewhat 
the conclusion reached by Clark and Holquist (LaCapra, 1983). 
Situating Bakhtin finnly within the traditions of marýdst thought 13, 
LaCapra argues that Bakhtin's study of Rabelais 'can be read as a 
hidden polemic directed against Stalinist uses of Mar,, dsm in the 
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Soviet regime of the 1930s and 1940s'(1983: 321). The populism 
which pervades Rabelais and His World, 
- 
and which is most 
clearly in evidence in the utopian construction of the carnivalesque 
- 
can be seen, LaCapra argues, as an attempt by Bakhtin to 
reassert the populist Impulses of Mandsm which had been so 
distorted by Stalin. The fight to make Rabelais a man of the 
people, ' in other words, 'is a fight to make Marx a man of the 
people' (1983: 322). Further. LaCapra argues, insofar as carnival 
is ideallsed as a festive alternative to the monotony of people's 
everyday existence, Bakhtin's text can be read as a'rethinking of 
Marxism': Bakhtin corrects the productivist empliasis within 
mandst economics by offering a counterpart of utopian freedom 
(1983: 322). While Marxism might provide a critical analysis of 
capitalist social relations, then, Bakhtin's utopian conception of 
carnival provides an important vision of an 'alternative social 
context' (1983: 324). Such a vision can be of value, LaCapra 
argues, in thinking creatively about the social and political 
structures that might replace capitalist social relations. 
d) Conclusions 
We have seen three areas, then, within which Bakhtin's 
analysis of carnival's utopian dimension operates with a critical 
impetus: his study of the historical development of laughter: his 
theory of dialogic discourse; and his relationship both to Stalinism 
and to Mandsm. Before we leave this issue, however, it is worth 
turning to look at some critiques of utopian thinking in order to 
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consider the extent to which Bakhtin's own utopian project might 
be susceptible to them. 
A good starting point for this discussion is Gardiner's two 
studies of the utopian dimension to Bakhtin's thought (Gardiner, 
1992 and 1993). Gardiner identifies two problematic forms of 
utopian thinking, the 'nostalgic utopia' and the 'total utopia' (1993: 
23). As Gardiner explains, nostalgic utopias look back to a 
moment from the past as a Golden Age, and this is idealised as an 
alternative to the problems of the present. Following Barbara 
Goodwin's analysis of such forms of utopia, Gardiner argues that 
they tend to be 'fundamentally fatalistic and unconstructive' 
insofar as they render 'the thinker impotent with respect to both 
present and future unless he hopes for a cyclical revival, or 
believes that social developments can in time be reversed' 
(Gardiner, 1993: 23; quoting Goodwin, 1982: 23). Total utopias, 
on the other hand, which advance a comprehensive blueprint for 
an alternative way of organising society, are usually flawed 
because of the way in which they conceal the real social 
contradictions of the present. As Gardiner puts it, they project 'a 
false unity which legitimates a particular power structure and 
obscures the reality of divergent material interests' (1993: 25). 
Frederick Engels advances a similar argument against the utopian 
approaches of Fourier, Owen and Saint-Simon in Socialism: 
Utopian and Scientific (Engels, 1975). The problem with these 
approaches, Engels argues, is that they attempt to transcend the 
reality of social relations. As a result, he concludes, they lack the 
necessary critical understanding of social relations, and, what is 
inore, they are unable to provide an account of the manner in 
68 
which their utopian model might be brought about. For this 
reason, he contends, we need '[tjo make a science of socialism', to 
place it 'upon a real basis' (1975: 62). 
In many ways, Bakhtin's utopian conception of carnival would 
seem to reproduce the problems cited here. Firstly, in discovering 
utopia in the carnivalesque practices of the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance, Bakhtin would appear to leave himself open to the 
charges levelled by Goodwin: namely, that there is an inevitable 
conservatism to this process of idealising a particular configuration 
form the past. Secondly, although the Bakhtinian carnivalesque 
can't really be seen as a form of total utopia, it would in many 
ways seem to represent a similar flight from the real. As both 
LaCapra and Gardiner have argued, for example, Bakhtin's theory 
of carnival lacks a comprehensive account of the interrelationship 
between institutions, politics and carnival (LaCapra, 1983: 323; 
Gardiner, 1992: 187). In the absence of such an account. it is not 
altogether clear how the utopian conditions of carnival might 
effectively be realised. 
However, in the face of these potential problems, Gardiner 
advances a convincing defence of Bakhtin. Here, he draws on Tom 
Moylan's concept of the 'critical utopia', which he characterises in 
two ways (Gardiner, 1993: 26). Firstly, the critical utopia 
maintains its links with the real. It doesn't simply project a vision 
of an imaginary alternative context, but attempts to negotiate the 
relationship between utopian possibilities, 'actual socio-historical 
movements and the activities and desires of particular social 
groups' (1993: 26). Secondly, the critical utopia adopts a sceptical 
view of the dominant tradition of utopian thinking, the tradition 
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represented by nostalgic and total utopias. Critical utopias, in 
contrast, resist the desire to advance a blueprint of a future 
utopian society, and insist instead upon 'the multiplicity of 
possible futures', rejecting'the systematisation and closure 
characteristic of the traditional utopia' (1993: 26). 
Bakhtin's utopian carnival, Gardiner argues, falls under the 
rubric of the critical utopia outlined here. In respect of the first 
characteristic, Bakhtin's carnival preserves its link with the real, 
and it achieves this in a number of ways. Not only does Bakhtin's 
theory locate the utopian potential of carnival within a specific 
historical moment, 
-a point noted above - but its description of 
carnival stresses the extent to which carnival is not simply an 
abstract realm, but a set of practices which are preoccupied with 
the concrete. As we have seen, carnival is dominated by the 
physical, the sensuous and the material: carnivalesque bodies 
merge together in a profusion of grotesque imagery. The 'utopian 
tones' of carnival, Bakhtin argues, 'were immersed in the depths of 
concrete, practical life, a life that could be touched, that was filled 
with aroma and sound' (Bakhtin, 1984: 185). In addition to this, 
the carnivalesque negation of official imagery, represented in 
images of 'the backside, the lower stratum, the inside out, and the 
topsy-turvy', is not, as Bakhtin argues, 'an abstract, absolute 
negation that clearly cuts off the object from the rest of the world' 
(Bakhtin, 1984: 411). Rather, it is inextricably linked to the 
material processes of reality: 
it actually offers a description of the world's 
metamorphoses, its remodeling, its transfer from the old 
to the new, from the past to the future. It is the world 
passing through the phase of death on the way to birth. (Bakhtin, 1984: 412) 
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As Gardiner argues, then, Bakhtinian carnival can be considered a 
critical utopia insofar as it projects not an abstract vision, but a 
world that is inextricably related to real practices and concrete, 
material imagery. 
In respect of the second characteristic identified in the critical 
utopia, Gardiner argues that Bakhtin displays a critical awareness 
of the problems of the dominant tradition of utopian thought. 
Rather than constructing an image of a closed, static alternative 
order, Bakhtin's utopia is 'a ceaselessly dynamic one, always 
remaining confrontational, unpredictable, and self-mocking' 
(Gardiner, 1993: 37: and 1993: 139). As we have seen, 
carnivalesque imagery is preoccupied with ambivalence, 
transformation and metamorphosis. Indeed, it was precisely as a 
result of this preoccupation that carnival proved during the 
Renaissance to be such a furtive resource for challenging the stasis 
that pervaded the medieval world view. Carnivalesque grotesque 
imagery unleashed a new historical consciousness, an awareness 
of the contingency of current social arrangements, and of the 
potential for such arrangements to be transformed. 
We might turn back briefly to Rabelais'work in order to 
contrast this dynamic form of utopia with its static alternative. 
Towards the end of the First Book, Gargantua builds a new 
monastic order, the Abbey of Th6l6me. The Abbey represented a 
reversal of all of the rules typically governing monastic life. Indeed, 
in the Th6l6me rule bookthere was only one clause: DO WHAT 
yOU WILI: (Rabelais, 1955: 159). In spite of this apparent 
freedom, however, Rabelais provides a detailed description of the 
Abbey: its architectural design*, its inscription; the way in which to 
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enter the order: the monks'and nuns'apparel (1955: 149-63). 
Each of these details represents a transgression of the doctrines of 
religious life, and as a result, the Abbey of Th6kme has been 
incorporated within the canon of utopian thought itself (e. g. 
Goodwin, 1982: 42). 
Bakhtin's discussion of the Abbey of Th6l6me in Rabelais and 
His World foregrounds the distinction between static and dynamic 
utopias. VVhile he registers the fact that the Abbey does represent 
a negation of the actual order, as much carnivalesque imagery 
does, he argues that it nevertheless has 'a rather formalistic 
aspect' in comparison with the concrete nature of true, 
carnivalesque negation (Bakhtin, 1984: 412). Indeed, he cites the 
Abbey of Th6l6me episode as one of those moments in Rabelais 
where 'bookish and official language prevafl[sl' (1984: 453). As a 
result, he argues, the Thdl6me episode 'is characteristic neither of 
Rabelais' philosophy nor of his system of images, nor of his style' 
(1984: 138). 'This is not a popular festive mood'. he concludes, 
'but a court and humanist utopia' (1984: 138). In distinguishing 
between the stasis of the Th6l6me utopia, - which he situates 
within the sphere of official culture - and the dynamism, of the 
carnivalesque utopia, - which embodies the rebelliousness of 
unofficial discourse - Bakhtin's utopian conception of carnival 
qualifies as a form of critical utopia. 
Gardiner's analysis of the utopian carnival would thus seem 
appropriate. Bakhtin projects a dynamic, concretised vision of 
utopia, and in this way he is able to avoid some of the problems 
that have traditionally been associated with utopian thinking. As I 
have argued in this section, then, we can defend Bakhtin's utopian 
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conception of carnival on the grounds of its critical potential, and 
we can see three specific areas in Bakhtin's work where this 
potential is realised: in his analysis of the historical development of 
laughter; in his theory of dialogic discourse; and in his allegorical 
critique of Stalinism. Further, just as we argued earlier that a 
dynamic model of popular culture was capable of helping to 
provide us with a'guarantee not that a different, better future is 
inevitable but that it is at least available through present struggle' 
(Yeo and Yeo, 1981: 130; quoted above), so it is possible that the 
dynamism of the utopian carnival might assist in a similar sort of 
process. I would agree with the conclusion drawn by Gardiner, 
then, that 
the utopian dream furtively glimpsed in the symbols and 
practices of carnival and elsewhere must be linked to an 
anti-hegemonic or transformative politics, for only then 
can the authoritarian structures of modem bureaucratic 
societies be effectively challenged and created anew. (Gardiner, 1993: 47) 
Conclusion 
In the course of this chapter, I have outlined Bakhtin's theory of 
carnival and explained the role that it plays in his analysis of 
Rabelais. Vv%fle I have noted the problematic nature of certain 
aspects of his theory, I have sought to defend a conception of 
carnival both as a historical category and as a utopian category. 
Although the discussion of this utopian dimension has been of 
prime significance to a thorough exegesis of Bakhtin's theory of 
carnival, it has tended to move us away from the central issue with 
73 
which I am concerned: comic theory. What I want to do in the next 
chapter, then, is to refocus on the topic of comic theory by 
exploring some of the methodological issues relating to a historical 
analysis of comic theories. 
Notes 
Hellenistic and Roman culture consisted of a combination of 
Latin and Greek languages, amongst others. Most wesiern 
European societies during the Middle Ages saw both Latin and 
vernacular languages in use. 
2 Rabelais published Pantagruel in 1532, while Gargantua, the 
story of Pantagruel's father, was published two years later. The 
Third, Fourth and Fifth books, which continue to tell the tale of 
Pantagruel's eventful life, were published in 1546,1549 and 
1562-64 respectively. The Penguin edition includes all five 
books under the heading 2"he Histories of Gargantua and 
Pantagruel (Rabelais, 1955). Similarly, Bakhtin's study 
broaches each of the five books. 
3 In Rabelais and His World, Bakhtin explains the timing of these 
events slightly differently. He says: 'America was still to be 
discovered, the Antipodes reached, the Western hemisphere 
explored, and the question arose: "What is under our feet? "' (1984: 271-2). 
4 Rabelais had himself studied medicine. 
5 There are two points to be made here. Firstly, Bakhtin's 
analysis of the folkloric. chronotope centres largely on pre-class 
society, corresponding to the first stage of his cultural 
periodisation rather than the second binary stage where he 
locates carnival. Secondly. since Bakhtin's concept of the 
chronotope refers to the time-space co-ordinates around which 
a narrative is structured, strictly speaking carnival does not 
have a chronotope, since it does not have a narrative structure. 
However, there remains a clear overlap between the spatial and 
temporal features of carnival and the Rabelaistan chronotope. 
6 Again. I am using the idea of the chronotope here not to refer to 
the spatio-temporal organisation of narrative, but rather to the 
space-time co-ordinates of the dominant world view in the 
Middle Ages. 
7 In Chapter Seven, I will focus on John Fiske's attempt to use 
the concept of carnival as a theoretical category with which to 
analyse popular culture (Fiske, 1987,1989a, 1989b). 
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8 We perhaps need to consider the relationship between Bakhtin's 
cultural periodisation and the historical example of Romans in 
1580. Within the terms of Bakhtin's schema, 1580 would seem 
to fall within the Renaissance stage. As a result it might be 
argued that, for all that Le Roy Ladurie's study perhaps 
contributes to our understanding of the historical development 
of carnival, the conclusions that we might derive from it do not 
necessarily count against Bakhtin's analysis of carnival 
practices in the Middle Ages. However, Bakhtin posits a 
continuity between carnival practices of the Middle Ages and 
the Renaissance. Indeed, it was on the basis of this continuity 
that carnival forms were able to penetrate high cultural forms 
during the Renaissance, and it was only after the Renaissance 
that such forms began to decline (Bakhtin, 1984: 33,217-18). 
Similarly, Le Roy Ladurie situates the Romans carnival of 1580 
within the lineage of popular traditions stretching back to the 
Middle Ages (Le Roy Ladurie, 1979: 294). It would thus seem 
reasonable to compare Le Roy Ladurie's analysis of carnival 
with Bakhtin's. 
9 Aristotle's Poetics is generally regarded as the earliest work of 
literary theory. It was also probably the earliest work of comic 
theory, but unfortunately the second volume of the Poetics, 
where Aristotle supposedly dealt with comedy, was lost long 
before Aristotle's work was rediscovered in Europe during the 
Middle Ages. Undeterred, and drawing on a number of Medieval 
texts which seem to cohere with Aristotle's theory of tragedy, 
Greek scholars, literary theorists and comic theorists have been 
trying to piece together an Aristotelian theory of comedy ever 
since. In his book Aristotle on Comedy - Towards a 
Reconstruction of Poetics H, for example, Richard Janko draws 
on the D-actatus Coislinianus, probably from the tenth century, 
an anonymous Prolegomenon to Comedy, from the eleventh or 
twelfth centuries, and John Tzetzes' Iambi de Comedia (twelfth 
century), in a reconstruction of Aristotle's theory (Janko, 1984). 
Umberto Eco's novel, The Name of the Rose, similarly includes a 
reconstruction of Aristotle's theory (Eco, 1984b: 90). 
10 E. g. Northrop Frye, R. S. Crane, Wayne Booth. 
11 Bakhffn fell foul of Stalin's authorities, and was arrested and 
exiled in 1929. It was not until the late 1950s that he was free 
to teach and write with impunity. It is partly as a result of this 
situation that there is confusion surrounding the authorship of 
some work now attributed to Bakhtin. 
12 The discussion from chapter three onwards will attempt to 
situate various comic theories in relation to the historical 
framework set out here by Bakhtin. This will allow for a more 
lengthy consideration of the adequacy of this framework. 
13 In Chapter Four I will consider the relationship between 
Bakhtin and Marxism in more detail. 
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Chapter Two 
Reading comic theory 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Bakhtin's study of 
Rabelais not only advances an analysis of the various practices 
and forms of imagery associated with carnival, it also incorporates 
a thesis about the decline in the significance of those practices and 
forms of imagery in post-Renaissance culture. In the course of this 
dissertation, I want to use Bakhtin's thesis as a starting point for a 
historical analysis of comic theory. As such, my project might be 
characterised as a form of intellectual history, a field of study 
whose methodological principles have in recent years sustained a 
number of theoretical interrogations (e. g. LaCapra, 1983 and 1985; 
LaCapra and Kaplan, 1982; R6e, 1978: Rorty, Schneewind and 
Skinner, 1984; White, 1978). In this chapter, I will address some 
of the methodological issues that have been raised in the field of 
intellectual history, in order to set out in more detail the form that 
my own analysis of comic theory might take. In the first section of 
the chapter, I will argue that Bakhtin's concept of dialogism 
complements a recent emphasis in the field of intellectual history 
on the dialogic imperative of historical analysis. In the second 
section, I will relate Bakhtin's analysis of carnival to some recent 
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work within the area of comic theory in order to reveal the extent to 
which his analysis complements contemporary developments 
within that field. 
Reading Comic Theory 
I use the label 'comic theory as a means of drawing together 
theoretical explorations of a range of phenomena that can be 
classed as 'comic': carnival, jokes, comic narrative, comic imagery, 
puns, parody. One potential problem with such a label is that the 
range of phenomena grouped within the class 'comic' is so diverse, 
and it is not immediately clear that such diversity can be dealt with 
appropriately under a single heading. There would seem to be two 
ways to negotiate such a problem, the first of which would be to 
appeal to dictionary definitions of 'the comic'. This is an approach 
taken by Steve Neale and Frank Krutnik, who argue that, since the 
dictionary definition of 'comic' is 'causing. or meant to cause 
laughter', so 'its field of potential reference is extensive', ranging 
from particular texts to certain situations (Neale and Krutnik, 
1990: 15-16). For our purposes we might need to modify this 
definition somewhat, since we want to exclude laughter that is 
brought about by nervousness, tickling or drugs from our scope of 
study. Further, we might expand the definition of the comic to 
include phenomena which might not produce laughter itself, but 
nevertheless produce the pleasurable feeling of amusement that 
typically accompanies laughter. What the dictionary definition 
approach allows us to do, however, is identify a unitary quality - 
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the potential to produce laughter and/or related pleasures 
- 
amongst a range of diverse phenomena. 
The second way of negotiating the problem of diversity is to 
appeal to Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances (e. g. Eco, 
1984a: Nelson, 1990: 22, Horton, 1991: 4). Eco adopts this 
approach in his critique of carnival, grouping it together with 
'humour, comedy, grotesque, parody, satire, wit, and so on'under 
the heading of the 'comic' (Eco, 1984a: 1). The purpose of dealing 
with the comic in this way is that by explaining it in terms of a 
$network of family resemblances', we are relieved of the burden of 
having to stipulate a unitary quality shared by all of the 
phenomena listed; 
It should be noted that while the scope of the term 'comic' 
advanced in each of these two approaches is roughly equivalent, 
there are nevertheless certain differences between them. While the 
first approach, for example, would suggest that we need to 
distinguish between, say, comic and non-comic parody (Neale and 
Krutnik, 1990: 18), the second approach 
- 
at least in Eco's version 
-of it 
- 
implies that parodic techniques as a whole bear significant 
resemblances to other phenomena included under the tenn 'comic'. 
Thus, Eco might argue, while certain forms of parody might not 
necessarily share the unitary quality identified by Neale and 
Krutnik, 
- 
the potential to produce laughter and/or related 
pleasures - the proximity between the structure of such forms and 
the structure of parodic forms which do enjoy that quality is such 
to merit their joint inclusion within the category of the 'comic'. In 
this sense, the scope of the term 'comic' advanced in the second 
approach would appear to be more wide-ranging than that 
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advanced in the first approach. At another level, however. while 
the second approach seems to limit its ascription of family 
resemblances to a range of different genres, forms and techniques, 
the definition offered by the first approach is more extensive, 
including'[a] real event... a real person or an instance of everyday 
discourse' within 'its field of potential reference' (Neale and 
Krutnik, 1990: 16). Given these discrepancies between the two 
approaches, it seems unlikely that we will be able to formulate an 
exact delineation of the term'comic'. However, given the high 
degree of convergence between the two approaches, this would not 
seem to pose too many problems for an analysis of comic theory. 
Indeed, we might attempt to delimit the scope of the analysis by 
appealing to both of the approaches outlined. All of the theories 
with which we will deal, then, attempt either to investigate or 
account for phenomena which, whether intentionally or 
accidentally. might be productive of laughter and/or related 
pleasures; or to investigate or account for phenomena which, by 
virtue of a family resemblance with other related phenomena. 
might be classed as 'comic'. 
It should also be pointed out that the diversity of comic 
phenomena does not simply pose terminological problems of the 
sort that we have been discussing, however. It also raises certain 
historical problems. As we have seen, it is Bakhtin's contention 
that the signification of comic phenomena has changed throughout 
history. 'Do we of the twentieth century laugh as did Rabelais and 
his contemporariesT he asks (Bakhtin, 1984: 134). If the answer 
is 'no', as Bakhtin suggests, then the comic theorist of the 
twentieth century and the comic theorist of the sixteenth century 
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do not differ merely in terms of the disparate comic phenomena 
that they address. They might also differ in terms of the very 
meaning of the laughter which they set out to explore. 
Consequently, it would appear that there is an important historical 
dimension to comic theory. In addition to these historical 
problems, it should be noted that the various comic theories we are 
going to address have been formulated within a disparate range of 
conceptual frameworks, from Kantian aesthetics to postmodem 
theory, via Bergsonian metaphysics, Freudian psychoanalysis and 
Brechtian theory. Given this diversity, it is likely that problems of 
incommensurability will arise in a comparative analysis of these 
various theoretical paradigms. We therefore need to consider the 
most appropriate way of negotiating these historical and theoretical 
problems in our analysis. In order to do this I wish to look first at 
what I consider to be two inappropriate forms of analysis: the 
'History of Philosophy' approach, as it has been labelled by 
Jonathan We (116e, 1978), and the 'reconstruction of the past' 
approach, as it has been labelled by Dominick LaCapra (LaCapra, 
1983: 61). 1 will then proceed to outline what I consider to be an 
appropriate form of inquiry by looking at some methodological 
issues that have recently been addressed within the field of 
intellectual history, and by relating them to Bakhtin's concept of 
dialogism. 
a) 'History of philosophy' 
Jonathan We identifies several problems in what he calls the 
'History of Philosophy' approach to philosophical texts. 'Ibis 
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approach presents the history of philosophy as a succession of 
ideas, most of which can be viewed with hindsight as erroneous. 
As such, the value of investigating the history of philosophy is to 
indicate the mistakes of the past in order to legitimate 
contemporary philosophical positions. Such investigations are 
typically very limited, rarely exploring questions of historiography, 
and rarely consulting any sources beyond a range of canonised 
philosophical texts. Further, the 'History of Philosophy' approach 
projects a continuity between the philosophers of the past and 
today's professional philosophers, treating the former'as though 
they were participants at a modern philosophical conference' (Rde, 
1978: 2). Overall, argues We, such an approach is profoundly 
unhistorical. As such, he concludes, it 
is perhaps less important for what it says than for what it 
conceals. It hides the way in which philosophical 
problems and the range of conceivable philosophical 
positions'vary historically, and the ways in which the 
present 
- 
including one's own philosophical outlook 
- 
is a 
product of the past. (1978: 32) 
We might cite John Morreall's anthology ne Philosophy of 
Laughter and Humor as an example of this approach in the field of 
comic theory (Morreall, 1987). Although this is a very useful 
collection of extracts from philosophical discussions of comic 
phenomena, rather than an historical analysis of them, Morreall's 
introduction to the anthology displays several of the features 
identified by Rde. Morreall explains the traditional neglect of comic 
phenomena within philosophy as a result of Plato and Aristotle's 
treatment of them as 'ethically suspect' (1987: 3). And since the 
'Superiority Theory'l of humour that they proposed was dogged by 
, Sloppy theorising', such sloppiness 'has troubled the whole history 
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of thought on laughter and humor' (1987: 4). In this way, Morreall 
presents the history of philosophies of humour as a largely self- 
contained process. While he does recognise historical transitions 
In the terminology surrounding comic phenomena, he doesn't 
consider the way in which factors beyond the scope of 
philosophical texts might have impinged on such processes. It is 
only with the advent of contemporary 'Incongruity Theories'2 of 
humour, Morreall suggests, that the problems of previous theories 
of humour have finally been overcome. As such, the history of the 
philosophy of humour is presented largely as a history of mistakes. 
For all that Morreall's collection draws together an interesting 
range of readings, it is not clear that he leaves us in a position to 
address adequately either the historical problems (concerning the 
historically transitory significance of comic phenomena), or the 
theoretical problems (concerning the disparate conceptual 
frameworks within which comic theories have been formulated) 
that we have raised above. 
b) Reconstructing the past 
Another mode of inquiry that would seem to be unable to 
negotiate these problems adequately is the approach that 
Dominick LaCapra has labelled the 'reconstruction of the past'. 
According to LaCapra, this approach relies upon a'documentary 
conception' of history (LaCapra 1983: 6 1), making use of 
documents from the past to reconstruct the meaning of particular 
texts. Such an approach is, as LaCapra admits, a vital part of any 
intellectual history. However, an intellectual history that relies 
82 
solely upon such an approach falls victim to certain problems. The 
first problem is that it often leads to a'narrowly historicist' 
conception of history( 1983: 62). In reconstructing a specift 
historical configuration, LaCapra argues, the narrowly historicist 
position tends to ignore historical processes, and the way in which 
a specific configuration might belong to a more long-term process. 
The second problem is that there is a tendency for the historian 
who adopts such an approach to fail to apply their historicism to 
their own historical position. The reconstruction of the past that 
they undertake, therefore, is considered to remain unaffected by 
any interpretative insights that might derive from their own specific 
historical location. As such, LaCapra argues, 'historical truth' is 
presented 'in an essentially nonhistorical way' U 983: 62). The 
third problem is that while this approach pays a great deal of 
attention to contextual detail in reconstructing the significance of a 
particular text at a particular moment - unlike the 'History of 
Philosophy' approach, 
- 
all too often the relationship between text 
and context is undertheorised. Very often, for example, this 
approach will appeal to the context in order to ground its 
reconstruction of the text's significance. However, such'an 
appeal... is deceptive, ' LaCapra argues: 'one never has - at least in 
the case of complex texts - the context' (1983: 35). LaCapra's 
critique of the 'reconstruction of the past' approach, then, would 
suggest that we need to look elsewhere if we are to negotiate 
successfully the historical and theoretical problems we have 
identified. 
If we were to identify a text within the field of comic theory that 
incorporates the 'reconstruction of the past' approach, then we 
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might turn to Bakhtin's Rabelais and His World. As we have seen, 
one stage in Bakhtin's argument is to reconstruct the specific 
historical configuration that obtained in the Renaissance in order 
to determine the significance of Rabelais'text. However, Bakhtin 
combines this approach with a certain historical sensitivity, and in 
doing so he manages to avoid the problems identified by LaCapra. 
Firstly, he avoids a narrowly historicist position by situating the 
dominant features of Renaissance culture in relation to long-term 
processes of cultural transformation. Secondly, he attempts to 
historicise his own reading of Rabelais by situating it in relation to 
the historical trajectory of Rabelaistan scholarship. finally, from 
the dialogic model of signification that Bakhtin expounds in more 
detail elsewhere, we can derive an account of the relationship 
between a text and its context that avoids the problem of over- 
simplification identified by LaCapra, a point to which we shall 
return later. 
c) Dialogic approaches 
LaCapra's response to the problems associated with the 
6 reconstruction of the past' approach is to propose a dialogic 
approach to intellectual history. I will argue that such an 
approach is capable of overcoming the problems encountered so 
far, and, further, that Bakhtin's theoretical position Complements 
such an approach. I want to focus on two aspects of LaCapra's 
approach: first, his theorisation of the relationship between text 
and context; second, his formulation of a dialogic approach to 
intellectual history. 
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Much of LaCapra's recent work has explored the complexities 
involved in the relationship between a text and its context, and he 
has sought to draw certain conclusions from this concerning the 
way in which intellectual history ought to proceed3 (LaCapra, 1983 
and 1985). LaCapra focuses on two principal factors which 
complicate the text-context relationship. The first factor is that our 
knowledge of particular contexts is itself acquired textually: 'the 
very reconstruction of a "context" or a "reality" takes place on the 
basis of "textualized" remainders of the past' (1983: 27). As a 
result, LaCapra argues, we cannot use a contextual reading to 
ground a fixed and final interpretation of a particular text, because 
historical contexts themselves call for interpretation. His response 
is 'to formulate as a problem what is often taken, deceptively, as a 
solution, ' and to argue for a circumspect approach to the role of 
contextual information in an interpretation of a particular text 
(1983: 16). Contextual material not only needs to treated as 
though it were a text, but we also need to register its multivalent 
quality. For any one text, in other words, there are always several 
contexts to which an interpretation might appeal: 'the author's 
intentions, a corpus of texts, a genre, a biography, the economic 
infrastructure, modes of production, society and culture.... codes, 
conventions, paradigms, or what have you' (1983: 16). In a similar 
vein, Hayden White has argued that the point of contextual 
analysis is not so much for contextual detail to fill in the gaps in 
our understanding of a particular text, but, rather, to allow us to 
analyse the extent to which 'the context is illuminated in its 
detailed operations by the moves made in [the] text' (White, 1982: 
309). 
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The second aspect of LaCapra's approach 
- 
its dialogic quality 
- 
is closely related to his analysis of the text-context relationship. In 
order to do justice to the complexities involved in the text-context 
relationship, he argues, we need to address the manner in which 
texts signify, the way in which a text might signify differently at 
different times, or for different readerships. LaCapra's argument is 
neatly summarised in the following passage: 
The historian who reads texts either as mere documents 
or as formal entities... does not read them historically 
precisely because he or she does not read them as texts. 
And, whatever else they may be, texts are events in the 
history of language. To understand these multivalent 
events as complex uses of language, one must learn to 
pose anew the question of "what really happens" in them 
and in the reader whom actually reads them. One of the 
most important contexts for reading texts is clearly our 
own... (1983: 65) 
Our interpretation of a particular text, then, is not only going to 
depend upon the particular contexts to which w- appeal, it is also 
going to depend upon the sort of questions that we put to it. And 
our own context is going to determine, at least in part, both the 
contextual material to which we have access, and the range of 
questions which we might be inclined to raise in relation to a 
particular text. LaCapra thus proposes a dialogic approach to 
intellectual history in which, in accepting our own historicity, an 
interpretation of a particular text is envisaged as a dialogue 
between past and present. 
if we consider the way in which this approach might be applied 
to our own historical analysis of comic theory, it would seem that 
three different dialogic relationships emerge: 
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a) The relationship between Bakhtin's texts and the other texts 
in our study. Bakhtin's suggestions for a historical analysis 
of comic theory play a crucial role in determining the way in 
which we analyse these texts. For example, one of the 
central areas of investigation will be the extent to which each 
text appears to articulate the decline of the carnivalesque. in 
this way, our analysis of each text will not only use Bakhtin's 
thesis as an interpretative tool, it will also attempt to test out 
this thesis. 
b) The interrelationship between the various comic theories to be 
analysed (Le. those ofKant, Schopenhauer, Bergson, Fýeud 
and Brecht). In performing a comparative analysis of a range 
of comic theories, our discussion constructs a dialogic 
relationship both between those texts and between the 
contexts within which they are inscribed (e. g. between the 
Enlightenment as an appropriate context within which to 
analyse Kant's theory. and Romanticism as an appropriate 
context within which to analyse Schopenhauer's: see 
Chapter Three) 
- 
C) The relationship between the present and the past. Not only 
is our interpretation of Bakhtin (as advanced in the previous 
chapter) formulated in the context of current debates about 
his work and about the carnivalesque, but our 
interpretations of the other theorists to whom we will turn is 
similarly infon-ned by current concerns within contemporary 
cultural theory. In this way, our discussion very much 
represents a dialogue between the present and the past. 
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Each of our interpretations will involve a combination of the 
three dialogic relationships outlined here. In this way, I hope to 
construct a historical analysis which, in LaCapra's terms, consists 
of 'a "dialogic" exchange both with the past and with others 
inquiring into it' (LaCapra, 1985: 9). 
We are now in a position to consider the way in which such an 
approach might overcome both the historical problems (the 
historically transitory significance of comic phenomena), and the 
theoretical problems (the disparate conceptual frameworks within 
which comic theories have been formulated), identified earlier. 
Firstly, the circumspect approach to texts and their various 
contexts recommended by LaCapra would seem to offer an 
appropriate manner in which to negotiate the historical problems. 
comic theory texts can be related to 'their various pertinent 
contexts' (LaCapra, 1983: 35) in a non-reductive and multivalent 
manner. We might investigate such texts, in other words, for what 
they reveal about the decline of the carnivalesque at a particular 
moment, for example. In this way, it might be argued, we will not 
only be in a position to perceive the way in which comic theories 
have developed through time, but we will also be in a position to 
understand the limitations of a particular theory in relation to the 
cultural configuration from which it emerged. This will enable us 
to relate the historical development of comic theories to the 
transitory significance of comic phenomena. Secondly, LaCapra's 
recommendation of a dialogic approach would seem to offer an 
appropriate manner in which to negotiate the theoretical problems 
concerning incommensurability. Unlike the'History of Philosophy' 
approach, characterised above, which supposes an almost 
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universal commensurability between different philosophical 
theories, LaCapra characterises his approach in terms of a 
'dialogue with an "other"': 'a dialogue involves the interpreter's 
attempt to think further what is at issue in a text or past "reality, " 
and in the process the questioner is himself questioned by the 
"other"' (1983: 31 and 32). Rather than playing down the problem 
of incommensurability, then, such a model would seem to suggest 
that, in accepting a theoretical text from the past as 'other', a 
dialogic approach is capable of negotiating its way between two or 
more disparate theoretical frameworks. LaCapra's theory would 
therefore seem to offer an appropriate approach for a historical 
analysis of comic theory. 
it should by now be clear that, with its emphasis on the dialogic 
nature of such an analysis, LaCapra's approach would seem to 
complement Bakhtin's theory of signification. Indeed, Voloshinov's 
analysis of the process of understanding would appear to coincide 
with LaCapra's theory of historical interpretation: 
To understand another person's utterance means to 
orient oneself with respect to it. to find the proper place 
for it in the corresponding context. For each word of the 
utterance that we are in the process of understanding, 
we, as it were, lay down a set of our own answering 
words... 
Thus each of the distinguishable significative elements of 
an utterance and the entire utterance as a whole entity 
are translated in our minds into another active and 
responsive, context. Any true understanding is dialogic in 
nature. (Voloshinov, 1973: 102) 
What this quotation reveals is the extent to which the interpreter is 
him or herself caught up in the process of dialogic deferral, a point 
that we have seen LaCapra formulate in terms of the need for 
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interpreters to recognise their own historicity. Bakhtin returns to 
an analysis of these processes in two of the essays included in the 
collection Speech Genres and Other Late Essays (Bakhtin, 1986) 4, 
where he addresses them specifically in relation to an inquiry into 
methodological techniques in the human sciences. Written very 
much in note form, the two essays fall short of 'a finished, 
consecutively prosecuted argument', as Michael Holquist notes in 
his introduction to the volume (Holquist, 1986: xvii). Further, as 
Tzvetan Todorov has argued, there is a tendency for Bakhtin to fail 
to draw an adequate distinction between, on the one hand, a 
theoretical account of the general laws governing the relationship 
between an utterance and its context (a task undertaken in 
Marxism and the Philosophy ofLanguage), and, on the other hand, 
a theoretical analysis of a specij7c utterance (or text) in relation to 
its various contexts (an undertaking which is very much the task 
of intellectual history) (Todorov, 1984: 24-8). Nevertheless, in spite 
of these shortcomings, we can identify within the two essays three 
key features of Bakhtin's discussion which complement LaCapraýs 
approach to intellectual history. 
The first of these features concerns Bakhtin's emphasis on the 
fact that the object of study in the human sciences is necessarily 
textual (Bakhtin, 1986: 103-4). Given that this is the case, we 
need to consider, in the course of any piece of analysis, some of the 
issues to which the object's textuality gives rise: '[tlhe problem of 
the boundaries between text and context, for example (1986: 161). 
Such concerns bring us to the second feature of Bakhtin's 
commentary, his discussion of the significance of context. Here, 
90 
Bakhtin's position is eloquently summarised in the following 
passage: 
- 
There is neither a first word nor a last word and there are 
no limits to the dialogic context (it extends into the 
boundless past and the boundless future). Even past 
meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of past 
centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and 
for all) 
- 
they will always change (be renewed) in the 
process of subsequent future development of the dialogue. 
At any moment in the development of the dialogue there 
are immense, boundless masses of forgotten contextual 
meanings, but at certain moments of the dialogue's 
subsequent development along the way they are recalled 
and invigorated in renewed form (in a new context). (1986: 170) 
Bakhtin's emphasis here upon the notion of an 'unfinalized 
context' (1986: 160) anticipates LaCapra's own problematisation of 
the procedures of contextual analysis, along with his insistence 
upon our inability to identify the context of a particular text. In his 
discussion both of the role of text, and of the role of context, within 
the human sciences, then, Bakhtin's position reveals strong 
affinities with that of LaCapra. 
Given these affinities, it is no surprise that Bakhtin similarly 
proposes a dialogic approach to research in the human sciences, 
and this is the third feature of his discussion that I wish to 
comment upon. There are two aspects to this emphasis upon 
dialogism. The first concerns the need to treat texts as utterances 
dialogically inscribed within specific contexts (1986: 105). In this 
way, a particular text can be analysed both as a response to a 
particular interlocutor (e. g. an author-, another text; a state of 
affairs; a problem), and as an utterance directed both at a 
particular addressee (e. g. a particular community of readers), and 
at what Bakhtin calls a'superaddressee... (God, absolute truth, the 
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court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of 
history, science, and so forthY (1986: 126). The second aspect 
concerns the imperative for the interpreter of a particular text to 
register their own dialogic relationship with it. Just as is the case 
in microphysics, so in the human sciences: '[tlhe experimenter 
constitutes part of the experimental system' (1986: 123). As a 
result, we need to be aware that the way in which we frame a 
particular text ffor example, the selection of various utterances of 
various scholars or sages of various eras on a single question' 
(1986: 117)) will be a powerful determinant on the way in which a 
text is interpreted. Overall, then, Bakhtin's guidelines for a 
methodology in the human sciences share with LaCapra's 
approach to intellectual history a strong insistence upon the 
necessarily dialogic nature of analytical inquiry. 
d) Dialogic approaches to comic theory 
If we were to look for examples of analyses of comic theory that 
have been carried out in a manner consistent with the dialogic 
approach identified here, then Richard Keller Simon's book The 
Labyrinth of the Comic: TheoTy and Practicefrom Fielding to Freud 
would seem to suffice (Simon, 1985). The title of Simon's study is 
a reference to Henri Bergson's characterisation of the comic as a 
labyrinth, a puzzling network of corridors that we attempt to 
navigate at our peril (1985: 7). Indeed, so perilous is such an 
attempt that, in many ways, 'the inquiry into the comic appears as 
2,500 years of interesting failure' (1985: 241). Such a conclusion 
would seem to suggest that Simon's tack will be akin to a'History 
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of Philosophy' approach to the subject. However, Simon's study 
rejects such an approach and embarks instead on a 
comprehensive analysis of four moments in the history of comic 
theory: the comic fiction of Meredith and Fielding. the 
philosophical exploration of irony in the writings of Soren 
Kierkegaard: the scientific psychological studies of hurnour 
produced by Bain, Darwin, Spencer and Sully; and the 
psychoanalytic theory ofjokes advanced by Freud. His analysis of 
each moment not only reveals the way in which the analysis of the 
comic has developed over time, it also unpicks the various 
intertextual references in each body of work. The conclusion that 
he draws is that the history of comic theory reproduces some of the 
key features of the material it sets out to analyse. Firstly, in 
reproducing the failures and past mistakes of previous theorists, 
comic theory can be seen to be essentially parodic. Secondly, in 
displaying optimism where so many others have failed, the comic 
theorist has much in common with the comic hero. As a result, 
argues Simon, comic theory and comic fiction are revealed to be 
-mutually interdependent forms' (1985: 6). It is not clear, then, 
whether it is finally possible for the theorist to find their way out 
Bergson's comic labyrinth unscathed. However, an analysis of the 
various attempts to do so can reveal important historical aspects of 
the moments within which such attempts were made: the way in 
which the comic was conceived at a particular time, for example, or 
the way in which a particular form of discourse (e. g. 
psychoanalysis) was advanced as a means for mastering the 
unmasterable (1985: 10). Thus, Simon concludes, when it is'read 
as intellectual history, the inquiry into the comic is a rich and 
exciting discourse, a series of remarkable attempts to understand 
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the most essential characteristics of very difficult material' (1985: 
241). 
Simon's analysis displays several of the features recommended 
by LaCapra. First, it represents a clear departure from the 'History 
of Philosophy' approach. Second, it tries to show not only how 
particular theories relate to their various contexts, but, in tracing 
intertextual connections between certain theories 
- 
the relationship 
between Sully and Bakhtin (1985: 206-7), for example, or between 
Freud and Groos (1985: 219-20) - Simon's analysis explores the 
extent to which past theories construct a dialogue with their own 
precursors. Finally, by placing his own analysis within the 
problematic raised by Bergson - the labyrinthine qualities of the 
comic 
- 
Simon not only constructs his own dialogue with Bergson, 
but he also uses Bergson as an intermediary in his analysis of 
previous comic theories. In this way, Simon's analysis involves 
three dialogic relationships, each analogous to the three outlined 
above (a, b and c) that our own analysis will deploy. Our analysis 
covers different ground from that of Simon, and this is largely a 
result of starting out from an alternative problematic, one 
suggested by Bakhtin rather than Bergson. Nevertheless, as I have 
tried to'show, Simon's study fulfils many of the objectives of 
dialogic inquiry recommended by LaCapra. 
e) Problems 
up to this point I have argued that LaCapra offers an 
appropriate model with which to embark on a historical analysis of 
comic theory, and that this model is consistent with the framework 
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set out by Bakhtin concerning a methodology for the human 
sciences. However, I want to turn now to consider two potential 
problems that might be raised against it. The first of these 
concerns its epistemological status, while the second concerns its 
political implications. 
The epistemological problem might be formulated in the 
following manner: by rejecting the documentary cenception of 
history offered by the 'reconstruction of the past' approach 
(referred to earlier), LaCapra gives up the possibility of an objective 
account of history and is forced to lapse back into an untenable 
form of subjective relativism. There are two ways of responding to 
such a charge. First, as we have already seen in this chapter, the 
objectivist approach itself faces problems. Second, as LaCapra 
himself argues, subjective relativism is not the only alternative to 
documentary objectivism (LaCapra, 1985: 137). In accepting our 
own existence as historically-constituted subjects, we are not 
required to commit ourselves to a semiotic free-for-all. Indeed, 
LaCapra's approach is geared towards formulating a framework 
within which we might derive legitimate conclusions about the past 
through a circumspect analysis of particular text-context 
relationships. In his essay 'Rethinking Intellectual History and 
Reading Texts', for example, he outlines six interacting contexts 
within which a text might be analysed: the 'relation between the 
author's intentions and the text': the 'relation between the author's 
life and the text': the 'relation of society to texts'; the 'relation of 
culture to texts': the 'relation of a text to the corpus of a writer'-, 
and the 'relation between modes of discourse and texts' U 983: 36 - 
56). That the conclusions we draw are themselves context-bound 
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(i. e. dependent in part on the context within which they were 
formulated) does not entail that any possible conclusion 
whatsoever would have to be deemed legitimate. It might be 
argued in reply that LaCapra falls to lay down any procedures for 
adjudicating between two or more divergent interpretations of a 
particular text. However, his dialogic approach arguably provides 
us with just such a procedure: either the interpreters who 
produced the divergent readings enter a dialogue re-assessing the 
appropriate pieces of evidence until they reach a point of 
agreement, or, alternatively, they undertake a renewed analysis of 
the relevant text-context relationship, either reaching a decision 
about each interpretation's adequacy, or providing a dialogic 
synthesis of their respective merits. 
'Ibis defence of LaCapra against the epistemological problems 
we have raised nevertheless brings us to the second problem that I 
wish to raise, its political implications. Insofar as he seems to 
recommend a process of hermeneutic dialogue, LaCapra's position 
can be compared to that of Hans-Georg Gadamer in Tntth and 
Method (Gadamer, 1989). In a similar fashion to LaCapra, 
Gadamer argues that the process of interpretation takes place in 
the form of a dialogue between a past text and a present 
interpreter. He also insists upon the idea that each act of 
interpretation is context-bound, and that a text will signify 
differently in different contexts. In spite of this radical historicity, 
Gadamer argues, our ability to interpret is preserved by the 
existence of a common tradition in the form, as Michael Gardiner 
has put it. of 'our shared membership in a particular linguistic- 
cultural community' (Gardiner, 1992: 115). This shared tradition 
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not only enables us to dialogise with the past, it also allows us to 
arrive at consensual decisions regarding divergent interpretations 
of particular texts. As such, Gadamer's position would seem to 
have much in common with that of LaCapra, and also, as Michael 
Gardiner has argued, with that of Bakhtin (1992: 108-23). In 
particular, Gadamer's conception of a comfortable dialogue 
providing us with the means for adjudicating between rival 
interpretations would appear to coincide with my explanation of 
LaCapra's possible response to the epistemological problems 
tackled above. And it is at this point that we can raise a number of 
issues conceming the political implications of such a position. 
Terry Eagleton, for example, has attacked Gadamer's concept of 
tradition in the following manner: 
It assumes... that history is a place where 'we' can always 
and everywhere be at home; that the work of the past will 
deepen 
- 
rather than, say, decimate 
- 
our present self- 
understanding; and that the alien is always secretly 
familiar. It is, in short, a grossly complacent theory of 
history... It has little conception of history and tradition 
as oppressive as well as liberating forces, areas rent by 
conflict and domination. (Eagleton, 1983: 72-3) 
In a similar vein, JOrgen Habermas has attacked Gadamer for 
submitting to the contingencies of tradition rather than seeking to 
instigate a critique of tradition (Habermas, 1974). As such, 
Gadamer's hermeneutics amount to nothing more, in Christopher 
Norris' words, than 'a species of conservative pleading for the 
'commonsense" status quo' (Norris, 1985: 1). If there really is 
such a close pro., dmity between Gadamer, LaCapra and Bakhtin, 
then. we clearly need to respond to these problems. 
In order to do this, I want to turn to Michael Gardiner's 
eloquent comparison between Bakhtin and Gadamer. Gardiner 
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concedes that there is a lot of common ground between the two 
theorists. Bakhtin's concept of dialogism is in many ways virtually 
synonymous with Gadamer's concept of hermeneutics, (Gardiner, 
1992: 111), and they also both share an emphasis on the centrality 
of language, the situatedness of signification, and the 'unfinalized 
nature of our experiential relation to the world and to others' 
(1992: 113). However, while Gadamer conceives of tradition in 
terms of a linguistic community conducive to dialogue and 
consensus, Bakhtin's conception of the linguistic community is, as 
Gardiner points out, markedly different. As we have seen, beneath 
the veneer of a shared vocabulary, Bakhtin identifies 'the clash of 
live social accents' (Voloshinov, 1973: 23). This is the point at 
which centripetal and centrifugal forces converge, the point at 
which social, economic and political power inscribes itself on the 
processes of communicative interaction. Bakhtin would therefore 
reject Gadamer's conception of the linguistic arena, envisaging it 
instead as a site of ideological contestation. As such, Gardiner 
concludes, Bakhtin would tend to side with Habermas' critique of 
Gadamer's conception of tradition. arguing instead that '"tradition" 
should be critically interrogated' (Gardiner, 1992: 12 1). It would 
seem, then. that for all that there are some important similarities 
between Bakhtin and Gadamer, Bakhtin's alternative conception of 
the linguistic arena allows him to escape from the charges of 
conservatism that have been levelled at Gadamer. 
We now need to consider the extent to which LaCapra's account 
of historical interpretation manages to overcome these charges. To 
what extent does he rely upon a notion of tradition akin to 
Gadamer's? To what extent does he conceive of communicative 
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interaction in the ideologically-charged manner preferred by 
Bakhtin? While LaCapra doesn't appear to formulate a specific 
model of communicative interaction, he does from time to time 
refer to the constraints imposed on such interaction (and, 
therefore, on dialogue), by socio-political factors. Such factors 
might include, for example, the situation of particular discourses 
within particular forms of discipline and/or particular types of 
institution (LaCapra, 1985: 140). The disciplinary and 
institutional location of a particular discourse, in other words, is 
going to have implications for the sort of things that can be 
articulated, and their eventual acceptance or rejection. For 
LaCapra, then, the dialogue necessary to adjudicate between rival 
interpretations does not take place in a vacuum, nor in the midst 
of a common tradition, but is bound up with a number of 
institutional factors. That LaCapra gestures towards such factors 
can be seen in his reaction to Bakhtin's work which, he suggests, 
could have done with addressing in rather more detail the 
relationship between power and language. He argues, for example, 
that 
Bakhtin's stature as a social theorist is diminished by the 
fact that he devotes little attention to the workaday 
institutions and settings with which carnivalesque 
phenomena must interact in the larger rhythm of social 
life. (LaCapra, 1983: 323) 
We might conclude from this that, for LaCapra, the intellectual 
historian, like the social theorist, needs to reflect on the manner in 
which 'workaday institutions and settings' impinge on the 
processes of interpretation. Observations of this sort would seem 
to suggest that, while LaCapra might fail to advance a 
comprehensive theory of signification himself, he nevertheless 
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appears to reject a Gadamerian conception of sedimented, shared 
tradition. I would argue, then, that LaCapra, like Bakhtin, would 
appear to overcome the charges of conservatism directed at 
Gadamer. 
I have argued in this section that a dialogic approach to 
historical analysis of the sort proposed by LaCapra offers an 
appropriate framework within which to undertake an analysis of 
comic theory. I have also suggested that there are some important 
affinities between such an approach and Bakhtin's own approach 
to the human sciences. Finally, I have sought to defend the 
approach against potential epistemological and political problems: 
Before we begin our analysis of comic theory texts from the past, I 
want to situate Bakhtin's work in relation to some recent work- in 
the area of comic theory. 
Recent comic theory 
In the twenty-seven years since Rabelais and His World was first 
published in English, the text has been incorporated into the 
#canon'of comic theory. On the one hand, Bakhtinian readings 
have been produced of comic texts, from Manfred Pfister's analysis 
of Shakespeare (Pfister, 1987), to William Paul's analysis of Charlie 
Chaplin (Paul, 1991). On the other hand, Bakhtin is seen as 
representing a particular position within the range of comic 
theories, a position which accredits the comic with subversive 
potential. This position has its supporters, such as Edith Kern, 
who equates the collective, grotesque festivity of Bakhtin's carnival 
with Baudelaire's concept of 'absolute comedy' (Kern, 1980). It also 
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has its detractors. such as Umberto Eco, who argues that the 
comic performs a conservative function (Eco, 1984a). 
As I have argued in the previous chapter, I do not think that 
Bakhtin's theory of carnival can be so easily assimilated to the 
position that views the comic as essentially subversive. As we have 
seen, Bakhtin at times displays flashes of essentialist commentary, 
where he seems to imply that the comic enjoys universal capacities 
of subversion. However, if we take into account both his general 
theory of signification, and his analysis of the decline of the 
carnivalesque, along with the observation that his concepts 
typically involve both descriptive and prescriptive applicability, we 
can argue, as I have done, that Bakhtin's analysis in fact provides 
us with a theory of the way in which the signification of comic 
practices is historically variable. Nevertheless, I do think that we 
can use Bakhtin's theory of camival as a position from which to 
critique certain types of comic theory, and this is the first task I 
will under-take in this section, by turning to Susan Purdie's own 
critique of certain traditions within comic theory. I will then 
examine the extent to which Bakhtin's theory might complement 
recent semiotic and semantic theories of comedy. Finally, I will 
look athow recent discussions of the historical development of 
comedy might be articulated with Bakhtin's theory of the decline of 
the carnivalesque. 
a) Susan Purdie 
In her book Comedy: The Mastery of Discourse, Susan Purdie 
provides, amongst other things, an analysis of literary accounts of 
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comedy (Purdie, 1993: 150-67). Focusing on theories of comedy 
produced within the field of literary studies over the course of this 
century, she argues that we can detect in them a valorisation of 
'individuality', in which individuality is perceived as something 
both natural and vital, and is constructed as existing prior to the 
'social'. Purdie traces the origins of theories of comic individuality 
back to F. M. Comford's The Or4gin ofAttic Comedy and Sir George 
Frazer's The Golden Bough, both published towards the beginning 
of this century. Both texts seek to identify a vital natural force 
that is bound up with the very essence of human individuality and 
which derives from primitive rituals. Cornford, for example, argues 
that Attic comedy derived from ancient rituals, and shares with 
these rituals the symbolisation of 'the same natural fact': 'the 
death of the old year and the birth and accession of the new, the 
decay and suspension of life in the frosts of winter and its release 
and renouveau in spring' (Comford, 1984: 67-8). Comford thus 
associates comedy with a regenerative impulse, attributable to 
ancient Greek affiliations between prototype comic forms and 
fertility rituals, and located in the structure of dramatic comedy. 
Cornford and Frazer's work has been influential throughout much 
twentieth century comic theory5. As a result the essence of 
comedy has regularly been defined in terms of a regenerative vital 
force produced by the narrative's 'happy ending', whose 
significance lies in its reassertion of the value of the individual over. 
and above that of the social. Purdie cites the comic theories of 
Northrop Frye and Suzanne Langer as illustrative of this sort of 
approach6, but she also looks at some more recent examples, and 
it is to these that I want to turn. 
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The first example is provided by George McFadden in his book 
Discovering the Comic (McFadden, 1982). Here McFadden attempts 
both to provide an analysis of comic theories, and to advance his 
own definition of the comic. We associate the comic with several 
qualities, he argues, 'spontaneity, liberation from inhibition and 
constraint, unblocking, vital movement, and ease and grace of 
behaviour' (1982: 11). As a result, he contends, freedom must be 
an 'indispensable component' of the comic (1982: 11). However, 
McFadden's conclusion defines this noýon of comic freedom in 
clearly delineated ideological terms: - 
If the comic is to survive... it will outlast, in literary art at 
least, the present wave of attacks upon the subject and 
the individual personality. The most severe test of all 
would come if freedom should one day cease to be the 
most valued of human desires and goals-, if, for example, a 
commonality of status, risk and reward should become 
the most valued object of human activity. (McFadden, 1982: 254; cited in Purdie. 1993: 156) 
For McFadden, then, the freedom that is essential for the comic to 
e. -dst is conceived in terms of a thorough-going individualism, 
which itself is threatened by the objectives of any sort of socialist 
or redistributive programme. Purdie argues that this sort of 
theorising is representative of humanist approaches to comedy, 
committed as it is to a concept of the individual as 'non-social' 
rather than socially-constructed. Comedy, by dint of its origins, is 
enlisted as a privileged site in which this vital essence of humanity 
might be revealed (1993: 164). Further, insofar as comedy is 
enlisted as a purveyor of metaphysical truths about humanity, the 
"'low" behaviour' characteristic of comic texts is dismissed as being 
of marginal importance to this 'deeper meaning' (1993: 165). In 
this way, Purdie concludes, humanist criticism accommodates 
comedy within a specific ideological perspective. 
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The second example comes from T. G. A. Nelson in his book 
Comedy (Nelson, 1990). As Purdie points out, Nelson's argument 
does not appeal to the same form of individualism as McFadden, 
but it nevertheless retains a conservative inflection, where comedy 
is deemed to reconcile us to the deflciencies of the world by 
summoning up the vital forces of life itself (1993: 164). Nelson 
concludes his study by noting the way in which comic endings are 
rarely as happy as we would like them to be. 'Perhaps, ' he 
continues, 
the most honest ending is that which simply returns us to 
the inadequacies of the world... to the awareness that life 
is a struggle in which nobody can alwsys be on the 
winning side, and where each of us will sometimes fill the 
role of victim, scapegoat, or fool. (Nelson, 1990: 186, quoted in Purdie, 1993: 165) 
A similar formulation is offered in Robert Bechtold Heilman's The 
Ways of the World: Comedy and Society (Heilman, 1978: not cited 
by Purdie). For Heilman, comedy represents 'a making-do with a 
society that falls short of an imaginable rational order; it is an 
instinctive rather than rational coming to terms with subutopian 
actuality' (Heilman, 1978: 11). As Purdie points out (with reference 
to Nelson), there is an implicit conservatism in such statements, 
urging us to accept social arrangements as we find them rather 
than to challenge their legitimacy. 
Purdie places Nelson together with McFadden in the same 
tradition of comic theorising, and she rejects this tradition on a 
number of grounds. Firstly, she rejects its humanist conception of 
subjectivity: her own theory of comedy, as we shall see later, draws 
on a Lacanian account of subject formation. Secondly, she calls 
into question the way in which it defines the essence of comedy in 
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terms of its 'happy ending', rather than in terms of the discursive 
formations involved in joking behaviour. Finally, she rejects the 
implicit conservatism of this tradition, proposing instead a theory 
of comedy that is much more attuned to the effects of power within 
comic practices. 
It might at first seem that Bakhtin's theory of carnival could 
easily be assimilated within this tradition of comic theory. Not only 
does it include a similar emphasis on the festive nature of 
carnivalesque practices, it also identifies images of regeneration as 
a central part of the carnivalesque vocabulary. Indeed, two 
commentators, Nelson and D. J. Palmer, seem to place Bakhtin 
within this tradition (Nelson, 1990: 171-8; 
_ 
Palmer, 1984: 17-8)7. 
What I want to argue here, however, is that Bakhtin's theory of 
carnival actually complements Purdie's critique of this tradition. 
Firstly, Bakhtin provides an alternative to the humanist conception 
of individuality upon which that tradition relies. In Marxism and 
the philosophy of Language, Voloshinov specifically rejects the idea 
that the 'individual' is a 'binary opposition' of the 'social', arguing 
that the binary opposite of the 'social' is, in fact, the 'natural' (a 
relationship now more usually formulated in terms of a binary 
opposition between culture and nature) (Voloshinov, 1973: 34). 
This concept of the 'natural' certainly includes a notion of the 
'individual' as a 'natural, biological specimen', but it does not 
include a notion of the individual as a social agent, as an agent 
capable of interacting with socio-cultural processes. Given that 
this is the case, Voloshinov argues, in order to visualise the 
individual as an agent capable of socio-cultural interaction, we are 
obliged to conceive of it as a thoroughly social phenomenon. 
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Bakhtin thus provides us with an account of the individual as 
socially-constituted, and this complements Purdie's critique of the 
humanist tradition of comic theory. In addition to this, Bakhtin 
argues that the individual is subsumed by the social in the 
processes of carnival. Laughter, for example, is not simply 
$subjective' and 'individual', but embodies 'the social consciousness 
of all the people' (Bakhtin, 1984: 92). Finally, according to 
Bakhtin, the grotesque imagery of carnival produces a unique 
conception of the body, not as the individualised body of the 
classical canon, but as an unlimited, dynamic phenomenon, where 
the 'confines between the body and the world and between 
separate bodies' are obfuscated (1984: 315). Bakhtin thus offers 
an alternative to theories which identify in comedy a valorisation of 
the individual against the social, by identifying in carnivalesque 
practices a valorisation of the individual as it is subsumed by the 
social. 
We might also appeal to Bakhtin in relation to Purdie's 
observation that the humanist tradition is over-reliant upon the 
figure of the happy ending in formulating its theory of comedy. 
The concept of the happy ending would not seem to be of much 
import to an analysis of carnival, since the ending is precisely the 
point at which the alternative social relations established during 
carnival are replaced by the regular social order. Like Purdle, 
then, Bakhtin is interested more in the discursive formations that 
operate within the period of carnival. As we have seen. most of 
Rabelais and His World, for example, is concerned with the 
semiotic potential of various types of imagery, and, in particular, 
with their political and ideological significance. 
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The final point at which Bakhtin's theory complements Purdie's 
critique is in its rejection of the conservatism of the sort displayed 
by McFadden, Nelson and Heilman. There are two issues to raise 
here. Firstly, in advancing a theory of carnival as a historically 
variable phenomenon, Bakhtin would reject the idea that carnival 
or comedy perform a universal function: of reconciling us to the 
social order, for example. Secondly, in his utopian conception of 
carnival, Bakhtin nevertheless provides us with an alternative to 
the conservative conception of carnival. Here is a set of cultural 
practices that are geared to fostering a critical representation of 
current social arrangements, an exercise in collectivity and popular 
rebellion. While such a conception can, as we have seen, be called 
into question, it nevertheless provides us with a critical utopian 
alternative to conservative theories of comedy. Overall, then, 
Bakhtin's theory of carnival can be seen as complementary to 
Purdie's critique of the humanist tradition of comic theory. 
Raskin and Palmer 
Bakhtin's theory also complements some recent semantic and 
semlotib theories of comedy, and I want to look at two such 
theories: Victor Raskin's Semantic Mechanisms ofHumor (Raskin, 
1985) and Jerry Palmer's 771e Lzgic of the Absurd (Palmer, 1987). 
Raskin tries to formulate a theory of the semantic processes 
involved in humour. Focusing solely on verbal humour, he 
proposes that a 'single joke-carrying text' is necessarily 
#compatible, fully or in part, with two scripts', but that these two 
scripts are themselves opposites (Raskin, 1985: 99). By the term 
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6 script', Raskin means the internalised 'semantic information' that 
surrounds a particular word for a particular speaker (1985: 8 1). 
The particular script that forms around a certain word for a 
particular speaker will depend upon his or her personal and social 
experience. Such a formulation allows us to explain the 
mechanism underlying any particular joke by specifying the two 
opposing scripts that are implicated in it. But because the ability 
to 'get' the joke depends upon a particular speaker's access to the 
appropriate script, we can also explain the importance of the 
context in joking behaviour. A speaker who lacks access to either 
or both of the scripts implicated in the joke will be unable to 
perceive the punch line as humorous. Rather than trying to 
explain particular jokes as necessarily funny, then, Raskin's th eory 
allows us to explain the potential funniness of a particular joke. 
We can perhaps provide an example to illustrate Raskin's theory 
by turning to Palmer's own semiotic analysis. Palmer formulates 
his theory around a visual gag from a short Laurel and Hardy film, 
Liberty (1929). Laurel and Hardy have escaped from prison, and 
they are finally pursued by a policeman to a building site, where 
they proceed to ascend the lift to the very top of the scaffolding. 
Later, they descend in the lift only for it to land on top of the 
policeman. The final shot, representing the visual punch line of 
the gag, shows the policeman emerging from under the lift as a 
dwarf. Palmer's analysis of this gag divides it into 'two moments': 
1) a peripeteia, a shock or surprise that the narrative 
constructs for us; 
2) a pair of syllogisms, leading to contradictory results: 
a) that the process is implausible 
b) that the process nonetheless has a certain measure 
of plausibility, but that this is less than the 
implausibility. (Palmer, 1987: 43) 
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In the gag from Liberty, then, the peripeteia is constructed by the 
surprise of the policeman emerging from under the lift. Such an 
outcome has a degree of implausibility and a degree of plausibility. 
It is implausible insofar as we would have expected the policeman 
to have been killed by the accident. It is simultaneously plausible 
insofar as we liýnow that 'the result of squashing is a reduction in 
size' (1987: 42), and the policeman's reduction in size therefore 
seems rather apt. According to Palmer, the outcome is humorous 
because the implausibility of the situation is greater than its 
plausibility. 
It would not'seem to be that difficult to transpose Palmer's 
analysis of this particular gag into the terms of Raskin's theory of 
humour. The gag is compatible with two different scripts (roughly 
comparable to Palmer's syllogisms), and these scripts contradict 
one another: on the one hand the outcome is plausible, on the 
other it is implausible. Further, just as Raskin insists on the 
importance of context in the actual success of joking behaviour, so 
Palmer's analysis is designed to illustrate the basic semiotic 
mechanism of humour ('the logic of the absurd') so that we are 
then in a position to understand the working of particular comic 
texts in particular situations. Indeed, one of the most important 
conclusions that Palmer draws is thathumour is intrinsically 
paradoxical' (1987: 18 1). The fact that a gag is constituted by a 
combination of plausibility and implausibility entails that it is 
necessarily ambivalent. As a result, we cannot ascertain purely 
from semiotic analysis the actual effect of a joke within a particular 
context: in order to identify such an effect we need to perform some 
form of contextual analysis. '[In] and of itself, ' Palmer concludes, 
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humour'involves no commitment to anything except the act of 
levity... its meaning changes dramatically according to the 
circumstances of its utterance' (1987: 182). Like Raskin's theory, 
then, Palmer's theory allows us to explain the processes that 
contribute to humour, but it also allows us to explain precisely 
why it is that humour is capable of dramatic variations in terms of 
its significance. 
We are now in a position to. consider the extent to which 
Bakhtin's analysis of carnival might complement Raskin and 
Palmer's theories. There are, I think, three points to be made. 
Firstly, we need once again to distinguish between Bakhtin's 
utopian model of carnival and his model of it as a historically 
variable entity. Clearly, in implying that the subversive qualities of 
carnival imagery obtain universally, the former model runs 
contrary to Raskin and Palmer's emphasis on the contextual 
detennination of humour. However, Bakhtin's analysis of the 
historically variable meanings of carnivalesque imagery would 
certainly seem to conform to Raskin and Palmer's models. The 
second point would be that, if we were to identify one concept that 
unites the various figures identified by Bakhtin in the 
carnivalesque (i. e. masks, inversions, parody, metamorphosis), it 
would probably be the concept of ambivalence. In his analysis of 
the medieval feast, for example, Bakhtin identifies a dual 
signification: an 'official, ecclesiastical face [which] was turned to 
the past and sanctioned the existing order, ' and 'the face of the 
people of the marketplace [which] looked into the future and 
laughed' (Bakhtin, 1984: 8 1). As we have seen, both Raskin and 
Palmer locate an essential contradiction or ambivalence within 
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each particular instance of humour. Insofar as carnivalesque 
imagery is itself imbued with this same essence of ambivalence, 
Bakhtin's analysis of it would again appear to have affinities with 
those of Raskin and Palmer. Thirdly, and finally, that 
carnivalesque imagery is essentially ambivalent entails that a 
contextual analysis is necessary in order to ascertain its 
significance in a particular time and place. Such imagery is, 
according to Bakhtin's historically variable model, not necessarily 
subversive, but liable to be transformed through time. Such an 
assessment is echoed in the work of Raskin and Palmer, 
particularly in the conclusion to Palmer's study. Bakhtin's 
analysis would therefore seem to have much in common with 
Raskin and Palmer's theories. We might argue that, in formulating 
precise, technical models of the mechanisms of humour, Raskin 
and Palmer's theories are capable both of complementing, and of 
providing further illumination of, Bakhtin's analysis of carnival. 
c) Comedy and culture 
Finally, I want to turn to two recent discussions of the historical 
development of comic genres and comic practices in order to 
consider their relationship with Bakhtin's analysis of the decline of 
the carnivalesque. I will begin by returning to Purdie's theory of 
comic discourse. As we have seen, Purdie offers a critique of a 
particular tradition of theorising comedy. However, she also offers 
a theory of her own which focuses on the discursive formations 
involved in comic phenomena. Humorous discourse allows us to 
exploit and advertise our discursive proficiency by playing with 
ill 
linguistic and social rules: a joke might transgress certain 
semantic codes; equally it might articulate thoughts which 
transgress certain social codes. Our very ability to construct or 
perform these transgressions, however, rests upon our prior 
knowledge of the rules which we are breaking. Consequently, in 
the process of joking we project ourselves as 'masters' of discourse. 
And since subjectivity, following Jacques Lacan, is effected through 
our employment of discursive structures - the Symbolic Order, as 
Lacan calls it 
- 
so joking practices are a key site in the 
construction of subjectivity. Purdie summarises this argument 
thus: 
joking paradigmatically involves a discursive exchange 
whose distinctive operation involves the marked 
transgression of the Symbolic Law and whose effect is 
thereby to constitute jokers as 'masters' of discourse: as 
those able to break and to keep the basic rule of 
language, and consequently in controlling possession of 
full human subjectivity. (Purdie, 1993: 5) 
Purdie draws a number of conclusions from this formulation, 
largely stemming from her theorisation of the Symbolic Order. The 
Symbolic Order, she argues, provides us with a set of discursive 
rules which are predicated on the power structures which obtain in 
society. Since the Symbolic Order is the medium within which we 
make sense of the world, our shared knowledge about the world 
will bear the hallmarks of these power structures. The Symbolic 
Order will thus tend to reproduce the patriarchal values that 
prevail in our social arrangements: Purdie's definition of comedy as 
the 'mastery' of discourse is thus deliberate, signifying the way in 
which 'our patriarchal culture identifies discursive power with 
masculinity' (1993: 7). These values will also affect the 
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construction of subjectivity, the way in which we make sense of 
ourselves as 'a person: '[ifl everything that "makes sense" involves 
mental representation within language, then it is not very 
contentious to claim that we know our identity within language' 
(1993: 17). If the practice of joking is necessarily tied to the rules 
of the Symbolic Order even as it transgresses them, then joking 
would seem to reinscribe such rules even if only ambiguously so. 
Consequently, comedy 
is therefore very unlikely radically to challenge an 
Audience's perceptions, and we are all of us deeply 
saturated with a constructed 'knowledge' of masculine 
dominance which is thus implicated in our performance 
of Symbolic competence. (1993: 147) 
On Purdie's view, then, comedy would seem largely to confirm the 
e. -Aisting set of social arrangements. If her theory is of value, it lies 
in the way in which she tries to formulate the complicated 
relationship between joking practices, psychic operations and 
social power. 
It might be objected at this stage, however, that Purdie has 
failed to present an alternative to an essentialist account of 
humour, since her own theory assumes the universality of the 
Symbol ic Order, and hence the universality of the discursive 
operations involved in joking behaviour. In addition, the Lacanian 
framework she employs would seem to imply that comic texts can 
but reinscribe current power structures irrespective of the context 
within which they are performed or articulated. If this is the case, 
then Purdie's theory would seem to be at odds with Bakhtin's 
historicised approach. 
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Purdie is aware of such problems, however, and tackles them in 
a postscript to her book (1993: 171-76). Here she argues that 
while the organisation of culture within any society may be 
conceived of in terms of a Symbolic Order, the precise relationship 
between the Symbolic Order and joking practices will vary socially 
and historically. For example, the emphasis on'enacted taboo- 
breaking' (1993: 174) within pre-Renaissance comic practices, 
along with a preoccupation with 'illicit sexuality, physical 
aggression [and] scatological pollution' (1993: 173), suggests that 
there was greater freedom to transgress social codes than there is 
today. As the regularisation of language increased after the 
Renaissance (Purdie cites the inception of 'correct' spelling as an 
example), so previously unavailable forms of pleasure were opened 
up and verbal jokes came to predominate, where the punch line 
allowed for the transgression (and simultaneous reassertion) of 
linguistic rules. As we have already seen, Purdie argues that 
subjectivity is constructed through such processes. However, if 
language failed to enjoy the same symbolic significance before the 
Renaissance as it does today, and if the punch line joke was only of 
minimal importance, then it would seem that a different set of 
processes would have produced different constructions of 
subjectivity. Purdie argues, then, that the relationship between 
joking practices, psychic operations and the Symbolic Order is 
historically variable. Further. she maintains that this relationship 
is only one aspect of joking behaviour, albeit a crucial one: 
Since joking is hugely overdetermined, there is more than 
one reason why most things are funny, and getting a joke 
will have more than one effect. Joking happens in 
actuality, not in theory, and each particular instance of joking and of comedy will have particular effects in 
relation to its context, its content and its interactions. (1993: 147) 
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For all that the Symbolic Order is implicated in the perfon-nance or 
articulation of all comic texts, then, its precise significance within 
any particular context cannot be determined without an analysis of 
that context. In this way, Purdie avoids the pitfalls of advancing 
an ahistorical, universal model of humour. 
We can draw two useful comparisons between Purdie and 
Bakhtin here. Firstly, her description of the development of comic 
practices maps quite neatly onto Bakhtin's description discussed 
in the previous chapter. Her citing of the Renaissance as the key 
turning point in this development echoes the importance afforded 
it by Bakhtin in his study of Rabelais. Secondly, although her 
theory of comedy seems to work against the possibility of comic 
practices as potentially subversive, her recognition of the 
potentially multivalent significance of a particular comic text 
within a particular context would seem to be consistent both with 
Bakhtin's theory of carnival as a historically variable entity, and 
with his overall theory of signification. 
The second example of an analysis of the historical development 
of comic phenomena comes from Jerry Palmer's second book on 
humour, Taking Humour Seriously (Palmer, 1994). Starting out 
from his theory of the logic of the absurd, Palmer proceeds to 
undertake a comprehensive analysis of the occasions, functions, 
structure and limits of humour. In the course of this analysis, 
Palmer also offers his own explanation of the historical 
development of comedy, an argument which focuses on the 
relationship between comic phenomena and post-Renaissance 
cultural stratification (Palmer, 1994: 120-43). 
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Palmer argues that after the Renaissance there was an apparent 
downgrading of comic phenomena, and that this belonged to a 
more general process of constructing a hierarchy of classics and 
rubbish, which was supported by, and simultaneously lent support 
to, emergent social codes. He identifies three elements that were 
involved in. this process: 
(1) the separation between comedy and farce: (2) the 
marginalisation and eventual suppression of popular 
cultural humorous institutions: (3) the reorganisation of 
vocabulary and literary style. (1994: 121) 
It is worth turning briefly to look at each of these elements. 
The separation between comedy and farce is closely related to 
the post-Renaissance distinction between serious 'and humorous 
discourse. According to Palmer, farce consists of comic texts and 
practices whose sole aim is to produce laughter, while comedy 
refers to comic texts which, while sometimes productive of 
laughter, are nevertheless deemed to enjoy a value and import 
which farcical texts lack (1994: 120). Farce represented the 
ungainly, the lower realms of the social order. and its subject 
matter was considered coarse and trivial. Comedy steered clear of 
such areas, and managed to articulate serious ideas, in spite of, 
rather than because of, any laughter it might have produced. 
While farce had been common in the theatres of England and 
France before the seventeenth century, from that point onwards it 
began to be excluded in favour of the more respectable comic forms 
(1994: 123). Such distinctions lent support to the new codes of 
decorum that helped to underpin the construction and 
consolidation of bourgeois hegemony after the Renaissance (1994: 
122). 
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Following Staffybrass and White, Palmer turns to the work of 
Ben Jonson as an example of the way in which the separation 
between comedy and farce was enacted. Palmer argues that, 
although texts such as Jonson's Bartholomew Fair incorporated 
several elements of farce, Jonson simultaneously scorned the 
vulgarity of such elements (1994: 124). Stallybrass and White 
identify in Jonson's reaction an attempt to establish the 
detachment of the poet from the tastes and activities of the 
populace: 
Jonson was attempting to dissociate the professional 
writer from the clamour of the marketplace and to install 
his works in the studies of the gentry and the libraries of 
the univeisities. (Stallybrass and White, 1986: 76) 
If such a task was to be achieved, then the poet needed to reject 
the debased discourse of farce, and Jonson's discussion of laughter 
in 71niber. - or, Discoveries, Made upon Men and Matter further 
illustrates this recommendation. Here, Jonson argues that we 
need to distinguish between true comedy, which is instructive and 
deals with noble virtues, and the sort of comic representations 
enjoyed by the populace, which are geared to the production of 
laughter and deal with the 'wry and depraved' ýJonson, 1984: 37). 
The extent to which the distinction between comedy and farce is 
both aesthetic and social is amply demonstrated in Jonson's 
remarks: 
jests that are true and naturall, seldome raise laughter, 
with the beast, the multitude. They love nothing, that is 
right, and proper. The farther it runs from reason, or 
possibility with them, the better it is. (1984: 37) 
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Comedy, where 'true and naturall'jests are to be found, is thus 
conjoined with reason and propriety, while farce is rejected as the 
vulgar pursuit of the bestial populace. 
According to Palmer, this separation between comedy and farce 
went hand in hand with a second element, the marginalisation of 
the vulgar pursuits enjoyed by the populace. Initially, as farce was 
exorcised from the theatre, it found a home in other sites, notably 
the fair. However, as the process of cultural stratification 
continued, popular sites and practices such as the fair also came 
under attack (Palmer, 1994: 123-3 1: Stallybrass and White, 1986: 
33-4). Palmer notes how some of these vulgar pursuits had 
already incurred the wrath of Protestant authorities in countries 
such as England and Holland after the Reformation. Here, the 
marking of a saint's day with carnivalesque celebrations not only 
seemed indecent, but also smacked of Catholicism (Palmer, 1994: 
127). The practices identified by Bakhtin as carnivalesque were 
increasingly marginalised from the realm of dominant cultural 
practices. 
Along with Stallybrass and White, Palmer argues that such 
processes were inextricably bound up with the construction of a 
demarcation between serious and humorous discourse, and that 
this demarcation was crucial if a bourgeois public sphere was to 
einerge. Stallybrass and White contend that the 'spaces of 
discourse' of the public sphere needed to be 'de-libidinized in the 
interests of serious, productive and "rational" intercourse' 
(Stallybrass and White, 1986: 97). Consequently, the libidinal 
pleasures connected with laughter, the vulgarity of carnivalesque 
practices, and the grotesque body were gradually excluded from 
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the public arena. In their place, new'spaces of discourse' 
developed. During the eighteenth century, for example, the coffee- 
house provided a sober discursive site where the interests and 
concerns of bourgeois culture might be articulated without 
interference from the hubbub of the populace (Stallybrass and 
White, 1986: 95-100; Palmer, 1994: 128-9). In short, the 
separation between comedy and farce belonged to a process of 
widespread reorganisation of cultural institutions whereby the 
bourgeoisie consolidated its hegemonic position. 
The other element identified by Palmer that accompanies this 
process is 'the reorganisation of vocabulary and literary style', a 
factor also noted by Purdie (Palmer, 1994: 121; 132-41). Linguistic 
proficiency, he argues, gradually came to be perceived as a register 
of decorum, as evidence that someone had acquired the codes of 
decent society. A proficient, polite speaker would eschew the 
language of the populace, thus the vulgar language that Bakhtin 
associates with carnival -'Various genres of billingsgate: curses, 
oaths, popular blazons' (Bakhtin, 1984: 5) - was excluded from the 
realm of linguistic propriety. Furthermore, Palmer notes, from the 
seventeenth century onwards there was an increasing valorisation 
of 'plain style'. a rejection of earlier more exaggerated styles of 
speech (Palmer, 1994: 134). The stress on plain style can be seen 
in the scientific and religious discourse of the period, and 
represented, according to Palmer, 'an attempt to create a language 
which would be transparent, a language in which the materiality of 
the signifier would have disappeared' (1994: 137). The result of 
this was that linguistic techniques which derived from the play of 
the signifier -'puns, jokes, metaphors' - were marginalised from 
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the realm of serious discourse (1994: 140). As Palmer notes, tl-lis 
was a new development: during the Renaissance, for example, it 
had been perfectly acceptable for such forms to be used as 
epistemological tools. 
Bakhtin identifies just such a function in Rabelaisian language. 
One of the techniques regularly deployed by Rabelais is the 'coq-d- 
I'dn&, a form culled from popular speech which flouts logical 
norms by absurdly juxtaposing two or more concepts, and Bakhtin 
posits for the 'coq-d-I'dn& a distinct epistemological role: 
in a period of the radical breaking up of the world's 
hierarchical picture and the building of a new concept, 
leading to a revision of all old words, objects, and ideas, 
the 'ccq-et-1'dne acquired an essential meaning; it was a 
form which granted momentary liberation from all logical 
links 
-a form of recreation. It was, so to speak, the 
carnivalization of speech, which freed it from the gloomy 
seriousness of official philosophy as well as from truisms 
and commonplace ideas. (Bakhtin, 1984: 426) 
Bakhtin notes that this linguistic carnival was short-lived, that it 
prepared the way for 'a new sober seriousness' as the new social 
order after the Renaissance emerged (1984: 426). If Palmer is 
correct, then this serious sobriety was underpinned by an 
emphasis on linguistic decorum, from which the humorous play of 
the signifier was excluded. Such developments went hand in hand 
with the downgrading of farce in relation to comedy, and the 
marginalisation of popular sites of humorous discourse. Palmer's 
analysis thus provides us with a detailed explanation of the various 
processes involved in the reorganisation of comic genres, and, 
, 
in 
doing so, supplements Bakhtin's analysis of the decline of the 
Camivalesque. 
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Conclusion 
What I have tried to do in this section, then, is to relate 
Bakhtin's work to some of the problems and issues that have 
recently been addressed within the field of comic theory, and to 
identify the points at which we might begin to make links between 
Bakhtin's theory of carnival and some of the recent trends in comic 
theory. In the previous section, I related Bakhtin's work to some 
recent discussions concerning 
-methodologies in intellectual 
history, and tried to formulate a number of issues that needed to 
be addressed in the course of a historical analysis of comic theory. 
We are now in a position to embark on that analysis. 
Notes 
I This is the view that laughter is occasioned by a feeling of 
superioilty over the object at whom the laughter is directed. 
2 This is the view that equates the experience of humorous 
amusement with the perception of an apparent incongruity. 
3 in recent years a number of theorists have raised 
historiographical issues concerning the practice of intellectual 
history. While not all of them are necessarily wholly in 
agreement with LaCapra, they nevertheless share his concerns 
about the need to formulate with greater clarity the modes of 
inquiry that intellectual history ought to employ (e. g. see 
LaCapra and Kaplan, 1982; 116e, 1978; Rorty, Schneewind and 
Skinner, 1984; White, 1978). 
4 The two essays to which I am referring are 'Me Problem of the 
Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences: An 
Experiment in Philosophical Analysis' and 'Toward a 
Methodology for the Human Sciences' (Bakhtin, 1986) 
5 Indeed, Bakhtin himself cites them both in his survey of studies 
of folk culture. He argues, however, that the 'enormous bulk of 
literature' to which they belong tends to marginalise the 
importance of folk culture: 'That which we have called the one 
world of folk culture of humour appears in these works as a 
collection of curiosities, not to be included, in spite of its widest 
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scope, in a serious history of European culture and literature' (Bakhtin, 1984: 54). 
6 See Frye's The Argument of Comedy', first published in 1948 (Frye, 1984) and Langer's Feeling and Forrn, first published in 
1953 (Langer, 1984). 
7 Purdie's only reference to Bakhtin cites him as a proponent of 
the 'carnival-as-necessarily-subversive' position (Purdie, 1993: 
127). As I have argued, while there are passages which would 
seem to support such a reading, if we situate Bakhtin's theory 
carnival in relation to the rest of his work, we end up with a 
theory of carnival as a historically variable phenomenon. 
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Chapter Three 
Kant and Schopenhauer 
In this chapter I will explore the extent to which the 
philosophies of humour to be found in the work of Immanuel Kant 
and Arthur Schopenhauer might be related to Bakhtin's thesis 
concerning the decline of the camivalesque. Schopenhauer 
occupies an important position in philosophical discussions of 
humour, where his analysis is frequently cited as a prototype 
incongruity theory of humour. By comparison, Kant's treatment of 
humour has been relatively neglected. However, not only does 
Kant similarly advance a form of incongruity theory but. as I hope 
to show here, a thorough discussion of both his and 
Schopenhauer's analysis allows us to broach some important 
issues concerning the historical development of comic theory. The 
central issue concerns the way in which each theory envisages the 
relationship between reason and humour. This in turn can be 
related not only to shifts in philosophical notions of reason, from 
Enlightenment to Romantic accounts, but also to wider 
configurations that such positions might represent. 
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Kant's analysis of humour 
Kant discusses humour in a brief but dense passage in Me 
Critique ofJudgement (1790), his major work on aesthetics which, 
along with his first two Critiques, forms a framework for his entire 
philosophical project. The first Critique, The Critique of Pure 
Reason U 78 1, with a revised version in 1787), had sought to 
establish the limits of knowledge and experience, while the second, 
The Critique ofPractical Reason U 788), had attempted to establish 
a normative basis for moral judgements. The central task of The 
Critique ofJudgement is to define the parameters within which 
judgements of taste are possible. What unites the three Critiques, 
then, is the concern to establish the universal features of reason 
and experience in the respective realms of epistemology (pure 
reason), ethics (practical reason) and aesthetics Oudgements of 
taste). 
Kant defines laughter as 'an affection risingfrom the sudden 
transformation of a strained expectation into nothing' (Kant, 195 1: 
177), and proceeds to try and illustrate this formula with the 
following joke: 
An Indian at the table of an Englishman in Surat, when 
lie saw a bottle of ale opened and all the beer turned into 
a froth and overflowing, testified his great astonishment 
with many exclamations. When the Englishman asked 
him, 'What is there In this to astonish you so muchT he 
answered, 'I am not at all astonished that it should flow 
out, but I do wonder how you ever got it in. ' (1951: 178) 
'At this story, ' Kant adds, 'we laugh, and it gives us hearty 
I pleasure'. According to him, the laughter results from the way in 
which the Indian's response undermines our expectation, his 
thoughts failing to conform to conventional reactions to opened 
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bottles of beer. However, Kant argues that the disappointment of 
our expectation is not on its own sufficient to produce laughter, a 
subtlety that tends to be ignored by commentators. Rather, a 
punch line must be capable of actually straining our expectation 
momentarily before that expectation dissipates into nothing. Kant 
illustrates this point by recounting the joke about 
the grief of the merchant returning from India to Europe 
with all his wealth in merchandise who was forced 
to throw it overboard in a heavy storm, and who grieved 
thereat so much that his wig turned gray the same night. (1951: 178) 
For Kant, this punch line is capable of momentarily deceiving us, 
for it requires a double-take before we reallse its absurdity. It is 
this'play of thoug[W (1951: 176), a momentary deception followed 
by dissipation into nothing, that produces laughter. 
Kant's concentration on strained expectation as the source of 
laughter is problematic. For example, as Michael Clark has 
pointed out, 'the humour of many comedy situations depends on 
the audience's knowing precisely what is going to happen' (Clark, 
1987a: 141-2). Since this is undoubtedly the case, we need to look 
for explanations other than strained expectation in order to 
account fully for the phenomenon of laughter. One such 
possibility, to use Palmer's formulation, is that we enjoy the 
incongruous conjunction of plausibility and implausibility as it 
appears in the joke (Palmer, 1987: see Chapter Two). However, 
that we might actually enjoy this incongruity in itself, rather than 
for the physical effects of laughter that our perception of it 
produces, is a possibility that Kant discounts, as we shall see when 
we look at his analysis of the relationship between humour and 
reason. Another possibility that he dismisses is that laughter 
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might result from a feeling of superiority. In his analysis of the 
bottle of beerjoke, for example, he rejects the idea that someone 
might laugh out of a feeling of superiority over the Indian. It could 
be argued, however, that the superiority of the person laughing is 
itself implicit in Kant's own analysis of the joke. According to him, 
we laugh as a result of the surprise sprung on our expectation. In 
this instance, the surprise arises because the Indian obviously 
lacks the knowledge that we possess about bottles of beer. To use 
Susan Purdie's formulation, the Indian has failed to master this 
particular cultural discourse, and we advertise our own mastery of 
it, and our cultural competence in general, by telling or laughing at 
the joke (Purdie. 1993; see Chapter Two). The setting of the joke, a 
native Indian at a colonialist's table, further underscores this 
relationship. Moreover, towards the end of his section on humour, 
Kant tries to define the category of naivety, which arises when we 
perceive an opposition between 'the unspoiled innocent nature' of 
humanity and the 'commonplace manner' of artificiality to which 
people have become accustomed. In such cases, says Kant, we 
'laugh at the simplicity that does not understand how to dissemble, 
and yet we are delighted with the simplicity of the nature which 
thwarts that art' (1951: 180). There is a dual response here, then, 
a mixture of superiority over and delight at such naivety, and the 
important point is that it is as a result of the feeling of superiority 
that we laugh. It is quite possible that this sort of response might 
have met the bottle of beerjoke. If so, then Kant's analysis of the 
joke, which is supposed to illustrate his account of humour as a 
whole, has some serious shortcomings. Overall, it would seem 
that, short of fairly extensive modification, Kant's analysis of 
humour is of limited applicability. 
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In spite of these problems, however, it is worth pursuing Kant's 
analysis still further in order to uncover the relationship he sets 
out between humour, reason and beauty, key distinctions on 
which he draws in the course of explaining the pleasure of 
humour. Although humour consists in the 'play of thought', the 
pleasure it produces derives from the physical gratification of 
laughter. Building on the formula of a strained expectation, Kant 
explains this process in the following way: 
the play begins with the thoughts which together occupy 
the body, so far as they admit of sensible expression; and 
as the understanding stops suddenly short at this 
presentment, in which it does not find what it expected, 
we feel the effect of this slackening in the body by the 
oscillation of the organs, which promotes the restoration 
of equilibrium and has a favorable influence upon health. (1951: 177) 
Our engagement with a joke consists of a play of ideas, then, and, 
as our expectation is first strained and then dissipates, this 
movement is transmitted to our body in the form of laughter. It is 
the 'feeling of health' resulting from this 'that makes up the 
gratification felt by us' (1951: 177). While the exact mechanics of 
this process could be questioned, laughter is doubtless physically 
gratifying. Indeed, recent research into the beneficial effects of 
laughter on the circulatory system would seem to confirm Kant's 
medical conjectures (see Fry and Savin, 1988). However, Kant's 
argument is that physical gratification is the soLe source of 
pleasure associated with humour, and that we need to distinguish 
this corpulent satisfaction both from the mental satisfaction 
associated with the exercising of reason, and from the 
contemplative pleasure connected with the experience of beauty. 
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Since humour is dependent on the absurd, it is something in 
which our understanding, directed as it is towards congruity and 
cogency, 'can find no satisfaction' (1951: 177). In Kant's system 
the understanding is one of the three cognitive faculties that define 
us as rational beings. It allows us to order the data of sense 
experience, while the second, reason, allows us to think 
consistently as autonomous subjects, and the third, judgement, 
allows us to administer approbation and disapprobation in 
accordance with reason. Some things are capable of satisfying us 
simply in the act of judging [theni]' (1951: 175), and thus provide a 
form of mental satisfaction in accordance with our status as 
rational beings. But since humour runs contrary to the interests 
of the faculties that give us this status, it is only capable of 
providing US with a lower, animal form of gratification. 
Having distinguished between reason and humour in this way, 
Kant continues by distinguishing between humour and beauty in a 
similar fashion. Beauty affords us a disinterested form of pleasure, 
but since humour provides us with physical gratification it cannot 
be disinterested. Kant sums up this sort of relationship earlier on 
the third Critique: 
That which gratiftes a man is called pleasant; that which 
merely pleases him is beautfitd;... Pleasantness concerns 
irrational animals also, but beauty only concerns men, 
i. e. animal. but still rational beings - not merely qua 
rational (e. g. spirits), but qua animal also 
... (1951: 44) 
Jokes, then, are pleasant rather than beautiful (1951: 177), and, 
as the above quotation suggests, the relationship between humour 
and rationality once again comes into pIay in this categorisation. 
Such hierarchical distinctions between humour, reason and beauty 
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are central to Kant's comic theory, then. What I want to argue now 
is that, far from being discrete theoretical classifications, they need 
to be understood within the social and philosophical context of the 
Enlightenment, and it is to this that I now turn. 
Humour and Kant's Enlightenment philosophy 
The Enlightenment is usually identified both in terms of a set of 
philosophical, political and social doctrines, and in terms of the 
period during the eighteenth century when those ideas first 
emerged. Thomas Docherty has offered the fullowing 
characterisation: 
The Enlightenment aimed at human emancipation from 
myth, superstition and enthralled enchantment to 
mysterious powers and forces of nature through the 
progressive operations of a critical reason. (Docherty, 1993: 5) 
Kantian philosophy, preoccupied as it is with setting out the limits 
of critical reason, clearly belongs to this project. And since 
Enlightenment thought is unified by the way in which it identifies 
itself with the application of reason, I want to begin by considering 
the relationship between reason and humour. 
Bakhtin addresses this relationship in terms of the reception of 
Rabelais during the Enlightenment, where he notes the tendency 
for Rabelals'work to be published only in abridged form, depriving 
it of the full force of its vulgarity. For Bakhtin, these acts of 
expurgation arose as a result of the contradiction between 
Rabelaisian humour and Enlightenment reason. The ambivalent, 
contradictory nature of grotesque imagery, he argues, 'could not be 
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reduced to the dimensions of the Enlighteners' reason' (Bakhtin, 
1984: 118): Further, Bakhtin posits a link between the grotesque 
and madness, which he characterises in terms of a critical, 
defamiliarising optic, allowing people to 'look at the world with 
different eyes, not dimmed by... commonplace ideas and 
judgments' (1984: 39). Since the Enlightenment sought to 
establish the sovereignty of reason, it is not surprising that it 
should also seek to banish the madness of the grotesque from 
within its province. 
If we turn to the first half of the eighteenth century in Germany, 
we can perceive this sort of process at work in the controversy 
surrounding the comic Hans Wurst character (see Haberland, 
197 1: Sheppard, 1990, Van Cleve, 1980). Hans Wurst was a 
version of the Harlequin character from the commedia dell'arte. 
Developed in Vienna by Josef Stranitzky at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, the character was popularised in Germany by 
touring companies who performed in the improvised style of the 
commedia (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1974: 986). As 
these perfonnances gained in popularity, however, criticism of 
them proliferated. They were discussed in learned treatises on the 
relationship between art and morality, where their raucous 
laughter and vulgar humour were portrayed as forms of depravity. 
At the same time, as one account explains, 
serious dramatic companies, notably the one headed by 
the actress-manager Caroline Neuber, heaped continual 
damnation on them and enacted the symbolic 
banishment of Harlequin from the stage. (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1974: 986) 
it would seem, then, that the Hans Wurst controversy Mounted to 
an attempt by the realm of 'serious' culture to distance itself from 
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the humour of popular comedy. Indeed, this is precisely the 
manner in which Bakhtin interprets the dispute, seeing it as an 
attempt to defend 'the aesthetics of the beautiful and the sublime' 
against the "'low" spectacle of the marketplace' (Bakhtin, 1984: 35). 
That such a process should take place is consistent with Palmer, 
Stallybrass and White's arguments, discussed in the previous 
chapter, concerning the post-Renaissance reorganisation of culture 
and the development of a de-libidinized public sphere (Palmer, 
1994; Stallybrass and White, 1986; see Chapter Two). What it 
suggests is that one element in the creation of this public sphere 
was the construction of a clear boundary between the propriety of 
reason and the vulgarity of humour. 
In his discussion of the Hans Wurst controversy, Paul 
Haberland has argued that the 'criticism surrounding the popular 
comedy during the Enlightenment reveals a desire to rid 
contemporary society of its vices' (Haberland, 1971: 55). John 
Walter Van Cleve's more extensive study analyses the roots of this 
desire within a social and historical context. While the German 
bourgeoisie began to consolidate their economic power during the 
first half of the eighteenth century, their political power was still 
limited'by the absolutism of the aristocracy, argues Van Cleve. As 
a result, it became increasingly important for the bourgeoisie to 
assert their identity in cultural terms, and it is this process that 
gave rise to the attacks on Hans Wurst: 
Not surprisingly, the rising class demanded its own 
distinctive drama tradition, a tradition clearly separate 
from that of the ruling aristocracy and from that of the 
lower classes. (Van Cleve, 1980: 165) 
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The cultural identity of the bourgeoisie was founded, at least in 
part, on its rejection of the forms of comedy enjoyed by the lower 
classes'. It would seem, then, that critical responses to the Hans 
Wurst plays belonged to a much wider process of securing and 
consolidating the cultural identity of the bourgeoisie. 
Although the Hans Wurst performances were no longer an issue 
at the time that Kant was writing, the sort of concerns raised by 
their detractors can be compared with concerns expressed in 
Kant's analysis of humour. While humour is contrasted with both 
reason and beauty, I will argue that Kant nevertheless suggests 
ways in which it might be incorporated into a bourgeois social life 
controlled by reason. In order to consider this, however, we need 
to begin by looking at Kant's aesthetic theory in rather more detail. 
A central feature of Kantian aesthetics is the notion of the 
disinterested pleasure that a judgement of taste is supposed to 
occasion. When we judge something to be beautiful, #we do not 
want to know whether anything depends or can depend on the 
existence of the thing, either for myself or for anyone else' (Kant, 
1951: 38). Rather, ourjudgement, and the resulting pleasure 
associated with that judgement, is based purely upon a 
consideration of the formal qualities of the object. As we have 
seen, the physical gratification of laughter thus excludes humour 
from this contemplative realm. 
'Ibis description of aesthetic judgement raises a problem for 
Kant. however, which he calls the 'Antinomy of Taste. It is clear 
that the judgement of taste is a subjective experience: it consists of 
a particular act of contemplation on the part of an individual 
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human subject. Nevertheless, the disinterestedness of the 
experience entails that any personal idiosyncrasies that the 
individual might have are prevented from encroaching upon their 
judgement. What is more, it seems to be the logic of aesthetic 
judgements that, if we judge something to be beautiful, we expect 
that everyone ought to judge it in this way. The resulting antinomy 
is that aesthetic judgement appears to be both subjective and 
universal. Kant seeks to resolve this antinomy by arguing that the 
judgement of taste is subjective in so far as we cannot objectively 
prove that something is beautiful: we can never appeal to a 
determinate concept of beauty under which certain objects might 
be deemed to fall. However, the judgement of taste is nonetheless 
universal because we can appeal to the concept of d "sensus 
communis" or common sense, an a priori standard of taste that is 
common to all human beings, which is supported in empirical 
terms by there allegedly being such widespread agreement about 
what is beautiful. Accordingly, aesthetic judgements are both 
subjective and universal. 
Kant's solution to the Antinomy of Taste is reminiscent of the 
approach that he develops in the first two Critiques. As he says in 
the third Critique, 'this problem of the Critique ofJudgement 
belongs to the general problem of transcendental philosophy: how 
are synthetical a priori judgements possibleT (1951: 131). In other 
words, how can we derive the necessary (a prioO features of 
experience from what is given by experience (i. e. from what is 
synthetic rather than analytic)? In each of the Critiques, Kant 
employs this transcendental leap from the subjective and empirical 
to the necessary and universal. 
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Two recent discussions of aesthetic theory have argued that the 
third Critique in fact bridges the gap between the first two 
Critiques. Andrew Bowie's analysis of this relationship focuses on 
the way in which the discourse of aesthetics, from the late 
eighteenth century onwards, was bound up with the question of 
subjectivity. The realms of art and beauty, the typical concerns of 
aesthetic theory, seemed to offer a privileged site on which to 
understand the relationship between the physical world and 
individual human consciousness. In Kant's philosophy, for 
example, the first Critique addresses our access to the physical 
world, and the second seeks to account for our autonomy as 
rational autonomous subjects. Meanwhile, the third Critique posits 
a harmonisation between human subjects and beautiful objects in 
the physical world, the subject enjoying a disinterested form of 
pleasure as he or she contemplates the object in question. As Kant 
explains it, beauty'brings with it a purposiveness in its form by 
which the object seems to be, as it were, preadapted to our 
judgment' (1951: 83). This, as Bowie explains, provides an 
essential link between subject and object, the domains of the first 
two Critiques (Bowie: 1990). 
Terry Eagleton addresses the third Critique in a similar fashion 
in 17w Ideology of the Aesthetic, where he argues that aesthetic 
theory achieved the importance that it did at the time that it did for 
two reasons. Firstly, because art seemed to provide an 'idealized 
refuge' from the ever-expanding processes of market capitalism. 
Secondly, because aesthetic discourse nevertheless complemented 
the ideology of market capitalism (Eagleton, 1990: 9). Thus, 
Kant's first Critique accounts for how we can 'know one another 
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only as objects', while the second Critique determines how we 
might'know and respect each other as autonomous subjects' 
(1990: 75-6). The problem is, however, that we can have little idea 
what this form of respect actually means unless we have a feeling 
of shared community to which these autonomous subjects belong. 
According to Eagleton, the third Critique resolves this problem by 
making the aesthetic judgement of taste dependent upon this very 
feeling. If I judge an object to be beautiful, for example, I 
necessarily impute that myjudgement can be universalised, that 
all members of the community ought to be able to make a similar 
judgement. 'Me social order is thus united by an assumed 
universal sensibility and, just as art transcends the mechanisms of 
the market, so this universal sensibility transcends the class 
divisions that structure capitalist society. Eagleton argues, then, 
that the ideological character of thejudgement of taste derives 
from this transcendent universality. 
Ted Cohen has sought to examine the relationship between this 
sort of universality and jokes. 'When you tell... a joke, ' he asks, 
$upon what basis do you expect anyone else to be movedT, issuing 
the following reply: 'Upon the fact that the joke moves you, plus 
your estimate that it moves you simply as a person and without 
regard to any idiosyncrasy of yours' (Cohen, 1983: 135). Given 
this, he asks, 'is] there such an argument for the postulation of a 
universal sense of humourT (1983: 135). Cohen neglects to 
answer this question explicitly, but the implication is that he 
would reply in the affirmative. Kant, on the other hand, as Cohen 
is fully aware, would reject the idea that comic amusement is free 
from personal idiosyncrasies. As he says of the category of the 
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pleasant, to which humour belongs, 'everyone is content that his 
judgment, which he bases upon private feeling aud by which he 
says of an object that it pleases him, should be limited merely to 
his own person' (Kant, 1951: 46). As a result, Kant would also 
reject the idea that the sense of humour might be universallsed: 
just as the most logical expression of the judgement 'it is pleasant' 
is 'it is pleasant to me (1951: 46), so we can assume that the most 
logical expression of the judgement 'it is funny' is 'it is funny to 
Md. 
In spite of this, however, in the course of his analysis of 
humour, Kant does seem to universalise his own judgements about 
particular jokes. Onejoke'gives us gratification', another'gives us 
hearty pleasure', while at another we laugh loud' (1951: 178, my 
emphasis). if we return to Kant's discussion of the variability of 
judgements concerning the pleasant, however, it is possible to 
resolve this apparent discrepancy. Kant argues that, while such 
judgements cannot be universalised in the logical sense, we 
nevertheless do speak as though they could be. Thus, 'we say of a 
man who knows how to entertain his guests with pleasures (of 
enjoyment for all the senses), so that they are all pleased, "he has 
taste"' (1951: 47), as though his hospitality accorded with a 
universal judgement of taste. But, argues Kant, the universality 
implied in such a statement is merely based upon an empirical 
estimation of the person's 'sociability'. rather than having a logical 
a priori basis, and the assumption seems to be that such 
estimations can be arrived at with a relatively high degree of 
impartiality. 
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The example of 'sociability' used by Kant here, based as it is 
upon a notion of good hospitality, is illuminating. Indeed, 
according to Kant, humour would seem to have a key role to play 
in the provision of good hospitality. Ranked among the pleasant 
arts, he claims, 
are all those charming arts that can gratify a company at 
a table, e. g. the art of telling stories in an entertaining 
way, of starting the company in frank and lively 
conversation,, of raising them byjest and laugh to a 
certain pitch of merriment... (1951: 148) 
What is striking here is the way in which the grotesque humour of 
the carnivalesque feast, celebrated in the work of Rabelais, has 
been replaced by a genteel form of humorous table talk. According 
to Bakhtin, the feast in Rabelais is bound up with images of the 
grotesque body. The communal dimension of the feast represents 
the grotesque body of the people as a whole, while images of the 
'wide-open mouth' consuming flesh, centred as they are on the 
'borderline between body and food images', symbolise aTusion of 
the devouring and devoured body' (Bakhtin, 1984: 279). As we 
have already seen in Chapter One, the comic aspects of the 
carnivalesque are inextricably bound up with this sort of grotesque 
imagery, and it is precisely this sort of imagery that is absent from 
the feast to which Kant refers. Above all, the feast has moved away 
from public sites and Into the private home. 
This is not to say that the bourgeois feast represents a complete 
rejection of the carnivalesque banquet. Rather, it represents a 
transformation of it, to the point where it can be incorporated 
within a new set of social relations. For example, Bakhtin cites the 
model of the ancient symposium as a possible influence on 
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representations of the feast in Rabelais. Such symposia consisted 
of a philosophical discussion between several speakers. in 
Rabelais, the feast becomes a grotesque version of this, where the 
Gpopular-festive right of laughter and clowneries, the right to be 
frank was extended to the table' (1984: 284), allowing the critical 
and celebratory aspects of carnival to be articulated in grotesque 
and comic forms of language. In a footnote, Bakhtin refers to the 
transformations that the symposium underwent after this period, 
and cites 'Beethoven's table talk' as an example. Meanwhile, in a 
footnote in the third Critique, we find a reference to Kant's own 
table talk. Apparently, Kant 
was accustomed to say that the talk at a dinner table 
should always pass through these three stages: narrative, 
discussion, and jest; and punctilious in this, as in all 
else, he is said to have directed the conversation at his 
own table accordingly. (1951: 148)2 
Although this sort Of symposium would seem to be devoid of the 
more grotesque elements of its Rabelaisian counterpart, there is 
nevertheless a sense in which, by emphasising the feast as a 
discursive site, the idea of the symposium is maintained, albeit in 
a slightly modified form. In spite of this move, however, from the 
rowdy, collective festivity of the carnivalesque feast, to the more 
refined and more private atmosphere of the bourgeois feast, there 
is a clear transition. What I want to argue here is that this type of 
transformation belongs to the sort of process identified by Palmer, 
Stallybrass and White (see Chapter Two and above). As 
Enlightened culture consolidated itself by ensuring that the public 
sphere accorded with the 'interests of serious, productive and 
rational discourse' (Stallybrass and White. 1986: 97), so suspect 
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cultural forms were either banished, or 'civilised' and incorporated 
into bourgeois practices. 
A key point to note here is the way in which Kant's overall 
aesthetic theory is bound up with notions of the public sphere. As 
the judgement of taste is universal, so judgements concerning 
beauty are communicable, and this presupposes a social medium 
'in which this communication is possible' (Kant, 1951: 116). 
However, the universal communicability pertaining to the realm of 
beauty is deemed to transcend both the vicissitudes of the 
marketplace, and the impulses of the body. As Eagleton puts it, 
'what we have seen so far as the aesthetic might more accurately 
be described as an anaesthetic' (Eagleton, 1990: 196). The space 
within which our aesthetic experience of beauty is shared is thus a 
de-libidinized zone, and since humour is distinguished from beauty 
on the basis of the physical gratification it affords, it would seem to 
be excluded from this de-libidinized sphere. 
The opposition between humour and reason would seem to 
reinforce the grounds for this exclusion, because Kant's conception 
of reason embodies assumptions about its relationship with the 
public sphere. Here, Kant propounds an account of reason typical 
of the Enlightenment. In his essayAn Answer to the Question: 
What is Enlightenment? ' (1784), Kant defines the motto of the 
Enlightenment as 'Have courage to exercise your own 
understandingl' (Kant, 1984: 90). The Enlightenment thus 
consists of an escape from what Kant calls our 'self-incurred 
tutelage' (1984: 90), so that we are able to achieve freedom through 
the autonomous exercising of reason. When Kant briefly returns to 
this question in the third Critique, the link between individual 
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autonomy and social manifestations of Enlightenment reason 
become more apparent. Kant argues that self-legislation 'is indeed 
quite easy for the man who wishes only to be in accordance with 
his essential purpose and does not desire to know what is beyond 
his understanding' (1951: 137). What is more difficult to achieve is 
the constant affu-mation of Enlightenment reason in 'the mind 
(especially the mind of the publid' (1951: 137, my emphasis). This 
requires not only that we think for ourselves, but also that we 'put 
ourselves in thought in the place of everyone else' (1951: 136), 
enabling us to reflect on things from a 'universal standpoint' (1951: 
137). While this universality might be more readily achieved at the 
level of aesthetic sensibility, it is clear that the proper exercising of 
reason is itself directed towards a consideration of the public 
sphere. Indeed, as Stallybrass and White suggest, Enlightenment 
thought tended to envisage this sphere as a site of rational 
discourse, all of which would seem to jeopardise the acceptability 
of humour within it. 
in spite of this, humour is not completely excluded from the 
public sphere. We have already seen that, for Karit, humour is not 
altogether devoid of value: laughter itself provides us with a 
healthy tonic. But just as the significance of the aesthetic realm 
was dependent upon its transcendence of the body and the 
marketplace, so the links between humour, the marketplace and 
the body are downplayed in order for it to be incorporated into 
bourgeois social life. Although the physical effects of laughter play 
a crucial part in Kant's analysis, for example, he completely 
overlooks physical forms of humour, concentrating Instead on 
verbal wit. On top of this, the relationship between humour and 
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the marketplace, identified by Bakhtin, is apparently severed. For 
Bakhtin, the marketplace was one of the sites where carnivalesque 
practices flourished, in the form of profane speech, billingsgate 
colloquialisms and the 'tones of the banquet' (Bakhtin, 1984: 185). 
As we have seen, Kant's analysis of humour moves away from such 
public locations, and cites instead the bourgeois feast as a suitable 
site for humorous interactions. This location represents a point of 
interaction between the private sphere (the home) and the public 
sphere (in the form of guests invited into the home), and itself 
serves as an arena for rational discussion. Further, humour is 
deemed to contribute to the 'sociability' of such gatherings, 
promoting social cohesion. Although this cohesive quality can only 
be identified empirically, and does not therefore have the same 
status as the logical a priori universality of either aesthetic 
sensibility or reason, it would nevertheless seem that Kant 
accredits humour with a limited function within the public sphere. 
I have argued in this section that we need to situate Kant's 
analysis of humour within the socW and philosophical contexts of 
the Enlightenment. The privileging of reason during the 
Enlightenment coincided with the consolidation of the cultural 
identity of the bourgeoisie, generating a process whereby the 
relationship between a range of cultural forms and practices was 
reconceptualised. Insofar as Kant both contrasts humour with 
reason and beauty. while simultaneously seeking to incorporate it 
within a public sphere policed by reason, his comic theory can be 
seen to belong to this process. 
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Schopenhauer's incongruity theory 
Although Kant's analysis of humour relies upon a notion of 
incongruity, as I have tried to show, more often than not it is to 
Schopenhauer that commentators turn for a more refined version 
of incongruity theory (e. g. Clark 1987a and 1987b). Recently, 
Terry Eagleton has subjected this theory to some extensive 
discussion, arguing that, since the structure of Schopenhauerian 
pessimism apparently resides in the structure of ajoke, so the 
sense of hopelessness derived from it might provide us with a 
useful antidote to over-celebratory accounts of the Bakhtinian 
carnivalesque (Eagdeton, 1989: 180-2). 1 have already argued in 
Chapter One that a historicised notion of carnival avoids the 
problems of such optimism. Nevertheless, the link that Eagleton 
identifies between Schopenhauer's comic theory and carnival is 
worth pursuing. What I will argue here is that, despite some 
similarities that it shares with Kant's analysis, Schopenhauer's 
theory can be read as a form of Romantic reaction to 
Enlightenment thought. I will also argue that this reaction itself 
has affinities with the structure of carnival. 
Schopenhauer's comic theory forms Part of Me World As Will 
And Idea (first published 1818, with a second edition in 1844), a 
massive work incorporating metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and 
aesthetics. As the title of Schopenhauer's text suggests, his 
philosophical system is predicated on a metaphysical distinction 
between the will and the realm of (Platonic) Ideas. The will 
operates in the physical realm as a blind, irrational force, 
generating a perpetual struggle between individual wills. This 
pessimistic view, however, is somewhat offset by Schopenhauer's 
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frank account of the relationship between the will and the human 
body, which reads at times like an anatomical textbook. According 
to him, the physical body is presented to the subject both as an 
object of perception and as a vehicle of the will. Thus, if we decide 
to raise an arm, for example, we are aware of it both as a result of 
seeing it move, and as a result of the movement being a 
manifestation of our will or desire. This amounts to a form of 
behaviourism, allowing internal desires to be read off from external 
conduct, as the following quotation suggests: 
The parts of the body must, therefore, completely 
correspond to the principal desires through which the will 
manifests itself, they must be the visible expression of 
these desires. Teeth, throat, and bowels are objectified 
hunger; the organs of generation are objectified sexual 
desire. the grasping hand, the hurrying feet, correspond 
to the more indirect desires of the will which they express. (Schopenhauer, 1907a: 14 1) 
There is a sense of excessiveness to Schopenhauer's examples here 
which has affinities with the grotesque hyperbole associated with 
the carnivalesque body. And although laughter goes unmentioned 
in this particular passage, Schopenhauer does discuss it in a 
similar vein in Parerga and Paralipomena. when he looks at reflex 
movements of the body. According to him, the 'usual and thus 
mental 
-excitation' of laughter 
has to be explained from the fact that the brain-function 
whereby we suddenly recognize the incongruity of an 
intuitively perceptual representation and an abstract 
representation that is in other respects appropriate 
thereto, has a peculiar effect on the medulla oblongata, or 
else plays a part appertaining to the exciter-motor system, 
whence comes that strange reflex movement which at the 
same time convulses many parts of the body. (1974: 168) 
This description introduces Schopenhauer's notion of humorous 
incongruity as a discrepancy between perception and reason, and 
143 
this notion, as we shall see, is crucial not only to his comic theory, 
but to his entire philosophical enterprise. The faCL dhat the 
passage is inserted between an analysis of cold baths, yawning, 
urinating, weeping and erections would also seem to maintain 
some sort of connection with carnivalesque imagery. Further, we 
can note similarities between this account and Kant's account of 
the mechanics of laughter. Indeed, since laughter is an 
objectification of the will, and since pleasure, for Schopenhauer, 
consists of that which is in accordance with the will (1 907a: 13 1), 
Kant and Schopenhauer would seem to agree about the basis of 
laughter's physical gratification. 
Further comparisons can be drawn between Kant and 
Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory. For Schopenhauer, while the will 
belongs to the physical domain, and is actualised in the body of 
the individual, aesthetic contemplation allows us access to the 
realm of Ideas, and is dependent upon our transcending the 
confines of the individual. He explains this process in the following 
way: 
When we say that a thing is beautiful, we thereby assert 
that it is an object of our aesthetic contemplation, and 
this has a double meaning; on the one hand it means that 
the sight of the thing makes us objective, that is to say, 
that in contemplating it we are no longer conscious of 
ourselves as individuals, but as pure will-less subjects of 
knowledge: and on the other hand it means that we 
recognise in the object, not the particular thing, but an 
idea... (1907a: 270) 
There are two senses in which this explanation approximates 
F. antian aesthetic theory. First, in distinguishing between the 
physical and the contemplative realm, it reiterates Mant's 
distinction between physical gratification and aesthetic pleasure. 
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Second, the assumption that the transcendence of individuality is 
a prerequisite for aesthetic contemplation can be compared to 
Kant's formulation of the disinterestedness, and consequent 
universality, of aesthetic judgement. 
However, there are nevertheless important distinctions to be 
drawn between the two accounts, and these result largely from 
their respective epistemological assumptions. Kant's philosophy 
assumes a transcendental idealist position, a doctrine that Kant 
explains in the first Critique in the following terms: 
appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, 
representations only... 
The objects of experience... are never given in themselves, 
but only in experience, and have no existence outside it. (Kant, 1933: 345 and 440 respectively) 
There has been a notorious debate over the interpretation of 
these and other references to transcendental idealism. Whichever 
Interpretation we were to assent to, however, it is clear that, for 
Kant, our experience is not warranted access to the world of 
things4n-themselves, independently of the way in which those 
objects appear to us. By contrast, Schopenhauer talks of a 
physical realm consisting of things-in-themselves, to which we are 
readily accorded access. This apparent realism is misleading, 
though. since such objects are themselves deemed to be dependent 
upon a subject. As such, the Schopenhauerian thing-in-itself has 
a similar epistemological status to the Kantian representation. 
However, Schopenhauer also assumes that the thing-in-itself is 
merely a poor physical manifestation of an Idea, its abiding and 
essential counterpart, and it is here that the key distinction 
between his and Kant's epistemology is to be found. It is also 
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where the chief disparity between their respective aesthetic 
theories is located. Although Kant's third Critique does not make 
explicit the relationship between transcendental idealism and 
aesthetic experience, it is clear that the judgement of taste Is 
concerned with the 'mere representation of the object' (Kant, 195 1: 
39), the way in which it appears to us, rather than the actual 
existence of the object itself. While Schopenhauer's theory 
similarly maintains the notion that aesthetic experience consists of 
the contemplation of representations, he nevertheless depar-ts from 
Kant by arguing that such contemplation allows us to transcend 
the thing-in-itself 
- 
equivalent, as I have argued, to Kantian 
representations - in order to gain access to a realm of Platonic 
Ideas. it is only by entering this realm that we can escape our 
painful existence in the physical world. By contrast, Kant's 
judgement of taste, as we have seen, both instigates a 
rapprochement between the subject and the physical world, and 
assures us of the potential unity between human subjects in a 
social context. While both Kant and Schopenhauer accord 
aesthetic experience a privileged position within their respective 
philosophical systems, then, they nevertheless view its potential 
quite differently. 
Having established the function of art in this way, 
Schopenhauer attempts a hierarchical classification of the arts, 
from architecture and horticulture at the bottom, to painting and 
poetry at the top, with music overrunning the scale and being 
placed in a position of its own above all other art forms. We have 
already seen Kant's distinction between humour and beauty, and, 
given its obvious physicality, laughter would seem to have an 
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equally precarious relationship with art in Schopenhauer's system. 
A comedy, for example, or any other work of art that incited 
laughter, would seem to preclude the possibility of aesthetic 
contemplation, at least while the laughing continued. This point is 
partly borne out in Schopenhauer's citing of tragedy as the summit 
of poetical art, a move which he justifies in the following terms: 
The unspeakable pain, the wail of humanity, the triumph 
of evil, the scornful mastery of chance, and the 
irretrievable fall of the just and innocent, is here 
presented to us; and in this lies a significant hint of the 
nature of the world and of e. -dstence. (Schopenhauer. 1907a: 326) 
It would seem, then, that even while aesthetic contemplation 
allows us to escape from the wretchedness of the everyday, the 
superiority of tragedy derives from the fact that it reminds us of 
that very wretchedness, gesturing towards the nature of the Will. 
While tragedy effectively represents this hopelessness at the level of 
art, however, it is the structure of humorous incongruity that 
represents it at the level of our everyday existence. In order to 
understand this relationship, though, we need to examine 
Schopenhauer's incongruity theory in more detail. 
Schopenhauer initially seeks to explain humour in a brief 
passage in the first volume of The World As Will And As Idea, but 
he returns to the subject in volume two in the form of a more 
lengthy discussion. Here, he is keen to distance himself from 
K, ant's theory, but regards it 'as unnecessary to prove [its] 
incorrectness' (1 907b: 270), as its insufficiency is so obvious. We 
have already identified several problems with Kant's analysis, and 
it is possible that Schopenhauer envisaged similar difficulties with 
it. Nevertheless, there are some important parallels to be drawn 
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between their two accounts, as can be seen if we remind ourselves 
of Schopenhauer's formulation: 
the source of the ludicrous is always the paradoxical, and 
therefore unexpected, subsumption of an object under a 
conception which in other respects is different from it, 
and accordingly the phenomenon of laughter always 
signifies the sudden apprehension of an incongruity 
between such a conception and the real object thought 
under it, thus between the abstract and the concrete 
object of perception. (1907b: 271) 
Kant's explanation of humour was centred on the way in which 
an incongruity undermines our expectation, and Schopenhauer 
seems to identify an identical process here. In both cases the 
subject relies upon abstract thought to conjure up an expectation 
of what will happen, but this expectation evaporates when it fails 
to conform to what concretely transpires. 
In spite of these similarities, however, there is a crucial 
difference between Kant and Schopenhauer's comic theory, and 
this concerns their respective conception of the relationship 
between humour and reason. As we have seen, we are unable to 
enjoy humour in itself, according to Kant, because the 
understanding is opposed to the absurdity that it finds there. This 
conclusion, it was argued, derived from Kant's Enlightenment 
notion of the sovereignty of reason. For Schopenhauer. on the 
other hand, we enjoy humour not only for the physical gratification 
that it yields, but also in itself insofar as it represents the defeat of 
reason. Schopenhauerian incongruity consists of abstract 
thoughts undermined by concrete perceptions, and this epitomises 
the insufficiency of reason. Abstract thought is too unwieldy to 
represent the subtleties of the concrete: only perception, which 'is 
always unquestionably right' (1 907b: 279), can accurately 
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represent such complexities. That this incongruity affords us 
pleasure is attributable to the fact that perception provides us with 
an immediate form of knowledge. As such, we do not have to go 
through the same sort of mental exertion that abstract thought 
requires. Therefore, Schopenhauer concludes, it'must... be 
" 
diverting to us to see this strict, untiring governess, the reason, for 
once convicted of insufficiency' (1 907b: 280). It is here that we 
discover the utter hopelessness of our everyday existence: for all 
that we put our faith in the power of reason, it will never be up to 
the job. While tragedy represents the 'wail of humanity' at the level 
of art, then, our 'bitter laughter' at incongruity embodies it at the 
level of the everyday (1907b: 280). 
There are several problems with Schopenhauer's argument 
here. For one thing he seems to assume the passivity of 
perception. an idea that Kant, in positing an active role for the 
understanding in making sense of representations, was keen to 
reject. What is so interesting about Schopenhauer's account, 
however, is not only the significance that humour assumes in his 
overall philosophy, but also the way in which his theory amounts 
to a form of Romantic critique of Enlightenment notions of 
rationality, and it is to this point that I now turn. 
Schopenhauer, humour and Romanticism 
John B. Halsted locates the era of Romanticism between 1780 
and 1850. While ideas that had gained prominence during the 
Enlightenment were still influential, he argues, a new set of 
attitudes developed during this period. As he says, 
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... 
Romantic ideas arose both as implicit and e)Tlicit 
criticisms of leading eighteenth-century views; they were 
adumbrated largely out of a sense of the inadequacy of 
the dominant ideas of the Enlightenment and of the 
society which produced them 
- 
or what Romanticists 
identified as "those" ideas and "that" society. As time 
went on, Romantic ideas appeared in conflict against the 
inheritance and the inheritors of the Enlightenment 
- 
or 
again, what Romanticists took them to be. (Halsted, 1969: 2) 
Such ideas, as Halsted argues, need to be related to other concerns 
current at the time. Not only had the repercussions of the French 
Revolution led to certain political crises, but the beginnings of the 
Industrial Revolution had aroused moral and social apprehension. 
Romanticism responded to these amdeties with a critique of the 
Enlightenment order out of which the problems seemed to have 
arisen (1969: 3). And while the label of Romanticism cannot 
necessarily be applied to Schopenhauer's entire philosophy, there 
was nevertheless a congruence, as Halsted notes, between much of 
his work and the central ideas of Romanticism (1969: 42). In 
defining humour in terms of the pleasurable defeat of reason, this 
congruence is clearly seen in Schopenhauer's comic theory. 
Bakhtin's discussion of Romanticism explores its relationship 
with the carnivalesque grotesque, and in so doing it shares with 
Halsted's analysis an emphasis on the extent to which 
Romanticism represented a rejection of the Enlightenment 
tradition3. While Enlightened culture had tended to subordinate 
carnivalesque elements, as we have seen, Bakhtin argues that 
Romanticism initiated a revival in the grotesque. He interprets this 
revival as 
a reaction against the cold rationalism, against official. 
formalistic, and logical authoritarianism; it was a 
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rejection of that which is finished and completed, of the didactic and utilitarian spirit of the Enfighteners with 
their narrow and artificial optimism. (Bakhtin, 1984: 37) 
Insofar as Romanticism managed to rejuvenate the grotesque 
elements of carnival, then, Bakhtin views it in positive terms. 
However, he also stresses that the Romantic grotesque represented 
a transformation of its Renaissance precursor, that in retrieving 
these popular traditions Romanticism had provided them with a 
new set of meanings. Not only was the collective nature of the 
medieval and Renaissance carnival transposed intoan individual 
carnival, marked by a vivid sense of isolation' (1984: 37), but so too 
was the rib-tickling belly-laugh of carnival transposed into a 
reduced form of laughter. While Bakhtin is keen to identify 
Romanticism with a revival in the fortunes of the grotesque, then, 
he is also keen to stress the point that it did not represent a 
complete return to the regenerative and triumphant potential of 
carnival in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. 
insofar as humour represents not only a critique of the 
inadequacy of reason, but also a celebration of this inadequacy, 
Schopenhauer's theory can also be related to the structure of 
carnival. Just as carnival represents a momentary liberation from 
the prevailing power arrangements, for example, so 
Schopenhauer's account of humour rests upon similar sorts of 
structure. Reason, as we have seen, is a'strict, untiring, 
troublesome governess' (1907b: 280, quoted above), and humorous 
incongruity thus enables the temporary overthrow of this 
oppressor. Indeed, this structure is not only present in the 
dynamics of Schopenhauer's theory, but also in several of the 
151 
examples that he uses to explain it, where the object of the joke is 
often an authority figure, such as a king, a policeman or a doctor 
(1907b: 272-3). However, the affinities between Schopenhauerian 
incongruity and carnival need to be pressed with a certain caution. 
Since the structure of this incongruity is, as we have seen, also the 
source of Schopenhauerian pessimism, there are good grounds for 
keeping the scale of its celebratory potential in perspective. This, 
argues Eagleton, is where Schopenhauer's theory might be of use 
in conjunction with a theory of carnival: in spite of the relentless 
hopelessness of Schopenhauer's philosophy, it does remind us that 
the 'dominant narrative of history to date has been one of carnage, 
wretchedness and oppression' (Eagleton, 1989: 182). Any 
'Bakhtinian celebrationwhich remains unaware of this fact is, 
Eagleton concludes, 'politically futile' (1989: 182), a conclusion 
that is wholly consistent with my earlier discussion of Bakhtin. 
While it can be argued that the Romantic critique of reason 
instigated by Schopenhauer's comic theory has similarities with 
the structure of carnival, then, the melanch oly which 
Schopenhauer's critique inspires reminds us of the need to 
approach the subject of carnival from a historical perspective. 
Having identified the Romantic and carnivalesque overtones of 
Schopenhauer's thcory, we can perhaps begin to situate it within a 
model of culture, as we did with Kant's analysis. It was argued 
that, while Kant differentiated between humour, reason and 
beauty, he nevertheless sought to assimilate humour within the 
bourgeois practices of the day, and that this was part of a more 
widespread cultural process. To what extent, then, might 
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Schopenhauer's theory of humour belong to a similar sort of 
process? 
It was argued above, following Stallybrass and White, that one 
of the features of the Enlightenment period was the evolution of a 
rational, de-libidinized public sphere, free from the vulgar excesses 
of both the public body and individual bodies. While Kant 
assumed that humour could be made to conform to the manners 
appropriate within this publicsphere, Schopenhauer identifies 
such conventions themselves as a source of incongruity. 'Good 
society, ' he argues, 'in order to be thoroughly insipid, has 
forbidden all decided utterances, and therefore all strong 
expressions' (1907b: 274). Asa result, 'scandalous' or 'indecent 
things' are expressed in the form of 'general conceptions' (1907b: 
274). if someone is 'thrashed and kicked out' of a party, for 
example, it is said that 'He had unpleasantness at the ball', and if 
someone is drunk, it is said that 'He has done too well' (1 907b: 
274). This mismatch between concrete indecency and vague 
generality corresponds to the structure of humorous incongruity: 
such forms of protocol are simply laughable. To a certain extent, 
then, Schopenhauer's theory of humour is expounded in relation to 
a critique of the culture in which he found himself. Not only does 
he reject Enlightenment rationalism but, as one might expect from 
a philosopher who apparently revels in the details of human 
anatomy, he also ridicules certain aspects of a sublimated public 
sphere. 
However, for all that Schopenhauer seems to enjoy the fact that 
humour marks the outwitting of reason, it would be inaccurate to 
read his comic theory simply as a championing of the plebeian over 
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the patrician. Rather, Schopenhauer strikes more of an 
ambivalent position towards the cultural order, and his discussion 
of humour as a distinct category of the ludicrous reveals a certain 
anxiety about the extent to which the public sphere was being 
vulgarised. For Schopenhauer, humour is the highest form of the 
ludicrous, allowing us to conceal seriousness behind a joke. This 
enables us to overcome the problems that the external world 
apparently imposes on our current situation. 'Schopenhauer 
despairs, however, of the widespread use of the term 'humour' to 
denote other forms of the ludicrous: the word 
is not intended to be used as the title for all kinds ofjokes 
and buffoonery, as is now universally the case in 
Germany, without opposition from men of letters and 
scholars; for the true conception of that modification, that 
tendency of the mind, that child of the sublime and the 
ridiculous, would be too subtle and too high for their 
public, to please which they take pains to make 
everything flat and vulgar. Well, 'high words and a low 
meaning' is in general the motto of the noble present, and 
accordingly now-a-days he is called a humorist who was 
formerly called a buffoon. (1907b: 284) 
While the juxtaposition of 'high words and a low meaning' is 
sometimes a source of amusement for Schopenhauer, as in the 
case of the insipid expressions referred to earlier, it can also be a 
sourceof despair, as in the case here. While the former represents 
the unnecessary politesse of the public sphere, the latter 
represents the decline of the cultural order. What I want to argue 
is that this ambivalence towards contemporary culture is bound up 
with the ambiguity both of Schopenhauer's comic theory and of his 
Romanticism. 
The ambiguity of Schopenhauer's comic theory derives from the 
fact that humour is, as we have seen, not only a source of 
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celebration but also a source of hopelessness. Furthermore, not 
only does humour represent the defeat of reason but, insofar as 
humour consists of an incongruity between percepts and concepts, 
so (conceptual) reason is itself a prerequisite of humour (1907b: 
280). It is precisety this ambiguity that structures Schopenhauer's 
Romanticism, for while humour demonstrates the insufficiency of 
reason, we are, as rational creatures, ultimately unable to avoid 
this insufficiency. For all that Romanticism develops a critique of 
Enlightenment ideals, then, such a critique will ultimately be tied 
to those very ideals. It is here that we can locate the ambivalence 
of Schopenhauer's relationship with the contemporary cultural 
order: at the same time as he develops a critique of the de- 
libidinized public sphere, he nevertheless distances himself from 
the vulgarisation of that sphere. Schopenhauer's theory of humour 
thus draws upon an ambiguity that not only lies at the heart of his 
overall philosophical system, but is also typical of Romantic 
critique in general. 
conclusion 
The most obvious distinction to be drawn between Kant's and 
Schopenhauer's theories of humour concerns the way in which 
they locate the source of comic enjoyment. While Kant argues that 
such enjoyment derives from the physical gratification of laughter 
alone, Schopenhauer identifies an additional source of pleasure in 
the actual perception of humorous incongruity: we can enjoy the 
ludicrous in itse! f. What I have argued in this chapter is that by 
relating each theory to its pertinent contexts, the wider social and 
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philosophical issues which impinge upon them become apparent. 
In particular, it was argued that Kant's Enlightenment background 
and Schopenhauer's Romantic tendencies were crucial influences 
on their respective comic theories. Such a conclusion is certainly 
consistent with Bakhtin's thesis concerning the decline of the 
carnivalesque. However, by relating his thesis to two particular 
historical moments in the fleld of comic theory, we have also been 
able to expand and elaborate upon the trajectory of this decline. 
2 
3 
I say'in part'here because Van Cleve's quotation suggests that 
the bourgeoisie also rejected aristocratic practices. While such 
a process is vital to the construction of a middle-class sense of 
decorum, it is of less interest to a discussion of comedy. 
Norbert Elias' study, Me Civilizing Process, however, provides a 
thorough account of the ways in which the German middle 
class did distinguish themselves from the nobility in the period 
we are discussing (Elias, 1978: 16-29). 
The footnote attributes this information to Wallace's Kant, 
p. 39. 
Bakhtin equates the Romantic grotesque with a number of 
areas: with Sturm und Drang; with the work of Theodor von 
Hippel, Ernst Hoffmann and Bonaventura; with the theories of 
Friedrich Schlegel and Jean Paul (Bakhtin, 1984: 36-44). 
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Chapter Four 
Bergson and laughter 
The fundamental tenet of Bergson's theory of humour is easily 
stated: the comic consists in 'something mechanical encrusted on 
the living', and laughter is a response which 'corrects' this rigidity 
(Bergson, 1980: 84). It is on the basis of this corrective function 
that Bakhtin cites Bergsonian laughter as representative of the 
negative streak in comic theory (Bakhtin, 1984: 71). When 
Bergson's remarks are taken out of the context of his overall 
philosophical position, as they frequently are (e. g. Nelson, 1990; 
Miller, 1988). it is never very clear why Bergson seems so 
preoccupied with the comic qualities of mechanical rigidity. One 
aim of this chapter, then, will be to consider Bergson's theory 
alongside an explication of his philosophical approach. However, I 
will also attempt to situate Bergson's comic theory historically in 
relation to modernity and modernism. As Wylie Sypher has noted 
in his introduction to the English translation of Bergson's 
'Laughter', Bergson's essay can be read as a reaction 'against the 
coarse logic, the "machinery, " of the nineteenth century' (1980: 
viii). While Sypher's commentary (first published in 1956) predates 
the more recent theoretical interest in the issues surrounding 
modernity and modernism, it nevertheless suggests an important 
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route to follow in developing a historicised reading of Bergson's 
theory. Such a reading would identify Bergson's vitalism as a 
critical reply to the perceived problems of modern society. This 
chapter will seek to build on such readings by relating Bergson's 
theory to recent theoretical discussions of modernity and 
modernism (see Giddens, 1990; Habermas, 1993: Giles, 199 1; 
Burwick and Douglass, 1992). In addition, it will explore the 
Bakhtinian response to Bergsonism. 
Bergson and the discourse of modernism 
It is fitting that the Lumi6re brothers first projected pictures 
through their Cin6matographe at the Grand Caf6 in Paris in 1895. 
Six years earlier Bergson had published his Essai sur les donn6es 
irnm6diates de la conscience (translated as 71me and Fý-ee Wilo, 
and, seven years after that, MatiLý-re et m6moire (translated as 
Matter and Memory). By 1907, when Bergson published his best 
known work, Ltvolution cr6atrice (translated as Creative Evolution), 
not only had cinema taken off, with Parisian crowds thronging to it 
every evening, but Bergson's own lectures at the Coll6ge de France 
in Paris used to attract huge crowds of 'Five o'clock Bergsonians' 
(Antliff, 1993: 4; quoting Charles Nguy), who spilled out onto the 
street in their attempts to catch a glimpse of the now famous 
philosopher. And it was in Creative Evolution that Bergson 
developed his critique of the intellect on the grounds that it 
resembled a cin6matographe, carving the dynamic flux of time up 
into finite, static frames (Bergson, 1960: 347). In order to 
appreciate fully the significance of the metaphors of mechanical 
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rigidit3r that abound in Bergson's comic theory (first published in 
1900), we need to turn first to his analysis of the relationship 
between the intellect and time. 
In 7Yme and Free Will, Bergson seeks to establish an opposition 
between the spatial and social realm of the intellect, and the 
temporal and subjective realm of intuition, an opposition that 
grounds much of his subsequent work (Bergson, 19 10). The 
intellect experiences time as 'a- homogeneous medium in which our 
conscious states are ranged alongside one another as in space' 
(1910: 90: quoted in Easthope, 1991: 184). For Bergson, the 
problem with this conception is that it conceives of time in linear, 
spatial terms. In reality, time consists in a process of 
'heterogeneous durationor dur6e (1910: 237, quoted in Easthope, 
1991: 184). This process is not one of linear progression, but of 
complex flux, where the past and the present merge into one 
another, 'as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, 
so to speak into one another' (19 10: 100: quoted in Easthope, 
199 1: 184). Only intuition is capable of experiencing dur6e, 'of 
grasping, ' as A. E. Pilkington has put it, 'the pure flow of 
consciousness before it is fragmented by the intellect into a 
collection of separate states and parts' (Pilkington, 1976: 16). 
In both 'Laughter' and Creative Evolution, Bergson develops this 
opposition further. The intellect, he argues, directs itself towards 
the material world. Its task is to ensure that the body adapts to its 
environment, that we are able both to represent the external world 
to ourselves, and to determine appropriate courses of action Within 
the world around us (Bergson, 1960: ix). The intellect, in other 
words, serves a pragmatic, quotidian purpose: it 'demands that we 
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grasp things in relation to our own needs' U 980: 158). As a result, 
it is ill-suited to perceiving the 'true nature of life' (I Z160: x). 
Science, for example, which is governed by the intellect, deploys a 
'cinematographical method' (1960: 347), constructing a 
compartmentalised and spatialised picture of the world that is 
adequate to the goals of the intellect. In a similar manner, 
language, the medium within which the intellect articulates 
statements about the world, provides a system for labelling objects 
with signs. However, this labelling system 'only takes note of the 
most ordinary function and commonplace aspect of the thing' 
(1980: 159). As a result, Bergson argues, we tend simply to read 
the label attached to a particular object, rather than seeing'the 
actual things themselves' (1980: 159). While the intellect is a 
necessary component of our existence, then, it limits us to a 
superficial understanding of reality: 
the intellect, so skilful in dealing with the inert, is 
awkward the moment it touches the living. Whether it 
wants to treat the life of the body or the life of the mind, it 
proceeds with the rigour, the stiffness and the brutality of 
an instrument not designed for such use. 
71w intellect is characterized by a natural inability to 
comprehend life. (1960: 173-4) 
The reason that the intellect is particularly unsuited to 
comprehending life is that life itself is endowed with qualities 
similar to those of dur6e: it comprises 'evolution in time and 
complexity in space' (1980: 118). Given this, it is not properly 
susceptible to the processes of fragmentation and classification 
undertaken by the intellect. Alongside the intellect, however, there 
eýdsts the faculty of intuition, a faculty which 'is moulded on the 
very forIn of life' because it treats everything 'organically' rather 
160 
than 'mechanically' (1960: 174). Rather than manipulating the 
world to suit the requirements of pragmatism, intuition is 
'disinterested' (1960: 175). As a result, argues Bergson, it is able 
to grasp things in themselves, to perceive the reality of life and of 
dur6e as continuous and indivisible. While the intellect erects a 
'veil' U 980: 158) between the mind and reality, then, intuition 
consists in a form of 'immediate consciousness, vision which 
hardly distinguishes itself from the object seen, knowledge which is 
in contact and even coincidence with this object' (Chiari, 1975: 4 1; 
quoting Bergson). This notion of immediate consciousness is 
crucial to Bergson's espousal of vitalism, the view that animate 
creatures possess a life force, or 61an vitaL As Bergson explains in 
Ltnergie Spirituelle (translated as Mind-Energy, and first published 
in 1919), 
To create the future requires preparatory action in the 
present, to prepare for what will be is to utilize what has 
been; life therefore is employed from its start in 
conserving the past and anticipating the future in a 
duration in which past, present and future tread one on 
another, forming an indivisible continuity. Such memory, 
such anticipations, are consciousness itself (Bergson, 1920: 13) 
In this remark, Bergson unites dur6e, intuition ane. the life force as 
three aspects of one complex realm of experience. Intuition is the 
means of perceiving dur6e, the qualitative continuity of 
consciousness, the embodiment of 61an vitaL In this way, Bergson 
posits a sharp binary divide between the intellectual realm of 
language and science, and the intuitive realm of immediate 
consciousness. 
There are a number of issues we could raise in relation to 
Bergson's account of the relationship between the mind and 
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reality. Firstly, as Sanford Schwartz has argued, Bergson is not 
consistent in the precise relationship that he posits between the 
intellect and intuition (Schwartz, 1992: 291). At times, for 
example, the two faculties are deemed to complement one another 
(e. g. Bergson, 1960: Nifi), while at other times the intellect is 
presented as being 'subordinate to intuition' as a result of its 
inability to perceive reality (Schwartz, 1992: 291: e. g. Bergson, 
1980: 158-60). Secondly, Bergson's analysis of language puts his 
own philosophical project in an impossible situation. As we have 
seen, language can only represent the world inadequately. As a 
result, Bergson's attempts to represent the realm of intuition are 
necessarily flawed: 'by the very language I was compelled to use, ' 
Bergson accepts, 'I betrayed the deeply ingrained habit of setting 
out time in space' (quoted in Rose, 1984: 97). The upshot would 
seem to be that philosophical discourse is in no better position to 
capture reality than science. Indeed, the activity where our 
intuitive powers are most effectively exercised is art rather than 
philosophy: this is the activity, according to Bergson, that allows 
our 'soul' to 'vibrate in perfect accord with nature' (Bergson, 1980: 
158). 
However, perhaps the most intriguing issue concerns the 
historical significance of Bergson's vitalism. Why was it that a 
philosophy which eschewed mechanism and science should 
achieve such potency precisely at the point at which those two 
processes were on the ascendancy? In order to address this 
question, we need to consider the relationship between modernity 
and modernism. 
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Anthony Giddens identifies modernity in terms of the 'modes of 
social life or organisation' (Giddens, 1990: 1) which, since the 
seventeenth century, have come to dominate first Europe, and then 
the entire globe. Conceived in such a way, he goes on to identify 
four interrelated 'institutional dimensions' to these modes of social 
life. The first such dimension is that of capitalism, the ability to 
sustain the production of commodities and the accumulation of 
capital. The second dimension is that of industrialism, the means 
to organise social life on the basis of mechanised'processes. The 
third dimension is that of surveillance, the capacity to supervise 
and administer the population. Finally, the fourth dimension is 
that of military power, the ability of the state to control the means 
of violence (1990: 55-9). While the precise relationship between 
these four dimensions has varied between different spatial and 
temporal contexts, Giddens does identify three specific processes 
which have occurred in the course of the development of 
modernity. The first of these is that of the 'separation of time and 
space' (1990: 53). As modernity developed, Giddens argues, so 
calendars and clocks were used to standardise time across regions. 
As this took place, idiosyncratic means of temporal organisation 
within a particular locale (e. g. around the number of daylight 
hours within which work could be undertaken) gradually 
disappeared. At the same time, there has been a tramsformation in 
the relationship between a particular locale and space, as 
individual 'locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in 
terms of social influences quite distant from them' (1990: 19). In 
other words, modernity ushered in a process whereby time and 
space were separated from particular locales, and conceived 
instead in uniform and universal terms. Such a process 
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contributed to the second feature identified by Giddens, the 
'development of disembedding mechanisms' (1990: 53). Here, 
Giddens is referring to processes which replaced 'local contexts of 
interaction' with contexts capable of ranging across various spatial 
and temporal zones (1990: 2 1). Money, for example, has allowed 
economic exchange to take place using symbolic tokens rather 
than bartered goods. As systems of foreign financial exchange 
developed, economic interaction became possible between ever 
more dispersed trading partners. Finally, the third process is that 
of reflexivity. By this, Giddens means that modernity ushers in a 
questioning of tradition. While pre-modem cultures were content 
to repeat traditions simply because they were traditions, modernity 
encourages a reflexive attitude towards social practices. In other 
words, 
The refie: ýdvity of modem life consists in the fact that 
social practices are constantly examined and reformed in 
the light of incoming information about those very 
practices, thus constitutively altering their character. (1990: 38) 
I will return to consider certain aspects of Giddens' analysis of 
modernity in relation to Bergson a little later, but first I will turn to 
the question of modernism. 
Modernism is usually construed in terms of a range of artistic 
practices and movements I that developed in Europe in the period 
1885-1935 (Sheppard, 1993: 1). The way in which such practices 
are characterised, however, is more problematic. One approach, as 
Richard Sheppard has shown, involves the attempt to equate 
modernism with certain 'key features' (1993: 2). The problem with 
such an approach is not only that it has produced an immense 
diversity of 'key features', but that these features are rarely 
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#specific to the modernist period' (1993: 2). A second approach, 
often operating in tandem with the first, attempts to locate 
mo dernism 'in a one-dimensional historical, literary-historical or 
sociological context' U 993: 3). While such an approach has 
advantages over the first insofar as it seeks to develop some sort of 
contextual understanding of modernism, too often it interprets 
modernism simply as a response to previous artistic movements, 
or, alternatively, as a precursor of subsequent movements. In 
doing so, this approach tends to minimalise the complexity of the 
socio-historical context out of which modernism developed. 
Given these problems, Sheppard devises a third approach which 
conceives modernism in terms of an interdisciplinary range of 
responses to the social and cultural upheavals experienced during 
the period (1993: 4-5). We have already seen Giddens' analysis of 
the sort of upheavals that modernity ushers in. In the light of this 
analysis, we could perhaps examine the extent to which some of 
the processes identified by him might have been experienced in a 
particularly intensified manner during the period when modernism 
developed2. Deploying Louis Althusser's notion of a 
#probl6matique', Sheppard argues that subjective perceptions of the 
modernist probldmatique might not necessarily have coincided 
with the objective state of affairs, and that it might only be with the 
benefit of hindsight that such variances can be discerned (1993: 
11). As such, modernism can be seen to incorporate a variety of 
different responses to the one social, economic and cultural 
configuration. Viewed in this way, modernism is understood to be 
both complex and contradictory. Such a strategy thus avoids the 
problems identified in the first two approaches, while at the same 
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time prompting an interrogative attitude towards the relationship 
between modernist practices and modem social and economic 
relations that avoids the pitfalls of reductionism (1993: 5). 
Having resolved some of these methodological issues, Sheppard 
proceeds to explore the modernist probl6matique in two ways: 
firstly, by outlining modernist diagnoses of the probl6matique; 
secondly, by surveying modernist responses to it. I want to use 
these two poles 
- 
diagnosis and response 
- 
as a way of examining 
Bergson's relationship with modernism and modernity. 
Bergson's diagnosis of the modernist probl6matique would seem 
to revolve around his critique of the cinematographic treatment of 
time. Indeed, his philosophy of time is taken by both Habermas 
and Harvey as emblematic of a more general modernist 
preoccupation with time (Habermas, 1993: 99: Harvey. 1989: 201, 
206). It is also apparent that Bergson's critique is applicable to the 
processes involved in the modern transformation of time and space 
identified by Giddens. While Bergson valorises the qualitative 
experience of time as it is given to us by intuition, the increasing 
rationalisation of time and space undertaken during modernity 
would seem to threaten the possibility of such experience. And 
while he argues that human life is necessarily organised by the 
intellect, the processes that took place during modernity - the 
imposition of uniform systems of time measurement, and the 
simultaneous supplanting of local contexts within much larger 
contexts - would have accentuated the extent to which the 
dominance of the intellect was increasing. 
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In addition to this critique of the rationalisation of time, we can 
also situate Bergson's position in relation to the ascendancy-of 
science. As Schwartz has noted, by the 1900s Bergson's Parisian 
lectures were increasingly being seen as a viable alternative to the 
scientific outlook that had been promulgated by Herbert Spencer, 
amongst others (Schwartz, 1992: 288). Schwartz argues that one 
of the reasons for the popularity of the vitalism offered by Bergson 
was that it seemed to represent an affirmation of 'freedom' in 
response to the 'mechanistic d eterminism'that seemed to hold 
sway elsewhere (1992: 278). Bergson's contention that there is 
something comic about the way in which mechanical rigidity 
imposes itself on living forms suggests that he offered more than a 
rebuttal simply of mechanistic theories: he also offered a critique of 
the way in which mechanical processes had increasingly invaded 
social life. As Harvey has noted, while some of the forms of 
modernism that emerged after World War One - such as futurism, 
or the international style of architecture - celebrated such 
processes 
the modernism that emerged before the First World War 
was more of a reaction to the new conditions of 
production (the machine, the factory, urbanization), 
circulation (the new systems of transport and 
communications), and consumption (the rise of mass 
markets, advertising, mass fashion)... (Harvey, 1989: 23) 
We can, I would argue, read Bergson as a form of modernist 
discourse by situating him within this strand of modernism. As we 
shall see in our discussion of 'Laughter', Bergson finds several key 
aspects of modem society risible. And although Bergson resists an 
overtly political critique of the sort of processes identified here by 
Harvey, his philosophy was the source of inspiration for sections of 
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the political left 
- 
notably the French anarchist Georges Sorel 
- 
to 
develop such a critique3 (see Schwartz, 1992: 296-7. Vout and 
Wilde, 1987). 
We have moved on now from a consideration of Bergson's 
diagnosis of the modernist probldmatique to his response to it. 
One aspect of his response is clearly to reveal the shortcomings of 
reason and science. We have seen earlier, for example, his attempt 
to demonstrate the inability ofthe intellect to grasp reality. In 
response to this inadequacy, Bergson asserts the role of intuition 
in allowing us access to the flux of time. What is perhaps most 
interesting about Bergson's position, however, is not simply his 
own response to the modernist probldmatique, but the way in 
which it in turn influenced several forms of modernist aesthetic 
practice. This is not to say that Bergson himself endorsed 
aesthetic modernism. While Bergson likens the activity of intuition 
to aesthetic perception (Bergson, 1960: 175: 1980: 157), his own 
reaction to Cubism was, as Mark Antliff has shown, 'far from 
favourable' (Antliff, 1993: 3), disapproving of the extent to which 
the practitioners of Cubism had replaced intuitive creativity with 
aesthetic theory. Nevertheless, as Habermas has argued, 'the 
exaltation of the present' that was first apparent in Bergson's 
conception of time4 was a common preoccupation of aesthetic 
modernism (Habermas, 1993: 100). Sheppard, for example, has 
cited Bergson as a likely influence on Dada, a point to which we 
shall return later (Sheppard, 1979: 183). Similarly, Antliff has 
traced the relationship between Bergson and the Parisian avant- 
garde, arguing that Bergson's vitalism exerted a powerful influence 
on Cubism and rhythmism in particular, and that, at various 
168 
times, it was given both radical and reactionary inflections (Antliff, 
1993). The idea that Bergson was a key player in the emergence of 
aesthetic modernism, however, has been stated most forcefully by 
Richard Lehan, who has argued that 
it was Bergson who created a systematic, rigorous 
philosophy that gave foundation to basic modernist 
tenets, and it was Bergson who cleared the modernist 
landscape of a materialistic underbrush that could have 
choked modernism off at the outset. (Lehan, 1992: 307-8) 
In this way, Bergson can be seen not only to offer a far-reaching 
diagnosis of the problems of modernity in his critique of science 
and the intellect, buf, in valorising the realm of intuition as the 
experience of the flux of time, he can be seen as a crucial influence 
on a variety of responses to such problems generated by aesthetic 
modernism. 
What I have done in this section, then, is to explore the 
relationship between Bergson, modernism and modernity. I now 
want to turn to his comic theory in order to assess the relevance of 
that relationship to his analysis of laughter. 
Bergson's comic theory 
What does laughter mean? What is the basal element in 
the laughable? What common ground can we find 
between the grimace of a merry-andrew, a play upon 
words, an unequivocal situation in a burlesque and a 
scene of high comedy? 
(Bergson, 1980: 61) 
In addressing these questions, Bergson not only attempts to 
provide a characterisation of the comic, he also offers a 
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functionalist explanation of laughter. In the course of this section, 
I will look at the argument advanced by Bergson in his essay 
'Laughter'. I will then explore contemporaneous alternatives to 
Bergson's conception of laughter, before examining the extent to 
which his comic theory remains tied to the modernist co-ordinates 
of his discourse outlined in the previous section. 
a) 'Laughter' 
Bergson prefaces his analysis of the comic with a description of 
his method. The problem faced by the comic theorist, Bergson 
argues, is that 'abstract definition[§]' of the comic fail to grasp the 
detail of its various contours: 'above all, ' he argues, the comic is 'a 
living thing' (1980: 61). As a result, his analysis will try to avoid 
the distortions that the intellect imposes on living forms, and 
methodologically he tries to achieve this by offering a definition of 
the comic to serve not as a rigid formula, but as a more fie, -dble 
-leitmotiv'(1980: 74). In this way, Bergson attempts to circumvent 
the theoretical problems posed by his vitalist position: how to 
perform philosophical analysis while overcoming the limitations 
wrought by language and intellectual reason. 
The leitmotiv offered by Bergson is thatrigidity is the comic, 
and laughter is its corrective' (1980: 74). Comic rigidity, he argues, 
manifests itself in several areas. Human behaviour, for example, 
exhibits 
ýý 
gidity in the form of clumsy actions: a man running 
along in the street arouses laughter if he trips up over a particular 
obstacle, Bergson claims. And the reason for this response is that 
he has failed to display the behavioural 'elasticity' required to 
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negotiate such obstacles (1980: 66). Language is another area 
where comic rigidity might arise. One form of linguistic rigidity 
derives from the articulation of an absurdity within well- 
established idioms. Bergson argues, for example, that the comic 
effect of the 'lazy lout', who proclaims 'I don't like working between 
meals, 'is dependent not simply upon the absurdity of the 
statement, but upon the way in which the statement itself 
incorporates the dictum 'One should not eat between meals' (1980: 
134). Ideally, Bergson argues, language should exhibit a flexibility 
and subtlety capable of representing the world as accurately as 
possible: structurally, it should exhibit the dynamism of a living 
organism. As a result, the deployment of ready-made phrases 
signifies a lack of such flexibility (1980: 144)5. The final area 
where comic rigidity arises is in human character. For example. 
the way in which Don Quixote continually mistakes windmills for 
giants is comic, Bergson argues, because it represents a rigidity of 
character. Ideally, the human character should be attuned to the 
changing circumstances around it, and this requires a high degree 
of fleidbility and adaptability. Don Quixote, on the contrary, 
-latches on to the illusory idea of giants, and this thought then 
comes to determine his activity. It thus represents an 
automatism' of character, an 'obstinacy of mind' (1980: 180 and 
1 179). Comic rigidity manifests itself, then, in character, behaviour 
and language. And in each of these instances, Bergson's 
explanation of comic potential is dependent upon his vitalism: 
rigidity represents a departure from the mobile, fle. ýXible qualities 
inherent in life itself, 
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The corrective function of laughter derives from its ability to 
correct rigidity and to realign behaviour, character or language 
with the vital forces of life. Bergson's account of this process rests 
upon a functionalist model of society, where society is envisaged as 
an organic structure, and various social phenomena are explained 
in terms of the function they perform in the maintenance of this 
structure. It is the duty of individuals to ensure their adaptability 
to the social system within which they live, Bergson argues. This 
means that '[elach member must be ever attentive to his social 
surroundings; he must model himself on his environment' (1980: 
147). In other words, the individual must exhibit the flexibility of 
life itself. When they fail to do so 
- 
when their behaviour is rigid or 
clumsy, for example - other members of society will laugh at them 
to encourage them to change their behaviour: 
society holds over each individual member, if not the 
threat of correction, at all events the prospect of a 
snubbing, which, although it is slight, is none the less 
dreaded. Such must be the function of laughter. Always 
rather humiliating for the one against whom it is dinected, 
laughter is really and truly a kind of social Tagging. ' (1980: 148) 
. 
Bergson thus identifies laughter as a thoroughly social 
phenomenon serving a specific social function. However, while this 
notion of corrective laughter can be applied to cases where an 
individual unintentionally makes a fool of him or herself. Bergson 
Is"aware that it can't so obviously be applied to cases where 
hurnour is created intentionally. In such cases, in other words, in 
what sense is the resulting laughter corrective? 
Bergson tackles this question while discussing the relationship 
between comedy and art. As we have seen, he likens aesthetic 
perception to intuitive experience, and the theory of art advanced 
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in'Laughter'very much follows on from this equation. Our'daily 
perception' is based around the 'generalities' and 'symbols' 
imposed by language and the intellect. In contrast, aesthetic 
perception is geared towards 'individualised' experience (1980: 
165). What art provides us with, Bergson argues, is a 
representation of feelings experienced in a particular time and 
place. To 'give general names to these feelings' betrays their 
aesthetic quality, and returns us to the realm of the everyday 
(1980: 165). Art has a universal quality insofar as the feelings it 
expresses can be universally communicated, but its object is 
necessarily unique. 
Comedy 
- 
and Bergson restricts his discussion to dramatic 
comedy 
- 
shares with art the aim of producing pleasure (1980: 
170), but in other crucial respects it is significantly different. 
While art aims at the unique, for example, comedy aims at the 
general: it 'depicts characters we have already come across and 
shall meet with again' (1980: 166). While tragedy centres on 
unique individuals (e. g. 'Macbeth, Hamlet, Othello, King I-ear' etc. 
(1980: 168)), comedy centres on types. As Bergson points out with 
reference to Moli6re, Te Misanthrope, IAvare, le Jouer, le Distrait, 
etc., are names of whole classes of people' (1980: 166). The reason 
for this, Bergson argues, is that, by dealing with general classes of 
people who will be recognisable to the audience, comedy preserves 
the corrective function of laughter. The audience's laughter at the 
characters' comic rigidity serves to instruct the audience about the 
folly of such rigidity. As Sir John Vanburgh, the Restoration 
Comedy playwright put it, '[tlhe business of comedy... is to shew 
people what they shou'd do, by representing them upon the Stage, 
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doing what they shou'd not... ' (quoted in Palmer, 1984: 113). 
Consequently, the corrective of laughter can operate in at least two 
ways. While laughter at unintentional comedy serves to correct the 
behaviour of the object of the laughter, the laughter produced by 
intentional comedy serves to correct the behaviour of those 
laughing. 
Having outlined Bergson's comic theory, we are now in a 
position to examine some of the issues that it raises. The first area 
that I will explore concerns Bergson's analysis of laughter as a 
social phenomenon and the processes whereby particular objects 
are constructed as comic. ýn the course of his argument, Bergson 
mentions a large range of apparently comic objects. Hunchbacks, 
for example, exhibit comic rigidity in their deformity, at least as 
long as it is 'a deformity that a normally built person could 
successfidbi imitate' (1980: 75). 'And why does one laugh at a 
negroT Bergson enquires further. The answer, he suggests, is that 
they appear to be 'unwashed', as though they were 'daubed over 
with ink or soot' (1980: 86). Their appearance, argues Bergson, is 
thus analogous to the wearing of a mask, and since masks 
represent the imposition of a form of rigidity on the mobility of life, 
the 'unwashed' demeanour signifies as a form of comic rigidity. 'A 
negro is a white man in disguise, 'is the conclusion drawn by the 
comic imagination (1980: 87). 
The disturbing nature of these examples would suggest that 
they require rather careful inspection. The first point to make in 
I relation to them is that Bergson is relatively pessimistic about 
laughter. While he argues that the overall function which it serves 
is beneficial to society as a whole, he accepts that, since the 
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purpose of laughter is to intimidate and humiliate, so individual 
cases might involve aspects of aggression and injustice (1980: 188- 
9). However, the model of society on which he predicates this 
analysis is itself problematic. Bergson claims, for example, that 
Society will... be suspicious of all inelasticý of character, 
of mind and even of body, because it is the possible sign 
of a slumbering activity as well as of an activity with 
separatist tendencies, that inclines to swerve from the 
common centre round which society gravitates: in short 
because it is the sign of an eccentricity. (1980: 73) 
This notion of a 'common centre' suggests that society is 
structured around a high degree of consensus. However, Bergson 
offers no indication of how this consensus is arrived at. Is it 
merely a point around which the majority happen to congregate, or 
is it produced in accordance with structures of social and 
e, conomic power? How are 'eccentricities' defined and prejudices 
created, and why does laughter single out these 'separatist 
tendencies' as its suitable objects? His discussion of the 
hunchback and the negro is illuminating on this point. 
Hunchbacks appear comic to 'normally built' people, while the 
. 
negro appears comic because he is not white. In both cases, the 
comic effect is dependent upon the esistence of a social norm, but 
in neither case does Bergson begin to enquire about the way in 
which such norms are constructed. In addition to these problems, 
Bergson's model also assumes the desirability of social cohesion: 
laughter is a force for good because it maintains social cohesion. 
-Mis raises the question of whether social cohesion is 'good' per se, 
or whether we need to suspend judgement about it until we know 
what particular fonn of society is being held together by laughter. 
In some of the passages concerning laughter as a corrective, such 
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as the one above, Bergson projects an image of a society based on 
zealotry, coercion and intimidation, and it is far from clear that the 
cohesion of such a society is to be preferred to its revolutionary 
reorganisation. 
Further, given that Bergson portrays laughter as a disciplinary 
force within society, it would seem increasingly inappropriate to 
ground his comic theory on the metaphysical distinction between 
vital, intuitive experience and systematic, intellectual abstraction. 
Laughter, he argues, serves to safeguard our adaptability and 
flexibility, and it achieves this by ensuring that our behaviour is 
attuned to the essential features of life itself Any departure from 
this axis will be perceived as a form of comic rigidity and laughed 
out of court. However, particularly in the light of the examples 
explored above, Bergsonian laughter would rather seem to confer 
rigidity on the social group by imposing the stringent demands of 
normalisation upon its members. The implication of Bergson's 
analysis, then, is that the coercive, repressive powcr of laughter 
underscores a rigid form of social conformity. And this implication 
undermines the very opposition on which his theory is predicated. 
it would therefore seem that Bergson's comic theory faces a 
number of serious problems. 
In spite of these problems, however, Bergson's identification of a 
form of laughter that seeks to humiliate would seem to have a 
fairly widespread applicability. His account of the way in which 
laughter serves to reinforce the dominant structures of society, for 
xaxnple, might usefully be used as a starting point for an analysis 
of the relationship between, say, racist and se,, dst joking discourse 
and the dominant structures of contemporary society. However, 
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the negative status which he assigns to laughter itself (even though 
its overaU effect is beneficial) has led some commentators to 
question whether we might not be able to identify a more positive 
conception of laughter alongside this negative one. What I want to 
do now, then, is to consider what from these alternative 
conceptions of laughter might take. 
b) Altematives to Bergsonian laughter 
Both Pete A. Gunter (Gunter, 1968) and John Lippitt (Lippitt, 
1992) have suggested that it would have been entirely consistent 
for Bergson to have 'posited two sorts of laughter, one subsuming 
the intellect's superficiality, the other expressing the penetration of 
the intuition' (Gunter, 1968: 496). And both of them turn to 
Nietzsche as a source for envisaging what this form'of laughter 
might sound like. In Vius Spake Zarathustra, they argue, 
Nietzsche identifies two forms of laughter, the 'laughter of the herd' 
and the laughter of the height' (Lippitt, 1992: 39: quoting 
Nietzsche). The laughter of the herd manifests itself when 
Zarathustra addresses the crowd in the marketplace on the subject 
of the Obennensch, a being who represents, in Lippitt's words, 
#ascending life, self-overcoming and self-possession' (1992: 39). 
The crowd greet Zarathustra with 'scornful, mocking laughter' 
(Lippitt, 1992: 39): '... while they laugh they hate me too, ' claims 
Zarathustra. 'There is ice in their laughter' (Gunter, 1968: 500; 
quoting Nietzsche). This, both Gunter and Lippitt argue, is 
Cornparable to Bergsonian laughter, insofar as it singles out an 
individual as eccentric and seeks to attack this othemess through 
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humiliation. In contrast, it is Zarathustra himself who expresses 
the laughter of the height. The key passage here, Gunter and 
Lippitt agree, is when the shepherd 
- 
who is really Zarathustra 
himself 
- 
is struggling to remove a black snake from his throat. 
When Zarathustra urges the shepherd to bite the snake in half 
The shepherd... bit as my cry had admonished him: he bit 
with a strong bitel Far away did he spit the head of the 
serpent 
-: and sprang up. - 
No longer the shepherd, no longer man 
-a transfigured being, a light-surrounded being, that laughedl Never on 
earth laughed a man as he laughedl 
0 my brethren, I heard a laughter which was no human 
laughter, 
- 
and now gnaweth a thirst at me, a longing that 
has never allayed. (Gunter, 1968: 502-3: quoting Nietzsche) 
Rather than the frustrated laughter of the multitude, then, 
Zarathustra's laughter of the height expresses, in Gunter's words, 
'the attainment of desire' (1968: 505): it represents an ability both 
to'overcome fear and to reject the herd instinct of the multitude. 
Gunter argues that this conception of laughter is applicable to 
forms that arise at moments of passing danger, such as the 
laughter of the surfer who, having negotiated giant waves makes it 
iito calmer waters (1968: 506). Lippitt argues, on the other hand, 
that because the future always holds further sources of danger, so 
'the laughter of the height, while certainly being joyous, also 
involves as an important element laughing at the comedy of 
eicistence, including one's own existence' (Lippitt, 1992: 44). In 
this sense, the laughter of the height represents a life-affirming 
acceptance of the futility of human existence. 
I do not wish to examine the points at which Gunter and 
Lippittts arguments diverge because there is such a high degree of 
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unanimity between them. However, I do want to raise two points. 
The first concerns the extent to which Bergson himself might have 
posited a more positive conception of laughter alongside the 
analysis provided in'Laughter'. In one of his final publications, 
Deux sources de la morale et de la religion (first published in 1932: 
translated as Vie Two Sources of Morality and Religion), Bergson 
projects the opposition between intellect and intuition onto the 
field of moral philosophy. There are, he argues, two forms of 
morality. 'Closed' morality is 'amorality of pressure' (1935: 206: 
quoted in Lacey, 1989: 204): it is the means whereby a particular 
social group constructs a system of norms, injunctions and 
prohibitions to govern behaviour. The purpose of such rules is to 
secure the cohesion, and thus the permanence, of current social 
arrangements. There is an obvious affinity between the 
pragmatism of such a system and the operation of the intellect. 
Open morality, on the other hand, is concerned with a dynamic 
and spiritual form of intuition. To quote Lacey, it 
involves aspiration rather than impulsion, is based on 
feelings or (higher) emotion rather than reason, is supra- 
intellectual rather than infra-intellectual, is universal 
rather than partial in its sympathies, follows individual 
example rather than rules, and leads to joy rather than 
mere pleasure. (Lacey, 1989: 207) 
Bergson's examples of those who have embodied this form of open 
rnorality include prophets, saints and mystics such as St. Paul and 
joan of Arc (Bergson, 1935: 194; cited in Lacey, 1989: 207). 
Although there is a certain distance between Zarathustra's 
Nietzschean will to power and Bergson's conception of open 
rnorality, I would argue that certain parallels can nevertheless be 
drawn between them. In both cases, an appeal is made to 
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individuals to respond to some higher calling in order to overcome 
or transcend everyday conditions and mores. Given this parallel, it 
is to The 71vo Sources ofMorality and Religion that we should look 
if we are to find space within Bergson's framework for a 
Nietzschean conception of laughter of the height. 
The second point I would raise in relation to Gunter and 
Lippitt's argument returns us to the topic of carnival. The problem 
with their argument is that it repeats Nietzsche's contempt for the 
'herd' in assuming that a collective form of laughter is necessarily 
Bergsonian. In Bakhtin's theory of carnival, however, we have yet 
another alternative to Bergsonian laughter in the form of the 
celebratory laughter of the carnivalesque crowd. I want to address 
this alternative historically in relation to Bergson by looking at 
Bakhtin's comments concerning the modernist carnival. 
Describing the decline of the carnivalesque since the Renaissance, 
Bakhtin tries to identify particular texts which embody strong 
traces of the carnivalesque grotesque, and, as an example of the 
modernist grotesque, Bakhtin cites Alfred Jarry (Bakhtin, 1984: 
46). jarry was a contemporary and compatriot of Bergson whose 
best known work, Ubu Roý was first performed in the theatre in 
Paris in 1896, four years before the publication of 'Laughter, As 
Richard Stam's reading of Ubu Roi argues, the play is replete with 
carnivalesque imagery and techniques (Stam, 1989: 99-102). 
parodying Shakespearean tragedy, Ubu Roi represents a 
Carnivalising of the conventions of both Shakespearean theatre and 
bourgeois realism. Ubu himself is a reincarnation of Macbeth but, 
as Starn points out, he 'is motivated primarily by the prospect of 
having an unlimited supply of sausages rather than any ambition 
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for wealth and power' (Stam, 1989: 100), a gluttonous streak which 
pervades the entire play. This, along with the play's scatological 
language and its sequences of physical dismemberment, combine 
to signify Jarry's preoccupation with the grotesque. Although it is 
a textual form of carnival, rather than the real thing, in appealing 
to the carnivalesque tradition Ubu Roi nevertheless reminds us of 
the rebellious, collective laughter of carnival. Rather than 
legitimating dominant social structures in the way that Bergsonian 
laughter does, carnivalesque laughter celebrates the temporary 
reorganisation of them. Insofar as it embodies many of the central 
motifs of carnival, then, Ubu Roi suggests an alternative not only to 
Bergsonian laughter, but also to the Nietzschean 'laughter of the 
height' to which Gunter and Lippitt appeal. 
We can expand on this point further by turning to another form 
of modernist practice contemporaneous with Bergson: Dada. First 
emerging in Zurich during the First World War, the Dadaist 
I 
movement then spread to other cities (e. g. Munich, Cologne, Berlin, 
paris). In each centre, Dada announced a rejection of the capitalist 
system, a denunciation of the bourgeois values that had led to the 
war, and an attack on the very institution of art. In its quest to 
construct a revolutionary aesthetic (or anti-aesthetic) practice, 
Dada attempted to dissolve the boundaries between high and 
popular culture. In the light of its irreverent, comic flavour, 
Kenneth Coutts-Smith has called Alfred Jarry the 'father of 
Dadaism' (Coutts-Smith, 1970: 45). However, what I am more 
interested in here is the relationship between Dada and Bergson, 
and the extent to which Dada might have shared Bergson's 
philosophical position, but combined it with a very different 
j 
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conception of laughter. That Bergson had a direct influence on 
Dada has been documented by Sheppard6 (Sheppard, 1979: 183). 
What is striking is the extent to which the Dadaists' diagnosis of 
the modernist probl6matique echoed Bergson's own. Sheppard, for 
example, identifies five assumptions which, the Dadaists 
maintained, underpinned civilisation, and which they consequently 
rejected 7. Firstly, they attacked the 'anthropomorphic' 
organisation of reality U 979: 177), the extent to which the 'alien 
flux' (1979: 178) of time is carved up into pragmatically ordered 
units, a critique which echoes Bergson's account of the intellect. 
Secondly, they attacked the supposed superiority Pf humanity, 
emphasising instead the extent to which humans were merely one 
component of the natural realm. This echoes Bergson's 
theorisation of the life force and his valorisation of forms of 
experience which allow us access to this force. Thirdly, Sheppard 
argues, in their rejection of the idea of human progress, the 
Dadaists reconceived human history in terms of 'a conflict between 
the human urge to create fixed forms and the flux which 
perpetually sweeps such constructs away' (1979: 180). While 
-Bergson doesn't necessarily offer an equivalent critique of progress, 
the Dadaists'reconception of history nevertheless embodies 
something of Bergson's account of the relationship between the 
intellect and intuition. The intellect/intuition relationship is also 
echoed in the Dadaists' critique of the fourth assumption 
underpinning civilisation: 'supremacy of reason' (1979: 18 1). just 
as Bergson had done, the Dadaists sought to reveal the 
shortcomings of reason, valorising instead the imagination, a 
faculty which could, like Bergson's intuition, 'perceive the hidden 
patterns in fluid reality and relate them on their own terms' (1979: 
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181-2). Finally, the Dadaists developed a critique of language as 
providing us with a socially-constructed representation of the 
world rather than an accurate representation of reality (1979: 182). 
Again, this echoes Bergson's own diagnosis of the inadequacy of 
language. 
The pro. -dmity between Bergson and Dada can be illustrated in 
relation to Bergson's comic theory with reference to an example of 
Dadaist practice, George Grosz's 1920 painting Republican 
Automatons (reproduced in Coutts-Smith, 1970: 100). The 
painting depicts two figures in an urban setting. The figure on the 
left is besuited, bowler-hatted and waves a German flag. His body 
is robotic, - composed mostly of cylindrical, jointed parts - and 
disfigured 
- 
bearing a prosthetic leg. The figure on the right is 
equally robotic and disfigured, but his head forms a receptacle, 
into (or out of) which flow numbers and letters, echoing the large 
number '12' printed on the blank face of the figure on the left. The 
figure on the left wears an Iron Cross medal, and his raised arm 
reveals a system of cogwheels attached to his body. On one level. 
the painting simply seems to invite a Bergsontan critique of the 
comic rigidity that the two figures embody. However, on another 
level this comic rigidity acquires a political significance. The two 
figures' clothing signifies their bourgeois status, and their 
automatism is ridiculed as a flag-waving, unthinking form of 
allegiance to the Weimar Republic. The system of cogs, meanwhile, 
not only underlines the automaton nature of the figures, it also 
refers us to the mechanised, dehumanising forces that were 
increasingly becoming central to the mode of production. Insofar 
as the picture enacts an aggressively satirical portrayal of the 
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Weimar bourgeoisie, then, it seeks to challenge the forces of social 
order and social cohesion. In this respect, then, for all that the 
Dadaist laugh directs itself at similar forms (i. e. rigidity, 
automatism, mechanism) as Bergsonian laughter, its 
counterhegemonic potential stands in sharp contrast to the 
hegemonic function of Bergsonian laughter. 
We can expand on the differences between Dada and 
Bergsonian laughter by returning to Sheppard's discussion. 
Sheppard goes on to identify the sense of humour as an important 
aspect of the Dadaist response to their diagnosis of the problems of 
E uropean culture and society, and he characterises this sense of 
humour in three ways: 
First, Dada is typified by an ebullient and anarchic joy in 
the life force which expresses itself through absurd and 
spontaneous actions and works of anti-art. Second, Dada 
cultivated a scathing satirical fierceness whose 
aggressiveness prevents thejoLe de vivre from becoming 
endearing and therefore socially acceptable. But third, 
and most characteristically, Dada is marked by a highly 
developed sense of self-irony... (1979: 194-5) 
We can contrast each of these features with the key features of 
Bergsonian laughter. Firstly, Dada's humorous celebration of 61an 
vital contrasts with the humiliating imposition of social conformity 
brought about by Bergsonian laughter. Secondly, then, while 
Dadaist laughter shared the aggressive streak of Bergsonian 
laughter, it nevertheless sought to remain beyond the scope of 
legitimate social convention. Bergsonian laughter, on the other 
hand, has legitimacy conferred on it by virtue of Its role in securing 
social cohesion. Thirdly, the Dadaists' self-irony contrasts sharply 
with the strategy of Bergsonian laughter to intimidate an other. 
According to Sheppard, this self-irony ensured the provisional 
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nature of Dada, the ability to maintain a constantly sceptical and 
ironic attitude towards the present. It was only by demonstrating 
such an attitude that Dada could reveal its commitment to a world 
in constant flux (1979: 195). While Bergsonian laughter is 
repressive and negative, then, the self-irony of the Dadaist sense of 
humour signifies a positive aspect, 'a means', as Sheppard puts. it, 
#of lifting men above their situation, of overcoming malaise, of 
accepting failures' (1979: 195). 'Ultimately, ' Sheppard concludes, 
dand despite all its cynicism and subversiveness, the humour of 
Dada is affirmative' (1979: 195). Indeed, in a later article 
exam. ining Dada poetry, Sheppard expands on the affirmative 
nature of Dada by arguing that the tropes of carnival resurface in 
Dada poetry (Sheppard, 1983). 
A similar sort of argument has been advanced by Richard Stam, 
who situates Dada within the same trajectory as Jarry in its 
deployment of grotesque imagery, and its inversion of aesthetic and 
social codes and conventions (Stam, 1989: 98). The Dadaist 
attempt to dissolve the boundaries between high and popular 
culture can certainly be compared to the processes identified by 
Bakhtin both in his analysis of carnival, and in his analysis of the 
role of carnival in the work of Rabelais. Very often, the Dadalst 
critique of institutionalised aesthetics involved an appeal to 
popular comic forms and practices. In the early twenties, for 
example, the Dadaist Revolutionary Council of Berlin demanded 
'the organization of 150 circuses "for the enlightenment of the 
proletariat"' (quoted in Coutts-Smith: 1970: 88). In this way, 
Dadaist laughter can be compared to carnivalesque laughter. 
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.1 While there is a high degree of proximity between Dada and 
Bergson, then, it has been argued that, in spite of its neo- 
Bergsonian framework, Dada nevertheless managed to project a 
form of laughter that in many ways was at odds with Bergsonian 
laughter. In Nietzsche's 'laughter of the height', and in the forms of 
laughter associated with Jarry and Dada, therefore, we have 
i dentified historically contemporaneous, positive conceptions of 
laughter to situate alongside Bergson's negative conception. Both 
, 
Jarryesque and Dadaist laughter emerged from within the vector of 
modernism, and this fact returns us to the question concerning the 
relationship between Bergson, modernism and modernity. I will 
finish this section by readdressing this question in the light of our 
discussion of 'Laughter'. 
,ý c) Bergsonian laughter and modernism 
As we have seen, Bergson's comic theory posits laughter as a 
mechanism that works to guarantee social conformity and social 
cohesion. As we have argued, Bergson's theory is contradictory 
because it explains this mechanism in terms of the ability of 
laughter to correct rigid conduct by encouraging us to adopt more 
adaptable and fle2dble fonns of behaviour. Rather than correcting 
rigidity, it was argued, Bergsonian laughter would seem to impose 
It 
If we situate 'Laughter' in relation to modernity, a similar sort of 
contradiction emerges. On the one hand, Bergsonian laughter can 
be seen as part of the very fabric of modernity, a mechanism that 
has been co-opted as a means of regulating social conformity. This 
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can be illustrated further by turning to Michel Foucault's critique 
of modernity. Foucault analyses modem society in terms of a 
#society of normalization', a network of disciplinary procedures 
capable of ensuring social cohesion (Foucault, 1980: 107). These 
procedures are administered from some of the key nodes in the 
network of modem society: the asylum, the prison and the clinic. 
Each of these institutions is legitimated by specific forms of 
discourse: psychiatry, criminology and medicine respectively. 
Each of these 'apparatuses of knowledge', Foucault argues, 
organises its own set of 'dividing practices', which both produce 
and control the norms which allow us to differentiate the mad from 
the sane, the criminal from the legitimate, and the sick from the 
healthy (1980: 102). Such discourses augment the maintenance of 
domination both by determining what it is to be sane, legitimate 
and healthy. and by determining procedures for confining those 
who transgress these norms in any way. The manner in which 
Bergson analyses laughter as a mechanism regulating social norms 
and eccentricities, and consolidating dominant social codes, allows 
us to situate his analysis in relation to a Foucauldian model of 
normalisation. And the crucial point here is that, according to 
Foucault, the emergence of discourses of normalisation such as 
psychiatry, criminology and medicine is one of the key features of 
modernity. In this way, then, Bergsonian laughter can be seen as 
one component in the modem network of power. 
We can pursue this relationship between Bergsonian laughter 
and modernity further still by turning to Adorno and Horkheimer's 
analysis of the culture industry. Published in the 1940s, this 
analysis can be read as a critique of the way in which modem 
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society produces a devalued, homogenised mass culture. The texts 
produced by the culture industry work to repress the desires of 
those who consume them. Hollywood's romantic films, for 
example, construct narratives predicated on desire. But rather 
than providing a real fulfilment of the desires that are set in place, 
the narrative resolution instead provides 'no more than a 
commendation of the depressing everyday world it sought to 
escape' (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979: 139). The implication is 
that latent desires for self-fulfilment and liberation, which for the 
Gmasses'will only be met in the form of social transformation, are 
held in check by the operation of the narrative. The narrative leads 
instead to a reassertion of the current status quo. As a result, the 
culture industry is able to structure the masses' leisure time in 
or der to prepare them for work the next day. The reason that this 
is of relevance to Bergson's comic theory is that Adorno and 
Horkheimer explain the laughter activated by the culture industry 
in terms of Bergsonian laughter. Here, they draw a distinction 
between 'conciliatory and 'terrible' laughter. Conciliatory laughter 
is 'an echo of an escape from power' (1979: 140). When an 
incongruous joke escapes the power of reason, or when a pun 
escaves the rules of language, for example, our response is to 
celebrate that escape with laughter. It is conciliatory because it is 
shared by everyone, providing a sense of solidarity (1979: 140- 1). 
in contrast, the form of laughter generated by the products of the 
culture industry is terrible, and Adomo and Horkheimer evoke 
Bergson's comic theory in order to characterise it. Rather than 
marking an escape from power, it'overcomes fear by capitulating 
to the forces which are to be feared' (1979: 140). The culture 
industry uses such laughter to sweeten the pill that it actually 
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offers, the pill that induces social conformity. Terrible laughter 
thus represents 
the echo of power as something inescapable. Fun is a 
medicinal bath. The pleasure industry never fails to 
prescribe it. It makes laughter the instrument of the 
fraud practised on happiness. (1979: 140) 
And rather than providing a sense of collectivity, the audience 
indulging in terrible laughter represents 
a parody of humanity. Its members are monads, all 
dedicated to the pleasure of being ready for anything at 
the expense of everyone else. Their harmony is a 
caricature of solidarity. What is fiendish about this false 
laughter is that it is a compelling parody of the best, 
which is conciliatory. (1979: 141) 
Adorno and Horkheimer do countenance the possibility of there 
being spaces within the culture industry where conciliatory 
laughter might be permitted. 'In some revue films, ' they suggest, 
6and especially in the grotesque and the funnies, the possibility of 
this negation does glimmer for a few moments. But, ' they add, 'of 
course it cannot happen' (1979: 142). The power of instiumental 
rationality on which cultural production is predicated is such that 
'the bunch of keys of capitalist reason' has replaced 'the cap and 
bells of the jester' (1979: 143). 
There are a number of problems with Adorno and Horkheimer's 
analysis. They assume the passivity of the people who consume 
the products of the culture industry, and they envisage the culture 
industry as an overly monolithic entity. Further, they perhaps 
over-estimate the power of the media (radio, film and television) to 
perforM functions of social integration and control. However, for 
all that it is problematic, it does provide us with a further model 
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with which to situate Bergsonian laughter in relation to modernity. 
On Adorno and Horkheirner's account, Bergsonian laughter is a 
symptom of the way in which modern, instrumental reason 
organises the cultural sphere. Although Bergson's analysis of 
laughter predates the historical emergence of the culture industry 
as envisaged by Adorno and Horkheimer, Bergson did, as we have 
seen, develop his own critique of the instrumentality of reason. 
It can be argued, then, that Bergsonian laughter is one 
component in the very fabric of modernity. However, at the same 
time Bergson identifies several aspects of modem society 
themselves as comic, and it is in this sense that his analysis is 
somewhat contradictory. The capitalist division of labour, for 
example, gives rise to a stratified and compartmentalised 
organisation of production. As a result, Bergson argues, there is a 
tendency for 
jejach particular profession [to] impress[ 
... 
I on its 
corporate members certain habits of mind and 
peculiarities of character in which they resemble each 
other and also distinguish themselves from the rest. (Bergson, 1980: 174) 
For Bergson, the rigidity that the division of labour induces can be 
perceived as comic, 'the professional comic, as he calls it (1980: 
175). On one level, the professional comic is greeted by laughter 
because the 'separatist tendency' of individual professions is a 
threat to overall sociability (1980: 174). However, on another level 
Bergson seems to find the division of labour a comic absurdity. it 
is responsible, for example, for the way in which individuals are 
subsumed by their job title, unable to break out of the mode of 
behaviour appropriate to that position (1980: 175). Further, the 
division of labour brings with it forms of jargon and forms of logic 
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which are deemed absurd on the grounds of their distance from 
common sense (1980: 143-4; 176-7). Overall, Bergson concludes, 
the self-importance that the division of labour confers on particular 
professions 'bring[s] about a kind of professional automatism 
analogous to that imposed upon the soul by the habits of the body, 
and equally laughable' R 980: 95). 
Bergson doesn't attempt to explore the socio-economic reasons 
for the emergence of the division of labour. However, since it is 
essential to the processes of capitalism and industrialism, the 
division of labour can be seen as one of the key features of 
modernity. Firstly, as Habermas has argued, a cultural division of 
labour can be perceived in the post-Enlightenment process of 
*cultural rationalization' (Habermas, 1993: 103), whereby the fields 
of science, art and morality became increasingly divorced both 
from each other, and from the realm of the everyday. While the 
Enlightenment had sought to develop fields of specialised 
knowledge that would be of universal benefit to humankind, after 
the Enlightenment these fields became increasingly 
institutionalised. to the point where. rather than benefiting 
humanity. 'the threat increases that the life-world, whose 
traditional substance has already been devalued, will become more 
and more impoverished' (1993: 103). For Habermas, then, cultural 
modernity consists in an increasing rationalisation and 
institutionalisation of forms of specialised knowledge, and an ever- 
widening gap between those forms and quotidian e)dstence. It is 
this divergence between speciallsed discourses and quotidian 
eýdstence that Bergson finds comic. 
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Similarly, Harvey identifies the division of labour as one of the 
key aspects of socio-economic modernisation. Drawing on MarýCs 
analysis of wage labour and the power of the capitalist to organise 
the factors of production, Harvey explains how the division of 
labour within the workplace effectively subordinated the worker to 
the productive mechanism controlled by the capitalist (1989: 105). 
Not only that, but the fragmentation of the labour process 
diminished the power of the worker to control the instruments of 
production. As Harvey argues, '[tlhis turns the labourer effectively 
into an "appendage" of the machine' (1989: 105). 'Ibis process was 
espoused most emphatically in the doctrine of Taylorism derived 
from F. W. Taylor's 77w principles of scientijtc management 
published in 1911, a doctrine that was put into practice in Henry 
Ford's car plant from 1913 onwards (1989: 28). As Antliff has 
argued, the 'temporal rationalization' on which Taylorism was 
based represented a new, intensified threat to the Bergsontan 
conception of the qualitative flux of dur6e (Antliff, 1993: 173). 
indeed, Bergson himself identifies the subordination of humans to 
machines as something that is intrinsically comic: '[t] he attitudes, 
gestures and movements of the human body are laughable in exact 
proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine' (Bergson, 
1980: 79). The sort of processes associated with the division of 
labour would thus have contributed to this realm of the comic. 
And while Bergson presents this 'law' as an ahistorical tenet, it is 
reasonable to link his observation to the processes of 
modernisation that were happening around him.. 
In this way, then, Bergson can be seen to portray certain 
aspects of modernity as comic. And since the laughter that greets 
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the comic is accredited by Bergson with a corrective function, so 
we can read Bergson's theory on one level as a critique of 
modernity. Such a conclusion tallies with our earlier 
characterisation of Bergson's philosophy as a form of modernist 
discourse. However, Bergson's analysis of laughter is 
contradictory, and alongside the comic critique of modernity, 
Bergsonian laughter can itself be seen as a thread in the texture of 
modernity. Bergson tells us that an analysis of laughter can reveal 
to us the contours of the relationship between art and life (1980: 
74: 145). What I have tried to show in this section is that an 
analysis of Bergson's comic theory can reveal some of the contours 
in the relationship between modernism and modernity. 
Bergson and Bakhtin 
in the first part of the twentieth century, Bergson's influence 
reached far beyond the lecture rooms of the Collýge de France. As 
Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist have noted, for example, 
Bergson's work would have been familiar to the intelligentsia of 
Petersburg and Leningrad in the 1910s and 1920F., including those 
grouped around Bakhtin (Clark and Holquist, 1984: 387). Indeed, 
they cite Bergson's 'Laughter' as 'a likely source' for Bakhtin's 
thesis in Rabelais and His World (1984: 387). Carnivalesque 
laughter, they note, attacks the comic rigidity of officialdom, the 
Stasis of its world view. As a result, they argue, there are 
significant parallels to be drawn between Bakhtin and Bergson's 
account of laughter. In the light of my discussion in the previous 
f, 
section, however, I would argue that Clark and Holquist's 
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speculation is misplaced. While there certainly are similarities 
between the comic rigidity that Bakhtin perceives in the official 
realm of the Middle Ages and the comic rigidity that is the object of 
Bergsonian laughter, Bakhtin and Bergson are diametrically 
opposed in the function that they each assign to laughter. While 
Bergsonian laughter enforces social cohesion, carnivalesque 
laughter accompanies a rearrangement of the social order. Indeed, 
Bakhtin's only reference to Bergson in Rabelais and His World 
contrasts the 'positive, regenerating, creative meaning' of 
carnivalesque laughter with the 'negative functions' of Bergsonian 
laughter (Bakhtin, 1984: 7 1). Bergson's 'Laughter' is thus situated 
by Bakhtin at a low point within the post-Renaissance tra ectory of 
the carnivalesque. It is for this reason that the laughter associated 
with Alfred Jarry and Dada was earlier identified both as an 
altemative to Bergsonian laughter, and as a fonn of laughter which 
embodied traces of the carnivalesque. Bakhtin's account of 
carnivalesque laughter thus stands in contradistinction to 
Bergson's own negative account. 
This is not to argue, however, that Bakhtin's work was devoid of 
any Bergsonian influences, and what I want to do in the rest of this 
section is to explore the Bakhtinian response to Bergson, focusing 
both on Bakhtin's response to the relationship between 
consciousness and the body, and also on his critique of vitalism. 
In so doing, I will try to delineate Bakhtin's own relationship with 
the discourse of modernism. 
Consciousness and the body 
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It is Michael Holquist who has made out the strongest case for 
the influence of Bergson on Bakhtin, identifying it most directly at 
work in Bakhtin's earliest essays, now published together in the 
collection Art and Answerability (Bakhtin, 1990). Holquist portrays 
Bakhtin as 'a great reader of Bergson, who shared the assumption 
(particularly in Matter and Menwry, 1896) that in so far as human 
beings are organisms, they cannot help but "pay attention to life"' 
(Holquist, 1990a: 152-3, see also Holquist, 1990b: =ciii-iv), and 
his commentary directs us towards Bakhtin's discussion of the 
relationship between the body and consciousness. Bakhtin 
explores this relationship in his essayAuthor and Hero in 
Aesthetic Activity' (written between 1920-1923). 'How do we 
experience our own exteriorThe asks (1990: 27), and in answering 
the question he draws a distinction between the inner body, - our 
experience of our exterior - and the outer body - the other's 
experience of it. My experience of my exterior is always 
fragmentary, 'dangling on the string of my Inner sensation of 
myself (1990: 28). The reason for this is that my inner sensation 
is necessarily situated within a specific vantage point. 'By turning 
my head in all directions, ' for example, 'I can succeed in seeing all 
of myself from all sides of the surrounding space in the center of 
which I am situated, but I shall never be able to see myself as 
actuallY surrounded by this space' (1990: 37). It is only the other 
who can experience my outer body as surrounded by this space, 
who can perceive me not as a fragmented body, but as a unified 
whole, 'as a delimited empirical object' (1990: 36). Thus, Bakhtin 
argues, 'a human being experiencing life in the category of his own 
I is incapable of gathering himself by himself into an outward 
whole that would be even relatively finished' (1990: 35). Inother 
195 
words, the construction of an outward, unified body is dependent 
upon the activity of an other: 
the body is not something that is self-sufficient: it needs 
the other, needs his recognition and his form-giving 
activity. Only the inner body... is given to a human being 
himself, the other's outer body is not given but set as a 
task I must actively produce it. (1990: 51) 
This relationship between self and other is then deployed by 
Bakhtin as an analogue of the relationship between hero and 
author. Just as the other'actively produce[s]'- or authors - the 
outer body of the self, so the author authors the physical identity 
of the hero. 
As Bakhtin himself points out, his discussion of our experience 
of our own exteriority owes something to Bergson's Matter and 
Menwry. '11-iere, Bergson conceives of consciousness, in Leszek 
Kolakowski's words, in terms of 'an indivisible continuity of 
heterogeneous and unrepeatable qualities' (Kolakowski, 1985: 43). 
This realm of inner sensation thus lacks the sense of unity which, 
for Bakhtin, only the activity of the other can bring. However. as 
. 
Holquist argues, it is at this point that the similarity between 
Bergson's and Bakhtin's accounts comes to an end (Holquist, 
1990b: xxxiv). Bergson privileges the consciousness over the body, 
the intuitive realm of what he later calls dur6e over the inert 
physical realm of matter. For Bakhtin, however, the body is not 
only the locus of the interrelationship between self and other, it is 
also a crucial site in the process of aesthetic (authorial) activity. 
Bakhtin's privileging of the body is seen even more clearly in some 
of his later work, particularly in Rabelats and His World8. 'Ibere, 
as we have seen, Bakhtin contrasts the classic conception of the 
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body with its grotesque conception. The former represented the 
body as a complete, unified entity: indeed, we might compare this 
representation with the way in which the outer body is constructed 
by the other in Art and Answerability 'as a delimited empirical 
object' (1990: 36; quoted above). The grotesque body, so central to 
carnivalesque imagery, is characterised by Bakhtin in terms of an 
incomplete, amorphous entity. As we have seen, this body is 
accorded a privileged status as a result of the role that it performed 
in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, not only representing an 
alternative to official conceptions of the body, but also embodying 
the affirmative aspect of regenerative time in its dynamic, 
ambivalent quality. While the influence of Bergson can be seen in 
Bakhtin's analysis of the relationship between the body and 
consciousness, then, his reversal in Art and Answerability of the 
Bergsonian hierarchy, and his increasing preoccupation with the 
status of the body in subsequent work, represents a significant 
departure from a Bergsonian framework. 
Vitalism 
A more general Bakhtinian response to Bergson can be seen in 
an article first published in 1926 entitled 'Contemporary Vitalism% 
Initially published under the name 1. Kanaýv, the essay is now 
acknowledged as Bakhtin's own work (Bakhtin, 1992: 76). Here, 
Bakhtin defines vitalism as a belief in the autonomy of life from 
mechanistic laws. This is a proposition that we have seen Bergson 
endorse in the distinction he draws between the continuous, 
indivisible realm of dur6e accessed by intuition and the spatialised, 
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fragmented experience provided by the intellect. Only intuition is 
capable of providing us with experience of the reality of life itself, 
because it alone perceives the world 'organically' rather than 
'mechanicaIV (Bergson. 1960: 174: quoted earlier). 
While Bakhtin cites Bergson as one of the key proponents of 
contemporary vitalism (Bakhtin, 1992: 8 1). the main focus of his 
essay is the vitalism of the German doctor and philosopher Hans 
Driesch. In particular. Bakhtin Is keen to evaluate the biological 
experiments undertaken by Driesch in order to 'prove' the central 
premise of vitalism concerning the autonomy of life. For readers 
familiar with Bakhtin's analysis of Rabelais, his discussion of 
Driesch's various experiments on dissected worms, hydra. sea 
urchins and Tubularia evokes images of dissection, 
'dismemberment and 
fragmentation reminiscent of the grotesque. 
As Bakhtin explains, by showing that the cells of these various 
creatures each contains the information necessary to reform and 
grow even when dissected. Driesch tries to demonstrate the 
existence of life as an autonomous phenomenon that is both 
'governed by laws of its own' and is 'an utterly objective quality' 
(1992: 83). The problem with Driesch's conclusion, according to 
Bakhtin, is that his experiments could equally be used in support 
of a mechanistic position. i. e. that life was reducible to physical 
and chemical processes. The onus on the mechanist would simply 
be to demonstrate the existence of the appropriate physical and 
chemical properties within the cells that allow growth to take place. 
And the reason why Driesch's vitalism is so flawed, Bakhtin 
argues, is that he advances it as the only alternative to a 
mechanistic position. 7be problem here is that Driesch only 
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considers the 'naNve-mechanist point of view'. the point of view 
which assumes that living organisms function exactly like 
machines (1992: 96). This point of view is obviously incapable of 
developing an adequate account of the dynamic processes of life 
because it explains organisms in terms of'fixed and immovable 
machines' (1992: 96). However, as Bakhtin concludes, 
In opposition to Driesch stands not the naive-mechanist 
point of view, with its fixed and immovable machines and 
its failure to recognize the machine as merely an 
analogical image, but the theoretical framework of 
modem dialectical materialism. Only dialectical 
materialism can provide the proper ground for an 
adequate, scientific presentation of such complex 
phenomena as the organic regulations. (1992: 96) 
Bakhtin thus posits dialectical materialism as a viable alternative 
both to nalve mechanism and to the vitalism of Driesch (and, we 
might add, Bergson). In order to assess the substance of Bakhtin's 
claim, we need to consider in more detail the extent to which he 
himself embraced dialectical materialism. 
The extent to which Bakhtin's work adopts a dialectical 
materialist position is usually addressed in terms of his 
relationship with Marxism. However, since it Is In the disputed 
texts 
- 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, D-eudianism: A 
Marxist Critique and Vie Formal Method in LiteraTy Scholarship: A 
Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics (Voloshinov, 1973 and 
1976; and Medvedev, 1985 respectively) 
- 
where Bakhtin adopts a 
Marxist framework most explicitly, discussions of the relationship 
between Bakhtin and Marxism frequently revolve around the issue 
of the authorship of the disputed texts. Gary Saul Morson, for 
example, has argued that the attribution of such texts to Bakhtin 
is both 'unsupported and improbable' (Morson, 1991: 1072). In 
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addition. Morson argues, the fact that it was Rabelais and His 
World, with its preoccupation with a collective populism, which 
was the first of Bakhtin's actual works to be translated into 
English has further skewed the reception of his oeuvre (1991: 
1072). In fact, Morson asserts, what we flnd in Bakhtin is not a 
variant of Mandsm, but a rejection of it. Bakhtin's stress upon 
contingency and his insistence 'upon the specificity of each case' 
(1991: 1076) reveals him as an opponent of the abstract 
theoreticism of 'great system[s] of explanation' such as Marxism or, 
for that matter, Freudianism (1991: 1071). Commentators who 
equate Bakhtin's notion of 'dialogue' with 'dialectics' are, Morson 
argues, simply mistaken. Indeed, he cites Bakhtin's own warning 
in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays as evidence: 
Dialogue and dialectics. Take a dialogue and remove the 
voices (the partitioning of the voices), remove the 
intonations (emotional and individualizing ones), carve 
out abstract concepts and judgments from living words 
and responses, [then] cram everything into one abstract 
consciousness 
- 
and that's how you get dialectics. (Bakhtin, 1986: 147: quoted in Morson, 1991: 1072) 
Given this apparent distancing of his own position from a Mandsm. 
Morson concludes, it is totally unacceptable to include Bakhtin's 
work under a Marýdst rubric (see also Morson. 1986: 84: and 
Shepherd, 1993: xvii-xx). 
There are a number of possible responses to this sort of 
critique. The first would be to argue that, even if the precise 
identity of the authorship of the disputed texts remains finally 
unresolved, there are nevertheless enough continuities between 
those texts and the rest of Bakhtin's work to posit a certain unity 
between them (see Todorov, 1984: 11). The task then becomes one 
of analysing both the continuities and the discontinuities between 
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the disputed texts and the texts bearing the name 'Bakhtin'. It is 
Michael F. Bernard-Donals who goes furthest in this respect, 
arguing that, overall, Bakhtin's oeuvre (including the disputed 
texts) ambivalently straddles both phenomenological and Marxist 
approaches, and that it is this ambivalence that has led to certain 
impasses in his work (Bernard-Donals, 1994: see also footnote 8). 
Further, given that the disputed texts apparently seek to operate 
within a Marxist framework, there is a need to analyse the extent 
to which those texts (and the rest of Bakhtin's work) adopt 
positions consistent with those of Marxism. In some respects, for 
example, Bakhtin would seem to be at odds with Marxist 
orthodoxy, and Bernard-Donals has identified three points at 
which these differences emerge. Firstly, while in the disputed texts 
Bakhtin pays heed to the primacy of the economic base, he tends 
to overlook the specific ways in which those economic factors 
might play a part in human communication and perception. 
Secondly, while Voloshinov conceives of ideology as both 
'determined and determining', the traditional historical materialist 
would maintain that Ideology'is determined in the last Instance by 
the economy'. Thirdly, since all communication is, for Bakhtin, 
dialogic, he is unable to identify a position beyond the dialogic 
realm of language within which the historical materialist might 
preserve the objective scientificity of his or her own discourse 
(Bernard-Donals, 1994: 105). If this is the case, it would seem that 
Bakhtin's work cannot be wholly contained by the category of 
Marxist theory. Nevertheless, at the same time there are some 
important points of contact between Bakhtin and Marxism. 
Bakhtin's theorisation of the way in which the development of 
cultural phenomena (both language and literature) is inextricably 
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linked to transitions In social relations is, as Bemard-Donals 
notes, consonant with a historical materialist conception of culture 
that would view it similarly as a product of social relations 
(Bernard-Donals: 1994: 88). In this respect, Bakhffn can be seen 
to be 'working "alongside" Marxism. ' as Starn has put it, '[and) 
certainly not against it' (Stam, 1989: 15). In addition. Starn claims, 
Bakhtin 'remedies some of the blind spots of Marxist theory' (1989: 
16). One example ofJust such a remedy is suggested in LaCapra's 
analysis of Bakhtin. discussed in Chapter One. Bakhtin's 
preoccupation with 'language. the body. and laughter'. LaCapra 
argues, allows him to introduce 'into a materialist dialectic forces 
that often appear as alien to it as they do to bourgeois society' 
(LaCapra, 1983: 322). As such, Bakhtin provides a'counterpoint' 
to the 'productivist ethos' of Mandsm (1983: 322), substituting 'a 
Rabelaisian for a Hegelian Marx7 (1983: 323)9. In this respect, we 
might recast Bakhtin's distinction between dialogue and dialectics, 
quoted by Morson above, not as a rejection of dialectics, but as a 
distinction between a Rabelaisian and a Hegelian Marx. The task 
of the Hegelian Marxist is to determine the abstract patterns of 
historical developmentIO. The task of the Rabelaisian Marx, on the 
other hand. is to uncover in the fabric of historical processes the 
heteroglottic exchange of voices, bodies and laughter. While the 
precise relationship between Bakhtin and Marxism is both complex 
and ambivalent, then, I would argue, pace Morson, that it is 
nevertheless a relationship that is important. 
We are now in a position to return to the conclusion reached by 
Bakhtin at the end of his 'Contemporary Vitalism' essay to the 
effect that dialectical materialism is the only viable aftemative to 
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vitalism. That essay was written around the same time as the 
disputed texts (Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, 1927: The Formal 
Method in Literary Scholarship, 1928: Marxism and the Philosophy 
ofLanguage, 1929), and the appeal to dialectical materialism can 
be likened to the explicitly Marxist framework to which those texts 
appeal. However, given the complexity and ambivalence of 
Bakhtin's overall relationship with Marxism, it would seem 
inappropriate to explain his appeal to dialectical materialism 
simply in terms of his apparent Marxism. What I want to do 
instead Is to address it as a response to the vitalist conception of 
time. 
As we have already seen, Bergson's account of time as 
continuous and indivisible is central to his vitalist position, that 
life itself is continuous and indivisible. From a similar standpoint, 
Bakhtin argues, Driesch rejects mechanism on the grounds that its 
key premise, that life can be reduced to mechanical processes, 
appeals to an image of the machine as static and ffixed. In 
recommending dialectical materialism as an alternative both to 
vitalism and to nalve mechanism. then, Bakhtin is hoping to 
provide a more adequate model for accounting for the way in which 
phenomena develop over time. That time progresses dialectically 
through a process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, is a premise 
that is not necessarily at odds with the vitalist concepti on of time: 
it certainly projects a dynamic model of evolution, conceiving of 
time as a continuous state of flux. However, where dialectical 
materialism is more at odds with a vitalist conception of time is in 
its insistence that temporal change is embodied in material 
developments, whether those developments be at the level of 
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organic matter, or at the level of soclo-economic relations. In 
contrast. Driesch insists that the essence of life cannot be reduced 
to the physical and chemical properties of particular organisms. In 
a similar vein, Bergson argues that dur6e is dependent upon 
consciousness: to use Kolakowski's words, that'itjraces of the past 
recorded in matter are thought of as "traces" only because 
consciousness Is there to monitor changes: in itself, matter has no 
past or future' (Kolakowski. 1985: 42-3). It is this flight from the 
material world evidenced in the vitalist outlook that Bakhtin 
contrasts with dialectical materialism. Indeed, in his study of 
Freud (1927). he identifies this as one of the defining features of 
the contemporary thought of the day, including the work of Freud, 
Driesch and Bergson in his assessment: 
A sui generisfear of history, an ambition to locate a world 
beyond the social and the historical, a searchfor this world 
precisely in the depths of the organic 
- 
these are the 
features that pervade all systems of contemporary 
philosophy and constitute the symptom of the 
disintegration and decline of the bourgeois world. (Voloshinov, 1976: 14) 
In contrast to these deficiencies, Bakhtin would maintain, 
dialectical materialism is able to conceive of temporal change in the 
texture of socio-historical processes. As such, he concludes, its 
dynamic model of transition, along with its ability to determine 
patterns within processes of transition (e. g. the transition from 
thesis and antithesis to synthesis, and so on), allows it to overcome 
the problems of Driesch's vitalism. 
What I would add here is that this conception of a dynamic time 
perceptible in socio 
-historical processes is itself embodied in 
Bakhtin's theory of carnival. Camival's grotesque imagery, for 
example, not only represents the process of becoming, it also 
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locates that process firmly within the body, whether it be an 
individual body (e. g. in the form of Gargamelle giving birth to 
Gargantua), or a collective body (e. g. in the form of the 
heteroglossia of the drunkards' conversation immediately 
preceding Gargantua's birth (Rabelais. 1955: 48-5 1)). Meanwhile, 
as we saw in Chapter One, the Rabelaislan chronotope is based 
upon a notion of time that is dynamic, regenerative and linked to 
the very processes of historical development. For Bakhtin, this 
specificity and concreteness derived from folkloric conceptions of 
time, which themselves were predicated on the collective and 
productive labour of pre-class, agricultural societies. Further, as 
we have also seen, it is within these 'depths of concrete, practical 
life, a life that could be touched, that was filled with aroma and 
sound'. that Bakhtin locates the critical 'utopian tones' of carnival 
(Bakhtin, 1984: 185, quoted in Chapter One). 
Bergson presents his account of dur6e as a metaphysical and 
universal truth: the problems that we encounter in achieving 
authentic experience of time itself derive from the very structures 
of language and reason. The important thing about Bakhtin's 
conception of carnivalesque time, however, is that it is socially- 
constructed. It derives not from metaphysical and universal 
truths, but from the manner in which material life was organised: 
it 
was experienced by primitive man not as a function of his 
abstract thought-processes or consciousness, but as an 
aspect of life itself 
- 
In a collective laboring with nature, in 
the collective consuming of the fruits of his labor and in 
the collective task of fostering the growth and renewal of 
the social whole. (Bakhtin, 1981: 211) 
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While Bergsonian time Is located In the activity of immediate 
consciousness. then. Bakhtin's carnivalesque time is both 
materialist and socially-determined. 
c) Bakhtin and the discourse of modemism 
For all that Bakhtin's analysis of folkloric time, and its influence 
on the Rabelaistan chronotope, addresses the emergence of such 
conceptions of time historically, there can be little doubt that 
Bakhtin himself valorises these notions of time over other 
chronotopesl 1. One explanation of this valorisation would be that, 
in foregrounding the processes of temporal transition, such 
conceptions of time are able to fulfil the sort of function attributed 
to carnival Itself 7brough its deployment of the grotesque, for 
example, and through its temporary rearrangement of social 
hierarchies, carnivalesque imagery was capable of calling into 
question the apparent stasis and eternity of the social order. In a 
similar fashion. the Rabelaisian chronotope was able to challenge 
the prevailing static world picture of the Middle Ages with a 
dynamic projection of 'a creative and generative time' (Bakhtin, 
1981: 206). However, another possible explanation of Bakhtin's 
valorisation of this dynamic sense of time has been suggested by 
Ken Hirschkop, who has argued that we can see Bakhtin as 
'imposing the figure of modernity on an image of medieval culture' 
(Hirschkop, 1989: 34). In Bakhtin's preoccupation with temporal 
dynamism, Hirschkop argues, 
[t1he change and ceaseless rush of the modern reappears, 
but with the added claim that the relativity of history is a 
'joyful relativity'. because historical change itself appears 
in the tangible form of agricultural labour. 
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(1989: 34) 
As we have seen earlier, the potential to transform the 
experience of time has been identified as one of the defining 
features of modemity. According to Giddens, for example, 
modernity ushered in a standardisation of time measurement, 
along with the consequent disembedding of particular places from 
their local contexts (Giddens, 1990). In the light of this analysis, I 
do not want to go along with Hirschkop's reading of Bakhtin as 
projecting the modern experience of time onto pre-modem social 
processes. Rather, what Bakhtin seems to be doing is appealing 
precisely to the specificity and concreteness of pre-modern 
conceptions of time, temporal qualities that have been lost under 
the conditions of modernity. In contrast to the disembedded 
conditions of modernity. in other words, Bakhtin identifies a 
utopian quality in the very embedment of pre-modem conditions. 
As a result, I would argue, although we can discern some 
important differences between Bergson and Bakhtin, we can begin 
to view Bakhtin's position as another possible response to the 
modernist probldmatique detailed by Sheppard. Since Bakhtin's 
discussion of time, along with his espousal of dialectical 
materialism, can be seen on one level as a response to the vitalist 
conception of time. however, this can only confirm the extent to 
which the discourse of moden-iism consisted of a heterogeneous 
and contradictory terrain. 
Conclusion 
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In the course of this chapter. I have related Bergson's 
philosophy 
- 
and, in particular, his comic theory 
- 
to a discussion 
of modernism. arguing that while on one level Bergsonian laughter 
would appear to belong to the social configuration of modernity, on 
another level it is precisely that configuration which Bergson so 
often deems to be comic. In relating Bakhtin to the same 
problematic, it was suggested that his link with the discourse of 
modernism is similarly complex. While there were some interesting 
points of contact between Bergson and Bakhtin, however, there 
were nevertheless some Important contrasts to be drawn. In 
undertaking this dialogic study, we were able to address some 
important issues within Bakhtin's work, such as his analysis of the 
relationship between consciousness and the body, and his 
affirmation of dialectical materialism. Above all, to refocus on the 
topic of comic theory, it was evident that there are some crucial 
points of departure between Bergsonian laughter and 
carnivalesque laughter. In this sense, Bergsonian laughter 
certainly represents a nadir in the development of the 
carnivalesque tradition. What I want to do next is to turn to look 
at the comic theory of one of Bergson's important contemporaries: 
Sigmund Freud and his theory of jokes. 
David Harvey, for example, lists the following: 'impressionism, 
post-impressionism, cubism, fauvism, Dada, surrealism, 
expressionism. etc. '(Harvey, 1989: 22) 
2 E. g. we could examine the acceleration in the processes of 
mechanisation and Industrialism in the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century, and the social, economic and military 
impact of the First World War. We would then want to trace the 
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specific way in which such processes might have contributed to 
the dynamics of modernity as Identified by Giddens. 3 As Mark Antliff has shown, however, Bergson was not only an 
influence on sections of the political left. Right-wing groups 
found the apparent organicism and irrationalism of Bergsonian 
vitalism appealing. According to Antliff, 'the French fascist 
party, the Faisceau. [was founded) in the name of these vitalist 
principles' (Antliff. 1993: 11). 
4 Bergson's notion of 'immediate consciousness'would seem to 
place the present in an exalted position. 5 There is an apparent contradiction In Bergson's argument at 
this point. As we have seen, he argues that language 
necessarily provides a distorted representation of reality (1980: 
159). If this is the case, it is not clear that language is capable 
of achieving the required flexibility. In addition, given that 
language is a tool of the intellect, it would seem to be 
inappropriate to view it in terms of a living organism. 6 Sheppard states: 'Although Ball came to find Bergson's concept 
of intuition cr6atrice unacceptable, he records that Bergson was 
very important to him and other Zurich Dadaists at the time of 
the Cabaret Voltaire, and Picabla, several years earlier, had also 
come under the influence of the F)rench philosopher' (Sheppard, 
1979: 183). 
7 Sheppard does acknowledge the complexity of Dada, however. 
Identifying three references of the term 'Dada': 'a bohemian 
movement.... a complex of existential attitudes... [and] the 
objective life force itself (1979: 193). Given this complexity, it is 
to be assumed that different wings of the Dada movement (e. g. 
Zurich, Munich, Cologne) would have given the general Dadaist 
position their own particular inflection. 8 The precise relationship between the early and the late Bakhtin 
is a complicated one. As Michael F. Bernard-Donals has 
recently argued, we need to distinguish between the 
phenomenological approach of Bakhtin's early texts, those texts 
which deal 'with the construction and nature of individual 
human consciousness' that is, and the Marxist flavour of his 
later texts, which deal instead 'with the construction of human 
social relations' (1994: 3). Given this tension. Bernard-Donals 
argues, it is not possible to present a unified version of Bakhtin. 
Although Bemard-Donals has little to say about Art and 
Answerability, its preoccupation precisely with the 'construction 
and nature of individual human consciousness' places it within 
the phenomenological strand of Bakhtin's work. 9 We have already touched on LaCapra's argument in rather more detail in chapter one, relating it to our discussion of the utopian dimension of carnival. 
10 Bakhtin's reference to 'cram[ming] everything into one abstract 
consciousness' sounds more like a reference to a Hegelian 
conception of history as the dialectical development of spirit, 
rather than to a more materialist conception of history as the 
dialectical development of social relations (Bakhtin. 1986: 147). 
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One of the key chronotopes with which Bakhtin contrasts the 
Rabelaisian chronotope is that of the adventure-time of Greek 
romance. According to Bakhtin. Greek adventure-time lacks 
any particular sense of temporal transition. 'In this kind of 
time. ' he argues, 'nothing changes: the world remains as It was, 
the biographical life of the heroes does not change, their feelings 
do not change, people do not even age' (Bakhtin, 1981: 91). The 
places where events take place are interchangeable: 'what 
happens in Babylon could just as well happen In Egypt or 
Byzantium and vice versa' (198 1: 100). What is more, the 
sequence of events in the Greek romance is itself also 
interchangeable. The units which constitute the narrative are, 
Bakhtin argues in a later essay, 'snatched at random from the 
temporal process' (Bakhtin, 1986: 11). As such. the adventure 
- 
time chronotope corresponds in many ways to the way in which 
the Bergsonlan Intellect perceives time, as something thiat can 
be unitised. as something that is interchangeable and 
reversible. 
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Chapterfilve 
Freud's theory of jokes 
First published in 1905 as Der Witz und seine Beziehung zurn 
Unbewussten (and now translated as Jokes and neir Relation to 
the Unconscious), Freud's theory of jokes occupies a dominant 
position within the history of comic theory. As Bob Hodge and 
Alan Mansfield testify in their analysis of the role of humour in 
forms of political protest, 'for the analysis of humour and effects, 
the classic text is still Freud's Jokes' (Hodge and Mansfield, 1985: 
200). Given this canonical status, that Freud's theory is not even 
mentioned by Bakhtin in Rabelais and His World strikes one as a 
curious omission. Indeed, its omission is doubly curious, because 
in 1927 a book-length study of Freud, entitled Fý-eudianism: A 
Marxist Critique (henceforth referred to as I; Yeudianism), had been 
published under the name of Voloshlnov, one of the notorious 
disputed texts' 
. 
In the final section of this chapter, I want to try to 
rectify this omission by exploring the relationship between Freud's 
theory of jokes and Bakhtin's analysis of carnival in the light of the 
critique of Freud undertaken in Voloshinov's study. Indeed, in that 
study, Voloshinov recasts Freud's distinction between the 
unconscious and the conscious in temis of a distinction between 
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an unofficial and official conscious. Given the way in which Freud 
posits a significant relationship between jokes and the 
unconscious, and the way in which the dynamic between the 
official and the unofficial structures Bakhtin's model of carnival, 
this revised formulation of the Freudian model of the psyche would 
seem to invite just such an exploration. Before that, I will provide 
my own explication and analysis of Freud's theory. I want to 
begin, however, by noting the proximity between Bergson and 
Freud: just five years separate the publication of 'Laughter' (1900) 
and Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905). What I 
want to do, then, is to explore the relationship both between these 
two texts, and, more generally, between Freud and Bergson's 
respective theoretical programmes. 
Freud and Bergson 
As I argued in the previous chapter, Bergson's philosophy can 
be read both as a modernist diagnosis of the problems of 
modernity (the increasing mechanisation of life and the 
simultaneous rationalisation of time), and as a response to such 
problenis (a valorisation of intuition over the Intellect). Crucially. 
these aspects of his overall philosophical position were seen to play 
a central role in his theory of laughter. 
To what extent, then, might Freud's theoretical project 
articulate concerns which could be related to this same territory? 
First and foremost, Freud's theorisation of the subject as an entity 
which lacks full self-awareness and whose rationality is threatened 
by a range of unconscious drives and desires, represents a 
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rejection of the dominant post-Enlightenment conception of 
subjectivity as a coherent, autonomous and rational entity. Along 
with Robert Con Davis and Ronald Schleifer, Richard Sheppard 
has argued that, in advancing this critique of subjectivity, the 
modernist contours of Freudian thought become apparent insofar 
as he contributes to the general modernist emphasis on 'the 
changing sense of human nature' (Con Davis and Schleifer, 199 1: 
86-7; Sheppard, 1993: 19-21; quoting Sheppard). In developing 
this critique, Freud's approach raises with Bergson's a question 
mark concerning the adequacy of reason. As we have seen, 
Bergson's vitalism commits him to a critique of reason as a realm 
of pragmatically-oriented experience, in contrast to the faculty of 
intuition which alone is able to grasp the reality of things in 
themselves. In a similar vein, Freud sought to reveal the extent to 
which the faculty of reason struggles to maintain its authority over 
the realm of the unconscious. As we shall see in his analysis of 
the relationship between jokes and the unconscious, it is the 
ability of the joke to bypass the censorship of reason by 
articulating nonsense disguised as sense with which Freud is 
particularly concerned. 
A further point of contact between Bergson and Freud can be 
seen in Bergson's often overlooked study of dreams, Initially 
delivered as a lecture in 1901, Bergson's study was published in 
English translation in 1914. Bergson argues that a dream consists 
of an amalgam of various memories selected in accordance with 
the various sensations that we experience in the disinterested state 
of sleep, 
[the] vague images which occupy my sight,... [the] 
indecisive sounds which affect my ear.... [the] indistinct 
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touches which are distributed over the surface of my 
body.... [the] numerous sensations which arise from the 
deepest parts of the organism... [and the] affective tone of 
our general sensibility. (Bergson, 1914: 38-9) 
The disinterestedness of sleep means that memories which might 
not usually surface are able to 'raise[.. I the trapdoor which has 
kept them beneath the floor of consciousness, [and] arise from the 
depths; they rise, they move, they perform in the night of 
unconsciousness a great dance macabre' (1914: 37-8). As such, 
Bergson explains in a footnote, the dream is a site where the 
Grepressed desires' analysed by Freud might surface (1914: 39). 
That Bergson shbuld cite Freud's Interpretation of Dreams 
(published in 1900) approvingly here inclines us to assess the 
convergence between Bergson and Freud's respective theories. For 
Freud, the dream-work processes of condensation and 
displacement transform the latent thoughts into the dream itself, 
and it is only with the use of psychoanalytic techniques that we 
can decode the text of the dream into its latent components. 
Bergson's account would seem to rest upon a similar distinction 
between latent dream thoughts and manifest dream content. 
Further, for Bergson it is the memory which controls the various 
latent thoughts which end up in the dream itself, and, since we will 
rarely be able to determine after the event the various sensations 
to which the process of memory selection responded, it will never 
be wholly clear to the conscious mind the manner In which latent 
mernories relate to the dream itself. As a result, the text of the 
Bergsonian dream would seem to demand a complex form of 
decoding along the lines suggested by Freud. Where we do need to 
distinguish between Bergson and Freud, however, is on the issue 
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of the function of dreams. Bergson has little to say about the 
function that dreams might perform in the ecology of the mind: 
rather, he is interested in accounting for the way in which they 
come about. Freud, on the other hand, argues that dreams 
perform a process of wish-fulfilment, transforming latent 
unfulfilled desires ('Oh! if only... ') into satisfied desires in the 
manifest content of the dream ('It is') (Freud, 1991: 219). Unlike 
Bergson, then, Freud is explicitly concerned with the function that 
dreams perform within the mental life of the individual. As a 
result, Bergson's theory of dreams can be seen as more limited in 
scope than Freud's. Indeed, Edwin Slosson, who provides the 
introduction to the English publication of Bergson's Dreanis, 
claims that it is precisely the more limited remit of Bergson's 
account that makes it more valuable than the 'wildest 
extravagances' to which 'fanatical Freudians' are inclined to go in 
their analysis of dreams. 'It is impossible to believe, ' he argues, 
that the subconsciousness of every one of us contains 
nothing but the foul and monstrous specimens which 
they [fanatical Freudians] dredge up from the mental 
depths of their neuropathic patients and exhibit with 
such pride. (Slosson, 1914: 8) 
While there are some similarities between Bergson and Freud's 
theory of dreams, then, there are also some important differences 
tIo be noted. 
We now need to turn to consider the relationship between their 
respective comic theories. In the course of Jokes, Freud draws a 
distinction between jokes, humour and the comic, and it is in his 
discussion of the latter that he turns to Bergson's 'Laughter'. For 
Freud, as we shall see in the next section, jokes are inextricably 
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bound up with the realm of the unconscious, and typically involve 
three people 
-a joke-teller, a butt and an audience. Humour, on 
the other hand, need only involve one person. For example, the 
criminal who, facing his own execution on a Monday morning, 
exclaimed, 'Well, the week's beginning nicely', displayed a 
humorous attitude (Freud, 1991: 294). As Freud explains in a 
short 1927 essay on the subject, humour thus represents the 
capacity of the super-ego 'to console the ego' in the face of 
adversity by saying'Lookl here is the world, which seems so 
dangerousl It is nothing but a game for children 
- 
just worth 
making a jest aboutt' (1961: 166) 2. In contrast, the comic requires 
two people, one who is the comic object, and the other who laughs 
at this object, and Freud's explanation of the manner in which 
laughter arises in such instances is based upon a notion of psychic 
economy. imagine, for example, a young child struggling to write, 
with her tongue sticking out. Such a sight incites laughter in the 
observer because of the unnecessary energy which the child seems 
to be expending in the course of performing the action (1991: 249). 
By comparing him or herself with the child, and imagining the 
reduced effort that it would take to complete a similar task, the 
observer is afforded a surplus of energy in comparison to the 
child's exertions. It is this surplus that is used up by the observer 
in the form of laughter (1991: 254). Alternatively, cases where 
someone expends too little mental energy can also prove comic, if 
their slapdash approach gives rise to 'nonsense and stupidity' 
(199 1: 255). Again, Freud argues, the observer accrues a saving in 
energy by comparing themselves with the comic person. An 
increase in intellectual work, Freud assumes, necessarily allows us 
to conserve our physical energy: a point proved, he argues, by the 
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success of machines in saving labour-time (1991: 255)3. As a 
result, one's laughter at an individual's over-hasty intellectual 
efforts derives from the imagined physical energy saved had the job 
been done properly. In both cases, then, 
- 
comic actions and 
comic mental behaviour 
-'ftjhe comic effect apparently depends... 
on the difference between the two cathectic expenditures 
- 
one's 
own and the other person's estimated by "empathy"' (1991: 255). 
Freud draws two favourable comparisons between his theory of 
the comic and that of Bergson. The first of these concerns 
Bergson's discussion of the relationship between the comic and 
childhood games. The first glimpses of the comic forms enjoyed by 
adults, Bergson argues, can be perceived in the mechanisation and 
repetition of games played by children. The jack-iii-the-box, the 
dancing-jack and the snow-ball effect, for example, all embody 
something of the mechanisation of life in their form. As such, he 
concludes, we can identify'the first faint traces of the 
combinations that make us laugh as grown-up persons' in a range 
of childhood toys (Bergson, 1980: 104). Freud is very impressed by 
these observations made in Bergson's 'charming and lively volume', 
and he sets out to pursue a similar line of enquiry (Freud, 199 1: 
286). However, as with their respective analyses of dreams, 
Bergson's discussion of the relationship between the comic and 
childhood is more limited in scope than that of Freud. Indeed, 
Freud's analysis of the relationship not only allows him to draw 
certain conclusions about the comic nature of childhood, but, more 
importantly, it plays a crucial role in his theory of jokes, as we 
shall see in the next section. In relation to the comic, Freud 
relates his economic explanation to an analYsis of childhood 
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pleasure. If someone running down the street falls over, for 
example, a child will laugh out of a feeling of superiority over the 
victim. Not yet capable of the process of empathy demanded by the 
adult form of the comic (as explained above), the child's laughter 
amounts to a laugh of'pure pleasure'(1991: 288). The adult's 
pleasure, on the other hand, is mediated by the process of 
comparative cathectic expenditure, and as a result the pure 
pleasure experienced by the child is not available to us. However, 
what the comic represents for the adult is an approximation of 
infantile, pure pleasure. As such, Freud concludes, the comic can 
be seen as 'the regained "lost laughter of childhood"': 
One could then say: 'I laugh at a difference in expenditure 
between another person and myself, every time I 
rediscover the child in him. ' Or. put more exactly, the 
complete comparison which leads to the comic would run: 
rhat is how he does it 
-I do it in another way - he does it 
as I used to do it as a child. 
Thus the laughter would always apply to the comparison 
between the adult's ego and the child's ego. (1991: 289) 
Although Freud is reluctant to apply this latter fon-nulation to 
every instance of the comic, he is happy to assert its widespread 
applicability. Indeed, the 'quantitative contrast' between small and 
large expenditure (e. g. in the cases of a child writing and of over- 
hasty intellectual work, both cited above) that is central to Freud's 
explanation of the yield of comic pleasure seems to embody'the 
'essential relation between a child and an adult', a fact which would 
seem to emphasise the relationship between the comic and the 
infantile (1991: 292). For Freud, then, childhood pleasures do not 
simply represent a distant recollection of comic forms, as they do 
for Bergson. Rather, the comic provides adults with a means of 
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retrieving forms of pleasure which approximate the exuberant 
exhilaration they experienced as children. 
The second point raised by Freud in relation to Bergson's 
'Laughter' concerns the latter's characterisation of the comic as a 
mechanisation of life. According to Freud, this formulation can be 
subsumed by his own economic model of cathectic expenditure. 
'Experience has taught us that every living thing is different from 
every other and calls for a kind of expenditure by our 
understanding, ' Freud argues, apparently moving towards 
Bergson's own vitalist position (1991: 271). Consequently, he 
continues, 'we find ourselves disappointed if, as a result of 
complete conformity or deceptive mimicry [for examplej we need 
make no fresh expenditure' (1991: 271). The mechanisation of life, 
- 
its regularisation - thus provides us with a saving of the energy 
that would have had to have been expended had things been more 
lifelike. This saving can thus be discharged in the form of 
laughter. In this way, Freud concludes, Bergson's comic theory 
can be included under his own formula (1991: 271). 
What Freud has done, then, is to transpose Bergson's 
preoccupation with the mechanisation of life into his own 
preoccupation with analogies of economic exchange. Such 
analogies pepper the text of Jokes 
-. 
The various techniques of 
Jokes, for example, are united by their'tendency to compressim, 
Freud claims: 'It all seems to be a question of economy. In 
Hamlet's words: 'Thrift, thrift, Horatiol"'(1991: 77). In the next 
section we will consider this economic dimension of the joke In 
rnore detail. For the moment, however, it might be suggested that, 
if Bergson's preoccupation with mechanisation reflects the 
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increasing automisation of modem social life. so Freud's 
preoccupation with analogies of economic exchange might itself 
reflect the increasingly rationalised system of economic exchange 
on which the development of modern social relations were 
predicated (see Giddens, 1990: 21-7). If this is the case, then we 
can add this aspect of Freud's theory to the modernist co-ordinates 
of his discourse that we have already identified above. 
In the course of this section, then, we have explored the 
relationship between Freud and Bergson's respective analyses of 
the comic. As we have seen, there are some interesting points of 
contact between Bergson and Freud, but, equally, some important 
differences to be drawn. In particular, it was noted in relation both 
to dreams and the comic that there is a tendency for Freud to 
pursue a particular path of enquiry further than Bergson would 
pursue it. The comple2dty of Freud's theory ofjokes is doubtless 
evidence of this theoretical tenacity. It is to his theory of jokes that 
we turn next. 
jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious 
in the introduction to his theory of jokes, Freud notes how 
previous commentators have frequently located the joke in a 
conjunction of sense and nonsense, an observation that he finds 
promising (Freud, 1991: 42). In the course of his analysis, Freud 
frequently returns to this idea, trying to formulate the precise 
relationship between the joking conjunction of sense and 
nonsense; the techniques which allow such a conjunction to be 
created in the first place; and the manner in which the purpose 
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and pleasure of ajoke relate to its specific combination of sense 
and nonsense. In what follows, I will structure my discussion 
along the lines suggested by the organisation of Freud's theory, 
looking firstly at joke techniques, and secondly at the purpose and 
pleasure ofjokes. 
a) Joke techniques 
The joke mechanism that Freud identifies in Jokes is heavily 
indebted to the dream mechanism established five years earlier in 
91w InteTpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1953). As we have already 
seen, Freud's theory of dreams constructs a model whereby our 
latent dream thoughts 
- 
our unconscious desires and the residue 
of the day's events - are transformed into the manifest content of 
the dream. The two key processes operative in this transformation 
are those of condensation and displacement. The former is 
responsible for the way in which two or more latent thoughts might 
be condensed into a hybrid image in the dream. The latter is 
responsible for the way in which insignificant latent thoughts 
might be displaced to a point where they occupy a central position 
iI 
within the manifest content of the dream, and vice versa. Working 
from the premise that'there is an intimate connection between all 
mental happenings' (1991: 46), a premise which underpins the 
entire psychoanalytic project, Freud proceeds to analyse a wide 
range of jokes in order to uncover the processes by which the 
latent joke thoughts are transformed into the text of the joke. Itis 
on the basis of his analysis of the processes of condensation and 
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displacement4 that Freud derives his first important distinction, a 
distinction between verbal and conceptual jokes. 
The technique of condensation is responsible for the production 
of verbal jokes. We are told the one about Baron Rothschild, for 
example, who treated an untitled acquaintance 'quite as his equal - 
quite famillionairely' (1991: 47); and we are told the one about the 
Yuletide festivities, or Christmas 'alcoholidays' (1991: 53). In each 
of these examples, two thoughts are condensed into one 
expression, an expression which constitutes the joke itself- 
'familiarly' and 'millionaire' become 'farnillionairely', while'alcohol' 
and 'holidays' b-ccome 'alcoholidays'. As such, both 'jokes' consist 
of a conjunction of sense and nonsense: an apparently nonsensical 
expression acquires sense because of the context within which it is 
uttered. 
The technique of displacement, on the other hand, is 
responsible for the production of conceptual jokes. How is it, for 
example, 'that cats have two holes cut in their skin precisely at the 
place where their eyes areT Why is it that'Nature has arranged it 
that as soon as a child comes into the world it finds a mother 
ready to take care of itl' (1991: 97). Each of these examples relies 
upon a displacement of the conventional train of thought. It is the 
fact that each 'Joke' initially appeals to the procedures of rational 
enquiry, while at the same time subverting those procedures 
through a deviation into the realm of absurdity, that constitutes 
the joking combination of sense and nonsense in each case. 
Cornprehensive though Freud's classification of Joke techniques 
rnay be, he acknowledges the fact 'that technique alone is 
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insufficient to characterize the nature ofjokes', because most if not 
all of the techniques that he has identified are also employed in 
other areas of creative activity (1991: 113). 'Representation by the 
opposite', for example, is the technique typically deployed in the 
creation of irony (1991: 112-3). And, more obviously, condensation 
and displacement are central to the process of dream-work. In the 
light of this juncture in Freud's discussion, Samuel Weber has 
argued that Freud's analysis ofjoke techniques 'appears as an 
enormous and ultimately futile effort to determine the essential 
characteristics of a phenomenon that, by essence, eludes 
characterization' (Weber, 1982: 9 1). Weber's task is to provide a 
deconstructive reading of Jokes; in particular, to reveal the way in 
which Freud's attempts to his shroud discourse in scientificity 
come adrift as he grapples with the elusive quality of the joke. 
41CIonfronted with theory, 'Weber suggests, 'the joke inevitably has 
the last laugh' (1982: 9 1). 1 would not necessarily concur with 
Weber's assessment of the futility of Freud's analysis ofjoke 
techniques. On the one hand, Freud provides us with a typology of 
joke forms. As his subsequent argument makes clear - as we shall 
-go on to see - it is precisely the capacity for this range of joke forms 
to make acceptable the potentially unpalatable thoughts lying 
behind the joke that protects the yield of pleasure to be had from 
the joke. On the other hand, Freud's foregrounding of the 
sinjilarity between the techniques of joke-work and those of dream- 
work, even while pointing out the important differences between 
jokes and dreams (1991: 237-8), allows him to emphasise the 
extent to which the phenomenon of jokes, like the phenomenon of 
dreams, very much belongs to the ecology of the mind. However, 
Weber raises some interesting points concerning the scientific 
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status of Freud's theory, and I want to return to this issue below. 
In the meantime, however, since Freud's analysib ofjoke 
techniques has reached an apparent impasse, I want to turn to the 
second area of his study, the purpose and pleasure ofjokes. 
b) The purpose and pleasure ofjokes 
Just as Freud's discussion of joke techniques revolved around a 
key distinction between verbal and conceptual jokes, so his 
consideration of the purpose and pleasure ofjokes revolves around 
a further distinction, this time between innocent and tendentious 
jokes. His elaboration of this distinction not only broaches the 
issue of the joking relationship between sense and nonsense that 
we have already touched on, it also returns us to his economic 
topography of the mind and to his analysis of childhood. 
An innocentjoke'is an end in itself and serves no particular 
aim, 'Freud claims (1991: 132). Innocentjokes thus lack any 
ulterior motive, and are more inclined to incite 'a slight smile' 
-rather than a raucous 
belly-laugh (1991: 139). Since an innucent 
joke is an end in itself, the source of the pleasure derived from it 
must necessarily be located in the joke techniques themselves 
(199 1: 167). In order to explain this yield of pleasure, however, 
Freud appeals to his notion of psychic expenditure. If we return to 
the examples of Freud's jokes already cited, we can begin to see 
how this process might operate. Taking verbal jokes first, a 
condensed punch line, such as'alcoholidays', affords us a saving 
of psychic energy by drawing together two words in the one sign. 
The fact that the semiotic gap between 'alcohol' and 'holidays' is 
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bridged by the joke allows us to discharge as laughter (or, at least, 
a vague smile) the energy that would usually have been expended 
in drawing together two signs of this sort. In relation to conceptual 
jokes, such as the question concerning the positioning of cats' eyes 
quoted earlier, there is again a saving in psychic energy to be had. 
Rational thought, Freud argues, takes more effort than wayward 
departures from it. As a result, the technique of displacement is 
capable of providing us with a source of pleasure by allowing us 
momentarily to escape the strictures of rationality (1991: 174). 
Freud does not leave it there, however. Instead, he begins to 
explore the psychogenesis ofjokes, and in doing so he supplements 
his economic account of their pleasure. The stage of childhood, he 
argues, makes available forms of behaviour that are forbidden in 
later life. For example, in the sphere of language-acquisition, the 
child is able to play with words not on the grounds that they make 
sense, but on the grounds that they provide an enjoyable 
combination of rhythms and sounds (1991: 174). Similarly, 'the 
pressure of critical reason' that is gradually imposed upon the 
child's discourse is pleasurably overcome by lapsing into absurdity 
(1991: 175). As a result, both condensation and displacement are 
capable of appealing to the pleasures experienced in childhood. 
However, 
- 
and this is the crucial point - to lapse simply into a 
childish discourse of incongruous sounds and equally incongruous 
logic is not an option open to the adult, since to do so would be to 
Jay oneself open to the strictures of adult, rational criticism. And it 
is for this reason that the joke consists not simply of the nonsense 
beloved of the infantile stage, but of a conjunction of sense and 
nonsense: it is precisely the sense of ajoke which allows it to 
bypass the wrath of rational criticism that would be meted out to 
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nonsense on its own (1991: 181). Freud's analysis of innocent 
jokes thus relates them to their economic appeal, their 
psychogenetic appeal, and their necessary combination of sense 
and nonsense. 
Freud's explanation of the purpose and pleasure of tendentious 
jokes is more complex, since the point of a tendentious joke is 
precisely that it is more than an end in itself. a tendentious joke 
has an ulterior motive. The chief example around which he 
elaborates his analysis of tendentious jokes is that of smut, and it 
is worth spending some time reviewing this example. There are 
two key features to Freud's model of the smuttyjoke. First, it is a 
rigidly gendered model, assigning each of the points in the joking 
transaction to a particular gender. Second, it Is tripartite model, 
expanding on the dynamic mentioned earlier between joke-teller, 
butt and audience. We will look at each in turn. 
Freud defines smut as 'the intentional bringing into prominence 
of sexual facts and relations by speech' (1991: 140). In addition, 
however, smut is directed by a sexually aroused male to a female 
who, on hearing the smutty discourse, is herself expected to 
become aroused. At this point, argues Freud, we need to 
distinguish between smut per se and a smutty joke. The former 
sin, ply consists of scatological language: it is to be found, 
according to Freud, amongst the lower social groups, where there 
are fewer prohibitions to be found concerning the decorum of 
language. The smuttyjoke, however, is found more amongst 
higher social groups, where the expected linguistic decorum 
proscribes the undisguised deployment of scatology. In such 
cases, the smutty joke is constructed around allusion, 'that is, 
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replacement by something small, something remotely connected, 
which the hearer reconstructs in his imagination into a complete 
and straightforward obscenity' (1991: 144). The purpose of this 
type of joke is thus to articulate in a witty and (more or less) 
socially acceptable form thoughts which, had they not been 
articulated in the form of ajoke, would have been ruled 
unacceptable. Suchjokes thus'make possible the satisfaction of 
an instinct (whether lustful or hostile) in the face of an obstacle 
that stands in its way' (1991: 144). The smutty joke thus makes 
use of the same techniques employed in innocentjokes, but the 
purpose of such techniques is to bypass the injunction that would 
usually forbid the articulation of such thoughts. Just as the 
innocentjoke conceals nonsense in sense, so the smuttyjoke 
constructs an ingenious envelope in which to place the smutty 
allusion. 
We can thus identify two fonns of pleasure in the smuttyjoke. 
First, there is the 'fore-pleasure' provided by the technique of the 
joke, which allows the thoughts contained In the joke to be uttered 
in the first place (1991: 188: see Palmer, 1994: 79-89). Second, 
there is the extra yield of pleasure that derives from the lifting of 
inhibitions which the joke allows (1991: 189). Both of these forms 
of pleasure can be explained in terms of the process of psychic 
economy. Fore-pleasure, the pleasure gained from registering the 
techniques of the joke, can be explained in the same way as the 
pleasure of innocent jokes was explained, both in terms of the 
saving in psychic expenditure allowed by the joke, and in terms of 
the way in which such techniques return us, in a protected form, 
to. the play of childhood. Similarly, the extra yield of pleasure 
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deriving from the overcoming of inhibitions has an economic 
dimension to it, because the internal maintenance of inhibitions 
requires a certain expenditure of psychic energy. The release 
provided by the lifting of these inhibitions can thus be discharged 
as laughter. 'Me precise weighting between these two forms of 
pleasure is unclear, however: we are unable to determine to what 
extent the pleasure derives either from the joke techniques or from 
the purpose that they serve. Thus, strictly speaking, ' Freud 
argues, 'we do not know what we are laughing at' (1991: 146). Our 
discussion of the first feature of Freud's smuttyjoke 
- 
its gendered 
quality - has thus led us onto explain several other features of the 
joke. indeed, while we started with the idea that smut is directed 
by a man at a woman, the woman herself seems to have all but 
dropped out of the equation. The reason for her marginalisation in 
this way will become apparent when we turn to the second feature 
of the smuttyjoke, its tripartite nature. 
In order for smutty discourse to develop into smuttyjoke- 
telling, three people need to be present: the woman who is the 
object of the first man's advances, and a third man to act as an 
audience for the first man's jokes. The reason for this tripartite 
structure derives once again from Freud's economic description of 
jokes. The first person, in creating and telling the joke, expends a 
certain amount of psychic energy themselves. As a result, the 
saving in energy produced by the joke itself is insufficient in 
volume to allow any excess to be discharged as laughter (199 1: 
202). it is for this reason that it is rare for people to tell 
themselves Jokes - and laugh at them - when on their own. In 
order to end up in credit, then, the first person needs to ensure 
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that he has an audience. According to Freud, there are three 
reasons why this should be the case. Firstly, because the third 
person's laughter confirms the success of the joke: secondly, 
because there is a tendency for laughter on the part of the 
audience to arouse laughter in the joke-teller, as a result of its 
infectious nature: and thirdly, in cases where ajoke is being told 
that has been told before, 'to make up for the loss of pleasure 
owing to the joke's lack of novelty' (1991: 209). While the woman, 
whose resistance to the first man's initial smutty advances, now 
finds herself as the butt of his smuttyjokes, the third person now 
finds himself as a prospective ally of the first man. The woman 
thus becomes a passive victim in the exchange, while the two men 
fulfil two mutually supportive roles: the first providing the third 
with the pleasure of laughter, the third providing the first with the 
satisfaction that his jokes have hit the mark. As Freud puts it, '[a] 
joke is thus a double-dealing rascal who serves two masters at 
once' (1991: 208). It is this tripartite structure that underlies all 
tendentious jokes. 
We are now in a position to explain the precise relationship 
between jokes and the unconscious. There are, I think, three 
aspects to Freud's argument at this point. Firstly, the techniques 
responsible for the production ofjokes - condensation and 
displacement 
- 
do not belong to the conscious realm of rational 
thought, but, rather, are located in the province of the 
unconscious. The fact that dreams, which are obviously generated 
by unconscious processes, should employ similar techniques is 
used as supporting evidence for this argument. Secondly, the fact 
that jokes provide a mechanism for overcoming repression (e. g. by 
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articulating smutty thoughts) would suggest that there is a crucial 
link with the unconscious, which is defined precisely in terms of its 
role as a store for repressed drives and desires. Finally, the fact 
that the techniques ofjokes return us to the pleasures of childhood 
behaviour suggest their link with the unconscious, since it is 
during the infantile stage that the unconscious is formed (199 1: 
225-8). For these three reasons, then, Freud accords the 
unconscious a primary role in the production ofjokes. Even when 
a gag-writer consciously sits down to invent some newjokes, 
argues Freud, his or her imagination will dip into the unconscious 
as a source for the technique, purpose and pleasure of the joke 
(1991: 228). 
c) Assessment 
Having undertaken an explication of Freud's theory ofjokes, we 
are now in a position to attempt an assessment of it. The first 
point to raise concerns the distinction between innocent and 
tendentious jokes. Since innocent jokes necessarily serve the 
purpose of protecting their yield of pleasure from the strictures of 
rational criticism, the hard-and-fast distinction between innocent 
jokes as an end in themselves and the instrumentality of 
tendentious jokes would, as Jeffrey MehIman points out (Mehlman, 
-1975: 442), and as Freud as good as admits (Freud, 1991: 183), 
seem liable to collapse. Even innocentjokes enjoy a purposive, 
tendentious dimension, then. Indeed, at one point Freud 
introduces the following joke as 'the most innocent possible 
example of a verbal joke': 'A girl to whom a visitor was announced 
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while she was at her toilet complained: "Oh, what a shame that 
one mayn't let oneself be seen just when one's at one's most * 
anziehend"' (1991: 137). As a footnote explains, the joke revolves 
around the double meaning of anziehend as both 'dressing' and 
dattractive' (1991: 137). Without explanation, however, Freud 
immediately changes tack: 
Since, however, doubts arise in me after all as to whether 
I have a right to describe this joke as being non- 
tendentious, I will replace it by another one which is 
extremely simple and should not be open to objection. (1991: 137) 
Freud's reasoning at this point is not made clear, but his 
admission does seem to suggest that the distinction between 
innocent and tendentious jokes is a precarious one. An additional 
problem here is that Freud seems to assume that jokes are either 
innocent or tendentious, irrespective of the context within which 
they are delivered. The most ostensibly innocent of jokes, in 
Freud's terms, for example, might be told by someone at a solemn 
occasion (such as a funeral) with the express purpose of causing a 
commotion or causing offence. That the purpose of telling a 
particular joke in this way is independent of the joke itself suggests 
that, alongside a formal analysis ofjoke techniques, we also 
require a contextual analysis ofjoking practices. 
it might be argued, however, that in his analysis of the tripartite 
nature of the tendentious joke, Freud provides us with just such 
an analytical model. As we have seen, the effect of a joke cannot 
be read off from the text of the joke itself, but can only be 
determined in the context within which it is told. The first person 
awaits the third person's laughter to confirm the success of the 
joke: as such the joke is very much a locus of interaction between 
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two active subjects, and a passive object (the butt of the joke). The 
telling of a joke is thus a negotiated transaction. What is more, it 
is a transaction that is overlaid with the contours of power. 
Freud's analysis of smut, for example, gives explicit consideration 
both to the gender dynamics within which smutty activity is 
enacted, and to the co-ordinates of class and decorum which 
impinge on the joking process. That Freud's model of the 
tendentious joke provides an appropriate model for a 
contextualised analysis ofjoking practices can be illustrated by 
turning briefly to a recent example, Harry Enfield's 'Loadsamoney' 
character. Created by Paul Whitehouse and Charlie Higson, 
Loadsamoney appeared regularly on London Weekend Television's 
FMay Night Live in 1988. Loadsamoney was, according to his 
creators, a satirical, loud-mouthed member of the Thatcherite, 
entrepreneurial nouveau-riche. Within weeks, however, 
Loadsamoney had become the darling of the right-wing tabloid 
press, and was heralded as some sort of popular hero. As a 
Channel 4 discussion of popular comedy pronounced, 'ironically, 
Loadsamoney was most popular amongst those It satirised' 
(Signals, 1990). In Freudian terms, the third person had 
reinterpreted the purpose of the joke as a celebration of 
Thatcherite values. Whitehouse and Higson have since complained 
that 'You can't be responsible when people take it wrongly, ' and 
that it was almost not treated as comedy' (Signals, 1990). Such 
admissions not only vindicate Freud's tripartite model of the joke, 
they also illustrate the ultimate dependency of the first person on 
the reaction of the third. In this way, Freud's theory of jokes would 
seem to provide an apt framework within which to analyse the 
dynamics of joking practices within specific contexts. 
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For all that Freud's analysis provides us with pointers for such 
an analysis of jokes, however, his discussion of tendentious jokes 
is not without its problems. Jokes is crammed full of examples of 
Jewish jokes. Jokes about Jews; jokes told by Jews: jokes that 
ridicule Yiddish modes of pronunciation; and a long series ofjokes 
that focuses on the Schadchen, or marriage-broker. Indeed, 
MehIman has noted howthe shrewdly perverse marriage-broker... 
at times seems like the protagonist of Freud's volume' (Mehlman, 
1975: 440). However, for all that there is wealth of tendentious 
jokes representing Jews in one form or other, Freud's paradigm 
case of the tendentious joke in fact focuses on the case of smut, as 
we have seen. And this even though, in the entire volume, there is 
not one clear example of a smuttyjoke. This has led Karen Smythe 
to argue that, in pursuing his analysis in this manner, Freud was 
actually displacing his own lack of self-worth as a Jew onto women 
(Smythe, 1991). We know, for example, that Freud himself had at 
times been arnious about the anti-Semitism that he had to face. 
In The Interpretation of Dreams, for instance, he cites one of his 
own dreams from 1897 which revealed his concerns about anti- 
Semitism possibly depriving him of the chance of promotion 
(Freud,. 1953: 136-45). Given this anxiety, it could be assumed, 
Freud might also have been the butt of anti-Semitic jokes. 
However, as Smythe argues, in taking women as the most 
prominent tendentious joking butts, Freud in fact 'makes "women" 
the scapegoat for his own negative self-image as a Jew' (Smythe, 
1991: 19). 
A similar sort of argument has been advanced by Sander 
Gilman (Gilman, 1985: cited in Neve, 1988). According to Neve, 
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Gilman argues that Freud's concern with 'mauscheld jokes that 
revolve around Yiddish pronunciation of German words springs 
from his own embarrassment at'his vulgar, but comic, father, 
Kallamon Jakob Freud, whose jokes may have been both provincial 
and, probably, sexual' (Neve, 1988: 38). In looking at such jokes 
'through the gaze of psychoanalysis, ' Neve paraphrases Gilman, 
Freud manages to'replace... the insecurities of the vulgar, 
mauscheln Jewish joke with the new language, and the new, non- 
provincial security and authority of psychoanalysis' (Neve. 1988: 
39). Thus, to conclude Gilman's argument, '[iln explaining the 
Jewish joke, Freud escapes its grasp, the grasp of his father and of 
low social status' (Neve, 1988: 39) 5. 
This argument returns us to an issue touched on earlier, the 
, 
apparent scientificity of Freud's discourse. As we have seen Weber 
'argue, 
this scientificity is at times outwitted by the elusiveness of 
the jokes themselves. And one point at which this outwitting takes 
place is in Freud's brief reference to the Aufsitzer, or shaggy dog 
story. Weber begins by relating the position of the first person in 
the tendentiousjoke to the narcissistic impulse. On telling ajoke. 
the first person narcissistically awaits the third person's laughter, 
which not only confirms the success of the joke, but also provides 
confirmation of the first person's ego (Weber, 1982: 114). In the 
case of the shaggy dog story, however, these dynamics are 
transformed. Here is one of Freud's examples: 
A man at the dinner table who was being handed fish 
dipped his two hands twice in the mayonnaise and then 
ran them through his hair. When his neighbour looked at 
him in astonishment, he seemed to notice his mistake 
and apologized: 'I'm sorry, I thought It was spinach. ' (Freud, 1991: 190) 
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Freud provides the following analysis of examples of this sort: 
These extreme examples have an effect because they 
rouse the expectation of ajoke, so that one tries to find 
concealed sense behind the nonsense. But one finds 
none: they really are nonsense. The pretence makes it 
possible for a moment to liberate the pleasure in 
nonsense. These jokes are not entirely without a 
purpose; they are a'take-in', and give the person who 
tells them a certain amount of pleasure in misleading and 
annoying his hearer. The latter then damps down his 
annoyance by determining to tell them himself later on. (1991: 190) 
Weber's discussion of Freud's analysis of the shaggy dog story is 
both ingenious and very revealing. Does the shaggy dog story 
really deserve the marginal status afforded it by Freud? Surely, 
Weber argues, if the telling of jokes is underpinned by a 
narcissistic dynamic (as Freud's remarks above suggest), then the 
most narcissistic of all jokes is the non-joke or shaggy dog story. 
With the joke proper, the third person decides the fate of the joke, 
but with a shaggy dog story, the first person decides the fate of the 
third. As a result, Weber continues, the shaggy dog story'must 
clearly be the best joke of all, because it is the worst' (1977: 18). 
Accordingly, the shaggy dog story is the Freudian joke par 
excellence, and, crucially, it erupts at the point at which nonsense 
is deprived of any sense whatsoever. Weber's argument does not 
finish there, however, for Freud has himself been duped by the 
shaggy dog story, into treating It merely as a marginal form of 
joking. Psychoanalysis, Weber concludes, can thus be seen to be 
unable to 'escape the effects of what it endeavours to think' (1982: 
xvi). Since the unconscious will always inscribe itself on 
psychoanalytic theory in this way, so psychoanalysis is ultimately 
unable to preserve its own autonomy as a form of scientift 
discourse. Indeed, in a similar fashion. it was the purpose of 
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Smythe and Gilman's arguments above to pursue the extent to 
which Freud's theory ofjokes itself bears the hallmarks of his own 
unconscious desires and anideties. 
In positing the e2dstence of the unconscious, psychoanalytic 
theory leaves itself open to critiques of this sort. More recently, 
theorists such as Lacan have sought to overcome, or, rather, 
confront, these problems through an obtuse style of discourse that 
advertises its own opacity as a-register of its self-awareness of 
unconscious drives. I do not want to conclude by rejecting Freud's 
entire theory. Indeed, what I have tried to do in this section is to 
identify both the strengths of his approach as well as Its blind 
spots and aporia. The arguments of Weber, Smythe and Gilman, 
however, which have been discussed as a means of determining 
the nature of these aporia, can all be seen as valid forms of 
historicised analysis, insofar they each treat the text of Jokes in 
relation to the historical process of its own authorship. As David 
Fisher has pointed out, '[t1he history of the psychoanalytic 
movement is intimately related to Freud's personal and intellectual 
history. in a dramatic way Freud was his own most persistent 
patient' (Fisher, 1982: 275). What I want to do in the next section 
is attempt another form of analysis by relating'Freud's text to 
Bakhtin's account of the decline of the camivalesque. 
Bakhtin, Freud and carnival 
in this section I want to explore the relationship between the 
structure of the Freudian joke and the dynamics of carnival. As 
has already been pointed out, Freud's theory doesn't even merit a 
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mention in Rabelais and His World, but Voloshinov does provide a 
full-length critique of psychoanalysis in Freudianism it is 
therefore to that volume that I will first turn. 
,- a) Fýeudianism 
Voloshinov characterises psychoanalysis as a species of 
a subjective psychology' (Voloshinov, 1976: 18). The distinction 
between subjective and objective psychology echoes the distinction 
drawn by Bakhtin in Art and Answerability between the inner and 
the outer body fBakhtin, 1990: 27-8; see Chapter Four). Just as 
our experience of our own exterior is always fragmentary, always 
I 
si tuated within a specific vantage point, so subjective psychology, 
in relying upon verbal reports from the subject of analysis him or 
herself, is necessarily limited in scope (Voloshinov, 1976: 18). But 
the most important error committed by subjective psychology is 
that it assumes a clear-cut opposition between the individual and 
the social. The object of study for psychology is the Individual: 
consequently, since the individual and the social are opposed to 
one another, subjective psychology deems it wholly appropriate to 
base a method of enquiry on an individual's own reports about 
their psychic condition. Voloshinov rejects such a position on two 
counts. First, he rejects it on the grounds that the subject isn't an 
abstracts autonomous entity, but is in fact 'the aggregate of social 
relationships' (Voloshinov, 1976: 15: quoting Marx). As such, the 
individual can't be seen in terms of an opposition to the social, 
since it is necessarily inscribed within the very concrete conditions 
of the social. Second, Voloshinov rejects subjective psychology on 
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the grounds that language, the medium within which the subject 
reports on his or her psychic condition, is itself a thoroughly social 
entity (1976: 2 1). As such, all language is overlaid with a range of 
social and ideological accents, and such a state of affairs 
undermines the supposed ability of the subject to provide a report 
on his or her psychic condition that is. devoid of any socio- 
ideological inflection. In rejecting subjective psychology in this 
way, Voloshinov calls for a form of objective psychology that treats 
the subject as a thoroughly social entity. Since the very language 
which the subject utters is imbued with socio-ideological 
significance, objective psychology amounts to a form of ideological 
analysis insofar as it attempts to relate the various contradictions 
inherent in human behaviour to the social contradictions within 
which they are inscribed (1976: 88). 
in accordance with this critique of subjective psychology, 
Voloshinov identifies a number of specific problems in 
psychoanalytic theory. Firstly, there is a tendency for phenomena 
to be stripped of any social significance, and only assigned an 
individual, psychic significance. Freud's comparison, for example, 
between the urge to hold back faeces and the desire to hold onto 
one's money lacks any attempt to identify particular aspects of the 
material world - whether they be in 'the organism itself or in the 
e nvironment' - which might support such a process (1976: 72). In 
a similar manner, the Freudian analysis of the family locates the 
dynamics of the family. entirely within a sexualised realm centred 
orl the Oedipus complex. As a result, Voloshinov argues, '[t1he 
family, that castle and keep of capitalism, evidently has become a 
thing economically and socially little understood and little taken to 
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heart' (1976: 90-1). Voloshinov thus demands that more attention 
be paid to the material conditions and context u; die family. 
Further still, the interactions on the basis of which Freud 
developed his theories took place in the context of a doctor-patient 
encounter. A number of factors and pressures will necessarily 
impinge upon such an encounter. Sex, age and class differentials, 
for example, will probably be played out in some form or other in 
the course of any exchange. So too will any feelings of resistance 
to the doctor's position on the part of the patient. In other words, 
'it is in the midst of this complex and very special atmosphere that 
the verbal utterances are made' (1976: 78). The contcxt within 
which the psychoanalytic encounter takes place is thus going to 
exert an unquantifiable influence on the findings of psychoanalytic 
theory. Finally, Voloshinov calls into question the concept of the 
unconscious. In ascribing to the unconscious such a complex 
range of mechanisms, - the mechanism of censorship, for example, 
Freud simply imputes to the unconscious a number of conscious 
procedures. That such a vast range of mechanisms could be 
maintained at the level of the unconscious is, Voloshinov argues, 
unfeasible. Rather than an unconscious, then, Voloshinov recasts 
the Freudian concept in terms of an 'unofficial conscious' (1976: 
85). In this respect, the official conscious is conceived in terms of 
those aspects of behaviour which conform to dominant patterns of 
thought and decorum, while the unofficial conscious refers to those 
aspects of behaviour which, while rooted in the material conditions 
of existence rather than being instinctual, nevertheless run 
counter to the dominant behavioural ideology. In this way, 
voloshinov's critique of Freudian theory in terms of its flight from 
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materialist forms of analysis echoes Bakhtin's critique of vitalism 
(see Chapter Four). 
We can, I think, raise a number of points in relation to this 
critique of Freud. Firstly, we might pause to consider the extent to 
which, in rejecting subjective psychology, Voloshinov falls into the 
trap of reductionism by reducing human behaviour to the 
economic and social relations out of which it arises. Had 
Voloshinov simply posited an official conscious which blithely 
reproduces the dominant codes of behaviour, then this charge of 
reductionism might have stood. However, in positing alongside the 
official conscious an unofficial conscious within which a range of 
oppositional behavioural possibilities are stored, Voloshinov is, I 
would argue, able to avoid such a charge. Indeed, in attempting to 
reveal the social, cultural and historical co-ordinates of 
psychoanalytic theory, Voloshinov's text can be placed in the same 
tradition as that of Erich Fromm, insofar as they both seek to 
integrate a psychological approach of sorts with a Marxist critique 
of culture (see Bocock, 1976: 148)6. 
The second point concerns the semiotic turn undertaken in 
Voloshinov's critique. Since psychoanalysis operates within the 
realm of utterances, Voloshinov argues, so it needs to register that 
its primary object of analysis is linguistic. As Neal Bruss, amongst 
others, has pointed out, such a position would appear to pre-empt 
the serniotic turn undertaken by Lacantan psychoanalysis several 
years later (Bruss, 1976: 118: see also Emerson, 1986). 
. 
The final point I want to raise in relation to Fý-eudjanjsm 
concerns the extent to which the critique of Freud is valid. As 
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Bruss argues in response to Voloshinovs text, Freud's Civilization 
and Its Discontents, which appeared three years after Freudianism, 
allegedly finds Freud addressing more explicitly the 
interrelationship between the subject and social processes, a line 
of enquiry that might have allowed him to have bypassed some of 
Voloshinov's criticisms (Bruss, 1976: 117). We might add that, on 
a sympathetic reading even of Freud's Jokes, there are perhaps 
grounds for challenging the drift of Voloshinov's critique. As I have 
argued in the previous section, for example, Freud's analysis of the 
tendentious joke not only registers the relations of class and 
gender which impinge on the joking process, it would also seem to 
invite a contextual analysis of such processes, as well as making 
the focus of such an inquiry the semiotic material of the Jokes 
themselves. While Voloshinov's argument about the need for 
psychoanalytic theory to undertake a more thorough critique of the 
social, cultural and historical determinants in the ecology- of the 
mind is certainly valid, then, it is possible, I would argue, to 
identify passages in Freud's work where such determinants are, 
implicitly if not explicitly, gestured towards. 
b) The Freudian joke and Bakhtinian carnival 
Having embarked upon this initial consideration of the 
relationship between Freud and Bakhtin, then, we are now in a 
position to turn to consider in more detail the relationship between 
Freud's theory of jokes and Bakhtin's theory of carnival. Charles 
Byrd has argued that we can identify in Rabelats and His World a 
powerful influence exerted by Freudian theory, and he identifies 
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three points at which this influence emerges. Firstly, in making 
ambivalence one of the key qualities of carnivalesque imagery, 
Bakhtin borrows one of the central concepts within psychoanalytic 
. 
theory, where it is used to denote 'the simultaneous existence of 
contradictory tendencies, attitudes, or feelings in the relationship 
to a single object' (Byrd, 1987: 225: quoting Freud). Secondly, 
Bakhtin's emphasis on the ambivalence of the excremental 
preoccupations of material bodily imagery echoes Freud's theory of 
anal eroticism, 'the anal stage being... the developmental period in 
which ambivalence reaches its peak' (1987: 226). Thirdly, Byrd 
argues, Bakhtin's method of interpreting carnivalesque Imagery by 
decoding its manifest content into its latent meaning is reminiscent 
of Freud's hermeneutics. And by providing the analyst with a high 
degree of interpretative leeway, as a result of the emphasis placed 
on the concept of ambivalence, so Bakhtin's interpretations are, for 
Byrd, susceptible to the same charges of randomness levelled at 
Freudian interpretative strategies (1987: 227). Byrd thus posits a 
close correspondence between Rabelais and His World and 
Freudian theory. Indeed, he argues that the central problem 
shared by Bakhtin's theory of carnival and Freud's theory of jokes 
is that in 'felmphasizing laughter's rebelliousness... [they] both 
neglect humour's service to ideological authority and the status 
quo' (1987: 228). 
Byrd is surely correct in noting that Bakhtin tends to ignore the 
degree to which humour might serve conservative forces. However, 
at the same time, Bakhtin's historical account of the development 
of carnival at least foregrounds the extent to which such forces 
have sought to marginalise carnivalesque practices. What is more, 
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as has been argued earlier, it is on the basis of the utopian 
dimension to his account of carnival as an essentially rebellious 
phenomenon that Bakhtin is able to undertake a historical critique 
of comic theory (see Chapter One). As a result, we perhaps need to 
qualify Byrd's assessment of Bakhtin. 
As for Byrd's contention that Freud shares Bakhtin's neglect of 
the possible conservative functions of humour, we need to consider 
the extent to which Freud's theory of jokes appears to incorporate 
a conception of carnivalesque rebelliousness. One way of 
addressing this issue is to return to Voloshinovs transposition of 
the conscious/unconscious relationship into a relationship 
between the official and unofficial conscious. If, as Freud argues, 
jokes are resourced by the unconscious, then their unofficial 
nature (in Voloshinov's terms) - their ability to bypass prohibitions, 
for example, - would seem to lend itself to a reasonably close 
comparison with the rebelliousness of carnival. Further, in 
allowing criticism or aggression to be vented in a socially 
acceptable form (i. e. in the form of a joke), joking behaviour is, as 
Freud notes, well-suited to the goals of those who want to adopt a 
rebellious stance towards those in authority (1991: 149). In this 
sense, then, Freud would indeed appear to emphasise the 
rebellious potential of laughter. However. if we look at Freud's 
theory more closely, it becomes clear that he also considers the 
extent to which humour might perform a conservative function, 
and in so doing, he casts the realm of jokes in more of an 
ambivalent light than Byrd would appear to suggest. In the final 
sentence of Jokes, for example, Freud not only relates jokes to a 
pessimistic characterisation of the human condition, he also 
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identifies a function for jokes in maintaining the equilibrium of 
that condition: 
the euphoria which we endeavour to reach by these 
means is nothing other than the mood of a period of life in 
which we were accustomed to deal with our psychical 
work in general with a small expenditure of energy 
- 
the 
mood of our childhood, when we were ignorant of the 
comic, when we were incapable ofjokes and when we had 
no need of humour to make us feel happy. (Freud, 1991: 302) 
Such a passage would seem to- attribute to jokes a safety-valve 
function. The joke, in other words, provides us with a release from 
the drudgery of our everyday e2dstence, reconstructing 
momentarily for us the pleasures that were once available before 
the drudgery was imposed upon us. The suggestion here that 
jokes serve to maintain our psychic health by providing a 
temporary sense of happiness maps neatly onto a safety-valve 
model of carnival, providing momentary liberation from systems of 
social control in order that those systems might be maintained. 
There are parallels to be drawn between this passage in Jokes 
and Freud's brief discussion of carnivals in Totem and Taboo. In 
the course of a discussion of ceremonial slaughter and totemic 
meals, Freud touches on the role of festivals in relation to such 
processes: 
A festival is a permitted, or rather an obligatory, excess, a 
solemn breach of a prohibition. It is not that men commit 
the excesses because they are feeling happy as a result of 
some injunction they have received. It is rather that 
excess is of the essence of a festival: the festive feeling is 
produced by the liberty to do what is as a rule prohibited. (Freud, 1955: 140) 
While the festival promotes a sense of revelling excess as a result of 
the suspension of prohibitive rules, then, the crucial point here is 
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that such revelry is not itself generated by rebelliousness. On the 
contrary, it is the temporary conferment of liberty that is the 
primary factor in inducing such excess. As a result, Freud 
conceives of festivals not as an anarchic outpouring of 
rebelliousness, but as a mechanism closely regulated by a system 
of social control. Again, such a conception lends itself to a safety- 
valve notion of carnival. 
On the one hand, all jokes (both innocent and tendentious) 
enact some form of rebellion against the way in which pleasure is 
officially policed, whether by retrieving the delights of childhood. or 
by articulating prohibited thoughts. On the other hand, Freud 
directs us to the function thatjoking processes might perform in 
maintaining the status quo. For Freud, therefore, jokes can be 
both unruly and benign, they can both provide mechanisms for 
rebelliousness, and provide forms of release necessary for the 
preservation of order. As a result, Byrd's argument about Freud's 
theory ofjokes would appear to call for some additional 
qualification. 
if, on the basis of this discussion, we were to compare Freud's 
theory ofjokes with Bakhtin's theory of carnival, then, it would 
seem that Freud's theory straddles two standpoints. Not only does 
he identify in jokes a rebellious propensity equivalent to the critical 
capacity of Bakhtinian carnival, but, in identifying jokes as 'a 
safety valve for pent-up energies in the unconscious', as 
Voloshinov puts it in his discussion of Jokes (Voloshinov, 1976: 
59), Freud also attributes to them a potential to perform a 
conservative function. What we might argue. however, is that, in 
emphasising the contextual significance of the tripartite dynamics 
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ofjoking behaviour, Freud's theory ofjokes actually shares with 
Bakhtin's historical conception of carnival the view that the precise 
function performed by a joke in any particular context cannot be 
resolved without an analysis of that context. As a result, if we were 
to situate Freud's theory of jokes in relation to Bakhtin's thesis 
concerning the historical development of the carnivalesque, it 
would seem to represent neither a particularly negative, nor a 
particularly positive, conception of laughter7. 
Conclusion 
Although Freud engages very directly with Bergson's essay on 
'Laughter', it would seem that his comic theory actually develops in 
a rather different direction. In the course of this chapter I have set 
out an account of this direction, and drawn attention to the 
various strengths and weaknesses of Freud's theory of jokes. 
Finally, in relating his theory both to Voloshinov's general critique 
of psychoanalysis, and to more specific connections between the 
carnivalesque and the Freudian joke, we were able to identify 
particular points of proximity and contrast. Situated against the 
backdrop of Bakhtin's account of the decline of the carnivalesque, 
Freud's theory is of ambivalent significance, combining in his 
account of jokes both a pessimistic dimension and a rebellious, 
critical dimension. Situated within the canon of comic theory, it is 
a text rich with argument, examples, and problems. Having 
focused on two contemporaneous comic theories from within that 
canon in the last two chapters, it is time now to turn to an area 
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that is rather less canonical as far as discussions of comic theory 
go: the work of Bertolt Brecht. 
That Rabelais and His World should neglect Freud's theory of jokes in this way, when its author had arguably produced a 
comprehensive survey of Freud's work just a few years before 
perhaps adds weight to the argument of those who maintain 
that Voloshinov was actually the author of those works which 
appeared under his name. Indeed, the translator/editor and 
co-editor of Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, 1. R. Titunik and 
Neal Bruss respectively, reject the idea that Bakhtin was in fact 
its author (Titunik and Bruss, 1976: xiii-iv). While accepting 
the coherence of the work of Bakhtin with that of Voloshinov (and Medvedev), they argue that it is unlikely that any 
individual would be able to produce four books on disparate 
fields (Voloshinov's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 
and Freudianism; Medvedev's The Formal Method in Literary 
Scholarship: and Bakhtin's Problems in Dostoevsky's Poetics) 
- 
as well as at least three essays - within the space ofjust three 
years (1926-1929) (1976: xiii). 
2 One of the key differences between Freud's analysis of humour 
in Jokes and his later analysis of it in 'Humour' is the model of 
the mind on which each is predicated. Jokes deploys Freud's 
economic model of the mind, which focuses on the the process 
of exchange and expenditure of psychic energy between the 
realms of the conscious, the preconscious and the unconscious. 
By the time he returned to the subject, he had developed his 
topographical theory of the mind, focusing on the 
interrelationship between the ego, the super-ego and the id. 
Freud charts the differences between these two approaches in 
, Psycho-analysis' (Freud, 1959). 
3 In spite of Freud's apparent critique of the sovereignty of 
reason, mentioned earlier, Freud's argument at this point would 
seem to accept the role of reason in our cultural progression 
towards a higher level of civilization' (1991: 255). 
4 In fact, Freud's classification ofjoke techniques is very 
comprehensive. He sub-divides the technique of condensation 
into no fewer than eleven specific forms (1991: 76-7). In 
reference to conceptual jokes, he differentiates between 
displacement, faulty reasoning, absurdity, indirect 
representation and representation by the opposite (1991: 87- 
92). Later on, he identifies condensation, displacement and 
indirect representation as 'the most striking'joke techniques 
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(1991: 222). 1 would argue, however, that indirect 
representation is just another form of displacement, as can be 
seen if we turn to Freud's example of a joke produced by the 
technique of indirect representation: This lady represents the 
Venus of Milo in many respects: she, too, is extraordinarily old, 
like her she has no teeth, and there are white and yellowish 
patches on the surface of her body' (1991: 109). While this 
example does not necessarily represent a deviation from a 
conventional train of thought in the way that Freud's examples 
of displacement proper do, it nevertheless represents a 
displacement of conventional standards of beauty. That 
condensation and displacement are the two key psychic 
processes identified by Freud throughout his analysis of the 
unconscious is generally accepted (e. g. see Weber, 1982: 91). 
Indeed, Jacques Lacan uses this distinction to ground his 
identification of metaphor (condensation) and metonymy 
(displacement) as the two key processes of signification in his 
analysis of the relationship between language and the 
unconscious (Lacan, 1977: 160-1). 
5 Neve actually rejects in part Gilman's argument. Gilman's 
mistake, he argues, is to assume that tendentious jokes are 
simply hostile. On the contrary, as we have seen, they also 
provide a yield of pleasure. As a result, Neve argues, Freud's 
preoccupation with Jewish jokes can be seen not simply as a 
distancing of himself from his origins via the scientific discourse 
of psychoanalysis, but, rather as evidence of the multivalence of 
such jokes. They can be hostile, and Freud himself is 
sometimes implicated in such hostility, but the also have a 
more benign potential, and Freud is quite fond of this amusing 
dimension to such jokes (Neve, 39). 
6 Fromm, however, sees psychoanalysis in more favourable terms 
than Voloshinov. 
7 While we have been able to reach certain conclusions about the 
relationship between the Freudian joke and Bakhtinian carnival 
at the level of function, however, it should be pointed out that 
Freud is largely concerned with the joke as a linguistic 
phenomenon. As such, we can identify in his theory a shift 
from Renaissance conceptions of the comic, with their emphasis 
on carnivalesque physicality and extravagance, towards a post- 
Renaissance conception preoccupied with the linguistic forms of 
humour which emerged in the period. In Chapter Two. we 
looked in detail at Purdie and Palmer's accounts of these 
developments (Purdie, 1993: Palmer, 1994: see Chapter Two). 
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Chapter six 
Brecht, theatre and comedy 
in Rabelais and His World, Bakhtin identifies two areas of 
twentieth century art which were keeping alive the tradition of the 
grotesque that had flourished so vividly during the Renaissance. 
The first of these areas was a'modernist form'of the grotesque 
(Bakhtin, 1984: 46), and we have already discussed Alfred Jarry 
and Dada as representatives of this style in Chapter Four. The 
second area was that of 'the realist grotesque' (1984: 46), and here 
Bakhtin cites Bertolt Brecht as one of the key practitionersl. For 
Bakhtin. this version of the grotesque 'is related to the tradition of 
realism and folk culture and reflects at times the direct influence 
of carnival forms... ' (1984: 46). The purpose of this chapter is to 
explore some of Brecht's work in the light of these remarks. The 
first section will focus on the extent to which Brecht himself 
advances a theory of grotesque realism, while the second section 
will discuss the extent to which Brechtlan dramaturgy 
incorporates a theory of comedy. The final section will concentrate 
oil the dynamics of theatre and carnival In order to interrogate the 
- relationship between Bakhtinian and Brechtian theory. Although 
reference will be made to some of Brecht's dramatic texts, the 
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central focus of the chapter will be Brecht's theoretical writings, 
particularly those drawn together in the collection Brecht on 
Theatre (Brecht, 1974). 
Brecht and (grotesque) reaHsm 
Not only did the first part of Brecht's career overlap with the 
period within which we have located the development of 
modernism (see Chapter Four), but Brecht himself explicitly 
engaged with several of the issues which constituted the terrain of 
moderniSM2. His rejection of traditional forms of dramaturgy, 
along with his quest for practices which would facilitate the 
creation of a revolutionary theatre, might both be seen as a 
response to the modernist probldmatique. In an essay written in 
1940, he appears to identify this probldmatique in terms of 'a crisis 
of the emotions', citing the practices of Futurism and Dada, and 
the emotional hyperbole of Fascism, as symptomatic of this critical 
point ., and advancing a valorisation of the rational as a possible 
response to this crisis (Brecht, 1974: 145). Given the proximity 
between Brecht's work and certain modernist preoccupations, 
then, we might feel inclined to situate his work in relation to 
modernism, a task which has certainly been attempted before (e. g. 
Wright, 1989: 68-89). However, in the light of Bakhtin's remarks, I 
want to address Brecht instead in terms of his analysis of realism., 
The key reference point for Brecht's concept of realism is his 
essay The Popular and the Realistic', written in 1938 (Brecht, 
1974: 107-15). Here Brecht advances a dynamic conception of 
realisM, and tries to reveal the crucial connection between realism 
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and the popular. Realism, he argues, lays bare social reality by 
demystifying ruling class ideology, enabling 'truthful 
representations of life' (1974: 107): 
Realist means: laying bare society's causal network/ showing 
up the dominant viewpoint as the viewpoint of the 
dominators/ writing from the standpoint of the class which 
has prepared the broadest solutions for the most pressing 
problems afflicting human society/ emphasizing the 
dynamics of development/ concrete and so as to encourage 
abstraction. (1974: 109) 
In this sense, realism is an essential ingredient in the creation of a 
political theatre. For Brecht, however, the range of techniques 
which might fulfil the objectives outlined above cannot be 
described simply in formal terms, because the ability of a 
particular set of formal techniques to project 'truthful 
representations of life' is historically variable. For example, while 
at one historical moment the conventions of tragedy might seem to 
constitute the most appropriate form for articulating the truth, at 
another moment the conventions of farce might seem more 
effective. In this way, Brecht's conception of realism is both 
pragmatic and historical. It is also inextricably linked to a notion 
of the popular, for the demystificatory potential of realism serves 
the interests of 'the broad working masses' (1974: 107). What is 
more, realism can only fulfil the task assigned to it by Brecht if it 
is likely to be consumed with enthusiasm by the people: realism 
has 'to be suggestive and intelligible to them, i. e. popular' (1974: 
107). As Brecht points out, however, the popularity of particular 
aesthetic forms is itself historically variable: '[w1hat was popular 
yesterday is no longer so today, for the people of yesterday were not 
the people as it is today' (1974: 110). Brecht's conception of the 
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popular is thus, like his conception of realism, both pragmatic and 
historical. 
It should be pointed out here that there is a great deal of 
distance between Brecht's definition of realism and alternative 
definitions. Here, I will contrast Brecht's definition with the 
critique of realism undertaken in the pages of the film journal 
Screen in the 1970s (e. g. MacCabe, 1974 and 1976), and, more 
recently, within the discipline of television studies (e. g. Fiske, 
1987)3. For MacCabe and Fiske, a realist text does not project a 
, truthful representation of life', as it does for Brecht. Rather, the 
realist text'reproduces the dominant sense of reality, as Fiske 
puts it (1987: 21). It achieves this as a result of its formal 
qualities. For Fiske, the realist text'presents itself as an 
unmediated picture of external reality' R 987: 2 1). For MacCabe, 
the formal meta-discourse of realism consists primarily of an 
omniscient narrator, or, in the case of film, a set of filmic codes 
analogous to the function of an omniscient narrator. Ibis meta- 
discourse constructs for the reader a position from which 
everything appears to be transparent, everything appears to make 
sense. As a result, the realist text creates a very comfortable 
reading position, resolving contradictions in the course of the 
narrative, and bestowing on the reader an ability to make sense of 
reality. As MacCabe explains it: 
The simple access to the truth which is guaranteed by the 
meta-discourse depends on a repression of its own 
operations and this repression confers an imaginary unity of 
position on the reader from which the other discourses in 
the film can be read. (MacCabe, 1974; quoted in Fiske, 1987: 35) 
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For MacCabe, then, realism is deflned both in terms of a specific 
set of formal codes, and in terms of the ideological function which 
these codes are deemed to perform. 
I would argue here that Brecht would probably concur with 
MacCabe's critique of these formal codes. From 1926 onwards, 
Brecht gradually developed a theory of epic theatre, a form of 
theatre which, through its cultivation of a detached and 
unemotional form of presentation, was capable of laying bare 
social reality in a critical and didactic manner. He contrasts this 
form of theatre with a theatre of illusion, and his characterisation 
of the latter in a 1949 analysis of Mother Courage incorporates 
much of MacCabe's critique of realism: 
Too much heightening of the illusion in the setting, together 
with a'magnetic'way of acting that gives the spectator the 
illusion of being present at a fleeting, accidental, 'real' event, 
create such an impression of naturalness that one can no 
longer interpose one's judgment, imagination or reactions, 
and must simply conform by sharing in the experience and 
becoming one of 'nature's' objects. (Brecht, 1974: 219) 
In passing itself off as an 'unmediated picture of external reality, in 
this way (Fiske, 1987: 2 1; quoted above), the meta-discourse of 
illusionistic theatre would itself be subject to the critique of 
realism advanced by MacCabe. The important point to emphasise 
here, however, is that the conventions that MacCabe identifies as 
realist do not fall under the rubric of Brechtian realism. Indeed, 
insofar as epic theatre seeks to fulfil the realist imperatives laid 
down by Brecht, it would specifically attempt to foreground Its own 
construction. The illusion created by the theatre must be a 
partial one, ' Brecht claims in his Mother Courage discussion, 'in 
order that it may always be recognized as an illusion' (1974: 219). 
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For MacCabe, on the other hand, realist texts seek to conceal the 
mechanics of their own construction. We are thus dealing with 
two radically different conceptions of realISM4. 
We are now in a position to explore the extent to which 
Brecht's conception of realism might be enlisted as a form of 
grotesque realism, in the way in which Bakhtin suggests. For 
Bakhtin, as we have seen, grotesque realism is a dynamic mode of 
representation that is preoccupied with material imagery and with 
processes of transition. The grotesque body is the primary site on 
which both of these preoccupations are projected. 'Me materiality 
of the grotesque body is epitomised in the graphic physical imagery 
that abounds in the work of Rabelais. Meanwhile, its transitory 
nature derives from its ambivalent signification: the grotesque 
body is always incomplete, blurring the point at which we 
demarcate between different individuals, between humans and 
animals, and between humans and the world around them. For 
Bakhtin, it is as a result of these dynamic, material qualities that 
the grotesque can be put to the service of realism. Bakhtin's 
ernphasis on historicity - an emphasis that can be perceived both 
in his analysis of carnival and in his theory of signification - leads 
to a concomitant understanding of reality not as a fixed state of 
affairs, but as a historically transitory state of affhIrs. Grotesque 
realism lays bare the historically transitory nature of reality, and it 
is precisely as a result of this propensity that it proved such an 
effective tool in blasting apart the static world view of officialdom 
at the time of the Renaissance. As a result, as we have seen, 
jE3akhtin ascribes to Rabelais a pivotal role in furthering 'the 
artistic and ideological expression of a mighty awareness of history 
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and historic change' through his deployment of grotesque realism 
(Bakhtin, 1984: 25). 
There are, I think, three points at which we might identify 
certain affinities between Brechtian realism and Bakhtinian 
grotesque realism. The first point is in their respective rejection of 
a conception of realism as an unmediated form of representation, 
the sort of conception discussed by Fiske and MacCabe. Just as 
Brecht rejected illusionist theatrical techniques in his espousal of 
realism, so Bakhtin's account of grotesque realism directs us, as 
Richard Stain has explained, to 'an anti-illusionistic style which 
remains physical, carnal, and material, which tells social truths, 
but does so in stylized, parodic, and hyperbolic rather than 
naturalistic fonn' (Stam, 1989: 236). For his part, in his essay on 
-Me popular and the Realistic', Brecht specifically entertains the 
possibility that the grotesque might contribute to the fulfilment of 
his realist objectives. 'In the theatre reality can be represented in 
a factual or a fantastic form, ' he argues. -1be actors can do 
without (or with the minimum of) makeup, appearing "natural", 
and the whole thing can be a fake; they can wear grotesque masks 
and represent the truth' (Brecht, 1974: 110). In this sense, then, 
there would appear to be a high degree of proximity between 
Brechtianrealism and Bakhtinian grotesque realism. 
The second point at which we might identify such affinities is 
their respective emphases on achieving a dynamic representation of 
reality. For Bakhtin, it was the ability of grotesque realism to 
project this dynamism that allowed it to contribute to the 
destruction of the static medieval world view. For Brecht, as we 
have seen, realism involves a similar commitment to representing 
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'the dynamics of development' (1974: 109). By representing social 
reality not as a natural given, but as a historically-constituted 
state of affairs, realism can contribute to an understanding on the 
part of the audience that social relations can be transformed 
through social pra. Nis. It is in this sense that realism is endorsed 
by Brecht as a vital component in the creation of a political 
theatre. 
As we have seen, Bakhtin claims that since the Renaissance the 
grotesque has been increasingly marginalised within European 
culture, but that it has been kept alive, and occasionally 
replenished, in the lineage of certain popular traditions. The third 
point at which Brechtian realism and grotesque realism compare 
favourably concerns Brecht's own intermittent appeal to such 
traditions. As we have seen, his definition of the popular includes 
a commitment to retrieve and remotivate popular forms from the 
past. Although Brecht's references to such forms are scattered 
throughout his writings, rather than concentrated in a specific 
text, we can at this point identify three such references of 
relevance to our discussion. The first is a brief essay on 
'Alienation Effects in the Narrative Pictures of the Elder Breughel'. 
written'in the early 1940s but not published until 1957. Although 
Brecht's analysis of Brcughel's paintings in this essay is fairly 
superficial, what does interest Brecht is Breughel's ability to deal 
In contradictions' (1974: 157). Such a comment is of interest not 
only because Bakhtin cites Breughel's paintings as one of the key 
I 
sources of grotesque imagery (Bakhtin, 1984: 27), but because the 
propensity to deal in contradictions is also crucial to Brecht's 
understanding of comedy, a point to which we shall return in the 
256 
next section. The second reference that we might identify is the 
carnival scene in Brecht's play Life of GaliLeo, first performed in 
1943. We shall return to this reference in more detail in the final 
section of the chapter, where it will be argued that the scene 
performs a pivotal role in the play. Finally, the third area to which 
we might turn concerns Brecht's scattered references to various 
popular, comic traditions. Such references are not only important 
in determining a Brechtian conception of comedy, they are also of 
significance in assessing the role of comedy within the project of 
epic theatre. 
In the course of this section. we have both explained Brecht's 
understanding of realism, and sought to determine the grounds on 
which Bakhtin might have enlisted it as a form of grotesque 
realism. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, one aspect of 
Brecht's connection with the traditions of grotesque realism lies in 
the way in which he gestures towards certain forms of comic 
practice. I now want to turn consider the extent to which we 
might identify a theory of comedy in Brecht's writings. 
Brecht and comedy 
To what extent does Brecht's theory of epic theatre incorporate 
a theory of comedy? There are two problems to be faced in 
- addressing this question. Firstly, Brecht's discussion of comic 
practices and techniques is scattered across several essays and 
articles. In the course of this section, then, I will try to piece 
together a Brechtian theory of comedy in relation to these 
scattered fragments. Secondly, his theory of epic theatre was 
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regularly revised and updated5. As John Willett complains in his 
introduction to Brecht on Theatre, 'too often [his] theory is treated 
as if it were a coherent whole' (1974: idii). While Willett's 
assessment is undoubtedly correct, I would argue that Brecht's 
theoretical writings are nevertheless united by a familiar set of 
concerns, an outline of which Brecht provides in the following 
quotation: 
Human behaviour is shown as alterable; man himself as 
dependent on certain political and economic factors and at 
the same time as capable of altering them... In short, the 
spectator is given the chance to"criticize human behaviour 
from a social point of view, and [each] scene is played as a 
piece of history. (1974: 86)6 
This passage provides us with a succinct expression of the 
objectives of epic theatre and, with its emphasis on representing 
reality as a dynamic state of affairs, It is evident that it 
complements Brecht's conception of realism. 
in order to produce a critical attitude on the part of the 
spectator, Brecht argued that epic theatre needed to appeal to the 
faculty of reason rather than to structures of empathy. 'Instead of 
sharing an experience, ' he claims, 'the spectator must come to 
grips with things' (1974: 23). He thus draws a distinction between 
the position of the spectator in illusionistic theatre, which he 
terms 'dramatic theatre', and their respective position in epic 
theatre. This distinction is drawn along the following lines: 
The dramatic theatre's spectator says: Yes, I have felt like 
that too 
- 
Just like me 
- 
It's only natural 
- 
It'll never change 
- 
The sufferings of this man appeal to me, because they are 
inescapable 
- 
That's great art; it all seems the most obvious 
thing in the world 
-I weep when they weep, I laugh when 
theylaugh. 
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The epic theatre's spectator says: I'd never have thought it 
- That's not the way 
- 
That's extraordinary, hardly believable 
- It's got to stop 
- 
The sufferings of this man appal me, 
because they are unnecessary 
- 
That's great art: nothing 
obvious in it 
-I laugh when they weep, I weep when they laugh. 
(1974: 71) 
There are two points to raise in relation to this passage. Firstly, 
for Brecht it is precisely the affective charge of the structures of 
empathy within the dramatic theatre which reinforces the apparent 
naturalness of that which it represents. It is as a result of this 
that any attempt to defamillarise the naturalness of theatrical 
representations must seek to appeal to reason. Secondly, what 
begins to emerge in this passage is the possible structure of 
laughter within epic theatre. It is not a form of laughter that 
derives from an empathetic identification with the characters in 
the fiction, but, rather, a form of laughter that derives from the 
critical distance established between the spectator and the 
characters in the fiction. In examining this form of laughter in 
more detail, I want to explore three areas: the relationship between 
comic practices and epic forms of representation: the targets of 
epic laughter: and the function of Brechtlan comedy. 
a) Comic practices and epic techniques 
if the theatrical representation is to be seen as historical, 
rather than natural, then the audience must be made aware of the 
way in which the representation itself is constructed. Not only' 
does this require that the illusory fourth wall is removed, and the 
sets and lighting laid bare, but that the actors present themselves 
not as characters, but as actors acting the part of characters. 
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Such techniques were designed to produce a VerfremdungseffejcL or 
alienation effect, thus opening up the critical distance which 
allowed the spectator to claim, That's extraordinary, hardly 
believable' (1974: 7 1: quoted above). According to Brecht, this 
alienation effect is 'familiar to us from comedy... certain alienation 
techniques come from the 2,000-year-old arsenal of comedy... ' 
(quoted in McGowan, 1982: 64). There would thus appear to be an 
important connection between comic practices and the techniques 
of epic theatre, and in tracing this connection I want to focus on 
Brecht's remarks concerning the type of acting that epic theatre 
demands. 
How should an actor seek to create an alienation effect? The 
aim is to ensure that the audience 'can no longer have the illusion 
of being the unseen spectator at an event which is really taking 
place' (Brecht, 1974: 92). and we can isolate three aspects of the 
actor's performance in Brecht's remarks. First, the actor needs to 
express his or herawareness of being watched' (1974: 92). This is 
a familiar technique in comic acting. Not only does it play an 
important role in the dynamics of pantomime performance 
('Behind youll but it was also frequently deployed in early film 
comedy. In Laurel and Hardy films, for example, especially the 
silent shorts of the 1920s, Hardy's gaze frequently addresses the 
audience directly, signifying his awareness of the camera. 
The second aspect of the epic actor's performance is his or her 
critical presentation of the character they are portraying, in the 
hope that this will in turn produce a critical response from the 
audience (1974: 136-7). Asnmothy Wiles usefully explains, rather 
than being represented by the actor, 'the character is "re- 
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presented" (made present again, seen as historical and not "always 
present")' CWiles, 1980: 72). In a 1936 essay on 'Alienation Effects 
in Chinese Acting', Brecht praises the ability of Chinese actors to 
achieve this effect, noting that it is an ability that is lacking in 
most western actors, 'apart from one or two comedians' (Brecht, 
1974: 94). In a reference to such techniques made in an interview 
two years earlier, Brecht cites Charlie Chaplin as one such 
comedian: 
The actor doesn't have to 'be' the man he portrays. He has 
to describe his character just as it would be described in a 
book. If Chaplin were to play Napoleon he wouldn't even 
look like him: he would show objectively and critically how 
Napoleon would behave in the various situations the author 
might put him in. In my view the great comedians have 
always been the best character actors. (1974: 68) 
For Brecht, then, the requirement that the epic performer acts 
both with an awareness of the audience, and with a critical 
purchase on the character represented, are familiar features of 
comic performances. 
The third aspect of the epic performance is what Brecht refers to 
-as gestic acting. This consists of displaying gestures which reveal 
to the audience the social context of the character - his or her 
social relationship with other people, the social determinants of 
his or her existence. If the spectator is to adopt a critical attitude 
towards the events represented, then they need to 'be put in a 
position where [they] can make comparisons about everything that 
influences the way in which human beings behave'(1974: 86). If 
this is the case, then the actor has to reveal to the audience these 
behavioural determinants, hence the need for gestic acting. 
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We might identify an example of such techniques in Chaplin's 
1916 film Easy Street. Volunteering as a policeman, Chaplin's 
tramp character sets about dealing with the social unrest gripping 
Easy Street. Having overcome one of the major perpetrators of the 
unrest, Chaplin catches a woman stealing from a shop. Instead of 
apprehending her, however, he is wooed by her story of poverty- 
stricken woe, signified by his bursting into tears. As a result, he 
happily adds to her pile of stolen goods, whereupon she physically 
collapses under its weight. The woman's collapse qualifies as a 
form of Brechtian social gest because of the way in which it 
acquires a social signification: it represents the woman collapsing 
under the weight of her poverty-inflicted troubles, and this signals 
to the audience the reason for her turn to theft. 
One of the areas to which Brecht refers in formulating his 
notion of the gest is cabaret. Discussing the ability of certain 
types of song to perform a gestic function, Brecht claims that 
'[slo-called "cheap" music, particularly that of the cabaret and the 
opere, 411a, has for sometime been a sort of gestic music' (1974: 87). 
Frederic Ewen has suggested Karl Valentin. the Munich cabaret 
performer for whom Brecht had a great admiration, as a possible 
model here (Ewen, 1970: 65). Cabaret combined music and 
particular forms of comic performance, especially political satire. 
Devoid of the fourth wall, it facilitated the creation of an intimate 
#smokers' theatre' (Brecht, 1974: 8), allowing for a certain critical 
detachment on the part of the audience. As such, Brechtian 
theory probably owes much to forms of cabaret theatre, as both 
Lisa Appignanesi and John Willett have argued (Appignanest, 1984: 
13o, Willett, 1967: 87-8). While cabaret cannot be wholly 
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subsumed within the concept of comedy, the fact that cabaret 
theatre did essentially foster humour as a means of social critique 
and mockery suggests it as an important reference point not only 
for Brecht's concept of the gest, but also for a Brechtian theory of 
comedy. In a number of ways, then, comic practices provided an 
important resource for Brecht's theorisation of the techniques of 
epic acting. 
b) Targets and function of epic laughter 
, 
The remaining two areas that I want to explore here are the 
targets of epic laughter and the function of Brechtian comedy, and 
I will look at them in tandem. Two important references for such a 
discussion are M. McGowan's article 'Comedy and the Volksstucle 
(McGowan, 1982), and the third chapter of Elizabeth Wright's book 
Postmodern Brecht: A Re-Presentation (Wright, 1989). For 
McGowan, the targets of epic laughter are the comic qualities of 
the social events and arrangements depicted on stage: their 
contradictory nature, for example. As McGowan explains, the 
function of laughter in such instances is closely related to the 
alienation effect, because comedy'can be used to encourage critical 
distance and reflection in the audience' (McGowan, 1982: 64). 
McGowan characterises such processes in relation to what William 
H azlitt, the eighteenth-century writer and philosopher, defined as 
the essence of humour, 'the incongruous'. that gap between 'what 
things are and what they ought to be' (1982: 64). In other words, 
it is possible that the alienation effects of comedy might prompt 
the spectator to reflect on the gap between how things are on the 
r 
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stage and how they ought to be, were it not for the various 
contradictions that the performance discloses. From here it is 
possible that the spectator might reflect on the gap between how 
things are and things ought to be in the world beyond the theatre. 
in this way, McGowan identifies a prominent role for comedy 
within Brechtian dramaturgy. 
Wright draws similar conclusions in her analysis of Brecht's 
theory of comedy. The targets- of Brechtian laughter, she argues, 
are the ridiculous or anachronistic features of the historical 
situation portrayed on the stage. In this way, Brechtian laughter 
derives from 'the amusement of an audience which is learning to 
perceive its historical advantage' (Wright, 1989: 50). Wright agrees 
with McGowan, then, that Brechtian laughter enjoys an important 
connection with the critical, historicising objectives of epic 
theatre. What is more, Wright argues, Brecht identifies the comic 
not as a universally stable quality, but as a historically variable 
quality that will be perceived in particular historical situations by 
particular, historically-situated spectators (1989: 50). Such a 
conception not only complements Brecht's theorisation of realism 
and the popular as historical categories, it also complements 
Bakhtin's account of the carnivalesque as a historical category. 
Wright's analysis of the function which Brecht assigns to 
comedy draws on Freud's theory ofJokes. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, Freud's model explains the pleasure that a joke 
produces in terms of the psychic economy that It affords us. This 
saving in psychic energy is then discharged as laughter. For 
Brecht, Wright argues, the objective of comic techniques is to 
enable the spectator, on leaving the theatre, to channel this energy 
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into addressing the social contradictions which are the ob ect of 
their mirth. The purpose of Brechtian comedy, in other words, is 
to leave 'the reader/audience with contradictions and the task of 
the resolution of them in life's pra3ds' (1989: 62), a formulation 
which accords closely with that of McGowan. In ascribing to 
comedy this socially-transformative function, Wright concludes, 
Brecht presents us with a radical departure from traditional 
theories of comedy which tend to emphasise its conservative 
function (1989: 62). 
Brecht would thus seem to propose a dialectical theory of 
comedy. While 'bourgeois theatre' aims 'at smoothing over 
contradictions, at creating false harmony', the object of Brechtian 
laughter is 'the joke of contradiction' (Brecht, 1974: 277). Terry 
Eagleton has argued not only that historical contradiction is the 
key to a Brechtian notion of comedy, but that there is actually a 
strong comic undertone to the dialectical view of history. There is, 
after all, 'something darkly comic about the fact that the 
bourgeoisie are their own grave-diggers' (Eagleton, 1981: 16 1). In a 
similar vein, Brecht himself remarked that he 'never found anybody 
without a sense of humour who could understand dialectics' 
(quoted in Willett, 1967: 85). The crucial point about Brecht's 
dialectical view of comedy, however, is that the joke of 
contradiction is not resolved in the theatre, but in the spectators' 
social prwds beyond the theatre. Some notes by Brecht on 77w 
Threepenny Opera, written in 1937, pick up on this very point, in a 
reference to the 'Ballad of Immoral Earnings'. Sung jointly by 
Jenny and Mac the Knife, the ballad tells of life in the 
whorehouse. The ballad's third verse deals in a fairly light-hearted 
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fashion with Jenny's pregnancy; with the resulting adjustments 
made to their copulatory positions; and with the baby's eventual 
abortion. Brecht comments: 
This is where those Macheaths who seem least inhibited 
from portraying his death agony commonly baulk at singing 
the third verse. They would obviously not reject the sexual 
theme if a tragedy had been made of it. But in our day and 
age sexual themes undoubtedly belong in the realm of 
comedy; for sex life and social life conflict, and the resulting 
contradiction is comic because it can only be resolved 
historically, i. e. under a different social order. So the actor 
must be able to put across a ballad like this in a comic way. (Brecht, 1979: 94) 
'Ihis passage foregrounds the extent to which. if social 
contradictions are represented on the stage as comic, then the 
dialectical resolution of those contradictions can only be achieved 
through a transformation of the social relations that gave rise to 
them in the first place. Insofar as epic theatre itself aims at 
furthering the possibility of such transformations. 
- 
at inciting the 
spectator to claim, 'That's extraordinary, hardly believable - It's got 
to stop' 
- 
then Brecht's dialectical theory of comedy can be seen to 
occupy a prominent position within his overall dramaturgy. 
Assessment 
,I want to return to Chaplin's Easy Street at this point in order 
to consider the applicability of Brecht's theory of comedy. The film 
begins with Chaplin in a mission chapel, where he is encouraged 
by a female mission-worker to turn to religion as a means beyond 
his destitution. Ironically, Easy Street itself is a very violent 
street, plagued by a gang of thugs, including one Particular bully. 
Chaplin decides to join the police force, and gradually manages 
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both to clean up the neighbourhood single-handedly. and to win 
the hand of the mission-worker. 
If we were to interpret this text in the light of Brecht's theory of 
, 
comedy, then it is probably appropriate to begin by turning to the 
ironies of the film's resolution. Easy Streefs narrative is circular, 
in that it begins and ends with the mission. Between the 
beginning and the end, however, there is a resolution to the social 
problems depicted: the street violence is eradicated; Easy Street's 
inhabitants are pacified; and the mission moves into the 
neighbourhood: the church and the police have successfully 
instilled peace, law and order. The inhabitants might still be 
poverty-stricken, but at least they now happily coeýdst. 
Given that the text itself resolves the social conflict with which 
it deals, we might question the extent to which Brecht's comic 
theory is of relevance here. I would argue, however, that it is 
applicable insofar as the narrative route to this outcome Is riddled 
with ironic contradiction. Not only are the police themselves a 
parody of the incompetence of the Keystone Kops, but their newly- 
found hero, the Chaplin character, who accepts religion in the first 
scene and has prompted the whole street to accept it by the final 
scene, is physically empowered to overcome the violence and pacify 
the inhabitants only by a shot of narcotics from a syringe, itself a 
symbol of urban deprivation. He thus paves the way for the 
religion of the New Mission to be brought to Easy Street. Religion, 
'the opium of the people', in Marx's famous epigram (Marx, 197 1: 
115), is thus established thanks to a shot of opiate. Hence Gerald 
Mast's comment that, if a solution is provided in Easy Street, 'it 
deliberately shows the ridiculousness of expecting easy solutions' 
267 
(Mast, 1973: 23). Further, the consistent implausibility of the 
film's slapstick components 
- 
the fight scenes, for example, 
culminating in Chaplin's superhuman efforts at the end of the 
film, the chase scenes, which obviously rely on the spltt-second 
timing of the actors: Chaplin's comic cadenzas, which make 
conspicuous the workings of the narrative 
- 
each may prompt us to 
reflect on the plausibility of the narrative resolution. For all that 
Easy Street offers a resolution to social conflict, the very prospect 
that such a resolution should emerge itself seems contradictory. 
Given that this is the case, it seems possible that such irony might 
prompt the spectator to reflect on the gap between how things are 
in the film (narrative resolution: the cleaning-up of Easy Street 
an .d the merry co-existence of its inhabitants), and how they ought 
to be (continued violence and poverty), were it not for the 
implausibilities provided by the comic aspects of the film. From 
here, it is possible that the spectator might reflect on the gap 
between how things are, and how things ought to be, beyond the 
1 1. film, the arena within which the Brechtian dialectic is resolved. In 
this way, I would argue that Easy Street can be related to a 
Brechtian view of comedy. 
For all that a Brechtian theory of comedy might have a certain 
applicability, however, we do need to consider its possible 
shortcomings. The most obvious problem is its preoccupation with 
the effects of comic techniques: Brecht is interested not so much 
in what comedy is, but in what it does. This is problematic 
because the task of ascertaining the effects that a particular text 
or performance might actually produce is such an inexact science. 
In the field of comedy, this inexactitude is partcularly acute. As 
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Jerry Palmer reminds us, humour is necessarily ambivalent. 
Consequently, while the act of levity might enjoy a certain political 
potential, we cannot determine the actual efficacy of particular 
comic texts without recourse to an empirical study of the specific 
conditions of their performance and/or consumption. As we have 
seen, Palmer is not arguing merely that the meaning of comic texts 
is ultimately context bound (an argument that we could probably 
apply to any sort of text), but that the meaning of a comic text in 
any particular situation is especially precarious, given the 
ambiguity of the logic of the absurd (Palmer, 1987). 
We might respond by arguing that comic techniques are 
particularly well-suited to the objectives of Brechtian theatre, 
because the implausibility and lack of verisimilitude to which they 
are committed makes them especially effective in questioning the 
#naturalness' of dominant ideological constructions. However, it 
seems clear that comic practices are just as capable of assisting in 
the shoring up of such constructions as in undermining them. it 
is possible, for example, that Irish jokes might contribute to the 
widespread belief that Irish people are 'naturally' stupid. Further, 
it is possible that a comic text which displays the sort of features 
demanded by Brecht will fail to produce the sort of effect he 
desires. As Gerald Mast has Pointed out, for example, rather than 
responding to the epic foregrounding of artifice by reflecting on the 
social causes of what we see, 'that reflection might just as well 
probe the artist's emphasis on the artificial' (Mast, 1973: 15). 
If Mast and Palmer are correct, then we need to qualify our 
reading of Easy Street as merely one possible reading. We can 
certainly justify the claim that the film's narrative is littered with 
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ironic contradictions. However, short of an ethnographic analysis 
of the real effects of the text on those watching it, the question as 
to whether or not these moments will be read as ironic 
contradictions, or whether or not they might generate the desire in 
the audience to resolve such contradictions in their social praxis, 
moves us into the territory of conjecture. Such problems have 
been addressed in an article by John 0. Thompson, who rejects the 
claim that we can identify the specific effects that an individual 
text might produce at a particular moment, even by undertaking 
ethnographic analysis. As he points out, not only is the notion 
that an individual text might be able to incite 'a meaningful 
political act' entirely unrealistic ('what sort of meaningful political 
-I 
act would one have any business undertaking purely on the basis 
of having just seen The Caucasian Chalk Circle 
.. 
7) (Thompson, 
1993: 293), but so too is the idea that individual texts actually 
operate as individual texts on their audience. '[01n the political 
lever, he says, 'texts can only operate in aggregate, and as elements 
of culturalformations ofgreat heterogeneity (1993: 294). He 
concl udes his argument thus: 
Once we shift our attention from individual texts to groups 
of texts, and from how texts resemble one another to how 
they differ, the bringing into existence or promoting of the 
Perfectly Progressive Text ceases to look either possible or 
desirable. Instead, relations of juxtaposition and dominance 
within the textual aggregate become politically pertinent. 
Which texts/genres/media are given precedence over others, 
within 'common sense', at a given moment? What troubling 
of that consensus can be achieved by promoting a despised 
or ignored text, of challenging an admired or widely- 
promoted one? Can troubling that consensus in a given 
instance really be articulated with other, more politically 
central struggles? (1993: 298) 
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,ý In the light of 'Ibompson's critique, we might conclude that 
Brecht's theory of comedy faces problems. In his espousal of a 
dialectical comic effect, Brecht would seem to overstate the 
manner in which an individual text might operate on the audience. 
In grounding a theory of political theatre on the supposed 
potential of techniques of this sort, then, Brechtian theory would 
seem to pay inadequate attention to the manner in which 
particular textual practices relate to the overall textual aggregate. 
In Brecht's defence, however, we might argue that, in adopting a 
historically pragmatic approach to the categories of realism, the 
popular and the comic, he was actually in a position to tackle the 
very issues raised by Thompson. What concerned Brecht, in other 
words, was precisely the ability to stage a production which would 
most trouble the consensus at a particular moment. Such an 
objective necessarily involved an institutional analysis of the 
status of theatre (and its relationship with other media) at that 
conjuncture. Writing about epic theatre in 1927, for example, 
Brecht claims: 'It is not the play's effect on the audience but its 
effect on the theatre that is decisive at this moment' (Brecht, 1974: 
22). While Brecht's theorisation of epic theatre at times might 
sound like a manifesto for the Perfectly Progressive Text, it is clear 
from the way in which he addresses a range of issues that he was 
equally concerned with developing a strategy that was pragmatic, 
institutionally sensitive and historically flexible. In many ways, 
then, we could begin to respond from a Brechtian perspective to 
the problems raised by Thompson. 
,-, If this is the case, then it would be inappropriate to reject 
Brecht's theory of comedy on the grounds that it seemed to be of 
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little relevance to the field of comic performance today. Rather, 
what is of interest in Brechtian theory, as has been argued in this 
section, is the way in which comedy was assigned such a 
prominent role within the project of epic theatre. Given this 
prominence, it is no surprise that Brecht was identified by Bakhtin 
as one of those helping to sustain the carnivalesque tradition. 
With this in mind, I want to return in the final section to a 
comparative analysis of Brecht and Bakhtin, and their respective 
positions on theatre, comedy and carnival. 
Brecht and Bakhtin 
One of the problems with Bakhtin's positive appraisal of Brecht 
in Rabelais and His World is that elsewhere he tends to advance a 
negative assessment of dramatic representation. I will begin this 
section by examining Bakhtin's approach to the theatre, before 
turning to an analysis of the relationship between the BakhUntan 
carnivalesque and Brechtian comedy. 
a) Bakhtin on theatre 
ý, As we have seen in chapter one, Bakhtin identifies the novel as 
the primary site on which dialogic discourse might flourish. 
Insofar as the novel enables a polyphonic orchestration of 
I contending speech types, so it exposes the heteroglottic nature of 
social reality. In contrast, the realm of authority has favoured 
monologic forms of discourse which, by obscuring the reality of 
heteroglottic conditions, have enabled it to underscore its own 
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position of power. For Bakhtin, dramatic discourse lends itself to 
these monologic forms of representation. In'Discourse in the 
Novel', for example, Bakhtin makes the following claim: 
Pure drama strives toward a unitary language, one that is 
individualized merely through dramatic personae who speak 
it. Dramatic dialogue is determined by a collision between 
individuals who exist within the limits of a single world and 
a single unitary language. (Bakhtin, 1981: 405) 
While novelistic discourse is capable of reaching'deep down into 
the internal dialogic essence of language itself (1981: 405), 
dramatic discourse represents dialogue within a monologic 
context, a contexfdevoid of the clash of ideologies and social 
accents which pervades real, heteroglottic conditions. As a result, 
Bakhtin concludes, dramatic discourse contributes to centralising 
social forces. He thus projects a negative assessment of dramatic 
discourse as the antithesis of novelistic discourse. 
That Bakhtin should have reached such a dismal conclusion 
concerning the possibilities available within the theatre seems 
unfortunate, especially as there would seem to be no a priori 
reason why dramatic forms of representation should not be every 
bit as effective in projecting dialogic relationships as novelistic 
forms of representation. Indeed, Bakhtin somewhat undoes his 
negative assessment in a series of more positive appraisals of 
dramatic forms. InTrorn the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse, 
for example, he cites the satyr play as a precursor to novelistic 
discourse. Performed at the Attic Dionysian festival, the satyr play 
would follow on the heels of three tragic performances, where it 
would enact a dialogic parody of tragic discourse (1981: 53-4). In a 
sirnilar vein, Rabelais and His World is peppered with references to 
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Shakespeare as one of the standard-bearers of the carnivalesque 
tradition. Further, Bakhtin's account of dramatic discourse in 
'Discourse in the Novel' (quoted above) itself receives two 
-I qualifications. 
First, he accepts that comedy is ItIo a certain 
extent... an exception' to his negative assessment. Second, he 
adds in a footnote that this assessment is strictly directed at 'pure 
classical drama, rather then '[clontemporary realistic social drama 
[which] may, of course, be heteroglot and multi-languaged' (198 1: 
405). As Graham Pechey has argued, Brecht is 'almost certainly 
one of the unnamed names' in this 'qualifying footnote' (Pechey, 
1989: 58). For all that Bakhtin portrays dramatic discourse as a 
monologic form of representation, then, he is not entirely 
consistent on this point. 
Given these inconsistencies, several commentators have sought 
I- 
to develop a more positive appraisal of dramatic discourse from a 
Bakhtinian perspective. Michael Bristol, for example, has noted 
how paradoxical it is that Bakhtin identifies the novel, rather than 
dr ama, as the 'exemplary genre in which heteroglossia and 
carnivalization are most powerfully manifested' (Bristol, 1985: 24). 
Bristol suggests that the Renaissance theatre made for even more 
of a heteroglottic experience than the novel. A public gathering 
place, which itself brought together 'a diversity of social speech 
types' (Bakhtin, 1981: 262), it offered a privileged site for'the 
celebration and critique of the needs and concerns of the Polis' 
(1985: 3). Maria Shevtsova has gone one step further, arguing 
that, with its emphasis on the utterance as a socially inscribed 
act, a Bakhtinian theory of discourse provides an ideal model with 
which to analyse theatre in the context of performance. Such a 
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model not only opens up an analysis of the dialogic relationship 
between the characters on the stage, but also of the dialogic 
relationship between the dramatic utterance and the audience 
(Shevtsova, 1989). Finally, Graham Pechey has explored the 
relationship between Brecht and Bakhtin in examining the latter's 
negative approach to theatre. Pechey arrives at three conclusions. 
First, he argues, insofar as Brechtian epic theatre aims to reveal 
the various social and historical determinants of human 
behaviour, it has a strong dialogic imperative itself (Pechey, 1989: 
59). The social gest, for example, attempts to represent an action 
not as an isolated fragment of behaviour, but as a gesture that is 
necessarily inscribed in a dialogic context, a context within which 
the social forces operating upon the character and to which the 
character responds are made apparent. Second, Pechey continues, 
insofar as epic theatre draws upon this dialogic impulse, so it taps 
into the very traditions of novelistic discourse, of parody and the 
carnivalesque, which Bakhtin is. so keen to valorise (1989: 60). In 
our earlier discussion of grotesque realism, we have already 
identified some of Brecht's own references to these traditions. 
Thirdly, Pechey echoes Shevtsova's suggestion that, as a result of 
its perfon-native aspect, the theatre is perfectly suited to an 
analysis grounded upon Bakhtin's concept of the dialogic. And at 
I 
the moments when this performative aspect is specifically 
foregrounded, such as in Renaissance tragedy, Pechey argues that 
a Bakhtinian approach would seem particularly appropriate (1989: 
61). Contrary to Bakhtin's initial evaluation of dramatic 
discourse, then, his own theoretical framework would actually 
appear to lend itself both to an analysis of theatrical practices, 
and to a more positive appraisal of them. 
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b) Carnival and Brechtian comedy 
Having negotiated the problems surrounding Bakhtin's 
treatment of dramatic discourse, we are now in a position to 
consider the extent to which Brecht's theory of comedy might 
reaffirm a Bakhtinian notion of carnival. In his book on Walter 
Benjamin, Terry Eagleton argues that Brecht's theory of comedy 
subsumes Bakhtin's notion of the carnivalesque. Defining 
Brechtian comedy in terms of the irony of historical contradiction, 
Eagleton argues that this definition also embraces the structure of 
carnival: 
The riot of carnival, the imprudence of inversion, the 
crackling of iconoclasm: these for historical materialism are 
moments within, not alternatives to, that deeper comedy 
which is the joke of contradiction and its pleasurable 
release. (Eagleton, 1981: 170) 
For Eagleton, carnival represents 'a temporary retextualizing of the 
social formation that exposes its "fictive" foundations' (1981: 149). 
The carnivalesque reorganisation of social relations has the ability 
to foreground the contradictions within, and the historical nature 
of, current social arrangements. As a result, its potential as a 
form of comic alienation effect becomes apparent, which makes 
Eagleton's contention that carnival is a species of Brechtian 
comedy seem plausible. 
However, I think that Eagleton's argument faces two problems, 
the first of which concerns the relationship between the dynamics 
of carnival and the dynamics of epic theatre, the context within 
which Brecht formulates his theory of comedy. For Bakhtin, one 
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of the essential features of carnival is that it 'is a pageant without 
a stage and without a division into performers and spectators' 
(Bakhtin, 1973: 100). As such, Bakhtin draws a sharp contrast 
between the structure of carnival and the structure of theatre. 
'Footlights would destroy a carnival', he claims, 'as the absence of 
footlights would destroy a theatrical performance' (Bakhtin. 1984: 
7). In many ways, Brechtian dramaturgy eschews the deployment 
of footlights, since a deliberate attempt is made to demolish the 
'fourth wall' between performer and spectator (Brecht, 1974: 91). it 
is required of the actors, for example, that they express their 
'awareness of being watched' (1974: 92), and Brecht's approving 
references to the dynamics of cabaret performance add additional 
emphasis to this demand. However, in another sense, as Robert 
Cunliffe has perceptively pointed out, in attempting to foster a 
critical detachment between the audience and the events on the 
stage, Brechtian epic theatre simultaneously relies upon the 
maintenance of footlights (Cunliffe, 1993: 61). This ambivalence 
towards footlights also extends to Brecht's theory of comedy. At 
one level, his conception of comedy incorporates a commitment to 
the elimination of footlights, achieved through the deployment of 
anti-illusionistic comic practices. However, in appealing to a form 
of laughter that is derived from a detached assessment of comic 
contradictions, so at another level his theory of comedy involves 
the retainment of footlights. Given that this is the case, the 
Complete subsumption of Bakhtin's notion of carnival within 
Brecht's theory of comedy would seem less feasible. 
The second problem with Eagleton's argument concerns the 
silnilarity between the form of pleasure which Brecht's account of 
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comedy envisages, and the sort of pleasures identified by Bakhtin 
in his analysis of carnival. Here, I want to turn to Terry Lovell's 
discussion of Brecht's treatment of pleasure (Lovell, 1983). As 
Lovell argues, Brecht tends to view pleasure as something'to serve 
I-earning rather than [something] to be valued in its own right' 
(1983: 94)7. Insofar as epic theatre is didactic, it seeks to harness 
pleasure as a means to that end, seeking to foster what Brecht 
terms 'pleasurable learning, cheerful and militant learning' 
(Brecht, 1974: 73). For Lovell, the problem here is that, in 
assuming that the only valuable forms of pleasure are those which 
accompany the development of a critical understanding of society, 
Brecht tends to overlook other forms of pleasure which might 
themselves possess a progressive or revolutionary potential: 
social pleasures. The pleasure of a text may be grounded in 
pleasures of an essentially public and social kind. For 
instance, pleasures of common experiences identifled and 
celebrated in art, and through this celebration, given 
recognition and validation-, pleasures of solidarity to which 
this sharing may give rise: pleasure In shared and socially 
defined aspirations and hopes: in a sense of identity and 
community. (Lovell, 1983: 95) 
. 
Lovell is aware that such pleasures might be fostered for 
reactionary purposes, but her argument does suggest another area 
where we might differentiate between Brechtian comedy and 
Bakhtinian carnival. The common, social pleasures to which 
Lovell refers are very much inscribed within the dynamics of 
carnival. For Bakhtin, the dissolution of footlights and 
suspension of hierarchy served to unite the participants in the 
carnival as one, affirming the collective power of the people. In 
contrast, Brecht's theory of comedy would appear to have little to 
say about the utopian pleasures of popular celebraL! orL. 
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. 
We might respond to Lovell's argument at this point by looking 
briefly at Brecht's conception of the Lehrstftck, or learning-play. 
Brecht wrote nine Lehrstftcke between 1929 and 19308 and, as 
Willett suggests, the principle underlying them 'was the notion 
that moral and political lessons could best be taught by 
participation in actual performance' (Brecht. 1974: 33, my 
emphasis). As a result, the Lehrstacke were written primarily for 
amateur performers (1974: 152). In the context of Lovell's 
argument concerning Brecht's neglect of collective forms of 
pleasure, Elizabeth Wright's characterisation of the Lehrtheater is 
illuminating. For Wright, the Lehrtheater 
presupposes the existence of a socialist state and is thus a 
'model' for a radically different theatre of the future, where 
the distinction between actor and spectator is entirely wiped 
out. The actors, all amateurs of one kind or another, occupy 
a double role of observing ('spectating') and acting, working 
and re-working a communal set text, which is perpetually 
alterable, the object being to turn art into a social practice, 
an experiment in socially productive behaviour. (Wright, 1989: 24) 
In this sense, the Brechtian Lehrtheater perhaps provides a space 
where the forms of pleasure identified by Lovell might be shared. 
What is more, with its abolition of footlights and its emphasis 
upon collective endeavour, the Lehrtheater would seem to construct 
a rnodel of social relations that is more or less equivalent to the 
rnodel which obtains during carnival. 
- 
if the Lehrtheater did gesture towards the social pleasures of the 
sort available during carnival, however, it is clear that such 
pleasures remained subordinate to the didactic objectives of the 
L. ehrstdcke. The performers in a Lehrsffick, Brecht reminds us, 
-rnust act like pupils' (Brecht, 1974: 33). As such, the Lehrtheater 
would seem to lack the celebratory potential that Bakhtin 
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identifies in carnival. Moreover, since Brecht's conception of 
comedy would seem to rest upon the construction of a critical 
distance between spectator and performer, a distance abolished in 
the Lehrtheater, it is unclear exactly how such a conception of 
comedy might figure in the Lehrstdcke, if at all. As a result, even if 
we were to enlist the Lehrtheater as a vehicle for the social 
pleasures identified by Lovell, there would still seem to be some 
important differences between Brecht and Bakhtin's respective 
approaches to the subject. While Eagleton is correct to note the 
proximity between Brechtian comedy and Bakhtinian carnival on 
the basis of their shared propensity for demystificatory social 
critique, then, we also need to register the points at which they are 
at variance with one another. 
The final point on which I want to focus concerns Brecht's own 
representation of carnival in his play Life of Galileo (Brecht, 1986). 
Written initially in 1938, the play was first performed in 1943, 
before being revised by Brecht and Charles Laughton in 1944-45. 
Apart from the obvious historical proximity between Life of Galileo 
and Bakhtin's Rabelais and His World, which was submitted as a 
thesis in 1940, there are several significant points of contact 
between the two texts, including their positive assessment of 
carnival. Firstly, just as Bakhtin was concerned with the way in 
which Rabelais broached the popular realms of the marketplace, 
the body and the grotesque, so Brecht is keen to establish Galileo 
as a figure in touch with the culture of the people. Galileo is 
represented as a man who values the PhYsical pleasures of food 
and drink: 'I value the consolations of the flesh' (1986: 76). What 
is more, in entertaining the possibility of the vernacular as a 
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vehicle for increasing the accessibility of his ideas, Galileo reveals 
his allegiance to those who produce wealth rather than those who 
control it: 
I might write in the language of the people, for the many, 
rather than in Latin for the few. Our new thoughts call for 
people who work with their hands. Who else cares about 
knowing the causes of things? People who only see bread on 
their table don't want to know how it got baked; that lot 
would sooner thank God than the baker. (1986: 80-1) 
If, as Dominick LaCapra has suggested, Rabelais and His World 
represents Bakhtin's attempt 'to make Rabelais a man of the 
people' (LaCapra, 1983: 322), then Life of Galileo similarly 
dramatises Galileo's potential as a man of the people. 
The second point concerns the similarity between Brecht's 
dramatisation of Galileo's life and Bakhtin's analysis of Rabelais. 
As we have seen, for Bakhtin, Rabelais' deployment of grotesque 
imagery, with its emphasis on dynamic, historical transformation, 
contributed to the destruction of the static world view of the 
Middle Ages. Brecht situates Galileo within a similar process, 
focusing on the conflict between the powers of the church and 
Galilean astronomy. For him, Galileo's ideas had revolutionary 
p otential because of their ability to challenge the static, earth- 
centred credo which underscored the power of the church. Not 
only did Galilean astronomy propose a new, dynamic model of the 
universe, but in so doing it lent itself to the construction of a new. 
dynamic model of human history: 'everything is in motion, ' as 
Galileo claims (1986: 6). 
in draxnatising this conflict between Galileo and the church, 
the text invites the audience to adopt the position of the epic 
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spectator. The choice that faces Galileo is whether to risk death, 
and unleash the full force of his revolutionary ideas on the world, 
or to suppress his ideas in order to minimise his persecution. In 
spite of Vanni's request that Galileo take the first course of action, 
in the knowledge that the progressive middle classes of the north 
would support him in any struggle against the church (1986: 87), 
Galileo chooses the alternative path, and lives as a prisoner of the 
Inquisition until his death. In spite of his imprisonment, he 
manages to smuggle out a copy of his 'Discorsi' before he dies. 'Me 
spectator is thus invited to assess the validity of Galileo's choice 
in the light of the historical circumstances which emerge in the 
course of the play. For Brecht, in passing over the opportunity to 
ma. ýdmise the revolutionary impact of his ideas, Galileo was 
mistaken. He says of Charles Laughton's portrayal of this 
moment: 'Laughton showed Galileo in a state of great inner 
agitation during his talk with [Vanni]... He played it as a moment 
of decision - the wrong one' (1986: xxix). In representing Galileo's 
decision as mistaken, the performance would have foregrounded 
the historical contingency of decisions of this sort. That the more 
revolutionary course of action was eventually overlooked is an 
issue that Brecht leaves the audience to address in their own 
social prwds. In this way, the play appeals to an epic conception 
of spectatorship. 
The third point of contact between Bakhtin's Rabelais and 
13recht's Galileo concerns the latter's carnival scene, a scene which 
crystallises the revolutionary potential of Galileo's ideas, and 
hence the gravity of the decision which faces him. The scene is set 
arnongst a masked crowd who are waiting for the carnival 
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procession to arrive. Two ballad singers present a song about 
Galilean astronomy, a song which emphasises the way in which, in 
inverting the ontological doctrines of the church, it paved the way 
for an inversion of social relations: 
Up stood the learned Galilei... 
And told the sun'Stop there. 
From now the whole creatio dei 
Will turn as I think fair: 
The boss starts turning from today 
His servants stand and stare'. 
Now that's no joke, my friends, it is no matter small. 
Each servants' insolence increases 
But one thing's true, pleasures are few. I ask you all: 
Who wouldn't like to say and do just as he pleases?... 
The serf sitting on his arse. 
This turning's turned his head. 
The altar boy won't serve the mass 
The apprentice lies in bed. (1986: 83) 
When the procession arrives, it carries effigies ridiculing the 
Grand-Duke of Florence and the senior figures of the church. and 
a large puppet lionising Galileo as'the bible-buster'(1986: 85). In 
this way, as Brecht explains, the scene represents the people 
Telating Galileo's revolutionary doctrine to their own revolutionary 
demands' (1986: 124). 
Brecht's representation of carnival has much in common with 
Bakhtin's analysis of it. Carnival is shomm to be a locus of 
popular discontent, social critique and collective laughter. In 
appropriating Galileo's ideas for themselves, the people are 
revealed to have a certain autonomy. Popular cultural practices, 
such as carnival, are assigned a rebellious potential. Mils is not to 
assume that Brecht envisages carnival as a phenomenon that Is 
rjecessarily transgressive. Indeed, the text would seem to 
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foreground the historical circumstances which provided the 
carnival with such potential at that specific moment. What is 
more, as Richard Sheppard has argued, we need to contrast the 
euphoria of the carnival scene with the suggestion in Scene 14 
that it is Galileo's own 'carnivalesque ethos' which contributes to 
his eventual betrayal of the scientific community (Sheppard, 1990: 
308). Such a conception is consistent with Bakhtin's own 
emphasis on the transitory significance of carnivalesque practices. 
, 
The carnival scene occupies a pivotal point in the play, for it is 
here that the revolutionary potential of Galileo's ideas is fully 
revealed. In the-following scene, after he has turned down Vanni's 
offer of support, it is disclosed that Galileo had sought to condemn 
the carnival proceedings (1986: 88). That Galileo should distance 
himself from the people in this way underscores the sense that his 
eventual decision is the wrong one. The carnival thus marks a 
crucial turning point in the play, an interpretation which Brecht 
supports in his discussion of Laughton's Galileo. There, Brecht 
explains the way in which the costume design of the production 
was executed to reflect the carnival scene's pivotal position. For 
Brecht, 'the entire sequence of scenes had to have its development 
in terms of colour' (Brecht, 1974: 167). Beginning with delicate 
-C olours in the opening scenes, the costumes gradually became 
stronger, before being'fully unleashed'in the carnival scene as a 
riot of colour (1974: 167). From that point on, the performance 
registered a 'descent into dull and sombre colours', further 
underlining the gravity of Galileo's decision (1974: 167). In making 
the carnival so central to the dramatisation of Galileo's life, then, 
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Brecht echoes Bakhtin's deployment of carnival as the key 
interpretative tool with which to dissect Rabelais. 
Conclusion 
There are thus several significant points of contact between Life 
of Galileo and Rabelais and His World. But what is most important 
for our purposes is the extent to which Life of Galileo constructs an 
image of carnival not as a marginalised anachronism, but as a 
vital, rebellious vehicle with the potential to catalyse social 
transformation. While we have identified certain differences 
between Brecht's theory of comedy and Bakhtin's theory of carnival 
in the course of this section, we have argued that Life of Galileo 
represents a vision of carnival which is suitably Bakhtinian. In 
putting carnival centre stage in this way, Bakhtin's estimation of 
Brecht as a guardian of the grotesque would seem to have a certain 
potency. 
N919-11, 
I Bakhtin also cites Thomas Mann and Pablo Neruda as members 
of this group (1984: 46). 
2 The best example of Brecht's intervention in the various debates 
related to modernism are included in Aesthetics and Politics (Bloch et al., 1980). 
31 do not want to imply here that MacCabe and Fiske share an 
identical analysis of realism. Indeed, the purpose of Fiske's 
discussion is to call into question the passivity on the part of 
the reader which MacCabe's model implies (see Fiske, 1987: 37- 
47). 
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4 If we were to take MacCabe and Fiske's versioi iG the more 
prevalent conception of realism, 
- 
and within the fields of fihn 
and television studies it certainly is 
- 
then Brecht emerges as 
an anti-realist, and he is often treated as such (e. g. Sim, 1992). 
David Harvey characterises aesthetic modernism in terms of its 
critique of the inadequacy of naturalism and realism (Harvey, 
1989: 20), and it is perhaps on the basis of his rejection of the 
dominant traditions of realism (in MacCabe and Fiske's sense) 
that Brecht himself can be situated within the broad terrain of 
modernism. 
5 Indeed, by the 1950s Brecht seemed to accept that his theory of 
epic theatre was in need of an overhaul, proposing the term 
'dialectical theatre' as an appropriate replacement (Brecht, 
1974: 28 1). As we shall see, the concept of the dialectic plays 
an important role in a Brechtian notion of the function of 
comedy. 
6 Here, Brecht is commenting on the deployment of gestic acting 
in epic theatre, and is referring to a specific scene in A Man's a 
Man. 
7- We perhaps need to qualify Lovell's remarks here. While in his 
earlier work Brecht certainly viewed pleasure as something 
subordinate to the didactic objectives of epic theatre, in 'A 
Short Organum for the Theatre'. written in 1948, Brecht seems 
to revise this judgement. The primary 'business' of the theatre 
is 'to entertain people', he claims (Brecht, 1974: 180). As a 
result, he argues, '[nJothing needs less justification than 
pleasure' (1974: 181). In this formulation, it would seem that 
pleasure no longer needs to be justified in terms of its ability to 
further the education of the audience, but is a quality that can 
be valued in its own right. 
8 The two best-known LehrstCxke are The Baden-Baden Cantata, 
performed at the Baden-Baden Music Festival in 1929, and 77W 
Measures Taken, first performed in 1930. 
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Chapter seven 
Carnival and contemporary culture 
In Rabelais and His World, Bakhtin's historical analysis of the 
development of the carnivalesque tradition takes us up to the point 
reached in the last chapter, the periodic re-emergence of the 
grotesque over the first half of the twentieth century. What I want 
to do in this chapter is to explore the extent to which we might 
update Bakhtin's thesis about the decline of the carnivalesque in 
order to take into account the terrain of contemporary culture. 
In his 1940 essay, 'From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse' 
(f3akhtin, 198 1), Bakhtin argues rather ruefully that in 'modem 
times the functions of parody are narrow and unproductive' (198 1: 
7 1). While the medieval parodist was able to perform outrageous 
travesties of sacred texts, modem heteroglottic conditions have 
produced more democratised linguistic communities. Under such 
conditions, parody has been reduced to a mere shadow of its 
former self, for it no longer has the opportunity to ridicule such 
venerable forms of discourse. In 'From Notes Made in 1970-7 F, 
]3akhtin advances a similar claim. The 'proclamatory genres' once 
favoured bypriests, prophets, preachers, judges, leaders, 
patriarchal fathers, and so forth', now only eýdst either in the form 
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of pastiche, or in the form of parody (Bakhtin, 1986: 132)1. Irony 
has become 'the equivocal language of modern Limes' (1986: 132). 
If Bakhtin is correct, then, the expansive traditions of 
carnivalesque humour have given way to more sombre and sober 
forms of parody and pastiche. 
That Bakhtin should identify these developments with 'modern' 
culture is striking, for although he died before the word 
'postmodern' emerged as a key theoretical category, in many ways 
his comments anticipate current debates about the relationship 
between postmodernism and the comic. Fredric Jameson, for 
example, has argued that postmodernism has replaced the 
parodist with the pasticheur, producing a culture that is 'devoid of 
laughter' (Jameson, 1991: 17). In contrast, Jerry Aline Flieger has 
claimed that postmodernism carries with it comic credentials, and 
that fundamental to it is its 'ludic, ironic or parodic quality' 
(Flieger, 1991: 29). While Jameson's view would seem to be 
consistent with the proposition that the importance of the 
carnivalesque tradition has continued to dwindle, Flieger's account 
would initially seem to suggest that postmodern culture has had 
the effect of reinvigorating that tradition. If Bakhtin's thesis about 
the decline of the carnivalesque is to be updated, therefore, then 
the domain of postmodern theory would seem to provide fertile 
territory for discussion. 
Postmodernism 
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One of the most contentious issues in the field of cultural 
theory at the moment concerns the currency of the term 
dpostmodemism' (e. g. see Chris Jencks, 1993: Smart, 1993: Storey, 
1993). That a particular range of cultural practices might be 
enlisted as postmodern, or that the general condition of our 
contemporary cultural configuration might be characterised as 
postmodern, itself sets into motion a series of controversies and 
debates. And as John Storey has commented, even those who 
deny the eldstence of postmodernism 'contribute to the debate on 
postmodemism with their acts of denial and thus contribute to the 
substantiation of postmodemism' (Storey, 1993: 155). 
In approaching this territory, I want to draw upon the 
framework with which we addressed the subject of modernism in 
Chapter Four. Following Sheppard (Sheppard, 1993), it was 
argued that modernism consisted of a complex and contradictory 
set of practices that emerged both as a diagnosis of, and as a 
responses to, a particular configuration of social. cultural and 
economic circumstances. In a similar vein, I want to argue here 
that the postmodern terrain is equally complex and contradictory, 
and includes both a range of theoretical diagnoses of contemporary 
conditions, and a range of cultural practices which can be viewed 
as responses to, and/or componental of, those conditions. The 
complexity and contradictoriness of this terrain is evidenced by the 
range of problems and issues which it spans. First there is the 
problem of how to characterise allegedly postmodemist cultural 
practices. Should they be viewed as a superficial and commodifted 
form of cultural production Warrieson, 199 1: Eagleton, 1988): or as 
a complex. dialogic practice, constructing a relationship either 
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between the past and the present (Hutcheon, 1988: Charles 
Jencks, 1993), or between high culture and popular culture 
(Collins, 1989; Easthope, 1991)? Second, there is the problem of 
the relationship between postmodernism and modernism. Is it 
possible to establish a break between postmodemist and modernist 
practices (Jameson, 1991), or are there rather more continuities 
between the two configurations than some are prepared to accept 
(Featherstone, 1988), in which case the term 'postmodernism' 
arguably becomes redundant? Third, what is the relationship 
between postmodernism as a set of cultural practices and recent 
socio-economic developments? Should the former be viewed as the 
counterpart to the current stage of capitalist development, such as 
'late capitalism' (Jameson, 199 1) or 'radicalised modernity' 
(Giddens, 1990): or have we witnessed the evolution of a radically 
new set of social and economic relations that we can refer to as 
6postmodernity' (Bauman, 1992) or 'post-industrial society' (Bell, 
1973)? Fourth, if radical shifts have taken place in cultural 
practices and social relations, to what extent will they be amenable 
to traditional theoretical paradigms, such as Marxism or 
psychoanalysis? Does the current 'incredulity towards grand 
narratives' require a new set of analytical. practices (Lyotard, 1984), 
or is there still something to be salvaged from the Enlightenment 
tradition that spawned those grand narratives in the first place 
(Habermas, 1993)? 
Since the purpose of this chapter is to update Bakhtin's thesis 
about carnival, I will focus on the manner in which the comic has 
been located within accounts of postmodernism. As a result, there 
will not be space to attempt to provide answers to all of the 
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questions raised above. Rather, I will use Jameson's analysis as a 
starting point, and will attempt to negotiate the problems and 
issues referred to here as they surface in the course of the 
discussion. It is to Jameson's account of postmodernism, parody 
and pastiche that I turn first. 
Jameson and postmodern pastiche 
In his seminal analysis of postmodern culture, Jameson makes 
the following claim about the current cultural climate: 
In this situation parody finds itself without a vocation, it 
has lived, and that strange new thing pastiche slowly 
comes to take its place. Pastiche is, like parody, the 
imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic style, the 
wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. 
But it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any 
of parody's ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric 
impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that 
alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily 
borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still e)dsts. 
Pastiche is thus blank parody, a statue with blind 
eyeballs... (Jameson, 1991: 17) 
For Jameson, the ascendancy of pastiche and the decline of parody 
are key aspects of postmodernism. Before we discuss the accuracy 
of his claim, I want to explain Jameson's overall position in relation 
to postmodernism in rather more detail. 
Drawing on Ernest Mandel's three-stage account of the 
development of capitalism, Jameson distinguishes between three 
periods of capitalist evolution: the market stage, established on the 
basis of steam technology: the monopoly or imperialist stage, 
established on the basis of electric and combustion technology: 
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and the current multinational stage (which Jameson also calls 'late 
capitalism'), established on the basis of electric and nuclear 
technology (Jameson, 1991: 35). He characterises this stage in the 
following way: 
... 
its features include the new international division of 
labor, a vertiginous new dynamic in international banking 
and the stock exchanges.... new forms of media 
interrelationship-, computers and automation, the flight 
of production to advanced Third World areas, along with 
all the more familiar social consequences, including the 
crisis of traditional labor, the emergence of yuppies, and 
gentrification on a now-global scale. (1991: xix) 
Jameson's next step is to identify the dominant form of cultural 
practice in each of these three stageS2. While the cultural 
dominant of market capitalism is identified as realism (Jameson, 
1981: 151-4), Jameson posits modernism as the cultural dominant 
of monopoly capitalism (1991: 36; 307). Postmodernism itself is 
identified as the dominant cultural logic of late capitalism, and I 
want to focus on Jameson's analysis of the Westin Bonaventure 
Hotel in Los Angeles in order to differentiate what he identifies as 
the definitive features of the postmodem condition. 
a) The Bonaventure Hotel 
The hotel, opened in 1977, is a vast glass and steel 
construction, and is popular as a tourist attraction. People enter it 
through rather inconspicuous doorways, but once inside, the hotel 
offers them'a kind of miniature city'(1991: 40). The Bonaventure 
does not simply provide accommodation, it provides shops and 
other amenities. In the middle of it is a central column and a small 
lake, while elsewhere are to be found a greenhouse floor, revolving 
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cocktail lounges, a central lobby, and a series of escalators running 
up and down each of its four towers. I want to look at the key 
aspects of Jamesonian postmodernism as he identifies them in the 
fabric and experience of the Bonaventure Hotel. 
According to Jameson, the construction of the building 
produces an environment where 'it is quite impossible to get your 
bearings', to such an extent that the hotel's shopkeepers despair of 
the inability of people to find them (1991: 43). The speed and scale 
of the escalators, for example, deprives the visitor of their own 
sense of movement. while a series of giant streamers hanging down 
from the ceiling deprives them of their sense of perspective. The 
Bonaventure thus produces a new form of postmodern space 
- 
the 
postmodern sublime - which our current cognitive capacities are 
unable to negotiate. You are in this hyperspace up to your eyes 
and body, 'Jameson concludes (1991: 43). 
Although the Bonaventure shares few of the stylistic features 
usually associated with postmodern architecture, as Jameson 
admits (1991: 38). it nevertheless exhibits most of the other 
features identified by Jameson as postmodern. For example, it 
produces a sense of 'depthlessness' that is so characteristic of 
postmodernism. Postmodern texts ruthlessly appropriate other 
texts: postmodern buildings 'quote' styles from the past: television 
adverts deploy an array of filmic and musical references: pop art 
remotivates images from the visual canon. Just as the 
Bonaventure disorients its visitors, so the consumers of 
postmodernism are presented with a disorienting. depthless 
intertextual web, where the distinction between past and present. 
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between the real and the artificial, and between the original and 
the copy, are blurred. 
This combined sense of disorientation and depthlessness 
contributes to a new construction of subjectivity. The unsettling 
nature of the Bonaventure environment strips the subject of its 
sense of autonomy, because it is unable to map its location, or 
indeed move around, with confidence. While the modern subject 
experienced feelings of anxiety and alienation, epitomised in 
Edvard Munch's The Scream, it nevertheless maintained a sense of 
self-sufficiency. In contrast, these modern psychopathologies are 
no longer a possibility for the decentred, postmodern subject, 
Osince there is no longer a self present to do the feeling' (1991: 15). 
As a result, postrnodem culture has produced a'waning of affect', 
replacing the individualised experiences of anxiety and alienation 
with a'free-floating and impersonal' sense of euphoria (1991: 16). 
it is presumably something like this sense of euphoria that 
jameson identifies in the Bonaventure experience, as its visitors (a 
collective 'hypercrowd' (1991: 40)) lose a sense of themselves as 
they hurtle up and down in the escalators. 
Jameson also relates this euphoria to the schizophrenic nature 
of postmodern culture. The plethora of depthless Images produces 
both a sense of euphoria (because of the overwhelming intensity of 
the situation), and, simultaneously, an inability to organise a 
#coherent experience'out of them (1991: 25). For Jameson, the 
psychological condition of schizophrenia provides an apt metaphor 
with which to characterise this experience. While nostalgia films 
such as American Graffiti (1973) and Rumble Fish (1983) provide us 
with a wealth of glossy images of the past, they are unable to 
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provide us with a genuine sense of historical co-ordinates. This 
loss of temporality in postmodern culture culminates in the 
heightened sense of spatiality offered in the environment of the 
Bonaventure Hotel. 
The Bonaventure Hotel example allows Jameson to identify 
several important aspects of postmodernism: depthlessness, 
decentred subjectivity, the waning of affect and schizophrenia. It 
also serves as a useful example to explain Jameson's theorisation 
of the relationship between cultural production and 
commodification in postmodern culture. Until our current stage of 
late capitalism, Jameson argues, cultural production enjoyed a 
position of relative autonomy from economic forces. This situation 
allowed, amongst other things, for the possibility of the avant- 
garde to fulfil a critical function, insofar as its relative autonomy 
from economic forces allowed it to maintain a critical distance. 
Under late capitalism, however, two transformations have taken 
place. The first is that cultural production has become entirely 
commodified. Indeed, while the Frankfurt School drew a 
distinction between the culture industry and autonomous art, 
Jameson notes the extent to which postmodernism, has effaced this 
boundary by incorporating 'this whole "degraded" landscape of 
schlock and kitsch, of 'IV series and Reader's Digest culture, of 
advertising and motels, of the late show and the grade-B Hollywood 
film' (1991: 2). Today there is such economic incitement for 
cultural production that art has been subsumed by the system of 
commodity production, a process which is most apparent in the 
field of architecture, given its capital intensive nature. We might 
point, for example, to the way in which the Bonaventure Hotel not 
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only provides accommodation, but serves as a tourist attraction 
and shopping mall, as well as transforming the environment of 
downtown Los AngeleS3. 
The second transformation that has taken place is that there 
has been such an explosion of cultural production that culture 
now inhabits every aspect of 'our social life - from economic value 
and state power to practices and to the very structure of the 
psyche itself (1991: 48). Again, we can see this process at work in 
the Bonaventure Hotel. Not only does the disorienting 
environment of the building have an impact on the economic 
activity of the shopkeepers, but its hyperspace works to produce 
the schizophrenia and decentred subjectivity characteristic of the 
postmodern psyche. 
Jameson finally provides a bleak analysis of postmodernism. 
While he admits to being an'enthusiastic consumer'of postmodern 
culture, he nevertheless argues that postmodern culture itself is an 
obstacle to social transformation (1991: 298). The indifference 
engendered by the postmodern waning of affect lends itself to a 
reinforcement of the current social order. At the same time, if the 
impulse to transform society is to be grounded on a collective will 
to create the future, then the postmodern pastiche of history not 
only inclines us to lose our own sense of history, it simultaneously 
undermines a sense of the future (1991: 46). Jameson wams 
against the futility of being either for or against postmodemism as 
a 'category mistake': to be for or against it involves the taking of a 
moral stance towards it, while what we really need to do is provide 
an analysis of it's function (1991: 46 and 299). Nevertheless, as 
Jameson attempts to show in his analysis, postmodernism assists 
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in intensifying the mechanisms of (late) capitalism rather than 
opening up possibilities for those mechanisms to be challenged. 
b) Pastiche and parody 
We are now in a position to return to Jameson's argument 
about pastiche and parody, and to situate it in relation to his 
overall theory of postmodernism. Jameson equates both parody 
and pastiche with the wearing of a mask, and his examples of 
parodic masks are taken from modernist literature. As the scale of 
monopoly capitalism threatened to dwarf the modem subject, he 
argues. modernism took refuge in the projection of increasingly 
idiosyncratic, individual styles: 
the Faulknerian long sentence.... with its breathless 
gerundives; Lawrentian nature imagery punctuated by 
testy colloquialism: Wallace Stevens's inveterate 
hypostasis of nonsubstantive parts of speech 
... 
: the 
fateful (but finally predictable) swoops in Mahler from 
high orchestral pathos into village accordion sentiment... (Jameson, 1991: 16) 
Faulkner, Lawrence, Stevens and Mahler, then, each adopt an 
idiosyncratic mask. The crucial feature of each of these examples, 
however, is that they qualify as idiosyncratic only Insofar as they 
depart from certain norms of literary (and, in the case of Mahler, 
musical) construction. In each case, the norm ultimately 'reasserts 
itself, in a not necessarily unfriendly way, by a systematic mimicry 
of their wilful eccentricities' (1991: 16). 
Jameson's distinction between parody and pastiche turns on 
the alleged disappearance of norms of this sort. Social life, he 
argues, has suffered a 'linguistic fragmentation' U 99 1: 17). Even 
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'media speech', 
- 
such as BBC English 
- 
has become just another 
linguistic style in the proliferation of media texts. In addition, 
every niche of social life now operates its own dialect, both in terms 
of the jargon of different disciplines and professions, and in terms 
of the discursive style of different 'ethnic, gender, race, religious 
and class-factional' social groups (1991: 17). While'society was 
once held together by the norms and ideology of the ruling class, 
argues Jameson, 'the advanced capitalist countries today are now 
a field of stylistic and discursive heterogeneity without a norm' 
(1991: 17). Such a situation disarms parodic discourse, which is 
now unable to appeal to the norms crucial to its operation. 
With the disappearance of such norms, Jameson argues, 
pastiche has become one of the most prominent features of 
postmodern culture. The pasticheur still wears a mask but, unlike 
the parodist, the wearing of the mask is devoid of both 'ulterior 
motives' and 'the satiric impulse' (1991: 17). In the field of 
architecture, for example, this has given rise to the practice of 
6quoting' architectural styles from the past in the fabric of a 
contemporary building. But, argues Jameson, the only purpose of 
such a practice is 'the random cannibalization of all the styles of 
the pas . t' (1991: 18), rather than a critical incorporation of them. 
in the field of cinema, pastiche is evidenced in the practices of the 
nostalgia film, mentioned above, which allude to representations of 
the past without actually exploring 'real history'. In the field of 
literature, Jameson identifies Claude Simon as a pasticheur, who 
embraces a Faulknerian style as though it were his own (199 1: 
133-53). 
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According to Jameson, there are two problems with postmodern. 
pastiche. First, the social fragmentation with which it is 
associated places obstacles in the way of building a collective 
movement. This process thus contributes to the way in which 
postmodem culture as a whole impedes the possibility of a socialist 
transformation of society. Second, the prominence of pastiche is 
further evidence of the fact that avant-garde scenarios 
- 
the notion 
that art might serve a revolutionary function 
- 
are no longer a 
possibility. Mils is a point touched on by Terry Eagleton in his 
response to Jameson's argument. Agreeing with Jameson's 
pessimism about the decline of parody in postmodem culture, 
Eagleton nevertheless identifies one parodic aspect that has 
survived: 
What is parodied by postmodernist culture, with its 
dissolution of art Into the prevailing forms of commodity 
production, is nothing less than the revolutionary art of 
the twentieth-century avant-garde. It is as though 
postmodernism is among other things a sick joke at the 
expense of.. revolutionary avant-gardism... (Eagleton, 1988: 385) 
Jameson would no doubt agree. As we have already seen, 
postmodem culture produces a decentred form of subjectivity, a 
lack of critical distance, and a waning of affect, and, together with 
pastiche, these would seem to combine to undermine the very 
possibility of avant-garde art. That postmodernism replaces the 
parodist with the pasticheur, then, is a development that Jameson 
views with pessimism. 
Jameson's discussion of parody would seem to suggest that the 
decline of the carnivalesque charted by Bakhtin is now complete: 
postmodemism has produced a culture 'devoid of laughter' (199 1: 
17: quoted earlier). Indeed. Jameson's argument echoes Bakhtin's 
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analysis in two significant ways. Firstly. Jameson's argument 
concerning the emergence of 'discursive heterogeneity' (1991: 17; 
quoted above) echoes Bakhtin's contention that the medieval 
conflguration of robust parodic styles alongside sacred and 
proclamatory norms has been replaced by a configuration of 
heteroglottic democracy where such norms have disappeared 
(1981: 71; cited above). Secondly. Bakhtin appears to identify a 
transition from parody to pastiche as one of the features of the 
process of decline. In his genealogy of the role of the mask, for 
example. Bakhtin describes the transition from its parodic function 
in the folk culture of the Middle Ages, to its nadir during the 
Romantic period. In its carnivalesque context, the mask served 
several 'ulterior motives': 
The mask is connected with the joy of change and 
reincarnation, with gay relativity and with the merry 
negation of uniformity and similarity; it rejects conformity 
to oneself. The mask is related to transition, 
metamorphoses, the violation of natural boundaries, to 
mockery and familiar nicknames. It contains the playful 
element of life... (Bakhtin, 1984: 39-40) 
As carnival declined, however, so too did the function of the mask, 
gradually losing its iconoclastic potential. During the Romantic 
period, for example, Bakhtin argues that the playful mask was 
replaced with a more 4sombre'version. Echoing Jameson's 
characterisation of postmodern pastiche, Bakhtin says of the 
Romantic mask: '[a] terrible vacuum, a nothingness lurks behind 
it' (1984: 40). There is thus a certain proximity between Bakhtin's 
analysis of the Romantic mask and Jameson's account of 
postmodern pastiche. There remains a crucial difference between 
them, however, and that is that Bakhtin is anaIysing what had 
become in the Romantic period a marginalised cultural form. In 
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contrast, Jameson is claiming the dominance of pastiche in 
contemporary culture. It is, he says, a'well-nigh universal 
practice' (1991: 16). What we need to do now is attempt an 
assessment of this proposition. 
If we turn to contemporary British television we can certainly 
identify examples of pastiche. In Granada Television's Stars In 
77wir Eyes, for example, contestants perform a song in the style of 
a chosen star In as convincing-a manner as possible4. Towards the 
end of the show, the studio audience vote on who they believe to be 
the most authentic. There is no attempt to parody the chosen 
star's style: the most successful contestants are those for whom 
the assumed mask conceals (or, indeed, subsumes) their own 
identity. 
It Is not clear, however. that such forms of pastiche constitute a 
dominant style in contemporary television. Indeed, the last ten 
years has seen a wealth of successful parody on British television, 
often in the form of political satire. Central Television's Spitting 
Image would be the prime example here, with the puppets 
providing satirical parodies of leading political figures. Such 
examples lead us to face the first problem with Jameson's 
argument, and that is its positing of postmodernism as the cultural 
dominant of late capitalism. Along with Steve Best and Douglas 
Kellner, for example, Simon During has argued that many of the 
features identified in Jameson's analysis are emergent rather than 
dominant qualities in contemporary culture (Best and Kellner, 
1991: 187-8: During, 1993: 448). In response, Jameson might 
argue, with reference to the two examples just cited, that Spitting 
Image is a vestige of residual culture, that it owes its origins to the 
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traditions of British political satire dating back to the eighteenth 
century. He could point to the prints of Willian, ; iogarth, James 
Gillray, Richard Newton and Thomas Rowlandson as its 
precursors. In contrast, he could argue, the pastiche of Stars In 
Their Eyes belongs to the cultural dominant because it follows the 
logic of late capitalism. That is, it is consistent with all of the 
various features that make this stage of capitalism different from 
the other stages. The problem with such an argument is that it 
runs the risk of circularity, in that it takes Stars In Their Eyes as 
definitive of the cultural logic of late capitalism, but then defines 
this logic in terms of the stylistic features of Stars In Their Eyes. 
While Jameson provides several examples of pastiche, then, it is 
not clear that this has become a dominant cultural practice. If this 
is the case, then there is probably more scope for parodic practices 
within contemporary culture than Jameson would allow. In order 
to address this possibility, I want to look at a more extended 
example, Woody Allen's film Hannah and Her Sisters (1986). 
c) Hannah and Her Sisters 
Hannah and Her Sisters follows the fortunes of four sisters and 
their respective partners over a period of two years, beginning and 
ending with a Thanksgiving meal. Woody Allen's character, 
Mickey, is Hannah's ex-husband, and in the course of the film he 
struggles both with a hypochondriac amNiety about his own health, 
and with a metaphysical amdety about the meaning of life, 
variously seeking solace in Judaism, Catholicism and Krishnaism. 
Towards the end of the film, he recounts to Veronica, one of 
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Hannah's sisters, the episode when he tried to commit suicide, an 
attempt which failed. Walking the streets directly after the 
incident, he enters a cinema, and there on the screen is a scene 
from the Marx Brothers' Duck Soup (1933). The experience of the 
film cures Mickey of his anxieties, making him realise that life is 
worth living: 'I started to sit back, and I actually started to enjoy 
myself. What I want to focus on here is the incorporation of the 
footage from Duck Soup, and the possible function that it performs. 
Woody Allen's films are not always included under the rubric of 
postmodernism: they certainly tend to be omitted from Jameson's 
filmography. It is Norman Denzin who has made out the most 
trenchant case for addressing Woody Allen's films in the context of 
postmodernism (Denzin, 199 1). Denzin follows Jameson in 
identifying postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism 
(1991: ix). Although he advances his own critique of Jameson S, 
Denzin's characterisation of postmodernism nevertheless shares 
with Jameson's an emphasis on the way in which culture has 
invaded the entire social and economic environment. 
Postmodernism, he argues, consists in 'the cinematization of 
contemporary life' (199 1: x), and he identifies three aspects of this 
condition: 
First, reality is a staged, social production. Secondly, the 
real is nowjudged against its staged, cinematic-video 
counterpart... Third, the metaphor of the dramaturgical 
society... Art not only mirrors life, it structures and 
reproduces it. 
. (199 1: X) 
In the field of cinema, Denzin argues, these circumstances have 
given rise to a range of texts which both incorporate references to 
other texts, and evoke a nostalgia for the past. What I want to 
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argue in relation to Hannah and Her Sisters is that, while the Marx 
Brothers episode can be treated simply as an example of 
Jamesonian pastiche, this can only generate an impoverished 
reading of the passage, and that it is only when we also consider 
its parodic *potential that the full complexity of the passage 
becomes apparent. 
That cinema should be so preoccupied with its own history, and 
that cinematic texts should be so preoccupied with other cinematic 
texts, illustrates the staged, dramaturgical metaphor to which 
Denzin appeals. In Allen's movies, Denzin argues, these 
preoccupations are keenly felt, and the film narrative regularly 
incorporates visits to the cinema and footage from Hollywood's 
past6. The logic of such texts, Denzin argues, is to assert the 
myths embodied in Hollywood's past in the face of broken 
marriages and faltering relationships: This dream factory is all we 
have left. It must not be mocked. It is society's most sacred of 
social institutions. Inside its fairy tales the myths always work out' 
(1991: 103). However, since Allen negotiates this territory in the 
form of a comic discourse, there is often an interplay between 
deconstructing and reaffirming such myths in the course of the 
narrative. 'Woody Allen is postmodem America's cinematic 
moralist', Denzin concludes (1991: 95). 
Denzin himself spends little time discussing Hannah and Her 
Sisters, suggesting simply that, in locating Mickey's volte-face in 
the cinema, the text'explores the so-called ability of "classic" 
Hollywood films to bring positive value into postmodern life' (199 1: 
11). 1 would agree with Denzin's reading, and argue that it is 
precisely as a result of the parodic dimension of the film's pastiche 
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that this exploration is made possible. At the level of pastiche, 
Hannah and Her Sisters is constructed around several intertextual 
components, incorporating excerpts from songs, an opera, an 
architectural tour of New York, and a punk performance, as well as 
the scene from Duck Soup 
- 
What I would argue in relation to the 
latter is that its inclusion generates a self-reflexive, parodic motif 
which operates at a number of levels. This is not an outrageous 
form of travesty, however, of the sort identified by Bakhtin in his 
account of medieval parody, but, rather, a less expansive form of 
the sort he identifies in modem parody. First, in situating the 
spectator in the cinema, both looking at Mickey, and then looking 
at the screen, the film foregrounds its own construction as a 
cinematic text. This foregrounding is reinforced by the fact that 
the Marx Brothers belong to the same screen comedy tradition as 
Allen himself Secondly, just as the scene in Hannah and her 
Sisters is a pivotal one, so the scene incorporated from Duck Soup 
is pivotal, involving a long drawn out decision to go to war, staged 
as a musical extravaganza. This moment leads onto the film's 
finale, a ridiculously comic victory in the war itself. In this way, 
Hannah and Her Sisters foregrounds its own narrative 
construction, drawing particular attention to the manner in which 
it might itself generate a happy ending. This foregrounding is also 
reinforced through dialogue: Mickey comments at the end of the 
film that his tale 'would make a great story. Thirdly, since the 
inclusion of the Marx Brothers scene generates these self-reflexive 
points of interest, the extent to which a classic Hollywood film 
might 'bring positive value into postmodern life' (Denzin, 199 1: 10, - 
quoted above) is itself called into question. The audience are 
invited to consider both the extent to which Hannah and Her 
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Sisters might imitate the comic happy ending of Duck Soup, and 
the extent to which their own viewing of Hannah and Her Sisters 
might imitate Mickey's viewing of Duck Soup, and might in turn 
endow their life with value. The parodic charge of the Marx 
Brothers sequence operates at these various levels, then, in setting 
up a series of questions about the very mechanisms both of film 
comedy, and of cinema in general. 
For Denzin, what differentiates postmodernism from other 
cultural configurations is the centrality of dramaturgical forms 
(including cinema), and the ability of those forms to structure the 
rest of social practice. In its preoccupation with the dynamics of 
spectatorship, and with the way in which the meanings of comic 
films might circulate, so Hannah and Her Sisters reproduces this 
postinodern primacy of the dramaturgical. Insofar as Hannah and 
Her Sisters articulates the cultural logic of late capitalism, Denzin 
would argue, so it can be enlisted as a postmodern text. 
d) Problems with Jameson's pastiche 
We can use this reading of Hannah and Her Sisters to challenge 
Jameson's interpretation of pastiche as a random form of 
eclecticism bereft of any'ulterior motives'. While such an 
interpretation might seem to apply to Stars In 771eir Eyes, we might 
wonder whether it is the only way in which to understand 
eclecticism. In Charles Jencks' taxonomy of postmodern 
architectural style, for example, eleven 'emergent rules' are listed 
which, Jencks argues, constitute most of the key features of 
contemporary postmodem architecture. One of these rules is that 
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of 'tradition reinteTpreted', and Jencks provides the example of a 
boathouse at Henley designed by the architect Terry Farrell to 
illustrate it. According to Jencks, the design draws on 'the syntax 
and colour of the traditional temple form', and combines them in 
the fabric of the building (Charles Jencks, 1993: 291). However, 
the building is not simply wearing a mask without any purpose, as 
Jameson's definition of pastiche would imply. Rather, 'old fonns 
[the temple] are given new meanings': '[t1he temple columns 
become paired pilasters, the broken pediment is extended down 
into the brick base to become a water gate for the boats, and the 
acroteria become spotlights' (1993: 29 1). When we understand 
this 'new validity', argues Jencks, 'the aura of pastiche disappears$ 
(1993: 29 1). In a similar manner, Hannah and Her Sisters 
reinterprets Duck Soup, placing it in a new context, and inviting a 
parodic, self-reflexive reconsideration of the nature of film comedy. 
Linda Hutcheon has further challenged Jameson, arguing that 
his distinction between parody and pastiche is based on an 
outdated definition of parody. This outdated definition takes 
parody to consist of 'ridiculing imitation' (Hutcheon, 1988: 26). 
That this form of imitation does not seem to be wholly apparent in 
the practices identified by Jameson as pastiche does not, as 
Jameson assumes, imply that such practices must be devoid of 
parodic qualities altogether. Rather, Hutcheon argues, it suggests 
that we need to redefine parody in accordance with the nuances of 
contemporary postmodern practices. The incorporation of previous 
styles in contemporary works is not, as Jameson would have it, a 
random eclecticism. Rather, it is a self-refle. Nive process that 
constructs a 'dialogue with the past' (1988: 23). In this redefined 
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sense, parody consists of 'repetition with critical distance that 
allows ironic signalling of difference at the very heart of similarity, 
(1988: 26). Jencks' example of the Henley boathouse would seem 
to fall neatly under the scope of such a definition. The building 
repeats features of the Greek temple, but maintains a distance 
from their original meaning (e. g. their sacredness) by ironically 
providing them with new meanings (e. g. secular, functional ones). 
in this way, the building combines similarity and difference, while 
Jameson's account implies that pastiche can only signify 
similarity. Hutcheon's reconceptualisation of parody is of equal 
applicability to 
-Hannah 
and Her Sisters. In incorporating the Marx 
brothers sequence, the film signifies its generic similarity to Duck 
Soup, but it also invites the audience to consider the extent to 
which it might itself deviate from such conventions. In overlooking 
these more nuanced forms of parody, Jameson's analysis would 
appear to have its shortcomings. 
A further problem is Jameson's univalent reading of 
postmodern culture. What I have tried to establish throughout 
this thesis is that a dialogic approach to texts not only provides an 
appropriate means for a historical analysis, bi it that it offers a 
particularly appropriate way in which to approach comic texts 
because of their semiotic ambiguity. In relation to Hannah and her 
Sisters, for example, I would argue that, while the Marx Brothers 
sequence might be read by some simply as an amusing 
incorporation of another text, others might relate it to the self- 
reflexive issues that I have outlined above. However, in spite of his 
thesis concerning the 'stylistic and discursive heterogeneity' of 
social life. Jameson's analysis of postmodern texts seems to 
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overlook the possibility both of aberrant readings, and of the 
ambiguities in a text prompting alternative readings to his own. 
Both Docker and Featherstone note the way in which Jameson 
seems to universalise his personal judgements about a particular 
text (Docker, 1994: 121; Featherstone, 1989: 126). As Docker 
points out, Jameson acknowledges that the rooms in the 
Bonaventure Hotel 'are in the worst of taste' (Jameson, 1991: 43), 
an assessment which would seem to imply a Kantian standard of 
aesthetic judgement. At the same time, as Susan Suleiman has 
argued, implicit in Jameson's claims about pastiche is 'the 
assumption that works of art determine their own reading and 
meaning' (Suleiman, 1990: 192). Since the work of pastiche is 
itself devoid of laughter, satire and ulterior motives, Jameson 
implies, it is therefore incapable of being subject to responses 
which might involve either laughter, satire or ulterior motives. 
Jameson therefore provides a univalent reading of the practices of 
the pasticheur, and we might contrast this reading with Bakhtin's 
analysis of the Romantic mask, mentioned earlier. While Bakhtin 
argues that the way in which the mask is deployed in Romantic 
culture connotes a sombre emptiness in comparison with its folk 
culture signification, he nevertheless maintains the possibility of 
its multivalence, arguing that it 'still retains something of its 
popular carnival nature' (Bakhtin, 1984: 40). Indeed, multivalent 
signification is often cited as one of the features of postmodern 
texts. Jencks, for example, includes 'double-coding' and 
#multivalenceý as two of the eleven emergent rules of postmodern 
architecture. The precise distinction between the two rules is 
rather unclear, but what Jencks seems to suggest in relation to 
each is that postmodern architecture is encoded to produce 
309 
variable decodings, acknowledging 'the simultaneous validity of 
opposite approaches and different tastes' (1993: 289). Jameson's 
analysis of pastiche, then, implicitly assumes that the pasticheur's 
texts are only capable of producing a single reading. We can 
question this assumption not only on the grounds that all reading 
is contextual (and consequently liable to produce a diversity of 
interpretation), but that the practices identified by Jameson as 
pastiche are allegedly more complex (and, therefore, more 
susceptible to multivalent readings) than Jameson would allow. 
In assuming the univalence of postmodern texts, and, 
consequently, the passivity of the reader in consuming this 
univalent signification, Jameson's analysis lends itself to a position 
of cultural pessimism. Such a position can be called into question 
even on the basis of Jameson's own examples, however. The 
Bonaventure Hotel, for instance, embodies several of the key 
features of postmodernism. However, as Jameson notes, there is a 
certain irony in the fact that, although the hotel was built by a 
millionaire businessman, its shops are so difficult to find that'all 
the merchandise is marked down to bargain prices' (199 1: 44). 
Such contradictions might prompt rather different assessments of 
the Bonaventure Hotel, and it is at such points that cracks might 
begin to appear in the glossy veneer that constitutes Jamesontan 
postmodemism. If, as Jencks and Hutcheon have argued, 
postmodern culture is littered with examples of double-coded texts, 
then we can call into question the univalence of postmodernism, 
the assumed passivity of postmodern readers, and, consequently, 
the pessimism of Jameson's theory. 
310 
Jameson bemoans the decline of parody and the emergence (or, 
in his parlance, the dominance) of pastiche, with its absence of 
laughter and satiric intent. Given the centrality that he attributes 
to pastiche in the terrain of postmodernism, contemporary culture 
would not seem to tolerate an abundance of comic techniques. 
However, we have identified several problems, both in Jameson's 
analysis of pastiche, and in his overall account of postmodernism, 
all of which would suggest that his theory is in need of some 
modification. It is thus appropriate to contrast Jameson's analysis 
with theories that find more of an affinity between postmodernism 
and comic techniques. 
Postmodern laughter? 
For Jerry Aline Flieger, the comic is not simply Prominent witWn 
postmodem practices, but actually fundamental to them. As a 
result, she would appear to offer an alternative to the conclusions 
reached by Jameson. Flieger begins by attributing to 
postmodernism an almost carnivalesque function. 'In our own 
day. ' she says, 
post-ing the modem continues to imply dethroning the 
serious, undermining the legitimate, and, most recently, 
exposing the profoundly parodic nature of those 
4centrisms'... upon which Western philosophy and social 
order has been constructed. (Flieger, 1991: 3) 
Flieger accepts the validity of associating postmodernism with a 
number of key issues: a'crisis of legitimation': a'problematization 
of the activity of representation: a'questioning of the concept of 
originality'; and an 'emphasis on excess, leftover, residue' (199 1: 
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29). However, as the above quote suggests, it is the 'ludic, ironic or 
parodic quality' of postmodemism that Flieger takes to be 
fundamental, and she uses the word 'comic' as an 'umbrella term' 
to cover these related qualities (1991: 12-3). 
Flieger's analysis of the way in which these features operate 
draws on the work of Charles Baudelaire and Maurice Blanchot. 
In 'Of the Essence in Laughter', Baudelaire distinguishes between 
two forms of comedy, 'referential' and 'absolute' (Baudelaire, 1972). 
Flieger likens each of these comic forms to types of cognitive 
process identified by Maurice Blanchot in L'entretien ir&L 
Baudelaire's referential comedy can be characterised in terms of a 
feeling of superiority, argues Flieger (1991: 34). The person 
laughing adjudges the comic object to fall short of the social codes 
expected of them. This is a comedy of manners, which has the 
effect of enforcing social codes in the manner described in 
Bergson's theory of laughter. Flieger equates this form of comedy 
with Blanchot's definition of understanding ('parole 
d'entendement') as a process of 'identify[ingi by separating' (199 1: 
31-2). In laughing at the comic object, the person laughing not 
only separates themselves from the person who is the object of 
their rn irth, but, in so doing, they confirm their own sense of 
identity. Flieger notes Jacques Lacan's citation of referential 
comedy as contributing in this way to 'the "illusion" of a unified 
ego' (1991: 39). Given the illusory nature of the unified ego 
produced here, the problem with referential jokers is that they 
'blind themselves to their own vulnerability and implication in the 
downfall of their victim' (1991: 46) 7. 
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Absolute comedy. on the other hand, affords the laugher the 
possibility of identifying with the comic object. This is a 
conciliatory, celebratory form of comedy that has been likened both 
to farce (Nelson, 1990: 25). and to carnival (Kem, 1980). Flieger 
also likens it to Blanchot's conception of reasoning ('parole de 
raison'), which Blanchot defines as a process of 'surmount[ing] by 
negating' (1991: 32). What is being surmounted here is not the 
comic object itself, but the limits that the comic behaviour 
transgresses (e. g. the rules that are broken during carnival). 
However, just as the broken rules are reinstated at the end of the 
carnival. so these transgressed -limits will reassert themselves at 
the end of the joke. As a result, argues Flieger, the problem with 
absolute jokers is that 'they blind themselves to the pennanence of 
the limits aboIished'(1991: 46)8. 
Up to this point in Flieger's argument. it is not entirely clear 
whether the appeals to Blanchot actually assist in clari, ýdng the 
discussion of Baudelaire's categories. Flieger seems to be able 
both to characterise and to problematise these categories without 
any particular assistance from Blanchot. However, given the 
problematic status of both referential and absolute comedy, Flieger 
goes in search of a third comic form which might escape such 
problems, and in order to discover this form she appeals to 
Blanchot's third category of cognitive processes, 'literary process' 
(, parole litt6raire') (1991: 32). Blanchot describes this category as a 
process of 'surmount[ing] by doubling' (1991: 33), and Flieger 
argues that this notion of doubling neatly appro. -dmates the comic 
operations of the postmodern text: 'a plural pleasantry. a worked 
and reworked text' (1991: 48). This third form of comedy, the 
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postmodern comic, employs the devices of repetition, recurrence 
and remotivation. As such, we can identify it at work in the 
passage from Hannah and Her Sisters: in inserting the Marx 
Brothers scene into the text, the film undertakes a re-working of it, 
deploying it in the self-refludve mechanism outlined above. What 
is more, the sequence invites neither the superior laughter of 
referential comedy, nor the celebratory laughter of absolute 
comedy. If anything, it simply invites a wry smile. For Flieger, 
then, the postmodern comic provides an alternative both to 
referential comedy and to absolute comedy. 
In identifying the comic as a fundamental characteristic ofý 
postmodernism in this way, Flieger presents us with an alternative 
to Jameson's vision of a cultural realm devoid of laughter. What is 
more, not only does she assign the'comic a fundamental position 
within postmodern culture, but she attributes to it the potential to 
furnish us with critical forms of knowledge, and in this she 
concurs with Hutcheon, who similarly defines the constitutive 
features of postmodernism in terms of a practice of reinterpreting, 
reincorporating and remotivating. What unites their two accounts 
is the idea that postmodernism provides us with a crucial 
historical perspective on the present. Comic techniques (Flieger) 
and parodic techniques (Hutcheon) contribute to this process in a 
fundamental manner. For Flieger, the provisional nature of the 
postmodern comic - the idea that a text will be reworked - also 
reveals a commitment to an understanding of the historical 
process. The postmodern joker, she claims, is 'always en route, 
not superior to reality or able to control it, but caught in the 
process initiated by the fictive work... ' (1991: 50). Meanwhile, 
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Hutcheon identifies a fundamental relationship between 
postmodernism and a problematisation of history. Her key 
definition of postmodernist practice is 'historiographic metafiction' 
(1988: ix), works of art, that is, which maintain a'theoretical self- 
awareness of history and fiction as human constructs' (1988: 5). 
This is why she identifies parody as such an important form within 
postmodern practices, because in incorporating styles from the 
past, such practices foreground the extent to which those styles 
are precisely historical human constructs. 
We might cite Hannah and Her Sisters here in relation to 
Flieger and Hutcheon's arguments. On the one hand, the Marx 
Brothers scene would seem to foreground both films' (Hannah and 
Her Sisters and Duck Soup) historical position within the traditions 
of film comedy. At the same time, by inviting a comparative 
consideration of the d6nouements of the two texts, the sequence 
would seem to draw attention to the construction of comic 
narrative. 
In ascribing this sort of potential to postmodern practices, 
Hutcheon and Flieger distance themselves from Jameson's account 
of postmodernism. For Jameson, as we have seen, one of the key 
features of postmodernism is its ability to disorient us, both 
temporally and spatially, a view tackled directly by Hutcheon. 
Postmodernism, she argues, does not confound our ability to 
position ourselves in relation to 'real history, as Jameson 
imagines. Rather, it contests 'the very possibility of our being able 
to know the "ultimate objects" of the past', accepting that our 
access to history is necessarily mediated discursively, either 
through textual discourse or, for example, through the discourse of 
architecture (1988: 24). Both Fheger and Hutcheon thus seek to 
establish a relationship between comic techniques, postmodernism 
and historical reflection. 
The idea that comic techniques might perform some sort of 
historicising role has already arisen in relation to Bakhtin's theory 
of carnival. Bakhtin attributes to carnivalesque practices the 
potential to foreground the historicity of social arrangements by 
constructing a temporary, defamiliarising reorganisation of them9. 
it is thus worth considering the extent to which Hutcheon and 
Flieger's respective accounts of postmodern comic practices might 
be synthesised -with Bakhtin's account of carnival. 
In A Poetics ofPostmodemism, Hutcheon explicitly invokes a 
Bakhtinian perspective. Since the parodic, ironic status of 
postmodern practices provides them with a necessary ambivalence, 
and since such practices construct complex relationships between 
the present and signs and images retrieved from the past, so an 
analysis of postmodern texts requires a thorough interrogation of 
the dialogic context within which they are produced and 
consumed. With its emphasis on the dialogic nature of 
signification, Hutcheon argues, a Bakhtinian perspective provides 
us withjust such a framework (1988: 54). 
in addition to this endorsement of Bakhtin, in an earlier article 
Hutcheon explicitly draws on a notion of the carnivalesque as a 
means of characterising postmodern practices. Focusing on 
contemporary forms of narrative, she argues that postmodernist 
fiction embodies several carnivalesque structures. Firstly, in its 
Metafictional preoccupations and its tendency to foreground the 
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artifice of literary construction, as in the work of John Fowles and 
John Barth, contemporary narrative enacts a carnivalesque 
rebellion against the official ideology of realism (1983: 83-4). 
Secondly, contemporary fiction has succeeded in blurring the 
distinction between high and popular culture, incorporating 'comic 
books, Hollywood'movies, popular songs, [and] pornography' 
(1983: 87). Tim Robbins' novel Even Cowgirls Get the Blues, for 
example, includes two epigraphs, 'one from William Blake and one 
from Roy Rogers' (1983: 87). This process of cross-fertilisation 
between high and popular culture mirrors Rabelais' own 
plundering of carnivalesque imagery at the time of the 
Renaissance. Thirdly, there is a tendency for contemporary fiction 
to draw on sexual and erotic imagery, and thus to appeal to the 
material bodily principle of the carnivalesque. However, whereas 
Bakhtin emphasised the positive, reproductive aspect of the 
ambivalent 
-bodily 
imagery of carnival, contemporary work, such as 
the novels of William Burroughs, tends to emphasise its negative, 
decaying aspect (1983: 89-90). If at one level the carnivalesque 
preoccupations of contemporary fiction acquire a negative aspect, 
however, at another level they direct us towards a very positive 
aspect:. 
today we are faced with self-refle. -dve forms of fiction 
which internalize the structures of more popular art 
forms as a way of activating in the reader both a self- 
consciousness about the literariness and flctiveness of 
what he or she is reading and also a subsequent 
acknowledgement of the value of such creative and 
ordering aesthetic processes. (1983: 88) 
If the decaying aspect of the carnivalesque body is represented in 
the erotic imagery of contemporary fiction, then its reproductive 
aspect is embodied in the very act of reading, which confers on the 
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reader a 'carnivalesque reproductive energy' (1983: 94). For 
Hutcheon, then, Bakhtin's notion of the carnivalesque provides a 
potent means of characterising postmodern literary techniques. 
indeed, challenging Bakhtin's claim that the carnivalesque 
tradition has declined since the Renaissance, Hutcheon argues 
that 'our cultural forms today have become even more parodic and 
self-reflecting than ever' (1983: 84-5). 
While Hutcheon is keen to establish the relationship between 
postmodern practices and the carnivalesque, however, Flieger 
draws a distinction between them. Indeed, her definition of the 
postmodern comic as 'a plural pleasantry, a worked and reworked 
text' (1991: 48), is explicitly advanced as an alternative both to a 
Bergsonian view of laughter as an expression of superiority, and to 
the position which sees laughter as a form of 'festival madness' 
(1991: 53). Although Flieger doesn't specifically mention Bakhtin 
here, it is this latter position which most approximates Bakhtin's 
conception of camivalesque laughter. Apart from a shared 
emphasis on the propensity of comic techniques to provide us with 
a critical perspective on the present, then, Flieger's conception of 
the postmodern comic would seem to have little in common with a 
Bakhtinian conception of carnival. 
In identifying comic techniques as central to postmodernist 
practices, and in attributing to those practices a critical potential, 
Flieger and Hutcheon's analyses provide an alternative to 
jameson's pessimistic vision of a culture devoid of laughter. 
However, where Flieger and Hutcheon appear to differ is over the 
extent to which they are prepared to invoke the concept of carnival 
as a model with which to characterise postmodernist practices. 
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For Hutcheon, a notion of the carnivalesque provides us with an 
apt metaphor with which to explore contemporary narrative: in this 
sense, postmodern laughter is closely allied to carnivalesque 
laughter. For Flieger, on the other hand, postmodem laughter is 
devoid of the 'festival madness' (1991: 53) characteristic of 
carnivalesque laughter. What emerges as a point of contention, 
therefore, is the extent to which the concept of carnival might 
provide an appropriate model for an analysis of postmodern 
culture. It is to this issue that I now turn. 
Carnival and postmodern culture 
In Hutcheon's study of contemporary narrative, we have already 
seen one example of an attempt to deploy carnival as an analytical 
tool with which to investigate postmodernism. Hutcheon's study 
was limited to certain literary formations, however, and in this 
section I want to look at an approach which assumes that the 
category of carnival has a more widespread applicability. In three 
books, Television Culture (Fiske, 1987), Reading the Popular (Fiske, 
1989a) and Understanding Popular Culture (Fiske, 1989b), John 
Fiske d eploys the concept of carnival as one of his central 
categories, applying it not only to particular types of cultural 
practice (wrestling, game shows, MIV, Miami Vice), but also to the 
very dynamics of popular culture. 
Fiske tums to the category of the carnivalesque because of the 
apparent inadequacy of certain other forms of analysis in the 
discipline of cultural studies (1989a: 1-13). Forms of analysis 
which focus predominantly on the economics of popular culture, 
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for example, tend to locate the control of popular culture with 
those who produce it, rather than those who consume it. As a 
result, such approaches tend both to overstate the hegemonic 
function of popular culture, and to take for granted the passivity of 
its consumers. Similarly, analyses which focus predominantly on 
the ideological form of popular practices tend to overstate the 
extent to which the consumers of popular culture simultaneously 
take on board the dominant ideological viewpoint which structures 
those practices. Both forms of analysis tend to view the pleasure 
associated with popular culture in fairly negative terms, conceiving 
it as a 'reward' in return for taking on board the hegemonic or 
dominant ideological viewpoint (1987: 225). In appealing to the 
category of carnival, then, Fiske hopes to avoid these problems by 
devising a more adequate account of pleasure, and a more dynamic 
model of the way in which people actually Interact with popular 
culture. 
Fiske rarely engages in detail with the debate about 
postmodernism. However, he does borrow the term to describe the 
intertextual nature of popular culture, its ability to blur genres, 
media, and cultural demarcations (1987: 254)10. Further, he 
characterises the view that treats pleasure as the opposite of 
ideology, rather than as its servant, as postmodernist (1987: 225). 
insofar as his own analysis approaches the issue of pleasure from 
this angle, so Fiske would, on his own terms, seem to occupy the 
terrain of postmodem theory. 
As we have seen, carnival provided a site where physical 
pleasures could be exploited to the full, and where the enjoyment 
of such pleasures carried with it both a celebratory and a critical 
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potential, at once celebrating the access to proscribed forms of 
pleasure, while at the same time enacting a critique of the 
structures which officially restricted such pleasures. In appealing 
to such a model, Fiske hopes to devise an account of cultural 
practices capable of identifying in popular culture a range of 
pleasures which, in embodying a celebratory and critical potential, 
actually work against the hegemonic drive of economic and 
ideological forces. In so doing, Fiske rejects the safety-valve 
approach to carnival (see Chapter One), and attempts to construct 
a dynamic model of popular culture. The threat to the power of 
the dominant', he claims, 'is evidenced by their constant attempts 
to control, delegitimate. and disparage the pleasures of the people' 
(1989a: 9). Since this is the case, he argues, the camivalesque 
pleasures of popular culture must amount to more than a mere 
safety-valve: rather, they represent a site of resistance. 
I want to focus on one of Fiske's examples of a Carnivalesque 
site of resistance, the American TV game show New Price is Right, 
which appeared on British television simply as Price is Right. 
Staged as a competition between contestants' knowledge of the 
price of a range of consumer durables and household goods, Fiske 
argues . that the show is carnivalesque insofar as it offers a 
revaluation of what are traditionally considered to be women's 
skills, skills which tend to be undervalued by patriarchal culture. 
Fiske identifies three areas in which carnivalesque inversions take 
place. First, the audience (largely made up of women) are 
encouraged to be as noisy as possible in their support for the 
various contestants. In allowing these moments of excessive 
behaviour. the show'provides a carnivalesque inversion of the 
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more normal silence with which [women's] skills are met in 
everyday life' (1989a: 21). Secondly, the programme inverts the 
conventional rules of good housekeeping. In awarding contestants 
with cash and commodity prizes in return for displaying their 
knowledge of consumer prices, Fiske argues, 'the woman's skills 
are rewarded not by spending less of the family money.... but by 
money or goods for her' (1989a: 21). Thirdly, the show replaces the 
process of shopping as a form of domestic labour with the process 
of shopping as a form of leisure. As a result, Fiske argues, 
contestants (and viewers alike) are repositioned in relation to the 
commodity system (1989a: 140). Again, Fiske interprets this 
transformation in terms of a carnivalesque inversion of everyday 
hierarchies, whereby'the normal ideological practice of making the 
producers' interests appear identical to those of consumers is 
momentarily disrupted' (1987: 277). At a number of levels, then, 
Fiske deploys the concept of carnival as a category with which to 
interpret the dynamics of New Price is Right, identifying the 
programme as a source of resistant pleasures. 
Fiske is not arguing that New Price is Right is entirely free of 
contradictions. Indeed, his notion of resistant forms of pleasure is 
depend ent precisely upon the idea that popular texts of this sort 
incorporate dominant ideological voices: 'they would not be 
popular', he argues, 'if they did not contain both contradictory 
forces, those of ideological dominance and of resistance to it' 
(1989a: 145). Further, he characterises the carnivalesque in terms 
of a potential within texts, rather than as an unrestrained and 
unlicensed certainty (1987: 277). However, the problem with his 
account would appear to be that, by neglecting the 'hegemonic 
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thrust' (1 989a: 145) of such practices, Fiske tends to overstate 
their resistant potential. We might choose instead to focus on the 
extent to which New Price is Right glamorises consumerism, and on 
the relationsl-dp between this aspect of the programme and the 
advertisements which surround it as it is broadcast. Further, we 
might draw a sharper distinction between the experience of the 
studio audience, those who participate in a public display of 
excess, and the experience of the television audience, those who 
watch the show in private space of the living room. For all that 
Fiske might maintain that the television audience are equally able 
to participate in the carnivalesque inversions which structure the 
show, at an experiential level the opportunities for them to 
participate in carnivalesque excess would seem to be lacking. In 
other words, we need to distinguish, as Mikita Hoy has pointed 
out, 'between the text which promotes the carnivalesque in 
linguistic terms. and the actual carnival of being and doing itself 
(concert, festival, disco, club, shopping, and so on)' (Hoy, 1992: 
780, quoted earlier). For a number of reasons, then, Fiske's 
carnivalesque analysis would seem to offer only a partial account 
of New Price is Right. 
Fiske's deployment of the category of car-nival provides us with 
some useful insights. Rather than making a case for the 
revolutionary potential of popular culture, in addressing the terrain 
of resistant forms of pleasure Fiske hopes to open up a space 
where we are able to explore the progressive potential of popular 
culture as it interacts with the lives of people at the level of the 
everyday (1989b: 161). However, as we have seen in relation to his 
analysis of New Price is Right, in focusing on such potential at the 
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expense of a text's hegemonic potential, Fiske tends to elide the 
contradictory detail of popular culture. And in championing 
pleasure in this way, while neglecting other factors, Fiske fails to 
situate popular culture within an adequately theorised model of 
social and economic forces. If pleasure is one of the key points in 
the postmodern terrain (Lovibond, 1993: 407), then Fiske attempts 
to describe the postmodern carnival. What I have suggested here 
is that his description has its limitations. 
Conclusion 
In the course of this chapter we have seen how Bakhtin's 
assessment of the status of parody in modern culture prefigures 
the terms of the debate concerning the relationship between 
contemporary, postmodern culture and comic practices. It is 
Jameson who, in envisaging a culture robbed of parodic 
possibilities, develops an account of postmodernism which would 
seem to take Bakhtin's thesis about carnivalesque decline to its 
furthest conclusion. However, in overstating the redundancy of 
parody, it was argued that Jameson's account was overly 
pessimistic. At the other extreme, it was argucd that Fiske's 
account of contemporary popular culture as a source of 
carnivalesque pleasures was overly optimistic. In between, Flieger 
and Hutcheon identified in postmodernism a parodic imperative 
which afforded it a discrete critical potential. On the basis of this 
discussion, I do not want to try and locate the precise point at 
which contemporary culture currently finds itself on the declining 
trajectory of the camivalesque. Rather, what I want to draw 
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attention to is the heterogeneity of contemporary cultural 
formations. In the course of this chapter, I have referred to 
examples from architecture, cinema, literature and television. 
With its focus on the relationship between literary formations and 
popular practices, it is unlikely that Bakhtin*s theory of carnival is 
going to be able to encapsulate the entire realm of contemporary 
culture. Nevertheless, what I would argue is that Bakhtin's theory 
has at least allowed us to begin to address the status and potential 
of carnivalesque practices and comic techniques at different points 
across the range of contemporary cultural forms. In this way, I 
would conclude, I have tried to perform the task undertaken in the 
previous four chapters: to explore the relationship between issues 
within comic theory and the historical development of the 
carnivalesque tradition. 
Notes 
1 Bakhtin's words are as follows: 
The speaking subjects of high. proclamatory genres... have all been 
replaced by the writer, simply the writer. who has fallen heir to their 
styles. He either stylizes them (i. e., assumes the guise of the prophet, 
a preacher, and so forth) or he parodies them (to one degree or 
another). (Bakhtin, 1986: 132) 
In this passage, Bakhtin's conception of stylisation can be 
equated with the technique of pastiche. 
2 Here Jameson draws on Raymond Williams' distinction between 
dominant, residual and emergent cultural forms. According to 
Williams, any particular cultural configuration will consist of a 
combination of dominant, residual and emergent forms. 
Dominant cultural practices constitute the 'hegemonic norm' 
within any cultural configuration, but alongside that dominant 
cultural logic will e, -dst both residual forms (the remnants of 
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previous dominant forms), and emergent forms (newly evolving 
types of cultural practice) (Jameson, 1991: 6). 
3 This first transformation effectively deprives the avant-garde of 
its critical function, because the commodification of culture 
deprives it of the necessary critical distance. At the same time, 
Jameson argues, any account of avant-garde art has to rely 
upon a notion of a centred subject, but this form of subjectivity 
is also undermined by postmodern. culture (1991: 15). 
4 On 27 May 1995, for example, contestants 'starred' as Brenda 
Lee, kd lang, Phil Lynott, Johnny Cash and Bono. 
5 Denzin argues that Jameson provides an inadequate analysis 
both of the relationship between late capitalism and previous 
stages of capitalism, and of the relationship between 
postmodernism and previous cultural dominants. Further, he 
argues that Jameson overlooks the realm of lived experience, 
and that, in identifying the depthlessness of postmodern, 
culture, he undermines his own attempt to provide an objective 
analysis of it (Denzin, 1991: 41-8) 
6 Denzin actually offers an extended analysis of Crimes and 
Misdemeanours (1989) (1991: 95-106). 
7 Susan Purdie develops a very similar account of the role joking 
behaviour in the construction of subjectivity. In allowing us to 
advertise our own mastery of discourse, she argues, the joke is 
a powerful site in the projection of a unified identity (Purdie, 
1993: see chapter two). 
8 This is identical to the argument that rejects carnival as nothing 
more than a safety-valve. Since the form of carnival necessarily 
involves a restoration of broken rules, the argument goes, so 
carnival can only ever function as a means for venting 
discontent. We looked at such arguments in more detail in 
Chapter One. 
9 As we have seen in the previous chapter, Brecht's theory of 
comedy, which enlists comic techniques as a form of alienation 
device, also attributes to comedy a historicising function. 
10 Fiske cites music videos and Miami Vice as examples here. 
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Conclusion 
The grotesque tradition peculiar to the marketplace and 
the academic literary tradition have parted ways and can 
no longer be brought back together. (Bakhtin, 1984: 109; quoted earlier) 
In my introduction, I considered some newspaper reactions to 
my research project. It was argued that they were underpinned by 
a key opposition between serious and comic discourse, and that 
this opposition had developed historically in relation to a series of 
cultural transitions. In the course of this thesis, I have explored 
particular moments in the history of comic theory in the light of 
this series of transitions, focusing in particular on the 
configurations of the Enlightenment. Romanticism, modernism, 
and postmodernism. What I would conclude in the light of this 
discussion is that, if the Renaissance marks the point at which 
the 'grotesque tradition' and the 'academic literary tradition' first 
paried company, then far from there being a smooth process of 
development since that point, the history of comic theory is 
marked by a series of shifts and reversals. 
In Chapter Two I identified three relationships on which my 
historical analysis of comic theory would focus: 
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a) The relationship between Bakhtin's texts and other 
texts. 
b) The interrelationship between different comic theories. 
c) The relationship between the present and the past. 
In order to conclude my overall argument, I want to reconsider 
these categories in the light of my preceding discussion. 
a) 7he relationship between Bakhtin's texts and other texts. 
In Chapter One, I argued that Bakhtin's theory of carnival 
incorporated both a historical and a utopian perspective, and in 
the course of this thesis I have sought to exploit both of these 
dimensions. In historical terms, I took Bakhtin's own account of 
the decline of the carnivalesque as a backdrop against which to set 
my own analysis of certain moments in the history of comic 
theory. Such an approach not only enabled me to relate 
developments in the field of comic theory to more general processes 
of cultural development, it also allowed me to elaborate on the 
trajectory described by Bakhtin, particularly in relation to the 
conjunctures on which I focused. For all that the utopian 
dimens ion to Bakhtin's theory of carnival would appear to detract 
from this historical project, I have deployed his utopian conception 
of laughter as a platform from which to explore subsequent comic 
theories. In so doing, I have tried to highlight the extent to which 
particular moments in the history of comic theory can be said to 
belong to a post-Renaissance process of carnivalesque decline. At 
the same time, in revealing the various configurations within 
which the status and function of laughter have been envisaged 
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historically, and in charting the transitory significance of comic 
phenomena, we are reminded of the ultimate futility of attempting 
to derive from Bakhtin's utopian perspective an ahistorical 
account of the essence of laughter. 
While Bakhtin's theory has been used as a starting point for my 
discussion, then, so my subsequent analysis of comic theory has 
been an attempt both to, reflect and, elaborate upon his thesis. 
b) Vie interrelationship between different comic theories. 
In elaborating on Bakhtin's thesis in this way, I have sought to 
identify significant points of contrast between different comic 
theories. While Kant reluctantly mistrusted humour as the enemy 
of beauty and rational thought, for example, Schopenhauer 
celebrated it as the usurper of reason. And while Bergson viewed 
modern social relations as a source of comedy, he simultaneously 
conceived laughter in terms of a disciplinary tool capable of 
reinforcing prevailing social arrangements. Freud was equally 
ambivalent. Citing the joke's rebellious potential in bypassing 
codes of social decorum, he also identified it as a site symbolising 
the extent to which adult life fell short of childhood happiness. 
And while Brecht turned to the joke of contradiction as a powerful 
tool within the context of a theory of performance, more recently 
theorists of postmodernism have produced divergent accounts 
concerning the comic and carnivalesque potential of contemporary 
cultural practices. 
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In Rabelais and His World, Bakhtin identifies some of the 
fluctuations that have taken place in the historical decline of the 
carnivalesque. In attempting a comparative analysis of a range of 
comic theories, I have tried both to locate some of these 
fluctuations, and to relate them to their respective contexts. 
c) The relationship between the present and the past. 
Given the current prominence of Bakhtin's work within the field 
of cultural theory, in conducting a historical analysis of comic 
theory in the light of Bakhtin's account of carnival, my thesis very 
much constructs a dialogue between the present and the past-, 
between current theoretical preoccupations with carnival, and 
earlier theoretical engagements with comic phenomena. Bakhtin 
first developed his account of carnival over fifty years ago, however, 
and so I have not only tried to reveal points of complementarity 
between his theory and recent work in the field of comic theory (see 
Chapter Two), but I have also tried to update his thesis in relation 
to current cultural configurations (see Chapter Seven). Moreover, 
in exploring the methodological issues surrounding a historical 
analysi .s of comic theory, I have argued that Bakhtin's work 
complements recent approaches to intellectual history. In 
particular, as the following quotation makes clear, Bakhtin 
envisages the process of inquiry in the human sciences 
-a domain 
which would include the discipline of intellectual history 
- 
precisely in terms of a dialogic relationship between the present 
and the past: 
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The transcription of thinking In the human sciences is 
always the transcription of a special kind -$f dialogue: the 
complex interrelations between the text (the object of 
study and reflection) and the created, framing context (questioning, refuting, and so forth) in which the 
scholar's cognizing and evaluating takes place. (Bakhtin, 1986: 106-7) 
In the course of this thesis, I have argued that Bakhtin's theory 
of carnival not only provides an appropriate 'framing context 
within which to analyse comic theory texts, but that such a 
process might itself simultaneously generate an interrogation of. 
and an elaboration on, Bakhtin's theory. In the light of my overall 
analysis, it might be concluded that, while it comes as no surprise 
to find the press reacting to my research in the way that they did, 
in mapping the terrain across which comic theory has developed, 
and in charting the relationship between the 'grotesque tradition' 
and 'the academic literary tradition' since the Renaissance, it 
becomes possible to understand the historical antecedents of such 
a reaction. 
331 
Bibliography 
The bibliography includes works cited in the thesis and works 
consulted while researching the thesis. 
Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, H. (1979) Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
trans. J. Cumming, London: Allen Lane. 
Antliff, M. (1993) Inventing Bergson: Cultural Politics and the 
Parisian Avant-garde, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Appignanesi, L. (1984) Cabaret: The First Hundred Years, London: 
Methuen. 
Bakhtin, M. M. (1973) Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, trans. R. 
W. Rostel, Ann Arbor: Ardis. 
Bakhtin, M. M. (1981) 77he Dialogic Imagination, trans. C. Emerson 
and M. Holquist, Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Bakhtin, M. M. (1984) Rabelais and His World, trans. H. Iswolsky, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Bakhtin, M. M. (1986) Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 
trans. V. W. McGhee, Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Bakhtir-, M. M. (1990) Art and Answerability, trans. V. Liapunov, 
Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Bakhtin, M. M. (1992) 'Contemporary Vitalism' in Burwick, F. and 
Douglass, P. (eds) The Crisis in Modemism: Bergson and the 
Vitalist Controversy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Barker, M. (1989) Comics: Ideology, Power and the Critics, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Bartram, G. and A. Waine (eds) (1982) Brecht in Perspective, 
London: Longman. 
Baudelaire, C. (1972) 'Of the Essence of Laughter' in Selected 
Writings on Art and Artists, trans. P. E. Charvet, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Bauman, Z. (1992) Intimations of Postmodemity, London: 
Routledge. 
332 
Beauroy, J., Bertrand, M. and Gargon, E. T. (1976) The Wolf and 
the Lamb: popular culture in Francefirorn the Old Regime to the 
twentieth century, Saratoga: Anma Libri. 
Bell, D. (1973) 7lie Coming of Post-Industrial Society; A Venture in 
Social Forecasting, New York: Basic Books. 
Bennett, T. (1979) Formalism and Marxism, London: Methuen. 
Bennett, T., Mercer, C. and Woollacott, J. (eds) (1986) Popular 
Culture and Social Relations, Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press. 
Bergson, H. (1910) Time and Free Will, trans. F. L. Pogson, London: 
Swan Sonnenschein. 
Bergson, H. (1914) Dreams, trans. E. E. Slosson, London: T. Fisher 
Unwin. 
Bergson, H. (1935) The Two Sources ofMorality and Religion, trans. 
R. A. Andra and C. Brereton, London: Macmillan. 
Bergson, H. (1920) Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays, London: 
Macmillan. 
Bergson, H. (1960) Creative Evolution, trans. A, Mitchell, London: 
Macmillan. 
Bergson, H. (1980) 'Laughter' in W. Sypher (ed. ) Comedy, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Bernard-Donals, M. F. (1994) Mikhail Bakhtin: between 
phenomenology and Marxism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Berrong, R. (1985) 'Finding Anti-feminism in Rabelais: or, a 
Response to Wayne Booth'. Critical Inquiry, 11: 687-696. 
Berrong, R. (1986) Rabelais and Bakhtin: Popular Culture in 
'Gargantua and Pantagruel', Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press. 
Best, S. and Kellner, D. (199 1) Postmodem 77ieory: Critkal 
Interrogations, London: Macmillan. 
Bloch, E. et al. (1980) Aesthetics and Politics, London: New Left 
Books. 
Bocock, R. (1976) 1i)-eud and Modem Society: an outline and 
analysis of Freud's sociology, Middlesex: Nelson. 
333 
Booth, W. C. (1986) 'Freedom of Interpretation: Bakhtin and the 
Challenge of Feminist Criticism' in G. S. Morson (ed. ) Bakhtin: 
Essays and Dialogues on His Work, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Bov6, C. M. (1983) The Text'as Dialogue in Bakhtin and Kristeva', 
University of Ottawa Quarterly, 53: 117-24. 
Bowie, A. (1990) Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Brecht, B. (1974) Brecht on Theatre: Tlie Development of an 
Aesthetic, trans. J. Willett, London: Methuen. 
Brecht, B. (1979) The Threepenny Opera, trans. R. Mannheim and 
J. Willett, London: Methuen. 
Brecht, B. (1986) Lifie of Galileo, trans. J. Willett, London: Methuen. 
Bristol, M. (1985) Carnival and Theater. Plebeian Culture and the 
Structure ofAuthority in Renaissance England, New York: 
Methuen. 
Bruss, N. (1976) 'V. N. Voloshinov and the Structure of language in 
Freudianism'in V. N. Voloshinov, Freudianism: A Marxist 
Critique, trans. 1. R. Titunik, New York: Academic Press. 
Burke, P. (1978) Popular Culture in Early Modem Europe, London: 
Templesmith. 
Burwick, F. and Douglass, P. (eds) (1992) The Crisis in Modernism: 
Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Byrd, C. L. (1987) 'Freud's Influence on Bakhtin: Traces of 
Psychoanalytic Theory in Rabelais and His World', Germano- 
Slavica, 5-6: 223-30. 
Charney, M. (1978) Comedy High and Low: An Introduction to the 
Experience of Comedy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chiari, J. (1975) Twentieth Century French 7Twught: From Bergson 
to Lhvi-Strauss, London: Paul Elek. 
Christensen, J. B. (1963)'Utani: Joking, Sexual License and Social 
obligations among the Luguru', American Anthropologist, 65: 
1314-27. 
Clark, C. (1983) The Vulgar Rabelais, Glasgow: Pressgang. 
Clark, M. (1987a)'Humour and Incongruity' in Morreall, J. (ed. ) 
The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, Albany: State University 
of New York Press. 
334 
Clark, M. (1 987b) 'Humour, Laughter and the Structure of 
Thought', British Journal ofAesthetics, 27: 238-45. 
Clark, K. and Holquist, M. (1984) Mikhail Bakhtin, Cambridge: 
Hai'vard University Press. 
Cohen, T. (1983) 'Jokes' in E. Schaper (ed. ) Pleasure, Preference 
and Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cohen, T. D. (1992) ... WOW: Voloshinov's Double-Talk', SubStance, 
21: 91-101. 
Collins, J. (1989) Uncommon Cultures: Popular Culture and Post- 
Modernism, New York: Routledge. 
Con Davis, R. C. and Schleifer, " R. (1991) Criticism and Culture: The 
Role of Critique in Modern Literary Theory, Harlow: Longman. 
Cook, J. (ed. ) (1982) Television Sitcom (BFI Dossier 17), London: 
BFI. 
Cornford, F. M. (1984) The Ritual Origins of Comedy'in D. J. 
Palmer (ed. ) Comedy: Developments in Criticism, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Education. 
Coutts-Smith, K. (1970) Dada, London: Studio Vista. 
Culler, J. (ed. ) (1988) On Puns: The Foundation of Letters, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Cunliffe, R. (1993) 'Charmed Snakes and Little Oedipuses: The 
Architectonics of carnival and Drama in Bakhtin, Artaud, and 
Brecht' in D. Shepherd (ed. ) Bakhtin: Carnival and Other 
Subjects: selected papers from the Fifth International Bakhtin 
Conference, Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Danow, D. (199 1) The Thought of Mikhail Bakhtin: From Word to 
Culture, London: Macmillan. 
Davis, N. (1975) Society and Culture in Early Modem Fý-ance, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Denzin, N. (199 1) Images of Postmodern Society: Social Theory and 
Contemporary Cinema, London: Sage. 
Docherty, T. (1993) 'Postmodemism: An Introduction' in T. 
Docherty (ed. ) Postmodernism: A Reader, Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Docker, J. (1994) Postmodernism and Popular Culture: A Cultural 
History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Durant, J. and Miller, J. (eds) (1988) Laughing Matters: A Serious 
Look at Humour, Harlow: Longman Scientific & Technical. 
335 
During, S. (1993) 'Postmodernism or Post-colonialism Today' in T. 
Docherty (ed. ) Postmodernism: A Reader, Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Eagleton, T. (198 1) Walter Benjamin, or, Towards a Revolutionary 
Criticism, London: NLB. 
Eagleton, T. (1983) Literary Theory: An Introduction, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Eagleton, T. (1988) 'Capitalism, modernism and postmodernism' in 
D. Lodge (ed. ) Modem Criticism and Theory: A Reader, London: 
Longman. 
Eagleton, T. (1989)'Bakhtin, Schopenhauer, Kundera' in K. 
Hirschkop and D. Shepherd (eds) Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Eagleton, T. (1990) 77ie Ideology of the Aesthetic, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Eagleton, T. (199 1) Ideology: An Introduction, London: Verso. 
Easthope, A. (1991) Literary Into Cultural Studies, London: 
Routledge. 
Eaton, M. (198 1) 'Laughter in the Dark', Screen, 22: 21-8. 
Eco, U. (1 984a) 'The Frames of Comic "Freedom"' in T. A. Sebeok 
(ed. ) Camivall, Berlin: Mouton. 
Eco, U. (1 984b) The Name of the Rose, London: Picador. 
Elias, N. (1978) The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners, 
trans. E. Jephcott, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Emerson, C. (1986) 'The Outer Word and inner Speech: Bakhtin, 
Vygotsky. and the Internalization of Language'in G. S. Morson 
(ed. ) Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on His Work, Chicago: 
UniVersity of Chicago Press. 
Engels, F. (1975) Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Peking: Foreign 
Language Press. 
Erasmus, D. (197 1) Praise of Folly, trans. B. Radice, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Ewen, F. (1970) Bertolt Brecht: his Ifte, his art and his times, 
London: Calder and Boyars. 
Featherstone, M. (1988) 'In Pursuit of the Postmodern: An 
Introduction', Theory, Culture and Society, 5: 195-216. 
336 
Featherstone, M. (1989) 'Postmodernism, Cultural Change. and 
Social Practice'in D. Kellner (ed. ) Postmodernism/ Jameson/ 
Critique, Washington: Maisonneuve Press. 
Fisher, D. J. (1982) 'Reading Freud's Civilization and Its 
Discontents'in D. LaCapra and S. L. Kaplan (eds) Modem 
European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New 
Perspectives, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Fiske, J. (1987) Television Culture, London: Routledge. 
Fiske, J. (1 989a) Reading the Popular, London: Unwin Hyman. 
Fiske, J. (1989b) Understanding the Popular, London: Unwin 
Hyman. 
Flaherty, P. (1986) 'Reading Carnival: Towards a Serniotics of 
History', Clio, 15: 411-28. 
Flieger, J. A. (199 1) T'he Purloined Punch Line: 17Yeud's Comic Theory 
and the Postmodem Text, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Foucault, M. (1980) Power-Knowledge: selected interviews and 
other writings, trans. C. Gordon, Brighton: Harvester. 
Freud, S. (1953) The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. J. Strachey, in 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psycholegical Works of 
Sigmund 17Yeud, vol. 4, London: Hogarth Press. 
Freud, S. (1955) Totem and Taboo, trans. J. Strachey, in Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Fý-eud, 
vol. 13, London: Hogarth Press. 
Freud, S. (1959)'Psycho-analysis', trans. J. Strachey, in Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Fý-eud. 
vol. 20, London: Hogarth Press. 
Freud, S. (196 1) 'Humour'. trans. J. Strachey, in Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 2 1, 
London: Hogarth Press. 
Freud, S. (199 1) Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, trans. 
J. Strachey, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Fry, W. F. and Savin. W. M. (1988) 'Mir-thful laughter and blood 
pressure' in Humor. The International Journal of Humor 
Research, 1: 49-62. 
Frye, N. (1984) 'The Argument of Comedy' in D-J. Palmer (ed. ) 
Comedy: Developments in Criticism, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Education. 
337 
Gadamer, H-G. (1989) Truth and Method (2nd rev. edn), trans. J. 
Weinsceimer and D. G. Marshall, London: Sheed and Ward. 
Galtung, J. and Ruge, M. (1973) 'Structuring and selecting news' in 
S. Cohen and J. Young (eds) The Manufacture of News, London: 
Constable. 
Gardiner, M. (1992) The Dialcgics of Critique: M. M. Bakhtin and the 
Theory of Ideology, London: Routledge. 
Gardiner, M. (1993)'Bakhtin's Carnival: Utopia as Critique' in D. 
Shepherd (ed. ) Bakhtin: Carnival and Other Subjects: selected 
papersfrom the FYfth International Bakhtin Conference, 
Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences ofModemity, Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Giles, S. (1993) 'Afterword: Avant-garde, Modernism, Modernity: A 
Theoretical Overview'in Giles, S. (ed. ) 77worizing Modernism: 
Essays in Critical Theory, London: Routledge. 
Gilman, S. (1985) Difference and Pathology, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Ginsburg, R. (1993) 'The Pregnant Text. Bakhtin's Ur-Chronotope: 
The Womb'in D. Shepherd (ed. ) Bakhtin: Carnival and Other 
Subjects: selected papersfrom the FYfth International Bakhtin 
Conference, Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Goodwin, B. and Taylor, K. (1982) The Politics of Utopia: A Study in 
Theory and Practice, London: Hutchinson. 
Gunter, P. A. (1968) 'Nietzschean Laughter'. Sewanee Review, 76: 
493-506. 
Gurewitch, M. (1975) Comedy: The Irrational Vision, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Haberland, P. (197 1) The Development of Comic Theory During the 
Eighteenth Century, Groppingen: Verlag Alfred Kummerle. 
Habermas, J. (1974) Theory and Practice, trans. J. Viertel, London: 
Heinemann. 
Habermas, J- (1993) 'Modernity 
- 
An Incomplete Project' in T. 
Docherty, Postmodernism: A Reader, Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Hajdukowski-Ahmed, M. (1993) in D. Shepherd (ed. ) Bakhtin: 
Carnival and Other Subjects: selected papers from the Fifth 
International Bakhtin Conference, Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Halsted, J. B. (1969) Romanticism, New York: Harper and Row. 
338 
Hammond, P. B. (1964) 'Mossi Joking'. Ethnology, 3: 259-67. 
Harvey, D. (1989) The Condition of Postmodemity: An Enquiry into 
the Origins of Cultural Change, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Heilman, R. B. (1978) The Ways of the World: Comedy and Society, 
Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
Henkle, R. B. (1980) Comedy and Culture: England 1820-1900, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hirschkop, K. (1986) 'Bakhtin, Discourse and Democracy, New 
Left Review 160: 92-113. 
Hirschkop, K. (1989) 'Introduction: Bakhtin and cultural theory' in 
K. Hirschkop and D. Shepherd (eds) Bakhtin and Cultural 
Theory, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Hirschkop, K. and Shepherd, D. (eds) (1989) Bakhtin and Cultural 
Theory, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Hodge, B. and Mansfield, A. (1985) '"Nothing Left to Laugh at... ": 
Humor as a Tactic of Resistance'in P. Chilton (ed. ) Language 
and the Nuclear Ai ,Y is Debate: Nukespeak Today, London: 
Frances Pinter. 
Holland, N. H. (1982) Laughing: A Psychology of Humor, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Holquist, M. (1990a) Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World, London: 
Routledge. 
Holquist, M. (1 990b) 'Introduction: The Architectonics of 
Answerability' in M. M. Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, Austin: 
Texas University Press. 
Horton, A. S. (1991) Comedy/ Cinema/TheoTy, Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
Hoy, M (1992) 'Bakhtin and Popular Culture', New Literary 
History, 23: 765-82. 
Hutcheon, L. (1983) 'The Carnivalesque and Contemporary 
Narrative: Popular Culture and the Erotic'. University of Ottawa 
Quarterly, 53: 83-94. 
Hutcheon, L. (1988) A Poetics of Postmodemism: History, Theory, 
Fiction, London: Routledge. 
Hutcheon, L. (1994) Irony's Edge: Tlie theory and politics of irony, 
London: Routledge. 
Jameson, F. (198 1) The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a 
Socially Symbolic Act, London: Methuen. 
339 
Jameson, F. (199 1) Postmodernism or The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism, London: Verso. 
Janko, R. (1984) Aristotle on Comedy: towards a reconstruction of 
'Poetics 11% London: Duckworth. 
Jarry, A. (1965) Selected Works, London: Eyre Methuen. 
Jencks, C. (Chris) (1993) Culture, London: Routledge. 
Jencks, C. (Charles) (1993) 'The Emergent Rules' in T. Docherty, 
Postmodemism: A Reader, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Jonson, B. (1984) 'Wise and Foolish Laughter' in D. J. Palmer (ed. ) 
Comedy: Developments in Criticism, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Education. 
Kant, 1. (1933) Critique of Pure Reason (2nd edn), trans. N. K. 
Smith, London: Macmillan. 
Kant. 1. (195 1) Critique ofJudgement, trans. J. H. Bernard, New 
York: Hafner Press. 
- 
Kant, 1. (1984) 'An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment? ' in P. Waugh (ed. ) Postmodemism: A Reader, 
London: Edward Arnold. 
Kellner, D. (ed. ) (1989) Postmodemism/Jameson/Critique, 
Washington: Maisonneuve Press. 
Kennedy, J. G. (1970) 'Bonds of Laughter among the Tarahumara 
Indians: Toward the Rethinking of Joking Relationship Theory' 
in W. Goldschmidt and H. Hoijer (eds) 77ie Social Anthropology 
ofLatin America, Los Angeles: Latin American Studies Center, 
University of California. 
Kern, E. (1980) The Absolute Comic, New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Kolakowski, L. (1985) Bergson, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kristeva, J. (1986) The Kristeva Reader, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lacan, J. (1977) kcrits: a Selection, trans. A. Sheridan, London: 
Tavistock. 
LaCapra, D. (1983) Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, 
Language, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
LaCapra, D. (1985) History and Criticism, Ithaca: Comell University 
Press. 
340 
LaCapra, D. and Kaplan, S. L. (eds) (1982) Modem European 
Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Lacey, A. R. (1989) Bergson, London: Routledge. 
Langer, S. (1984) "Ibe Comic Rhythm'in D. J. Palmer (ed. ) 
Comedy: Developments in Criticism, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Education. 
Larsen, E. (1980) Wit as a Weapon 
- 
The Political Joke in History, 
London: Frederick Muller Ltd. 
Lehan. R. (1992) 'Bergson and the discourse of the modems' in 
Burwick, F. and Douglass, P. (eds) 7he Crisis in Modernism: 
Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Le Roy Ladurie, E. (1979) Carnival: A People's Uprising at Romans 
1579-1580, trans. Mary Feeney, London: Scolar Press. 
Levin, H. (1987) Playboys and Kilyoys: An Essay on the Theory and 
Practice of Comedy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lippitt, J. (1992) 'Nietzsche, Zarathustra and the Status of 
Laughter', British Journal ofAesthetics, 32: 39-49. 
Lodge, D. (1990) After Bakhtin: Essays onfiction and criticism, 
London: Routledge. 
Lovell, T. (1983) Pictures of Reality: Aesthetics, Politics and 
Pleasure, London: BFI. 
Lovibond, S. (1993)'Feminism and Postmodemism'in T. Docherty (ed. ) Postmodemism: A Reader, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Lyotard, J-F. (1984) The Postmodem Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
MacCabe, C. (1974) 'Realism and the Cinema: Notes on some 
Brechtian theses', Screen, 15: 7-27. 
MacCabe, C. (1976) "Ibeory and Film: Principles of Realism and 
Pleasure', Screen, 17: 7-27. 
McFadden, G. (1982) Discovering the Comic, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
McGowan, M. (1982)'Comedy and the Volkssffick'in G. Bartram 
and A. Waine (eds) Brecht in Perspective, London: Longman. 
341 
McKenna, A. J. (1983) 'After Bakhtin: On the Future of Laughter 
and Its History in France', University of Ottawa Quarterly, 53: 
61-82. 
Malcuzynski, M-P. (1983) 'Mikhail Bakhtin and Contemporary 
Narrative Theory, University of Ottawa Quarterly, 53: 51-65. 
Marc, D. (1989) Comic Visions: Television Comedy and American 
Culture, Boston: Unwin Hyman. 
Marx, K. (197 1) Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' 
in Karl Marx. Early Texts, trans. D. McLellan, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Mast, G. (1973) The Comic Mind: Comedy and the Movies, London: 
New English Library. 
Medvedev, P. M. (1985) The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: 
A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics, trans. A. J. Wehrle, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Mehlman, J. (1975) 'How to Read Freud on Jokes: The Critic as 
Schadcherf 
. 
New Literary History, 6: 439-6 1. 
Miller, F. C. (1967) 'Humor in a Chippewa Tribal Council', 
Ethnology 6: 263-71. 
Miller, J. (1988) 'Jokes and joking: a serious laughing matters' in J. 
Durant and J. Miller (eds) Laughing Matters: A Serious Look at 
Humour, Harlow: Longman Scientific & Technical. 
Morreall, J. (ed. ) (1987) 77ie Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Morson G. S. (ed. ) (1986) Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on His 
Work, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Morson, G. S. (199 1) 'Bakhtin, Genres, and Temporality', New 
Literary History, 22: 1071-92. 
Mulkay. - M. (1988) On Humour. Its Nature and Its Place in Modem 
Society, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Murray, 1. (1990) 'Smile and say Jeeves'. Marketing Week, February 
16,1990. 
Neale, S. (1981) 'Psychoanalysis and Comedy', Screen, 22: 29-43. 
Neale, S. and Krutnik, F (1990) Popular FYlrn and Television 
Comedy, London: Routledge. 
Nelson, T. G. A. (1990) Comedy: The Theory of Comedy in 
Literature, Drama, and Cinema, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
342 
Neve, M. (1988) 'Freud's theory of humour, wit and jokes' in J. 
Durant and J. Miller (eds), Laughing Matters: A Serious Look at 
Humour, Harlow: Longman Scientific and Technical. 
The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (Macropaedia) (1974) (15th edn) 
Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Nietzsche, F. (1977) Vie Nietzsche Reader, trans. R. J. Howngdale, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Norris, C. (1985) 7Tie Contest ofFaculties: philosophy and theory 
after deconstruction, London: Methuen. 
Norris, C. (1993) 77w Týuth About Postmodernism, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Palmer, D. J. (ed. ) (1984) Comedy: Developments in Criticism, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Education. 
Palmer, J. (1987) 7he Logic of the Absurd: On Rlm and Television 
Comedy, London: BF1. 
Palmer, J. (1989) 'Kind Hearts and Coronets', Screen, 30: 144-57. 
Palmer, J. (1994) Taking Humour Seriously, London: Routledge. 
Paul, W. (199 1) 'Charles Chaplin and the Annals of Anality' in A. S. 
Horton (ed. ), Comedy/Cinema/Theory, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Pechey, G. (1989) 'On the borders of Bakhtin: dialogisation, 
decolonisation'in K. Hirschkop and D. Shepherd (eds) Bakhtin 
and Cultural Theory. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Pfister, M. (1987) 'A Bakhtinian View of the Comic in Shakespeare', 
Deutsche Shakespeare-Geselleschaft West Jah-rbuch, 27-43. 
Pilkington, A. E. (1976) Bergson and His Influence: A 
Reassessment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Polan, D. (1991) 'The Light Side of Genius: Hitchcock's Mr. and 
Mrs. Smith in the Screwball Tradition' in A. S. Horton (ed. ) 
Comedy/Cinema/Theory, Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Purdie, S. (1993) Comedy: The Mastery of Discourse, Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Rabelais, F. (1955), Gargantua and Pantagruel, trans. J. M. Cohen, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Raskin, V. (1985) Semantic Mechanisms ofHumor, Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel Publishing. 
343 
We, J. (1978) Philosophy and Its Past, Hassocks: Harvester. 
Rorty, R., Schneewind, J. B. and Skinner, Q. (eds) (1984) 
Philosophy in History: essays on the historiography of 
philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rose, G. (1984) Dialectic ofNihilism: Post-Structuraltsm and Law, 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Russo, M. (1988) 'Female grotesques: carnival and theory' in T. de 
Lauretis (ed. ) Feminist StudieslCritical Studies, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
Rzhevsky, N. (1994) 'Kozhinov on Bakhtin', New Literary History, 
25: 429-44. 
Salmon, J. H. M. (1975) Society in Crisis: 1; 1-ance in the Sixteenth 
Century, London: Methuen. 
Schaeffer, N. (198 1) The Art ofLaughter, New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Schopenhauer, A. (1 907a) The World As Will And Idea, vol. I (6th 
edn), trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner and Co. 
Schopenhauer, A. (1 907b) 71w World As Will And Idea, vol. 11 (6th 
edn), trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench. Trubner and Co. 
Schopenhauer, A. (1974) Parerga and Paral(pomena, vol. II, trans. 
E. F. J. Payne, Oxford: Clarendon. 
Schwartz, S. (1992) 'Bergson and the politics of vitalism' in 
Burwick, F. and Douglass, P. (eds) 77ie Crisis in Modemism: 
Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Screech, M. (1979) Rabelais, London: Duckworth. 
Seidel, M. (1979) Satiric Inheritance: Rabelais to Steme, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Sharman. A. (1969)'Joking in Padhola% Man, 4: 103-17. 
Shepherd D. (1993) 'Introduction: (Mis)Representing Bakhtin' in 
Shepherd, D. (ed. ) Bakhtin: Camival and Other Subjects: 
selected papersfrom the FYfth International Bakhtin Conference, 
Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Sheppard, R. G 979) 'What is Dada? ', Orbis Litterarum, 34: 175- 
207. 
344 
Sheppard, R. (ed. ) (1981) New StudL-s in Dada: Essays and 
Documents, Driffield: Hutton Press. 
Sheppard, R. (1983) 'nricksters, Carnival and the Magic Figures of 
Dada Poetry, FAILS, 19: 116-25. 
Sheppard, R. (1990)'Upstairs-Downstairs 
- 
Some Reflections on 
German Literature in the Light of Bakhtin's Theory of Carnival' 
in R. Sheppard (ed. ) New Ways in 'Germanistik', Oxford: Berg. 
Sheppard, R. (1993) 'The Problematics of European Modernism' in 
Giles, S. (ed. ) 7lieorizing Modernism: Essays in Critical Theory, 
London: Routledge. 
Shevtsova, M. (1989) 'The Sociology of the Theatre, Part Three: 
Performance', New Theatre Quarterly, 5: 282-300. 
Shevtsova, M. (1992) 'Dialogism in the Novel and Bakhtin's Theory 
of Culture', New Literary History, 23: 747-63. 
Sim, S. (1992)'Marxism and Aesthetics' in 0. Hanfling (ed. ) 
Philosophical Aesthetics: An Introduction, Oxford: 
Blackwell/Open University. 
Simon, R. K. (1985) The Labyrinth of the Comic: Theory and Practice 
from Fielding to Freud, Tallahassee: University Presses of 
Florida. 
Slosson, E. E. (1914) 'Introduction' in H. Bergson, Dreams, 
London: T. Fisher Unwin. 
Smart, B. (1993) Postmodernity, London: Routledge. 
Smythe, K. (199 1) 'Sexual scenarios in Freud's j oke-analysis', 
SubStance, 20: 16-30. 
Speirs, R. (1982) Brecht's Early Plays, London: Macmillan. 
Stallybrass, P. and White, A, (1986) The Politics and Poetics of 
Transgression, London: Methuen. 
Stam, R. (1989) Subversive Pleasures: Bakhtin, Cultural Criticism 
and Film, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Stites, R. (1992) Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and 
Society since 1900, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Storey, J. (1993) An Introductory Guide to Cultural Theory and 
Popular Culture, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Suleiman, S. (1990) Subversive Intent: gender, politics and the 
avant-garde, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
345 
Sypher, W. (1980) 'Introduction' in W. Sypher (ed. ) Comedy, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Taylor, R. (1985) 'Bakhtin's Truths of Laughter', Clio, 14: 237-57. 
Thompson, E. P. (1974) 'Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture', 
Journal of Social History, 7: 382-405. 
Thompson, J. 0. (1993) 'Up Aporia Creek' in M. Alvarado, E. 
Buscombe and R. Collins (eds) 77w Screen Education Reader, 
London: Macmillan. 
Thomson, C. (1983) The Semitotics of M. M. Bakhtin', University of 
Ottawa Quarterly, 53: 11-2 1. 
Todorov, T. (1984) Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle, trans. 
W. Godzich, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Turner, G. (1990) British Cultural Studies: An Introduction, London: 
Routledge. 
Van Cleve, J. W. (1980) Harlequin Besieged: The Reception of 
Comedy in Germany During the Early Enlightenment, Bern: Peter 
Lang. 
Voloshinov, V. N. (1973) Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, 
trans. L. Matejka and 1. R. Titunik, New York: Seminar Press. 
Voloshinov, V. N. (1976) Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, trans. I. 
R. Titunik, New York: Academic Press. 
Vout, M. and Wilde, L. (1987) 'Socialism and myth: the case of 
Sorel and Bergson', Radical Philosophy 46: 2-7. 
Weber, B. N. and Heinen, H. (eds) (1980) Bertolt Brecht: Political 
Theory and Literary Practice, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Weber, S. (1977) 'The Divaricator: Remarks on Freud's Wiff, 
Glyph, 1: 1-27. 
Weber, S. (1982) The Legend of Freud, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
White, A. (1993) Carnival, Hysteria, and Writing: Cokcted Essays 
and Autobiography, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
White, H. (1978) Tropics of discourse: essays in cultural criticism, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
White, H. (1982) 'Method and Ideology in Intellectual History: The 
case of Henry Adams' in D. LaCapra and S. L. Kaplan (eds) 
Modem European Intellectual History: ReappraisaLs and New 
Perspectives, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
346 
Wiles, T. (1980) The Theater Event: Modem Theories of Performance, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Willett, J. (1967) The Theatre of Bertolt Brecht: a studyfrom eight 
aspects (3rd edn), London: Methuen. 
Wills, C. (1989) 'Upsetting the public: carnival, hysteria and 
women's texts'in K. Hirschkop and D. Shepherd (eds) Bakhtin 
and Cultural Theory, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Winkler, J. J. and Zeitlin, F. 1. (eds) (1990) Nothing to Do with 
Dionysos? 
- 
Athenian Drama in Its Social Context, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Wright, E. (1989) Postmodem Brecht: A Re-Presentation, London: 
Routledge. 
Yeo E. and Yeo, S. (1981) Ways of Seeing: Control and Leisure 
versus Class and Struggle'in E. Yeo and S. Yeo (eds) Popular 
Culture and Class Conflict: 1590-1914, Brighton: Harvester 
Press. 
Ziv, A. (1987) National Styles in Humor, Westport: Greenwood 
Press. 
347 
Filmography 
Duck Soup, Paramount, USA, 1933. 
Easy Street, Mutual, USA, 1917. 
Hannah and Her Sisters, Orion, USA, 1986. 
Liberty, Hal Roach, USA, 1929. 
Signals: 'Only Joking? ', Channel 4 Television, UK, 1990. 
348 
